UK Constitution: Oversight and Responsibility (Report from the Constitution Committee)

Lord Beith Excerpts

Friday 4th July 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Beith]

That this House takes note of the Report from the Constitution Committee Executive oversight and responsibility for the UK constitution (6th Report, HL Paper 72).

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak to the Constitution Committee’s report, published in January, on Executive Oversight and Responsibility for the UK Constitution. I speak in place of the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, who was chair of the committee during this inquiry but is unfortunately unable to be here today. I pay tribute to her excellent chairmanship, which was fair, firm, fruitful and always friendly.

The UK constitution requires active stewardship. Its flexibility is a strength that allows for pragmatism and evolution, but it also leaves our constitution vulnerable to erosion and challenge. There is a key distinction between lawfulness and constitutionality. As we said in the report, paraphrasing the noble Lord, Lord Sedwill,

“if the Attorney General had advised that a course of action was unlawful and the Prime Minister chose to pursue it nonetheless, then he, as Cabinet Secretary, would advise that the civil service would not be able to support it because doing so would be in contravention of the Civil Service Code. By contrast, if the Cabinet Secretary advised that an action was unconstitutional, for example, in violation of a clear convention, then, so long as it was lawful, the civil service would be able to support its delivery if the Prime Minister chose to go ahead”.

Obviously, there are some constitutional issues which get resolved in the courts, Prorogation being perhaps the most dramatic recent example. However, the existence of an area of constitutional issues which cannot be tested in the courts but which could lead to the Government acting unconstitutionally underlines the importance of the various methods for safeguarding the constitution. There is a complex network of guardians on whom we rely to safeguard the constitution. Parliament itself is a significant guardian and the Constitution Committee has a vital role to play, scrutinising all legislation for its constitutional implications and drawing them where necessary to the attention of the House, as well as holding the Government to account on constitutional matters.

The focus of this inquiry was on the role of the Executive as constitutional guardian. We also took an early look at the Council of the Nations and Regions, to which I will refer later. I will begin with the very centre of government. The Prime Minister is ultimately responsible for safeguarding the constitution within government. This is a significant responsibility which ought to be taken seriously but, in reality, the Prime Minister is much more likely to be held to account for failure to deliver on policy objectives than on constitutional responsibilities, and may find that the latter get in the way of the former.

Increasingly, Prime Ministers are tested on whether they deliver on their policy promises. Two recent Prime Ministers did not really consider themselves inhibited by constitutional principles and norms. That was bad news, but most Prime Ministers sincerely believe in the constitution and their role in defending it, in theory if not always in practice. We have to recognise how much pressure they are under to deliver on their promises rather than worrying about the constitution. This happens, for example, when Governments seek to achieve their policy objectives via secondary legislation, thereby greatly enhancing the power of the Executive relative to Parliament. An interesting comparison is President Trump’s use of the executive order to bypass Congress and state legislatures.

The Prime Minister is supported by a number of close advisers. Significant among them is the Cabinet Secretary, who plays a vital role in advising on constitutional matters. Given its significance, it was disappointing to see that this responsibility was not explicitly included in the job description during the recent recruitment for that post and that our recommendation to include it going forward was not accepted by the Government. Yet the Cabinet Secretary can also be affected by the priority given to delivery and be expected to ensure that the Civil Service is fully committed to securing the Government’s policy objectives. Warnings of constitutional impropriety can be made to look like obstruction and delay.

Supporting the Cabinet Secretary, as well as Ministers, officials and special advisers, is the Propriety and Constitution Group in the Cabinet Office. It provides advice on constitutional issues, devolution, standards and the relationship with the monarch. However, it has been shuffled around between departments, in particular the Cabinet Office and the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, several times in recent years. We recommend in our report that it be made a permanent fixture within the Cabinet Office, enabling it to become a true centre of excellence.

Institutional memory is another concern. Constitutional precedent must be consistently recorded. Without this, Ministers and officials are left navigating complex issues as they arise without the benefit of deep institutional knowledge. This weakens the quality of advice and risks undermining constitutional norms.

I turn to the role of other Ministers. We recognise that constitutional responsibility is not confined to the Prime Minister. The Lord Chancellor has a statutory duty to defend the rule of law and judicial independence. The law officers, particularly the Attorney-General, are the definitive source of legal advice for the Prime Minister. We were pleased to see the new Attorney-General swear a new version of the oath that included a commitment to the rule of law. This is a welcome affirmation of this element of his role. In the current Government, there is a Minister for the Constitution, but his constitutional responsibilities appear to be limited and sit alongside very different issues such as EU engagement and the Infected Blood Inquiry.

We recommended the appointment of a senior Minister with broader responsibility for advising the Prime Minister on constitutional matters—a role which used to be filled by the Lord Chancellor when they were a Member of this House. This individual should be senior and authoritative and someone whose advice cannot be lightly disregarded—preferably somebody at a senior stage in their career rather than looking for their next job. The Government did not accept this recommendation. We urge them to give further thought to the issue.

It is important that all Ministers, particularly the Prime Minister, take their constitutional responsibilities seriously. Otherwise, given that in most matters the only sanctions are political, there is a risk that constitutional norms are gradually eroded. This risk means that it is particularly important for there to be effective constitutional safeguards. We recommend that the Government should review and strengthen the status of advisory bodies such as the House of Lords Appointments Commission and consider whether it would be desirable to place them on a statutory footing.

We welcome the creation of the Union and Constitution Cabinet committee as a positive step towards raising the profile of constitutional issues within government. We said in our report that we would welcome an annual meeting between the deputy chair of this new Cabinet committee, the Constitution Committee and the Cabinet Secretary to discuss outcomes. The Government told us that they would be unable to disclose specific details of the Cabinet committee’s work because of the convention of collective Cabinet responsibility. Nevertheless, we would be happy to find ways to make such a discussion possible while respecting the convention of confidentiality. I hope the Minister will take us up on this request.

I turn to the Council of the Nations and Regions. We chose to take an early look at the council both as a follow-up to our recent report on the governance of the union and because it now forms part of the institutional safeguards around intergovernmental relations within the UK. Transparency and clarity of ownership around the council are important. We need clarity about its management, which was notably absent when the noble Baroness, Lady Gray, was briefly appointed as the Prime Minister’s envoy to the nations and regions but did not take up the job. Has someone since been appointed or was the role never needed?

We were disappointed that information about the second meeting of the council is not yet available, and we urge the Government to publish the communiqué without further delay. It is important that the council effectively complements the existing intergovernmental structures and does not leave anyone unrepresented, particularly those in much of England who do not have a metro mayor. The Government told us that these areas will be represented on the council if they choose to join with others to create a metro mayor. It is very odd to make a central part of the intergovernmental machinery contingent on a political decision to opt for a mayoral system of local government. We are concerned about their representation in the meantime and would welcome clarity from the Government on how the council will ensure that the interests of much of England are heard.

To be successful, the council requires serious and sustained engagement by the UK Government and the other Governments and regions in the United Kingdom. We look forward to reviewing the utility and success of the council in due course; I think the jury is still out on whether the council is going to become a really significant element in our constitutional structure.

The fact that we have a constitution which is not to be found in a single document and large parts of which are not enforceable in the courts provides, particularly for overseas observers, a mixture of puzzlement and admiration—but very definitely both. Essentially, it works because we have a culture of constitutional government, and general acceptance that we should observe constitutional conventions and that long-established practices have merit; they can be changed, but they need to be changed on the basis of consensus. We have tried to look at the machinery by which, within the Executive, these things are examined and, where necessary, enforced. We urge wider interest in the issues we have raised. On that basis, I beg to move.

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[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the House for a truly excellent debate. I know it is conventional to say what a good debate we have had, but I genuinely think that the committee’s work has been greatly helped by the way its report has been considered, including the detailed way in which the Minister has responded, even though I am disappointed by some of the things that she has not committed herself to—perhaps I was not as good as my noble friend at getting her into trouble.

One of things that became quite clear in the debate is that there is an appreciation that, although most people want the Prime Minister to retain the responsibility for adherence to constitutionality, the pressures on the Prime Minister are considerable, and some other ways have to be found of making sure that this is not an unrealistic way of dealing with the matter. There are some differences of view as to whether we create a senior Minister with this role or simply make sure that all Ministers at every level are more firmly committed to dealing with constitutional matters and providing appropriate advice to the Prime Minister.

There is a very good degree of acceptance in the House of almost all the other recommendations made by the committee. We will reflect on what the debate has brought forward and what the Minister has said, which will be relevant to the committee’s current and future inquiries. I also assure the House that the committee will continue, week by week, its work of examining all the legislation that comes before the House to see whether it has constitutional implications and, when it does, to make them clear to the House.

I am sure the House will agree that it has taken note of the committee’s report.

Motion agreed.

European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill

Lord Beith Excerpts

Report stage & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords & Report: 1st sitting: House of Lords & Report: 1st sitting
Monday 20th January 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I support what the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, has just said. Clause 21 says:

“Regulations under subsection (1) may make any provision that could be made by an Act of Parliament (including modifying this Act).”


That is about as broad as the power could possibly go. It seems to me to be entirely unacceptable that there should be absolutely no curb of any sort upon the powers of any Government, and I consider that it is something that this House ought to be very worried about.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I am a signatory to Amendment 4 and my willingness to support it is partly based on a constant desire to police the boundary that ought to exist in the use of regulatory powers, so that they do not permit the imposing of taxation or fees, the making of retrospective provision, the creation of criminal offences or the establishment of public authorities, some of which could arise as a result of what is in the protocol. The Minister may well want to explain to what extent he thinks the protocol itself limits the powers that can be used under this section.

This is an area we have often been reminded of by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, who until his recent departure was such a valued member of the Constitution Committee. If we had not policed the boundary, he would have been urging us on to do so. Indeed, he may have something to say on this amendment. It is an issue we keep having to come back to, because there are those within government who seem to think they can keep putting these kinds of powers into Bills, and we know how dangerous they are.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Beith]

12: Clause 26, page 30, line 13, leave out paragraph (b)
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would remove the power of Ministers by delegated legislation to decide which courts and tribunals should have power to depart from judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union and by reference to what test.

[Lord Beith]

My Lords, I rise to move Amendment 12. This amendment will not delay Brexit. It will not even delay this Bill, which is going to the Commons in any case. However, it will avoid a great deal of legal confusion and safeguard the independence of the judiciary. It reflects concerns held by the Constitution Committee, several members of which have taken part in the debates, including of course our chair, the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor. The background is that European Court of Justice case law will be relevant in interpreting retained European law. We recognised that in the 2018 withdrawal Act and made provision for it to be dealt with, so that the Supreme Court and the High Court of the Justiciary would be able to depart from EU case law when they thought it right to do so.

Clause 26 of this Bill gives Ministers very wide regulation-making powers to decide which courts can depart from CJEU case law. It could be any court, right down to the magistrates’ court, the county court or the sheriff court. Through unamendable statutory instruments, Ministers could decide what test the courts should apply when considering whether to depart from EU case law. Ministers could effectively direct the courts to disapply case law in specified circumstances. Bear in mind that lower courts cannot bind other courts, so we will have conflicting interpretations and a lot more litigation as a result.

These are not appropriate powers to be exercised by regulation. They open the way to ministerial interference with the courts. If any of this needs to be done, it should be done in primary legislation. I would have been happy to see provision in the Bill to extend the powers in the 2018 Act to the Appeal Court and the Inner House of the Court of Session, for example. However, I have tabled these amendments on Report because last week’s proceedings in Committee were inconclusive. I said then that when such serious concerns are raised by so many noble and learned Lords, including those with a lifetime of experience in interpreting the law, Ministers need to think again and respond.

I encouraged the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, to use his skills when he spoke in the debate to think of ways in which we could get through this and to encourage Ministers to do so, which he certainly has. Amendment 14, his valuable amendment in this group, would be very helpful. It does not do all the things I sought to do by deleting some of these powers, but it would very much clarify the situation I am worried about, of lower courts making rulings which conflict with those of other courts. If the noble and learned Lord decides that he wants to press his amendment to a vote, in circumstances which I will refer to in a moment, I would be happy to make way by withdrawing mine in due course to enable him to do so. I hope he can make it clear to us when he explains his amendment whether that is the course of action he wishes to take.

I said that reconsideration was necessary. I believe that such reconsideration had taken place and that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, was ready to move an amendment at Third Reading which would have met all our concerns. I have a copy of that draft amendment. The noble and learned Lord was expected to wind up this debate, but is no longer doing so. That seems very significant to me. I think he knows full well that the Bill as it stands would be a source of legal confusion and would lead to this danger of Ministers having the power to impose an unspecified new legal test on the courts, a test which could not be amended by Parliament. Parliament is about to make bad law which Ministers know to be bad. I am afraid that my conclusion is that No. 10 Downing Street is in a sulk because this House carried an earlier amendment to the Bill. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, is an entirely honourable man who serves the House very well and is always a man of his word. I think his absence from the debate at this stage indicates that some exchanges in the Government have led to this House being asked to make law that it knows to be bad. I beg to move.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, when we debated this clause in Committee, we looked at two key provisions: which courts should be able to look at this matter, and what the test should be. I was particularly concerned about saying what the test should be, because I regarded that as an interference with judicial independence—and I still regard it as such. If Parliament sets out the test, as it did in the 2018 Act, for the Supreme Court and the High Court of the Justiciary, that is the law and the courts can therefore take it and act on it. However, it seemed to me and a number of your Lordships that it was not proper for a Minister to deal with the judiciary in these circumstances. Having the Minister set what the test should be by regulation really should not happen. That was the conclusion of the debate in Committee, generally speaking.

When I thought over that, I concluded that we were blocking altogether what the Government were seeking to achieve. I therefore felt strongly that it was my responsibility, along with others, to see whether there was some other way of dealing with this problem. I have thought about it a good deal and, as I understand it, the Prime Minister said that he was in favour of every court being able to deal with this matter. I was anxious that my proposal should achieve that, if at all possible, because he had said that in good faith as part of his election campaign. Therefore, I felt that I should try to think up an amendment which gave that power. Amendment 14 does that because it allows any court in the United Kingdom to consider this matter and make a judgment on it. However, because of the nature of the judgment, there is a requirement that it be referred to the Supreme Court, which should have a power to grant the result, on condition that it has a power not to hear it if it feels that the application was not very substantial or very good, as it has for many appeals in the ordinary course of events.

I can see that having that sort of burden on the Supreme Court might be rather disagreeable. Therefore, it was quite reasonable to think of giving that power, the result of the reporting power, to the Court of Appeal in England—I think Wales and Northern Ireland would also be covered by that—and to the Inner House of the Court of Session in Scotland, which is its equivalent. The High Court of Justiciary would of course also have that responsibility in criminal cases. I am very open to negotiating how this should happen, but I venture to think it important that we consider this issue carefully. I hope that your Lordships may feel that we should pass this amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Callanan]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 12 and 13 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Beith, and Amendment 14 in that of my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern. We debated this matter at length in Committee and the Government have noted the strength of feeling across the House about both a power in principle and the different uses to which it might be put. However, I regret to inform the House that the amendments cannot be accepted.

The clause provides for an important principle: UK courts should be able to interpret UK laws. After the implementation period, that is a matter for us to decide. My noble and learned friend Lord Keen and I have had significant engagement on this issue with noble Lords across the House during the past few days. I can say on behalf of both of us that we are grateful to those noble Lords who met us. While I know that it has not been possible to allay noble Lords’ concerns, I hope that it has become clear that the Government will implement this policy sensibly and in a way that works for courts across the whole United Kingdom.

As my noble and learned friend Lord Keen noted when we debated the matter in Committee, two vital safeguards are built into the Bill. First, we must consult the senior judiciary. The Government are also happy to make it clear that, where the clause requires us to consult other appropriate persons, we also intend to engage with the devolved Administrations.

Secondly, this power can only be used before the end of the implementation period—a critical issue. There is no way in which a Minister can interfere with a live case, nor seek to unpick a single historic judgment which the Government have taken a dislike to. This is a power to allow the Government time to consult, consider and soberly extend the jurisdiction of UK courts to the historic case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, properly reflecting that, after the end of the IP, such case law will form part of our domestic legal order. The way in which courts are to do this will be made clear. At all times, there will be legal clarity on the rules of interpretation when any cases concerning the body of retained EU law come before those courts. Again, I thank noble Lords for their contributions to this debate and their constructive engagement with our proposals.

Amendments 12 and 13, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Beith, would mean that retained EU case law would continue to bind our courts, other than the highest courts of appeal, long after the end of the implementation period. For this reason, those amendments are not acceptable to the Government. Amendment 14, in the name of my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay, is an interesting suggestion but, as drafted, it would create a reference process and confer a role upon the Supreme Court that would be novel in a domestic context and could have unintended consequences, including serious implications for the role and case load of the Supreme Court. We look forward to continuing to work closely with noble Lords in the development of these regulations and will continue to listen to the many constructive ideas that have been put forward on this subject. With our commitment to work closely across the House and consult on this issue over the coming months, I hope that the noble Lord will be able to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Beith]

My Lords we are no further forward at all on which courts it is intended shall acquire the power; on what the test they will be required to carry out is; or on any reliable process by which we can ensure that Ministers do not get involved in specifying the circumstances in which courts, at any level, can depart from existing case law. The beauty of the amendment in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, is, as he explained, that it seeks to satisfy the Government’s objective—as restated now by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan—that any court in the land should be able to engage in this process. This is not a very wise thing to do but, if it is going to be done, it should be done with the protection suggested by the noble and learned Lord: that it should involve a reference process which the Supreme Court can take up if it sees reason to do so. On that basis, and knowing in what high regard the noble and learned Lord is held, I am content to seek the leave of the House to withdraw my amendment, so as to facilitate him pressing his.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

It would be right for the noble Lord, Lord Beith, to continue with his two amendments, because I am proposing the option in my amendment in the event of his disappearing. I think I am right in saying that. I may be wrong; I stand to be corrected. I understood from the Public Bill Office that I did not need to put my name to Amendments 12 and 13—in fact I could not, because there were four there already. It may be that those amendments should just stand.

[Lord Beith]

The consequence of my amendment, if it was carried, would be that the amendment in the name of the noble and learned, Lord, Lord Mackay, could not then be taken, because the words upon which it bites would have been removed. I would be content to divide on my amendment, to test the opinion of the House.

[Baroness Taylor of Bolton (Lab)]

My Lords, it would be possible for the Government to bring back something along the lines suggested by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, should this amendment be carried. It would be foolish not to allow the House to make a clear decision about what it thinks on Clause 26(1)(b). As has been said, time and again, this is a serious and constitutionally significant move. It would, therefore, be wise to test the opinion of the House.

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[Lord Beith]

I have received advice from two quarters for which I have particular respect, including my own committee chairman. It being the case that if my amendment were carried there would be no need for the amendment in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, but if it were not then we could still press for a division on his, I will test the opinion of the House.

Queen’s Speech

Lord Beith Excerpts

Tuesday 27th June 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, we have a new Lord Chancellor. He is somebody I know and respect, but we should remind him of two challenges that he faces. The first is that he must uphold and promote the rule of law and the independence and quality of the judiciary. I believe that he intends to do this. However, as well as being ready publicly to defend the judiciary, he has got to be ready to address the problem of morale and recruitment which currently exists in the senior judiciary such that it is becoming difficult to fill some of the vacancies that arise while maintaining, as it is right to do and as we must do, the high-quality standard that we insist on for the judiciary. We may have to look at the retirement age again. It is becoming more illogical to enforce the retirement age of 70 if we are to deal with the situation in the short term—but, in the longer term, there are many more things to be done. When referring to the rule of law, he also has to recognise his responsibility to the integrity and quality of the law. When the Brexit process really gets under way, I hope that he will play a role in insisting that it is done properly and that Parliament scrutinises properly and adequately the vast corpus of law that will be transferred.

His second major challenge has been referred to by my noble friends Lord Dholakia and Lord McNally and by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, in powerful speeches. It is the situation in the prisons, where the level of violence, suicide and self-harm is appalling, where prison officers are being put at far too high a level of risk from violence and where reoffending levels are far too high—yet Ministers pretend that prison numbers are not an issue. The gracious Speech at one point hints at further intervention to lengthen sentences. Prison is a very expensive resource, and the more it is overused, the less effective it is, because conditions inside prisons are not then rehabilitative. The absence of the prisons element of the former Prisons and Courts Bill is an unfortunate signal to have given. There is a lot that can be done without legislation, but it would have been better to have had a positive signal that that Bill was still on the road.

I can create some space for the Lord Chancellor to do these things because there are a number of things that he does not need to do. He does not need to mess around with the civil rights of British citizens by making changes in our adherence to the European Convention on Human Rights. He is going to have to lock Mr Dominic Raab in a room somewhere in the Ministry of Justice for further extensive study of the matter, but no proposals need to come forward.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Stern, pointed out, the Lord Chancellor should not abolish the Serious Fraud Office. That proposal was not in the Queen’s Speech, and I hope it has been buried. It is an improved organisation, not a perfect one. It is a prosecuting agency in a field where successful prosecution is extremely difficult. It would not fit in the National Crime Agency, which is a police-led investigating body—so I hope that this proposal is a dead parrot, to quote an old phrase. However, it might be an opportunity to look again at the funding model of the Serious Fraud Office which is frankly bizarre. More than half of its spending does not come from its annual budget because the Treasury approves its major prosecutions on a one-off basis. It is not an ideal arrangement and it leads to short-term decisions about the recruitment of legal support for the prosecutions that it undertakes.

Finally, looking beyond the MoJ, and with the welcome presence of the noble Lord, Lord Bourne, who I know will try to answer my question—and if he cannot do it tonight will do it by letter—I want to refer to growth deals. The Conservative manifesto contained an interesting commitment to bring forward a borderlands growth deal, including all councils on both sides of the border, to help secure prosperity in southern Scotland. Since the early 1970s, I have been arguing for cross-border working of this kind. Does that fall within the commitment in the gracious Speech that it will be a priority,

“to build a more united country, strengthening the social, economic and cultural bonds between England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales”?

I presume that that phrase was not written to refer to the £1 billion deal that so many noble Lords have referred to—but that is the only deal that has emerged over recent days. Is there any substance or serious commitment to a borderlands growth deal, which would be quite complex to bring into existence? What discussions are planned between the authorities involved on both sides of the border—in the Scottish Borders, Northumberland and Cumbria for example? I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Bourne, will seek to find an answer to that question.

Oral Answers to Questions

Lord Beith Excerpts

Wednesday 26th February 2014 Commons Chamber

[The Prime Minister]

Let me join the hon. Gentleman in congratulating Team GB on its best medal performance at a winter games since 1924. It was a huge honour to welcome them to Downing street, where I had an explanation of the tasks of skeleton bobsleighing and, indeed, curling. Our congratulations go to everyone involved and all those who helped to train them.

Bank bonuses are well down from the appalling situation that was left by the previous Labour Government, but what we need to see is the proper control of all forms of pay and bonuses. What I do not want to see, and what I think we would get from the Labour party, is a focus only on bonuses, because, of course, you can claw back a bonus, but you cannot claw back pay. We do not want to go back to the days of Fred Goodwin, where you could be paid well for an appalling performance.

[Sir Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (LD)]

Q2. Does the Prime Minister recognise that it is part of the job of Church leaders to challenge Governments about poverty? Will he discuss with them measures that can help people out of poverty, like the pupil premium, cutting tax on low pay and measures to help troubled families? There is nothing particularly moral about pouring even more borrowed money into systems that can trap people in poverty and dependence on state benefits.

[The Prime Minister]

My right hon. Friend, who is himself a distinguished churchman, talks perfect sense. There is nothing moral about running up huge deficits and out-of-control welfare bills. If we do not deal with those problems the whole country will be poorer. We should listen to the words of George Carey, the former Archbishop of Canterbury, who said that

“the churches should beware of the dangers of blithely defending a gargantuan welfare budget that every serious politician would cut as a matter of economic common sense.”

I think that serious politicians have to engage with this, and that should go for everybody.