European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Beith Excerpts

Committee: 8th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 19th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith (LD)]

The situation that the noble Baroness described, in which the sifting committee has made a recommendation that the Government have rejected, is surely not one in which the confidence in the committee will be undermined. It is for the Government then to see whether they can persuade the House as a whole that the committee’s recommendation is unnecessary or undesirable. That is the scenario, not the one that she presented.

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If I were expressing the strategic purpose of these amendments in military terms, I would describe them as another step in a graduated response; that is, a step between the built-in inflexibility of the existing scrutiny procedures of your Lordships’ House on the one hand, and their complete rejection and destruction on the other. I beg to move.

[Lord Beith]

My Lords, the amendments in this group all seek to address a long-standing problem with statutory instruments: that for the most part, they are incapable of amendment. That is not absolutely always so because, many years ago in the other place, I moved an amendment to a statutory instrument arising from the Census Act but few bits of primary legislation allow one to do that. This is not an occasion on which those of us who have long been concerned about that are trying to use this legislation to improve a long-standing defect. It is peculiarly relevant to what we are considering because major matters will be dealt with by way of statutory instrument—a theme throughout the debates in recent days—and they may well include things which ought to be susceptible to amendment, such as details about the creation of public bodies, their powers and remit. To take one example, and there will be others, there are the ways in which new bodies can be held to account when they are created to replace European bodies.

We would be left in a situation where it would be said in the House of Commons, “Take it or leave it—this is the only statutory instrument you’re going to get and we clearly need to address this issue, therefore you must accept it in this form”. I am afraid that in this House, it would be, “Take it or face unspecified constitutional consequences”. Either we agreed to the statutory instrument in its present form or did something we should really not be doing at all, according to members of the Executive. That is an absurd position to put this House in, when what would be at issue would be some fundamental defect in the way the statutory instrument sought to transpose existing European processes into the British domestic statute book. The Government have to address the plea that all these amendments raise: to have some way to do something which falls short of wanting to reject a statutory instrument but insists that if it is to go through, it must be amended in some way.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 247, which seeks to do precisely that. I am delighted to have secured the support of the noble Lords, Lord Wigley and Lord Dykes. I took great comfort from the words of my noble friend Lady Goldie earlier this evening when she said that the Government welcome scrutiny. I hope that she will not regret those remarks.

My starting point this evening was paragraph 215 of the report by the Select Committee on the Constitution, which states:

“We do not consider that it is appropriate for the Henry VIII powers in this Bill to be exercisable by the negative procedure, particularly as they might be used to make legislation of substantive policy significance”.


In Amendment 247, what I seek to do is precisely that: to enable a statutory instrument to be amendable.

While this may seem radical or even revolutionary, it is not as there is a precedent. To appeal to the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, who I know likes some precedents but not others, the precedent here is the Civil Contingencies Act, which legislated precisely for statutory instruments to be amended. Under that Act, specific examples would be required. In my view, there should not be a blanket provision to amend but in the specific circumstances where a statutory instrument in relation to the Bill before the Committee legislates on what amounts to a substantive policy change, it should be open to both Houses to be able to amend the statutory instrument. That is the procedure that I have set out here, once again with the expert advice of the Public Bill Office. At Clauses 19 and 20 of the Civil Contingencies Act, there is a power to make emergency regulations if certain conditions are met. These orders stand unless negated or amended by Parliament, so the power to amend the statutory instrument does exist, although I accept it is not used very often.

Further, in Clause 29, the emergency regulations should be made by statutory instrument. Statutory instruments can be made by either negative or affirmative resolution of the Houses of Parliament. Whether negative or affirmative is set out in the regulations, which will already have been agreed by Parliament, and committed and put into operation by the Government, unless later rejected or amended by Parliament within the seven-day period set down in that clause.

I am sure that my noble friend, in summing up the debate on this small group of amendments, will say that it is not appropriate to amend statutory instruments in these circumstances. I put it to your Lordships in Committee this evening that in those very specific circumstances where the Government seek to make and propose a substantive policy change by way of statutory instrument rather than by an Act of Parliament, that is simply not appropriate and outwith the actual remit of the Bill before us this evening. I therefore hope that Amendment 247 will find favour with the Committee this evening.

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[Baroness Goldie]

My Lords, I have to say that I have been called many things in my life, but the appellation by the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, of a “parliamentary anaesthetic” is a first. As we approach the last contribution from the Government on today’s business, though, maybe a metaphorical sleeping draught is appropriate as noble Lords contemplate their slumbers.

As I have stressed, the Government are committed to full and proper scrutiny of the statutory instruments that will come under the Bill. The sifting process seeks to provide transparency where there has been ministerial discretion in choosing the procedure that will apply to an instrument, and it is therefore extended to the main powers under the Bill. All instruments under the Bill will be subject to an appropriate level of parliamentary scrutiny. We have also provided for additional explanatory material to ensure that there is a proper level of transparency for all the instruments and that Parliament is fully informed and can properly sift and scrutinise all the secondary legislation that is to come. If noble Lords do not approve of their contents—and sometimes that happens—the proper way to express that is to oppose the instruments and ask the Government to come back with an alternative proposal.

Nothing in the Bill is intended to be an alteration to the long-established and, in this House, well-functioning procedures for the scrutiny of secondary legislation. The Government understand the concerns around the powers in Clause 17, and I have listened closely to what your Lordships have been saying. We will consider how we might be able to provide reassurance and address concerns when we reach that clause, as we shall imminently do.

The amendments in this group raise similar issues to those in earlier groups, but I shall address—in, I hope, sufficient detail—my noble friend Lord Hodgson’s Amendments 238 and 239 concerning the creation of a new super-affirmative procedure for the scrutiny of statutory instruments under the Bill.

I cannot shy away from the fact that a significant number of statutory instruments will come before us under the Bill. I reassure your Lordships once more that a very significant element of what needs to be done will be strictly technical, making de minimis changes such as the adjustment of reference to EU law or to retained EU law. Procedures such as that suggested by my noble friend, which were described as “turbocharged” procedures, are simply disproportionate to these changes, and a procedure of the kind mooted by my noble friend is simply unnecessary. The powers in the Bill can be used only for limited purposes and are themselves subject to a number of restrictions.

For the types of major policy change that a number of your Lordships appear to be concerned that the Government might seek to make under the Bill, we do not shy away from parliamentary scrutiny. The proper means for scrutiny of such changes is primary legislation—rather than seeking to design, at pace, a new, bespoke super-affirmative process.

I know that some of your Lordships are wary of relying on assurances from the Dispatch Box but, in this case, we have acted on those assurances already, as can be seen through the passage of the Nuclear Safeguards Bill and the sanctions Bill. I understand noble Lords’ wish to ensure that Parliament can give the SIs to come consideration which is akin or similar to the consideration given to primary legislation, but I suggest that there must be some delineation—there always has been—between things that merit such full consideration and those that do not. Frankly, the alternative is legislative logjam: a complete constipation of the process.

For each of those categories, the Government wish to use the well-established procedures that Parliament has already set down. I have to say that all precedent suggests that procedures such as those suggested by my noble friend can take six months to a year or even longer. Quite simply, in the context of what we are engaged in, we do not have that time. Adopting a super-affirmative procedure would therefore prevent us from being able to deliver on a key objective of the Bill: making timeous and necessary change to maximise certainty for businesses and individuals by ensuring continuity through a functioning statute book in time for exit. In my opinion, that would be a grave failing.

My noble friend Lord Hailsham’s amendment, Amendment 248, crosses similar ground to Amendment 247 in the name of my noble friend Lady McIntosh. They bring us to a discussion of some of the fundamental assumptions of the debates we are having today, have had on previous days and shall have in regard to other Bills, about secondary legislation. I understand the concern of my noble friends, echoed no doubt by others in the Committee, that this is a framework Bill and that the detail, wherein the devil always lies, will be available only in secondary legislation, with which we can only declare ourselves content or not content. However, I must make it clear that the Government cannot support these amendments as a solution to this problem.

It is by the processes involved in passing primary legislation that the House can amend law as it passes before Parliament. That process involves long and detailed scrutiny and debate, with the Government given an opportunity to explain their case in great detail and others given an opportunity to challenge and test that over multiple stages and in both Houses in sequence.

[Lord Beith]

I should like the Minister to envisage that she is responding on behalf of the Government to a debate on a statutory instrument which the House in general is saying that we need to have but which has a fundamental flaw that has been identified by many noble Lords. At that point, is she really going to say to the House, “The proper course for you to take is to reject this instrument, and then I will be forced to take it away and come back with a corrected instrument”? Or will she say, “We’ve no time for that now, you will just have to accept it as it is”?

[Baroness Goldie]

That would of course entirely depend on the circumstances of the instrument, the extent of the change being effected by the instrument and what was an appropriate response to the concerns being raised. I am certain that the Government would respond in a sensible manner if that situation were to arise.

I repeat that it is for primary legislation to set a policy direction and establish the framework in which government may operate. Secondary legislation has a different place in our legal framework. The Hansard Society, which many in the House will accept as an expert source in this area, has said that the power to amend SIs would be,

“essentially undermining the principle of delegation”.

If wider review of the legislative process is proposed—as a number of noble Lords would like—this Bill is not the place to do it. I note the recommendation of the Constitution Committee, in its report The Process of Constitutional Change, that substantial constitutional change should be clear when a Bill is introduced. This Bill is substantial in its repeal of the ECA, but that was clear even before the Bill was introduced and I do not think a change of this type would be appropriate for a Bill which has already completed its passage through the other place.

In the other place, my right honourable friend Dominic Grieve proposed a triage mechanism and both he and the Government accepted the sifting mechanism proposed by its Procedure Committee. This will increase the transparency surrounding secondary legislation, but will not change its nature. Secondary legislation can be scrutinised and debated and, indeed, can be of great importance. However, its purpose is to fill in the spaces where Parliament has set a course under primary legislation and empowered the Government to provide for the details in subordinate instruments. As has already been said, if Parliament is not content with an SI, it can be rejected and the Government can consider and return with another. To open statutory instruments to amendment would essentially be to create a new kind of legislation, without the scrutiny afforded to primary legislation but, at the same time, conferring on the new kind one of the essential qualities of primary legislation.