Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill
Lord Beecham Excerpts(10 years, 5 months ago)
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Lord Beecham
“Discretion in ordering victim surcharge to offenders under the age of 18
In section 161(A) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (court’s duty to order payment of surcharge), after subsection (4) there is inserted—“(5) In the case of offenders under the age of 18, the ordering of payment of a victim surcharge may be at the discretion of the sentencing body.””
Lord Beecham (Lab)
My Lords, I rise to move the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Ponsonby, who cannot be in his place tonight. I shall be uncharacteristically brief. My noble friend draws the attention of the Committee, and indeed mine, to an anomaly in the present situation on victim surcharge orders. The payment may be ordered to be made by the parents of a young offender who are themselves the victims of a crime. That situation cannot possibly have been envisaged originally, but it appears to be the case and there seems to be no court discretion to avoid imposing what many of your Lordships would feel is a ridiculous outcome. The noble Lord may not be able to accept the amendment tonight, but I hope that he will look at it, as it seems to be anomalous and ought to be corrected.
The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord McNally) (LD)
My Lords, let me confirm at once that the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, has been uncharacteristically brief. I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, was unable to move his amendment because I know of his deep and continuing concern on these matters.
The Government are determined to provide the best support for victims of crime, which must be properly funded, but increasingly by offenders rather than taxpayers. In 2010-11, offenders contributed less than £1 in every £6 of funding that supports victims’ services. We intend to raise up to an additional £50 million from offenders to pay for services to support victims of crime. That is why we brought forward reforms to the victim surcharge last year, following public consultation, to ensure that all offenders bear a greater proportion of the cost of victims’ services. Proceeds from the surcharge are ring-fenced to fund support services for victims and witnesses. From October 2012, the victim surcharge for adult offenders was increased when ordered with a fine and extended to a wider range of in-court disposals such as conditional discharges, community sentences and custodial sentences. Similar provision was made for juvenile offenders who even before the changes made in 2012 were required to pay the surcharge when sentenced to a fine.
A key point of the victim surcharge is that all offenders, including juveniles, take responsibility for their offending behaviour and make a contribution towards funding victims’ services. Juveniles have therefore always been within its scope and I do not believe that it would be right to introduce discretion to exempt them. Having said that, I recognise the concerns of the noble Lord about the practicalities. When the offender is a juvenile, Section 137 of the Power of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 provides that the parent or guardian might become liable to pay a financial order made by the court. There may, therefore, be circumstances where the parent or guardian of a juvenile becomes liable to pay the victim surcharge when they have been the victim of the offence. We recognise the issue that such cases raise.
Let me reassure the noble Lord that the court does have the discretion not to order the parent or guardian to pay the surcharge if, having regard to the circumstances of the case, it considers that it would be unreasonable to do so. While the court would still need to order the surcharge in respect of the juvenile, there are a number of options open to it when it comes to payment. In this vein, the Justices’ Clerks’ Society issued a circular to its members in June this year outlining some of these approaches. These could include inquiring as to any income the offender may be receiving, particularly if they are older juveniles, in which case responsibility for paying the surcharge would fall directly to the young person. Additionally, in exceptional circumstances, the court has the power to defer payment of the surcharge until such time as it considers the offender would be able to pay it, again making responsibility for paying the surcharge the offender’s rather than that of his or her parents.
We believe that it is right that all offenders, including those aged under 18, should take responsibility and make greater reparation towards the cost of victim support services as a result of their actions. It is therefore appropriate that the surcharge should continue to be ordered when a court deals with an individual, whether as an adult or a juvenile. I hope that I have been able to reassure the noble Lord on the points he raised and that he will be content to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Beecham
My Lords, I am grateful for what I might best describe as an uncharacteristically helpful and informative response from the noble Lord, which I undertake to convey to my noble friend. We are, of course, entirely with the noble Lord and the Government in wanting to ensure that victims are compensated, especially by those who wrong them. He has adequately explained the situation and my noble friend’s fears seem to be unfounded. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Beecham
Lord Beecham
My Lords, I shall also speak to Amendments 95AB, 95BA and 95D in relation to the issue of court and tribunal fees. At Second Reading I described the Bill as not so much a curate’s egg as a curate’s omelette, comprising as it does so many ingredients, both good and bad, mixed up together. It is perhaps fitting that the Committee should end with a debate on a clause which impels me to produce another culinary analogy, for this clause and the process which has informed it can best be described as half-baked.
It is perfectly reasonable to update the fees for proceedings in courts and tribunals to keep pace with inflation and, in appropriate cases, to seek full-cost recovery, provided there is a reasonable and effective scheme for the remission of fees, in whole or in part, for those of modest means or less. Equally, I have few qualms about fees in cases such as those in the commercial court which the Government are anxious to promote internationally as a forum of choice, but the approach of the Government to this clause has been cavalier in the extreme.
On 4 December the Minister wrote to me to say that the Government had launched a consultation on the provisions of Clause 155, as announced the previous day, that is to say four working days before the clause comes to be considered by this House. Had progress been quicker on earlier clauses, we would have reached this clause on the very day that the Minister’s letter reached me. The consultation, incidentally, is to last seven weeks, including the Christmas and new year period. It will end on 21 January, by which time we will presumably have reached Report, if not concluded it, and there will be little or probably no time at all for the Government to give their response before the Bill’s final stage is reached.
That is not all. Impact assessments for these proposals published on 2 December say next to nothing about the impact on claimants applying to tribunals or to the courts, as opposed to the amounts the Government hope to rake in from increased fees. The Government’s attitude to consultation is underlined by paragraph 20 of the current consultation paper which refers to an earlier consultation, CP15/2011, Fees in the High Court and Court of Appeal Civil Division, to which, the consultation paper records,
“the Government has not yet responded”
after some two years, and which are, the consultation paper says, “superseded”—without, I may say, any explanation—by the current proposals.
The saga does not end there—perhaps I should say does not start there—for the Government launched yet another consultation last April, this time on fee remissions for courts and tribunals, with a four-week period for responses, and published their response, conveniently, no doubt, for them on 9 September, when Parliament was in recess. Interestingly, that document introduced a disposable capital test and airily dismissed concerns that this might have a deterrent effect on claimants. There is, incidentally, currently concern about an apparently significant drop in employment tribunal claims following the hotly contested introduction of fees, which were widely regarded as too high. Perhaps the Minister would save me the trouble of tabling a Question by agreeing to write to me in the new year with details of the number of claims before and after the imposition of charges. It is, after all, an analogous situation to that which this clause deals with.
The Government’s latest consultation paper refers to interviews and research, both of which are said to have been the subject of a full report published alongside the consultation, but for which no references are given. Painting, as ever, with a broad brush, the Government say that they believe,
“that all those who issue a court case benefit equally from the existence of the civil justice system as a whole and should share in contributing towards its indirect costs”,
and, therefore, they divide the indirect costs of the system between all cases that are issued. It is not clear to me whether the apportionment applies equally to all cases, or whether it is in some way proportionate to the amount claimed. On the face of it, this looks very like the application of the principle of the poll tax to the cost of making a claim to a court or tribunal.
Paragraph 60 of the consultation proposes to combine the fees for issue and allocation to a track—the small claims track, fast track or multi-track—without any clear explanation of the rationale. Paragraph 63 acknowledges that the hearing fees for the higher track cases are higher than the average cost of such, but it does not propose to adjust them, thereby importing the concept of more than full-cost recovery by the back door. In divorce cases, while the Government say, at paragraph 71, that they will maintain the issue fee at £410, already above the actual cost price of £270, they will impose an extra charge of £300 to cover the cost of the remainder of the proceedings. Given that, in many cases these will be a mere formality, this looks suspiciously like another example of more than full-cost recovery, though not, of course, for the complex cases where there are major issues as to income and property, where such charges might be thought to be not unreasonable.
Ominously, the Government propose changes to the fees in money claims, including, no doubt at the behest, yet again, of their friends in the insurance industry, in personal injury cases. They go so far as to say that their proposals, if applied in their entirety, would lead to reduced fees on claims of around £10,000 or less but, typically, they will not be changing those fees.
The Committee will understand that there are many questions about these proposals, but there is an overriding question about the abuse of the legislative process which, not for the first time, is being perpetrated by this Government. I acknowledge and welcome the concessions made in the Government’s amendments as far as they go. They will ensure that any increase in fees other than inflation-related increases will have to be approved by affirmative resolution, and that is a welcome improvement. But will the Government consider the amendments I have tabled, which seek to ensure that access to justice is a prime consideration before setting the size of the fee increases, and that the remission arrangements are properly scrutinised and agreed? Will they revise the existing remission arrangements in the light of the proposed major changes, and will they review the proposals to take disposable capital into account?
Given the shambles of the process thus far, I have to say that on Report the Opposition may well press for a sunrise clause along the lines of Amendment 95D to ensure that there is proper parliamentary scrutiny of the complete package when its final contents are developed. As I say, that is unlikely to be the case before this Bill receives its Third Reading.
In addition, in the mean time it will be helpful to know whether, in the indefinite age of austerity that the Chancellor has decreed for public services, the principle of full-cost recovery, and especially of more than full-cost recovery, will be extended to other services such as further and higher education, prescription charges or other parts of the health service. By what logic, one wonders, would the Government differentiate between some of the proposals they are making in this Bill, incorporating more than full-cost recovery for access to justice, and those or other public services? I beg to move.
Lord McNally
My Lords, I shall not try to follow the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, down his culinary route. One of the pleasures of responding to the noble Lord is that it is almost like doing a school exam. So many questions are fired at you in quick succession. If I do not cover them all in this reply, I will carefully read what he has said, note the question marks that Hansard inserts and try to send suitable replies, including on the point he made in opening about the figures for claims at employment tribunals after the introduction of charges.
Perhaps I may deal first with the two government amendments in the group, namely, Amendments 95B and 95C. These give effect to the recommendation made by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee relating to the power to charge enhanced court fees. Clause 155 currently provides that, when the power to set a fee or fees at an enhanced level is used for the first time, the relevant statutory instrument should be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure, with any subsequent changes to the fee or fees being subject to the negative procedure. The Government’s intention was that the principle of charging an enhanced fee should be subject to a full debate in Parliament, after which the negative procedure would provide the necessary level of parliamentary oversight for any subsequent changes to the fee.
However, the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee was concerned that this would provide the Lord Chancellor with a very wide discretion to set the level of fees. Although the legislation requires the Lord Chancellor to have regard to the financial position of the courts and tribunals and to the competitiveness of the legal services market when setting fees, the committee felt it was possible that, in future, very different considerations might apply and that these should be taken into account. The committee therefore recommended that the power to set an enhanced fee should be subject to the affirmative procedure unless the amendment is being made solely to reflect the change in the value of money. The Government agree that this change would be appropriate and, accordingly, Amendments 95B and 95C will implement this recommendation.
I turn now to the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Beecham. Amendments 95AA and 95AB seek to require the Lord Chancellor to have regard to the principle of “access to justice” when setting fees. I can wholeheartedly agree with the noble Lord that this is an important consideration. However, the Lord Chancellor is already under a duty to do exactly this when setting fees under Section 92 of the Courts Act 2003. Subsection (3) of that section provides that the Lord Chancellor,
“must have regard to the principle that access to the courts must not be denied”.
Amendment 95BA seeks to make the remission scheme subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. As noble Lords will be aware, there is already a remission scheme in place. Indeed, the scheme has been in place for a number of years, but was updated and revised as recently as 7 October 2013 when the Courts and Tribunals Fee Remissions Order 2013 came into force. It is the Government’s intention that the existing remission scheme will continue to apply in all cases where enhanced fees would be introduced.
The current scheme provides for certain court and tribunal fees to be remitted in whole or in part where litigants meet certain criteria based on their disposable capital and gross monthly income. The existing scheme is made under the same order-making powers as apply to the setting of fees, for example, Section 92 of the Courts Act 2003, which relates to fees payable in respect of proceedings in the senior courts, county courts and magistrates’ courts. As the remission scheme relies on the same order-making powers as the statutory instruments prescribing court and tribunal fees, they are subject to the same level of parliamentary procedure—namely, the negative procedure. In its seventh report of Session 2002-03, the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee welcomed a government amendment to make the order-making power in what is now Section 92 of the Courts Act 2003 subject to the negative procedure. Given that previous endorsement by the committee, and the fact that the current arrangements have been in place for some years, I see no good reason why we should now alter the level of parliamentary scrutiny.
Finally, Amendment 95D would require the Lord Chancellor to report to Parliament on the outcome of the public consultation on these proposals and to obtain approval for its response. As the noble Lord indicated, the Government on 3 December set out their detailed proposals for using the power to set enhanced fees in the consultation paper, Court Fees: Proposals for reform. This seeks views on a series of proposals for charging enhanced fees, including for money claims, in commercial proceedings and for divorce, alongside proposals for reducing the current deficit of £100 million in the cost of running the Courts and Tribunals Service. The consultation closes on 21 January. In the normal way, we will publish a response to that consultation in due course and Parliament will have an opportunity to consider it when we lay a draft order under Clause 155. I therefore take Amendment 95D as a probing amendment rather than an attempt to enshrine in statute the normal process of reporting on the outcome of a consultation.
Lord Beecham
My Lords, I always read the noble Lord’s speeches carefully and I am certainly willing to do so on this occasion. I am grateful to the Minister for his reply, and I suspect that this short debate will be seen as something of an aperitif for the rather more weighty matters that we are about to discuss when the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, moves his prayers to annul two other orders.
The Minister fails to acknowledge, however, that a negative procedure might be sufficient when one is dealing with a stable situation, but the Government are here proposing an entirely new basis for the levying of fees: in the first place, to ensure full-cost recovery, but, more significantly, potentially going beyond that to ensure more than full-cost recovery. That puts a whole different perspective on the likely impact of fees on litigants or applicants to tribunals. In these circumstances, a different procedure than the conventional negative procedure is required, at least in the early stages. This is a matter to which we may wish to return on Report.
The consultation effectively comes after the completion of the process of enacting this Bill, which will allow the Government to introduce new principles. It is the wrong way around: the consultation should have taken place and we should have had the result of that before we discussed this clause, which makes a significant difference to the way our courts operate. It is now too late for that to happen and that is a matter of regret. I am afraid that I do not resile for a moment from the criticisms I made, not of the Minister, who is not personally responsible—he is well aware of that—but of others occupying, perhaps, more senior positions, who ought to reflect on the way they are treating Parliament and its due processes when they push forward proposals of this kind in this way. Nevertheless, in the circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill
Lord Beecham Excerpts(10 years, 5 months ago)
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Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon
It was always my great desire to be the noble Lord, Lord Taylor of Holbeach. My ultimate aspiration has today been achieved twice over.
These amendments are designed to improve the use of DNA and fingerprints in criminal investigations. I shall begin with Amendment 56YD, which allows the retaking of DNA and fingerprints if an investigation is restarted. At present, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 allows DNA sampling and fingerprinting of an arrested or charged person only once in an investigation. If the police or the Crown Prosecution Service decide not to proceed against an accused person, that person’s DNA and fingerprints must be deleted, unless they have previously been convicted, or charged with a qualifying offence. If the investigation is later restarted, there is no power to retake the DNA and fingerprints. The CPS has now introduced a new procedure, the victims’ right to review, under which a decision not to proceed may be reviewed and the case restarted. If DNA and fingerprints have already been taken and destroyed, there is currently no power to take them again if the case is restarted. Amendment 56YD provides for such a power.
Amendment 56YE ensures that the retention of a person’s DNA is determined by considering their entire criminal history. If a conviction in that history would allow retention, it is important that a DNA profile can be retained, regardless of whether the arrest in connection with which the profile was obtained was itself followed by a conviction. This is important because, normally, when a person has had a DNA sample taken on a first arrest, DNA is not taken on any later arrests, because that would incur unnecessary costs to obtain the same profile. However, without this amendment, there is a danger that the DNA from the first arrest would be deleted from the database if there was no causal link between the taking of DNA on a first arrest and a conviction obtained following a later arrest. Amendment 56YE makes the position clear, thereby ensuring that a DNA profile can be retained indefinitely whenever someone has a previous conviction or caution for a recordable offence, irrespective of the fact that they were not proceeded against for the offence in respect of which the DNA sample was taken.
Finally, Amendment 97 to Schedule 9 to the Bill is consequential on amendment 56YD and amends Schedule 2A to PACE, which allows the police to require people to attend at a police station for the purposes of having their fingerprints or DNA taken. It duly applies the existing time limits for imposing such a requirement to the new provisions that I have described. Under existing legislation, if a person is arrested or charged then released without having had their DNA or fingerprints taken, the police may take them later, but only within the following six months. The amendments to Schedule 9 apply this principle to the scenario involving retaking, putting a time limit of six months from the restarting of the investigation on the power to retake DNA or fingerprints. These amendments are sensible measures to improve the use of DNA and fingerprints which I commend to the Committee.
Lord Beecham (Lab)
My Lords, I note the Minister’s recidivist tendencies in terms of his aspirations to be the noble Lord, Lord Taylor of Holbeach, and congratulate him on his judgment in that respect.
This is a classic case of legislating in haste and repenting at leisure, because the problems that these amendments seek to address were highlighted by the Opposition when the Government originally legislated. We pointed out that the Government should have taken the greatest possible steps they could in acknowledging the legal requirements set down under European court judgments to maintain the retention of DNA so that it could be used to define and catch criminals who had committed crimes or could potentially commit further crimes. This was argued during the passage of the Protection of Freedoms Act, and the argument was not accepted at the time by the Government. Now, not untypically in an era of rapid U-turns, they have made a U-turn, although it has taken some time. It is clearly right that the Government should act in this way. It is notable that on this occasion they are not following the practice of the Conservative Party in making sure that their records are consigned to history rather than being kept available. That is welcome, although perhaps we may see a U-turn in that respect as well.
So far as this legislation is concerned, there is still an issue around the retention of information. The Minister referred to the fact that samples would have to be taken within six months. I do not understand the rationale for that. DNA samples can be taken and kept for long after the event. I recently read an interesting history book called The Isles in which DNA samples were taken from a cave in Cheddar Gorge from remains going back some thousands of years. Yet with those DNA samples they managed to trace somebody living in the 21st century in that area. These things can last. Crime is not just a short-term matter—I understand that an estimated 20,000 to 23,000 people could have committed crimes within a span of six years—so I do not understand the rationale for the six-month period. While we welcome the progress made so far, perhaps we could have an explanation of why six months is being insisted on rather than a longer period. My honourable friends in another place were suggesting that a period of six years would be appropriate. After all, we are talking here about potentially serious crimes; we would not be bothering with DNA samples if we were not. There is no rationale, in my judgment, for the period the Government have selected.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for his broad support and support in principle for what we are seeking to do here. I also listen with great care whenever he talks about history and literature. Today he combined both. I am forever learning from the noble Lord.
On the specific question of why six months, it is our view that there must be a limit otherwise people who have been arrested and then had proceedings against them dropped for lack of evidence would never actually know whether they were free of the risk of having their DNA and fingerprints taken. Six months has been regarded as the reasonable limit in legislation passed by this Government as well as the previous one. The noble Lord mentioned the Protection of Freedoms Act, namely that the DNA of a person who has not committed any offence should not be retained indefinitely. He used that as a premise for saying perhaps that the Government are U-turning. This is not a U-turn. I always regard these things as progression and I think we have moved in the right way and I am glad that the noble Lord respects that.
Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill
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Lord Taylor of Holbeach
We should not make the methodology of serving the notice, which is what the noble Lord is referring to, specific. We discussed this when we talked about the requirement to do certain things. The steps that might have to be taken to achieve specified results may be up to the individual to judge. What is not in doubt is the need to indicate the specified result that is required. We discussed this issue when we were talking about the difference between paragraphs (a), (b) and (c).
Lord Beecham (Lab)
I follow briefly and with some trepidation in the footsteps of my noble friend Lord Harris. I draw the Minister’s attention to Clause 41(2), which states:
“Conduct on, or affecting, premises occupied for the purposes of a government department is treated for the purposes of section 40 as conduct of the Minister in charge of that department”.
Can the Minister give us some examples of conduct that would be attributed to a Minister which might invoke the community protection notice procedure—for example, the activities of Jobcentre Plus, the DWP or some other government departments? What do the Government have in mind here?
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
I suppose that this comes back to the accountability of Ministers. I am accountable to the Committee this evening in giving answers to somewhat difficult questions. I promise to write to the noble Lord with an explanation. He was very astute. I saw him leap with alacrity at a particular point and show it to a colleague on his Bench, so I knew that something might be up. I will write to the noble Lord.
Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill
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Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon
My Lords, the Government are often accused of not listening. I listened with great interest to the previous debate, initiated by my noble friend Lord Marlesford, and as I went over to the Box I noticed a piece of litter on the floor. I acted promptly and handed it to the doorkeeper—so there is some hope of instant action on the part of the Government.
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, for tabling her amendment with the proposed new clause and raising an important point. I agree with her that, where businesses act in a way that is likely to cause harm to others, they should be held to account. However, the Government feel that a corporate ASBO is unnecessary. We believe that we have drafted the new powers in such a way as to be flexible enough to deal with this eventuality.
For example, the new community protection notice, which we will discuss when we come to Part 4, can be issued against a corporate body. If that corporate body is persistently acting in an unreasonable manner and having a detrimental effect on the quality of life of those in the locality, it can be held to account through the new notice. While the community protection notice replaces litter and graffiti notices, it can be used for much more, including noise and other behaviours. What is more, breach is a criminal offence and, on conviction, a business could be fined up to £20,000. It is a power which provides real teeth.
Lord Beecham (Lab)
Will the Minister indicate whether unincorporated bodies will be caught by the provision, or would that require additional legislation?
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon
I believe that the clause as drafted could apply to an individual or an organisation. When we discuss that wording, it will be clarified. This applies to an individual or an organisation—which incorporates the issue raised by the noble Lord. In addition, where the use of business premises has resulted, or is likely to result, in nuisance to members of the public or disorder nearby, the new closure powers that we are introducing, to which the noble Baroness referred, will be able to close a premises immediately. The police and/or local authorities can act quickly where a business acts anti-socially. Again, breach is a criminal offence with the potential for a significant fine.
It is also worth saying that sometimes it may be a particular individual who is the root cause of the anti-social behaviour—for instance, the business owner or a store manager—and not the business as a whole. In those circumstances, the police, council or others listed in Clause 4 could apply to the court for an injunction against the individual on the test of nuisance or annoyance. Hopefully that would deal with the issue and, while breach in this case may not be a criminal offence, it could still result in a large fine or even a custodial sentence.
In putting forward this amendment, the noble Baroness said that it was a probing amendment to seek clarification. I hope that on the basis of the example I have given, by drawing the attention of noble Lords to the fact that we will be discussing this issue under Part 4 and with my explanation, she will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill
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Lord Taylor of Holbeach
Amendment 21B, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, would require the courts to take into account whether or not to grant applications for arrest warrants in cases where an arrest warrant was not attached to prohibitions in the injunction at the time of its issue but was sought subsequently, when the breach had occurred.
We are not introducing a new and untested power under Clause 9. The courts are used to handling applications for arrest warrants: for anti-social behaviour injunctions on which the IPNA is modelled and gang injunctions, as well as other injunctions. We should therefore bear in mind that the courts are already experienced in handling applications for arrest warrants and dealing with breach proceedings and they are experienced in doing so without needless delay or copious guidance. So while I agree with the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, on the importance of swift action—indeed that is one of the reasons we are reforming the anti-social behaviour powers—I am not persuaded that statutory guidance is needed on this point.
My noble friend Lady Hamwee has also tabled an amendment to the provisions on powers of arrest. The purpose of Amendment 21C is to prevent an arrest warrant being issued against someone who breaches a requirement in their injunction. They would only be able to be brought before the court to answer the breach of a prohibition in the order. With respect to my noble friend, I do not agree with that. Whether a term in an injunction is a prohibition or a requirement, they form part of an order of the court. They must be complied with. The requirement to do something about the cause of your anti-social behaviour is as important as the prohibition to stop it. The courts must have the power to enforce them both. If a person is not forced to do something about their behaviour by complying with a positive requirement, it is likely that they will eventually breach the order and cause further problems. That has been the problem with anti-social behaviour orders.
As my noble friend points out, this is different from the approach we have taken in Clause 3. At the time an injunction is made, a power of arrest can only be attached to a prohibition and not to a positive requirement. The reason for this distinction is that the test under Clause 3 is, rightly, a high one. A power of arrest can only be attached where there is a threat of violence or harm. It is difficult to see how this test could be met by breaching a positive requirement. However, the provisions in Clause 9 for obtaining an arrest warrant do not include such a high test because here the focus is on enforcing the injunction, not on preventing an immediate risk of violence or harm.
On the basis of this explanation, I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, will be content to withdraw her amendment.
Lord Beecham (Lab)
My Lords, the Minister has not addressed the thrust of my noble friend’s amendment, in terms of the potential for delay. This is an area where, by definition, the quicker one proceeds to a resolution of the matter, the better. There are some constraints in the way the court system currently works which make that rather more difficult. A number of proposed court closures have affected both county courts and magistrates’ courts. I assume that these breaches would be basically dealt with in the county courts, but there have been closures there as well. Do the Government have any indication of how long it will take to secure these injunctions, in the light of that development and the general pressure on the court system?
It is not necessarily the case that a matter can be easily resolved at a first hearing. There is also the question of the operation of legal aid under the rather restricted system we now have. One assumes, and perhaps the Minister can confirm this, that legal aid would be available for those who qualify, on financial grounds, to defend an application for an injunction. There seems to be a potential for an undesirable delay, which may or may not be necessary. The thrust of my noble friend’s amendment is that the Government should endeavour to begin properly and assess the likely timescales and the likelihood of delays and then to give guidance to ensure that, where necessary, the relevant resources can be made available. Could the noble Lord deal with those issues?
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, the noble Lord has asked me a number of detailed questions. If he does not mind, I will look at the record and write to him, as I do not have the briefing here to be able to reply in detail to all that he wishes to know.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
I will take a look at the record and if I feel that it will be productive and I can add to the position they have stated I will write to the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, and the noble Baroness. I cannot commit to a particular timeframe, but if there is evidence of a problem to which the noble Baroness is able to draw my attention, I will deal with it.
Lord Beecham
It occurs to me to ask the noble Lord whether there have been any consultations with the judiciary about this aspect. I assume that that may have been the case. Presumably the judiciary will have a view on the imposition of a new burden on it. We talked about the new burdens doctrine earlier this evening as regards the costs of some of the proposals in the Bill on local government and whether they will be met. From a local government perspective I cannot say that I was very thrilled with the Minister’s response to that; he seemed rather to ignore it. However, this is a different sort of new burden—one placed on the courts system. That being the case, one would have imagined that this would have been discussed with the judiciary at some level. Has the noble Lord any knowledge of such discussions taking place, or were any representations made as a result of consultations on the Bill?
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
I was anxious to move on, as noble Lords may have guessed, but I think that the sentiment of the House is that the night is perhaps getting on—although I was just getting into my stride. I have found answering these amendments somewhat more difficult than others as they stray into a legal capacity where my skill base is probably not as substantial as that of the noble Lord, Lord Beecham. None the less, I have said that I will look at the record and write to noble Lords on the basis of the points they have made when I am able to give them a fuller and more reasonable answer to the points they raised. No doubt we will have plenty of opportunity to deal with that in future. In the mean time, I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
Lord Beecham
The noble Lord has just reminded me that I really ought to have declared an interest. I am still a solicitor, not so much practising but an unpaid consultant in the firm for which I used to act. I am only sorry that a particular noble Baroness is not in the Chamber because I used to appear before her father in the county court when he was sitting as a district registrar—an experience not to be recommended, I have to say, to those who followed me.
Baroness Smith of Basildon
My Lords, I beg leave to withdraw. I understand the noble Lord is going to write to me about the issue we raised.
Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill
Lord Beecham Excerpts(10 years, 7 months ago)
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Lord Beecham (Lab)
My Lords, this Bill is not so much a curate’s egg as a curate’s omelette, with some distinctly unsavoury ingredients mixed in with some reasonable proposals. Before addressing some of the substantive measures included in the Bill’s 200 pages which have emerged, after scant debate, from the House of Commons, it is necessary to complain yet again at the cavalier way in which this Government go about churning out legislation that deals with sensitive aspects of public and social policy even when they impinge on important areas such as human rights and access to justice.
Once again the Joint Committee on Human Rights—which has just four Labour members in its membership of 12—has been driven to express serious concerns not just about some of the Bill’s proposals but about the procedure employed. The committee drew attention to a number of government amendments to the Bill that have human rights implications and to the lack of time allowed to scrutinise them. It is pursuing its,
“concerns about the recurring inadequacy of the time available”,
for such scrutiny,
“with the Leader of the House”.
Can the Minister tell us what has transpired on that score?
Even more pointedly, the committee complains that two pieces of information in relation to controversial matters—in respect of Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act, and the suggested change in compensation for miscarriages of justice—were promised for 29 July but delivered on 7 October, 48 hours before the committee met to consider its report. What justification if any can the Minister advance for such conduct, and what assurances can he give for the future?
Turning to some of the proposals in the Bill, I acknowledge the importance of the issue of anti-social behaviour. It has been a problem in parts of the ward that I have represented in Newcastle for the last 46 years and it requires a co-ordinated approach from the courts, the police and the local authority, by listening to and working with the community affected. I am currently dealing with a case in which a young council tenant has been subjected to constant harassment by a group of youths not resident in the estate. I well recall how two streets in my ward suffered so badly from the behaviour of a small number of families who moved in after being evicted from their homes in an adjoining ward that, in the end, the streets were demolished. These were at all times private tenants. The Bill extends the procedure to enable such people to be dealt with to other tenures, subject to an authorised procedure. As we have heard, however, it worryingly adopts, in effect, the notion of guilt by association in respect of those who have been participating in riots—not just for the rioters but for their families—so that the innocent householder and their family may be evicted after such a person participates in a riot taking place anywhere, not even in the immediate locality.
As we have also heard, the Bill does little to ensure that the interests of children—both the practical ones in terms of their accommodation, and the legal ones in relation to their human rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child—are sufficiently taken into account when sanctions are imposed on their family. Of course, eviction in such cases may well lead not just to problems for the child but, in the short or longer term, to increased pressure and cost on hard-pressed children’s services. The same reservations arise, as the Joint Committee stresses, in relation to new civil injunctions on children as young as 10, the use of detention for breach of such an injunction for children over 14 and the possible removal of reporting restrictions in relation to children in injunction proceedings.
Moreover, the shift in the case of these new injunction proceedings from the need to show that an order is necessary and proportionate to what is just and convenient, is deemed by the Joint Committee to be incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights, not least because the injunction procedures apply to cases where the conduct complained of is,
“capable of causing nuisance or annoyance to any person”.
We have heard that phrase used before tonight. It is a loose, unsatisfactory and highly subjective test.
Another troubling issue is the provision in relation to compensation for miscarriages of justice, under which someone whose conviction has been overturned will, as we have heard, now have to prove their innocence in order to secure their compensation. This effectively reverses the burden of proof. Indeed, it comes close to importing the Scottish “not proven” verdict into English law. By chance, the other night on the radio, I heard part of the serialisation of a dramatised version of an apparently famous Scottish case in which one defendant secured such a verdict—“not proven”—which she described as meaning, “We know you did it but we can't actually find you legally guilty on the evidence”. Effectively, that is now to be applied to those seeking compensation for a miscarriage of justice. It is unacceptable to import such an approach by the back door—not least when, as we have also heard, only a couple of cases a year result in a payment.
Other areas that we will wish to explore in Committee include extradition, about which we have heard something tonight, and the notion that costs in courts and tribunals should not merely be set to achieve full recovery—itself a challenging concept, given what has happened to legal aid and advice—but should also generate a surplus as a contribution to reducing the deficit. This could, of course, be the thin end of a very large wedge. If that principle is applied to the courts and tribunals, why not to the National Health Service or to education? Perhaps the Government already have that in mind. Does the proposal also imply that the Government will further ratchet up the fees for employment tribunals so recently and controversially imposed?
The role of local government does not seem to be adequately reflected in some of the new provisions—for example, in relation to dispersal powers or in the new community remedy approach set out in Clause 93 and the community protection notices in Clauses 40 to 54, which have yet to be evaluated. As the Home Affairs Committee pointed out in its scrutiny report on the draft bill, interagency working is essential if the issues of anti-social behaviour and disorder are to be tackled effectively.
The Bill as it stands is flawed in a number of respects. I hope the Government will listen seriously to the concerns it arouses and respond constructively to attempts to improve it, with the twin aims of tackling significant social and other problems while preserving our reputation for upholding civil liberties and human rights. I am sure that your Lordships’ House will offer many positive suggestions to improve the Bill.
Police Act 1997 (Criminal Record Certificates: Relevant Matters) (Amendment) (England and Wales) Order 2013
Lord Beecham Excerpts(11 years ago)
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The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Taylor of Holbeach)
My Lords, in moving for the Grand Committee’s consideration of this first order, I shall speak also to the subsequent order, as they operate jointly in addressing a common issue.
The Court of Appeal recently held that the Police Act 1997 and the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 (Exceptions) Order 1975 are incompatible with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights in that they provide for the disclosure to employers of, and allow employers to ask about and take into account, all cautions and convictions on a blanket basis. The court held that this regime, in so far as it relates to historic and minor cautions and convictions, is disproportionate. While the Government is seeking leave to appeal this judgment because we believe that the Court of Appeal went too far in its judgment and did not give sufficient weight to the views of Parliament on these matters, it is vital that we ensure that the legislation reflects the judgment of the Court of Appeal while it remains in place and that the Disclosure and Barring Service can continue to disclose spent cautions and convictions, and that employers can take these into account, where it is necessary and proportionate to do so to protect vulnerable groups, including children. That is the purpose of the orders that I am presenting today.
The orders amend the exceptions order to the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act and the Police Act so that, while maintaining important safeguards for public protection and national security, certain spent cautions and convictions will be filtered from, and no longer be automatically included on, a criminal record certificate issued by the Disclosure and Barring Service. Employers will not be able to take such filtered matters into account.
Full disclosure of cautions and convictions will continue to be required in respect of some employment decisions, such as police recruitment or posts relating to safeguarding national security. Further, all cautions and convictions for serious violent and sexual offences and for certain other offences specified in the orders, such as those directly relevant to the safeguarding of vulnerable groups, including children, will continue to be disclosed, as will all convictions resulting in a custodial sentence.
We are also changing the position in relation to service personnel and former service personnel. Currently, service personnel or former service personnel applying for any position covered by the exceptions order to the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act would have to disclose previous convictions for all service offences, including those that have no civilian equivalent, such as being absent without leave. We are changing the position so that, once spent, these non-recordable disciplinary offences will no longer need to be disclosed.
For all other offences, the orders provide for the following filtering rules to be applied: cautions, and equivalents, administered to a young offender will not be disclosed after a period of two years; adult cautions will not be disclosed after a period of six years; a conviction received as a young offender resulting in a non-custodial sentence will not be disclosed after a period of five and a half years; and an adult conviction resulting in a non-custodial sentence will not be disclosed after a period of 11 years; but all convictions will continue to be disclosed where an individual has more than one conviction recorded.
The Disclosure and Barring Service will continue to see all cautions and convictions, whether spent or not, for the purpose of making barring decisions. Individuals who have been barred from working with children or vulnerable adults must not be offered such employment.
Following the Court of Appeal’s judgment, these changes will ensure that the disclosure of criminal records information remains proportionate and that, while avoiding unnecessary intrusion into people’s lives, public protection arrangements remain robust. I commend the orders to the Grand Committee for consideration.
Lord Beecham
My Lords, in principle, I certainly welcome the changes that these orders make. It is sensible to narrow the scope of the obligation to disclose convictions, particularly where they are of a less serious nature. However, there remain some issues on which I should be glad to have clarification. In particular, paragraph 7.4 of the Explanatory Memorandum states, as the Minister pointed out, that,
“no conviction resulting in a custodial sentence will be filtered”.
Does that include a suspended custodial sentence? I think that there is a nod from the Box—although it is not quite a Box—so I will take it that that is the case and I am grateful for the clarification.
The Minister identified the various periods of time after which disclosure need not be made. My honourable friend Jenny Chapman, in dealing with this statutory instrument yesterday, questioned the basis of the periods of time given. They are rather curious, ranging from, for example, 11 years for an adult conviction resulting in a non-custodial sentence to five and a half years for a young offender. Obviously, in the case of a young offender it should be a shorter period, but I just wonder why this rather odd figure of 11, on which the other figure is presumably based, was chosen.
My honourable friend also asked whether harassment or stalking offences should be disclosed if a perpetrator seeks to enter a profession in which they will work closely with vulnerable people. I understand that such offences will not be exempt from disclosure but perhaps the Minister can confirm that. She also raised a question about a conviction for online sexual offences—for example, downloading indecent images of children and the like. Again, I assume, but would welcome confirmation, that that also is a conviction that would have to be disclosed. It would certainly make sense if that were the case.
On the other hand—my honourable friend referred to this matter as well—in the run-up to the police commissioner elections we had a rather ridiculous set of circumstances arising where very old convictions for very minor offences served to disqualify people from being a candidate for that position. Because they were not custodial sentences, I do not know the extent to which these provisions would now change that rather absurd outcome. I hope that they would but, if not, perhaps the Minister will undertake that a review will be made of the provisions that affect the nomination and qualifications for the position of police commissioner—if that is not already in hand as a result of several people having been disqualified in the rather absurd circumstances that arose last year.
The Minister in the other place said that the matter would be kept under review—that is, how the exceptions and so on are working out and whether the list requires change at all. Perhaps the Minister could indicate how and when such a review might take place. It might take place in two or thee years’ time. Will it be conducted within the department or be subject to wider consultation?
Having said that, as I said, we certainly support the principle and, subject to answers on these rather detailed points, are happy to support the two orders, the second being consequential on the first. My honourable friends in the Commons voted against it yesterday because at that point the Minister was unable to give assurances around certain of these matters, in particular in relation to harassment and sexual offences having to be disclosed. If I am right in thinking that that has now been confirmed, of course we would accept that position. If not, we would ask the Government to think again about those categories of offence.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, for his welcome for these proposals. They are a rational response to the court’s decision. We have had an interesting exchange of views. I hope that I will be able to satisfy the noble Lord on all the points that he raised. To the extent that I do not, I hope that he will allow me to drop him a line on the matter.
The point that he made and that I would like to emphasise is that notwithstanding the changes, public protection, particularly of children and adults in vulnerable circumstances, is of paramount importance to the Government. In the Chamber earlier today I had to give some horrendous figures which gave us all a chance to reflect on these things. It is also right that we should acknowledge individuals’ wishes to put their past behind them, and to allow that to happen in circumstances where we can be fairly confident that public protection will not be compromised.
The Rehabilitation of Offenders Act aims to aid the employment and resettlement of ex-offenders who put their criminal past behind them. It does this by declaring certain convictions to be spent after a specified time has elapsed after the conviction. A spent conviction is deemed for most purposes never to have existed, and an ex-offender will not have to reveal it in many circumstances, including when applying for most jobs. The rehabilitation periods are determined according to the sentence imposed, in order to reflect the severity of the offence. Currently, a conviction resulting in a custodial sentence of more than 30 months can never be spent.
There must be a balance to ensure that members of the public, especially those groups at greatest risk of harm, such as children and adults in vulnerable circumstances, are adequately protected. The exceptions order of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act seeks to achieve this balance by excluding certain employment positions, bodies and proceedings from the general application of the Act. This means that where an individual applies for a specified job or role, such as working with vulnerable groups, including children, their spent convictions must be made available to the employer and may be taken into account.
Linked to this, the Police Act requires that all cautions and convictions, whether spent or not and regardless of how old or minor they may be, are disclosed on criminal record certificates issued by the Disclosure and Barring Service. It is this regime that the Court of Appeal has found to be incompatible, and which the orders we have debated seek to address.
I will go through some of the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham. Perhaps I may begin by explaining that the orders introduce a mechanism to ensure that certain old and minor spent cautions and convictions no longer need to be disclosed and are no longer automatically included on criminal record certificates issued by the DBS. The introduction of such a filtering mechanism is a significant modification of the current public protection arrangements, and it is important that we approach the proposed changes with care. With that in mind, I am grateful for the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, to the debate today.
The noble Lord asked about what was a conviction and what was a custodial sentence. A conviction, which is any determination of guilt by a court, regardless of the sentence imposed, and a conditional and absolute discharge are both sentences following a conviction. A custodial sentence includes any sentence of imprisonment, including a suspended sentence. I hope that that helps the noble Lord in that respect and confirms the nod that he may have seen from my officials behind me.
Lord Beecham
I am grateful. There is one matter that I ought to have raised before: the provision is in relation to the dispensation from disclosure only if there is no other conviction on the individual’s record. Does that mean a conviction of any kind, or would the conviction have to be of a category that would otherwise create the obligation to disclose? If it is the former, then for a long time a very minor offence could require the disclosure, which would otherwise not necessarily be the case.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
I agree with the noble Lord but, in fact, any conviction subsequent to a previous conviction will bring that particular element into play. I suspect that we will consider this area when we see how the new regime works. Is there not an enormous incentive for people who have a conviction not to get another? This is one of the real drivers of why these changes, which have been forced upon us by the Court of Appeal, may be welcomed for giving people an opportunity to rebuild their lives in such a positive way.
Therefore, I hope that the measures being proposed strike a balance between enabling offenders to put their past behind them while ensuring that public protection is not compromised. With that, I commend them to the Committee.
Queen’s Speech
Lord Beecham Excerpts(11 years ago)
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Lord Beecham
My Lords, debates on the Queen’s Speech inevitably feature ministerial double acts. Today, the event stars the noble Lords, Lord Taylor and Lord McNally. The genre is, of course, a familiar one. We think perhaps of Neil Simon’s “The Odd Couple” or the Geordie comedy “The Likely Lads”, though perhaps “The Likely Lords” would be a more appropriate description. The latest example is the new comedy series “Vicious”, although I would not for a moment suggest that that is an appropriate adjective to describe two highly congenial and respected Ministers, and in any case I cannot quite decide which would be Ian McKellen and which would be Derek Jacobi.
My responsibilities as a shadow Minister are limited to justice matters, but in a debate ranging across crime, justice, equalities and constitutional issues I will inevitably touch on some matters beyond my normal brief.
I start with constitutional issues and especially those that concern Parliament as a whole and your Lordships’ House in particular. In so doing, I commend the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, for her intention to bring forward the Bill to which she has just referred. Last Wednesday, the Select Committee on the Constitution published a report entitled The Pre-emption of Parliament. The report deals with the tendency of the Government to pre-empt legislation or, in a phrase that I coined with regard to the Public Bodies Bill, to engage in pre-legislative implementation, as opposed to the established concept of pre-legislative scrutiny and post-legislative review. The report asserts that,
“the principle of restraint in the name of good constitutional practice should apply to all pre-emptive actions, not just those involving expenditure under the new service rules. This recommendation particularly applies to re-organisations of public bodies”.
The report concluded with an emphatic injunction:
“Where the pre-emption involved is such that it threatens effective parliamentary scrutiny, it should not be undertaken. It is for Parliament, not the Government, to decide whether to change the law”.
I ask the Minister when the Government will respond to this report and the recommendations that it contains, and, if it is at all possible, to give an indication of their thinking today.
However, there are other aspects of the way that the Government deal with legislation which arouse concerns across the House. The committee of the noble Lord, Lord Goodlad, reported recently on the Government’s approach to consultation and was critical of the shortened timescales that they too often impose. Frequently, moreover, we receive details of the response to consultation and, in turn, the Government’s response to the outcome of consultation at a very late stage in the legislative process. Proposed statutory guidance or draft regulations are all too often simply not available at all in time to be taken into account as we scrutinise the legislation. In these circumstances, neither House is able to discharge its responsibility to scrutinise and improve legislation properly.
We are already seeing the sour fruits of this approach in a number of areas—not least, relevant to today’s debate, in relation to the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act and the Crime and Courts Act. The president of the Family Division has proclaimed that the courts are “wholly unprepared” for the changes now being implemented. The Government are pressing ahead, as we learnt today, with the privatisation of much of the work of the probation service and the introduction of a payment-by-results system. Not only have they cancelled the two pilot schemes they were running, in Staffordshire in the West Midlands and in Wales, they have even refused a Freedom of Information Act request made by colleagues in the House of Commons that sought information on the evaluation of the schemes. Can the Minister explain those curious decisions?
While welcoming the Government’s intention to reduce reoffending rates and to offer supervision to ex-offenders released after short sentences, we will wish to examine carefully—as will your Lordships’ House as a whole—the details of the proposals, their practicality and their impact on the probation service. I echo the concerns expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Howe, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks, on these matters. Time and again, after all, the Government have charged ahead with ill-thought-out measures that have caused huge problems and cost large sums of money. The fiasco of the new court interpreter system, the process of issuing all civil monetary claims from a single court and the outsourcing of court security—that paragon of efficiency, G4S, apparently pays its staff £6.45 an hour but is itself paid £11.49 an hour for the hours worked by its staff, and makes a gross profit of £42 million a year—all testify to that ideological obsession with outsourcing to which the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Lichfield referred this morning.
I will, however, commend the Lord Chancellor on at least one recent decision, which is to set up a review of the Court of Protection, about which I have voiced doubts on a number of occasions. It needs a root-and-branch examination, and I look forward to the outcome of that. Equally, I welcome what I take to be the Government’s intention to proceed with the equal marriage Bill, and I support the noble Lord, Lord Fowler, who made a remarkable speech this morning, on what he said about the Bill. Too often, it seems to me, the Lord Chancellor indulges in the politics of the dog whistle—a tendency that will no doubt become more evident as the UKIP pack snaps at the Tories’ electoral heels. It is interesting that his recent announcement on prisoner privileges, uniforms and the like, affect privately run prisons more than publicly run ones.
However, it is in the fields of legal aid and litigation that the most profound damage is threatened to our system of justice and of access to it. It is extraordinary that one of the main justifications advanced for the changes which will deprive 650,000 claimants a year of legal advice or legal aid is that the scheme has changed over the past 65 years to cover more areas of law, although, as it happens, a smaller proportion of the population. Would the same argument be advanced to justify cutting the National Health Service where more treatments become available, or any of the other areas of public policy where needs change as society, the economy, technology or the environment change? We will continue to scrutinise and challenge the regulations still to be made to implement the LASPO changes, and we look forward to the Low commission’s report on the effect of the changes and the cost to the court system. Both in this context and in relation to criminal legal aid, to which I now turn, we will look for alternative savings across the whole system which will not imperil access to justice.
The Government’s proposals on criminal legal aid rely yet again on the discredited tendering system which has given us Atos, Group 4, the interpreter fiasco, and more besides. But these proposals are even worse because, as the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, pointed out, those who qualify for legal aid will have no choice of representative. A mere 400 firms will be given contracts and clients will be allocated to them apparently on a crude rotation basis. Fees for both barristers and solicitors will be cut by at least 30% and 17.5% respectively from in most cases a low base which, of course, includes substantial overheads. The criminal Bar in particular will be very hard hit, but the real damage will be done to the client and the courts as well as to the practitioners. Nor do the Government’s sums add up. They claim a saving of £220 million a year but their estimate shows only £118 million a year by 2016-17. As that is the product of the cut in fees the tendering exercise appears to make no difference. The proposed savings on prison law will save all of £4 million allegedly, and Answers to Parliamentary Questions tabled by colleagues in the House of Commons have established that there is no estimate of the savings to flow from the proposed 12-month residency test, or even how much is now spent on legal aid for foreigners. It is all just another blast on the dog whistle.
Astonishingly, the Government have just produced a series of amendments to their own consultation document, several of which modify the original claimed savings. One of them corrects a figure given at paragraph 5.3 on page 72 of the consultation document for the costs of very high value cases from £592 million to £92 million, a reduction of 84%. If only the Chancellor of the Exchequer could amend the OBR figures in the same way. We await with interest the outcome of this amended consultation and the Government’s response, which on past form will probably largely ignore it.
Even the Daily Telegraph ran a piece by one of its feature writers proclaiming that it is the end of the legal system as we know it. I am pleased that the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Thomas, and the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, have voiced serious concerns about the Government’s proposals. I hope that they will join with us in challenging them if, as I assume, secondary legislation and regulations will be brought to this House for approval.
Change is not limited to the criminal law. At the behest of its generous friends in the insurance industry the Tory party—with, apparently, its Liberal Democrat partners once again colluding with it—is embarking on radical changes to civil justice, extending the scope of small claim courts and imposing a rigorous cost regime which will make it uneconomic for practitioners to undertake the work given the need for relevant expertise to be deployed. Coupled with the LASPO changes, significant roadblocks are being placed on access to civil justice, based in part on the myth sedulously fostered by insurance companies of a compensation culture, a notion recently dismissed out of hand by Lord Dyson, the newly appointed Master of the Rolls.
There are also deep concerns about the future of judicial review, an essential tool in holding government and public bodies to account. The Government claim that only a tiny percentage of claims are successful. In fact, a significant number of cases are settled in the claimant’s favour before the stage of judicial permission to proceed. Of those which do proceed to hearing, again a substantial proportion is successful. Lord Dyson has said:
“There is no principle more basic to our system of law than the maintenance of the rule of law itself and the constitutional protection afforded by judicial review”.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, has stated, “Judicial review is critical” and that the Ministry of Justice,
“is showing a remarkable lack of concern for the precision of the facts”.
What answer does the Minister make to those remarks of the eminent judges who have pronounced upon the Government’s policy?
Unfortunately, we now seem constantly to denigrate the human rights legislation which it was once our proud boast as a nation to promote at home and abroad. We appear much keener to sell access to British justice to wealthy foreigners than to secure it for our own citizens.
The grayling, I understand, is a protected species of the salmon family, which apparently provides thrilling sport when the trout season is at an end. If the noble Lord, Lord Lee of Trafford, who is apparently a keen angler, was in his place now, as he was this morning, he would no doubt confirm the description of the fish. For our part, we do not regard the Lord Chancellor as a protected species, nor will we treat opposition to his destructive policies as a sport, thrilling or otherwise. Our concern on these Benches—and I think the concern of many across your Lordships’ House—is to protect the enduring values of our legal system and to preserve access to justice for all who need it, while of course striving to do so as efficiently, effectively and economically as possible.
Crime and Courts Bill [HL]
Lord Beecham Excerpts(11 years, 2 months ago)
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Lord Phillips of Sudbury
My Lords, I understand my noble friend Lord Taylor’s point, but I also understand fully the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick. We bring our Chamber into disrepute if we try to deal with 80 pages of amendments in the course of this afternoon and evening, including, as has been said, 20 pages of not just brand new but highly complex legislation on which we ought to consult outside this Chamber. The issues concerned could not be of greater importance.
Lord Beecham
My Lords, I endorse what has been said by noble Lords, particularly the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd. We have here a situation that is uncomfortably analogous to that which applies to the Jobseekers (Back to Work Schemes) Bill, whereby these Commons amendments are, in effect, being treated as if they were emergency legislation. Admittedly, they do not have retrospective effect, which I suppose is welcome, but the timetabling aspect is extremely unsatisfactory. This House does not have an opportunity to consider the amendments fully. There are a great many matters that your Lordships will wish to discuss, not least around Leveson, which itself has come late in the day—although one understands the reasons for that. There is no particular reason why the measures to which the noble and learned Lord referred must be dealt with today. I hope that the Minister will acknowledge that it is asking too much of your Lordships’ House to deal with this matter sensibly, fully and thoroughly—as it needs to be—at such short notice, particularly when considering everything else that we have to discuss today.
Lord Cormack
My Lords, I underline the importance of what has been said because we have been given an extra week’s recess, which none of us particularly wanted because many of us have many engagements in London that week. It is quite wrong to steam-roller something through. This is the Executive treating this House with something approaching contempt. That is something up with which we should not put.
Lord Beecham
My Lords, I will confine myself to two topics. Taken in reverse order of importance, the first is what has become known in common parlance as “bash the burglar” legislation. The Minister emphasised the need for bringing this measure into force as quickly as possible. Given the paucity of cases to which this would apply, as we discussed when we were debating the Bill, I find this to be little more than an example of gesture politics of the cheapest kind.
The second more significant matter, which I entirely support the Government in raising, is Amendment 9 about making use of films and other recordings of proceedings. I would not have spoken at all on this matter except that there was a report in the press at the end of last week about the position in Scotland where it now appears that a drama is going to be broadcast based entirely on recordings in the criminal court. This is under Scottish legislation; it is not legislation that applies in this country. This is exactly what those who have expressed fears about filming proceedings in court were really worried might take place. Apparently witnesses, parties in criminal cases and, in this particular case, a retrial of a significant case regarding a serious offence have been filmed and will be shown on Scottish television, presumably, as a rather dramatic production rather than a factual and low-key look at how the courts work. The English legislation that we are debating does not facilitate that, and I would be glad to hear the Minister give a firm assurance that it will not be extended to allow that kind of development, which would be a significant change in the way that the Government have envisaged matters and one in which we should in no way seek to experience what Scotland is about to undergo.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon
I thank the noble Lord for his support for much of what has been covered. He referred to self-defence as “bash the burglar”. He may think that; I could not possibly comment. We believe it is important that if the legislation is passed, no one should fall into the trap between Royal Assent being given and this becoming law so that it can be used as a defence. If we are making these changes, it is important that they happen as quickly as possible so that we prevent any occurrence of people who act. I contend that anyone confronted with a burglar, faced with such a situation where they are protecting their home, their family and their loved ones, is often faced with that instant decision. It is important that we give that instant protection. I therefore believe that the Government have taken the right way forward on this. I am sure that, on reflection, the noble Lord would agree with me.
The noble Lord mentioned broadcasting and, again, I welcome his support. As I said, we have put four locks in place. He raised the specific issue of broadcasting in Scotland and the filming of all parts of a trial. I assure him that we are not proposing to allow this at all. The safeguards that I have outlined will protect such an extension. He raised the specific issue of witnesses. I share his concern. The Government’s intention is to provide that level of protection. With those clarifications, I beg to move.
Lord Beecham
My Lords, I join the noble Baroness in welcoming the Government’s moves to tighten up the arrangements for bailiffs. Like her, however, I regret that they have failed to take the ultimate step of establishing a clear and relatively straightforward regulatory system. I am slightly puzzled by some aspects of their response to the consultation. For example, in paragraph 18 of their response, the Government say that they will implement Section 64 of the Act and “produce regulations” about the regulation of enforcement agents, which is a somewhat circuitous expression. Nor is it entirely clear where that would be heading.
Equally, the response goes on to say at paragraph 134 that the Government,
“will continue to work with stakeholders from the enforcement and advice sectors in developing the content of the regulations and will also work with HM Courts and Tribunals Service and the judiciary on the court procedure”.
I take it that that means that, ultimately, the Government will produce regulations to be approved by both Houses. Perhaps the noble Lord would be able to confirm that. It is clear, as the Minister has pointed out, that much of the work—or, any rate, the function—of the industry is directed towards recovering sums due to local or central government, hence the involvement of the Local Government Ombudsman. That work is likely to be enhanced considerably as councils seek to recover, if it is economical to do so, the likely shortfall in the collection of council tax now that a significant cut has been made in council tax support, and many people will now be called upon to pay council tax who have not hitherto done so, in rather small amounts. That may make collection uneconomic.
Be that as it may, and quite taking the point about the Local Government Ombudsman’s position, would it not be sensible, if we are thinking in terms of sensible regulation without offering competing avenues for this, for the Local Government Ombudsman’s responsibilities to be widened so that he can undertake that regulatory role for the whole system? Why not? Hopefully, local authorities, either singly or collectively, will in any case employ staff directly rather than contract out. It is in the contracting out of the service that we see so many of the problems.
It is interesting that the advice sector did not agree with the not unexpected majority of the enforcement sector and creditors in saying that the existing complaints process was sufficient and did not require any further government intervention. The advice sector thought that the processes,
“have proved to be ineffective or inadequate”.
Given the Government’s propensity to rely on the voluntary sector to make good the damage inflicted upon advice services generally—the withdrawal of legal aid and legal advice, for example—one might have thought that they would pay rather more attention to the advice of the sector in this sensitive area. As the Minister has, in fairness, readily recognised, there have been too many instances of abuse for us to be comfortable with the present position.
Finally, the Government propose a rather curious process of review at one, three and five-year intervals. It is not clear quite what form that would take, but I ask the Minister for an assurance that if it is seen that there is no significant improvement in how the system is working, they will revert to the concept not merely of support, advice and certification but of a proper regulatory system to which people can have ready and inexpensive access.
Lord McNally
My Lords, I will re-emphasise why we are not introducing an independent regulator. The legislative changes that we are making to protect people in debt from aggressive bailiffs together with the new laws and mandatory training and certification scheme, which bailiffs must pass before going into business, will provide enough protection against aggressive bailiffs. Bailiffs who do not follow the rules will be barred from the industry. We will also clarify the complaints process so that debtors know how to seek redress and what the responsibility of creditors and enforcements agents are.
As I have explained, in the process, the appropriate regulator in each of the areas where bailiffs are used will be able to be appealed to. We mentioned this small degree of commercial debt—less than 1%—and I would be happy to receive any representation from either the CBI or the Federation of Small Businesses if they thought that this was a genuine loophole causing a real problem.
Every individual will have access to an appropriate complainant authority. As the noble Baroness pointed out, we have indicated that we are looking for something like a three-month training programme; it will not just be a tick-box exercise. We are looking at other parts of the forest, as it were, to see whether there are training modules and practices that we can readily adapt. I confirm that the local government ombudsman will have responsibility for private bailiffs when they are acting for local authorities.
The noble Baroness rightly raised the problems of dealing with people who may have some difficulties with mental capacity. We would hope that in the training will come a clear responsibility to recognise and assess such situations. Where they identify that a vulnerable person is involved, they will refer back to the relevant authority to further instructions and, where necessary, bring in other assistance to deal with the situation.
As I have said, we are developing training that we consider a minimum requirement. We have not yet been able to gauge exactly the length of time that the training would take. However, we are clear that, at a minimum, bailiffs will need to understand the role that they play, the law that governs their powers, the practice of taking control of goods, the fees that they can charge and, as I have said, specific training to deal with vulnerable people.
On whether the system will allow complaints against bailiff firms as well as individuals, most complaints about bailiff companies relate to the fees charged by their bailiffs, the type of goods seized and the ways in which they were seized. All these issues will be dealt with under the new regulations and will be subject to the means of redress. The behaviour of individual bailiffs on the doorstep will be regulated through the certification system. Poor behaviour can be addressed by the removal of a certificate. We are working with the advice sector to identify any complaints that would fall outside the regulation. All bailiffs will have to be certified, and I can confirm that training will be independently accredited.
We will bring forward the regulations by negative resolution. The regulations have already been subject to a full and open consultation. Comments were invited as part of this process and were included with the consultation paper. Officials are currently working with stakeholder groups to refine the regulations, and we plan to make them available by the summer. As set out in the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, the regulation will be subject to the negative procedure for statutory instruments.
As I said, I believe that what has been put forward in a way is greatly to the credit of the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, who has championed these ideas through the House. I hope she recognises a victory when she sees one. I certainly hope, as I said before, that the House will agree to Amendments 5, 6 and 31.
Crime and Courts Bill [HL]
Lord Beecham Excerpts(11 years, 5 months ago)
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Lord Goldsmith
My Lords, this amendment can be dealt with briefly, and I would have said that before the Chief Whip made her statement. It concerns the question of the extent of the discretion that prosecutors will have, subject to the double lock of supervision by the courts, in reaching agreements on deferred prosecution agreements. Along with other noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, I have been concerned that the Bill does not appear to provide a discretion on the maximum reduction of financial penalty. For example, on 10 December at col. 968 the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon, talked about a maximum discount of one-third, and it was not the first time that that had been said. That led me to consider whether that was the view of the prosecutors, and having made inquiries of them, it turns out that that is not what they thought the Bill was going to do. It was because of that, and only because of that, that I wanted to raise the matter again for clarification.
I wrote to the noble Lord, Lord McNally, and I am grateful to him and to his officials for his detailed response. What I asked in substance was whether it was in fact the case that one-third was not the maximum discount on the financial penalty that could be agreed; it could be greater than that. I understand from the Minister’s response that, shortly put, the one-third discount is not the maximum that can be agreed and that in appropriate cases, there could be an agreement—I underline, subject to the agreement of the court—which could be greater than that. If that clarification can be made, which otherwise would go uncorrected, although I personally would still prefer to see a greater discretion, at least it would deal with the major problem of an apparent one-third maximum reduction. For those reasons, I beg to move.
Lord Beecham
My Lords, I support the amendment moved by my noble and learned friend, although I do not anticipate that he will seek to divide the House on it. It is interesting to note that the amendment has come before the House on the same day as a question from the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Crosby, that referred, of course, to the settlement of cases in America. She referred to a billion-pound settlement reached under a deferred prosecution agreement over there and contrasted that with the very modest levels of financial penalty incurred in this country under processes that usually involve the Serious Fraud Office or, in revenue cases, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs.
Throughout our debates on deferred prosecution agreements, my noble and learned friend has pointed to the need to incentivise potential corporate defendants. At the moment they are only corporate defendants, but in due course there may be a case for extending them to individual defendants. He has stressed the need to adopt this procedure rather than rely on prosecution because, as has been pointed out on several occasions, the success rate of the Serious Fraud Office in these cases has been, to put it mildly, not very marked. Unless there is a credible threat of a successful prosecution, there is virtually no incentive for a defendant corporation to plead guilty and every incentive for it to contest the case. The corporation has a very reasonable prospect of being successful. The case would seem to be similar in revenue cases, hitherto at any rate. HMRC has been apt to settle for rather more modest amounts than one might have expected relative to the level of abuse that is alleged to have taken place. The advantage of the agreements, as has been pointed out by my noble and learned friend and several other noble Lords, is not only that there is a financial penalty available as part of the agreement, but that other measures are available as well.
An additional reason for the Government, through their relevant agencies, to press for a deferred prosecution agreement is because, first, there is a greater incentive for companies to settle, knowing that they will not have to meet the full costs which they can take into account in balancing their considerations about whether to defend or not, and secondly, from the public interest perspective, there can be additional conditions that might apply to such an agreement. Those might be monitoring, changes in practice and so on. Furthermore, there can be a period during which matters can be reviewed. All of this suggests that greater flexibility in discounting from what might be expected to be the maximum fine would assist the whole process, although that does raise the question of what the sentencing guidelines from the Sentencing Council will be with regard to these penalties. Perhaps we ought to be moving more in the direction of the level of fines imposed under the American system, which it is hoped would increase the incentives.
My noble and learned friend is clearly minded to accept the position on the basis of the Minister’s letter. From the Opposition’s perspective, we are content with that, and we look forward to seeing in due course how the system moves forward. We would hope also to have an opportunity to review it, as has been discussed in previous debates. I commend my noble and learned friend on his persistence in this matter and the Minister on what has apparently been a sympathetic response.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, I would like to take this opportunity to thank the Bill team for its support. This has been a long, complex Bill, and two departments of government have had to contend with two different Ministers. If I might say so, my noble friend Lord McNally and I have enjoyed working together on this Bill. My noble friend has, of course, had a change of partner since Committee stage, and I know that my noble friend Lord Henley would like to be associated with these remarks. I thank, too, those who have supported us through this Bill.
Lord Beecham
My Lords, I echo the thanks to the Bill team for its support and to the Ministers. I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord McNally, on his new civil partnership. I also commend and thank the noble Lord, Lord Henley, for his contribution. I feel as though I and my colleagues—I speak now for two opposition teams as well—are emerging from a six-month sentence, which is perhaps an appropriate way to regard these past few months dealing with this Bill. It has been a challenging but instructive and, at times, entertaining experience, and I am grateful that for the most part it has been conducted in the usual spirit of your Lordships’ House. We look forward to future pieces of legislation—preferably deferred for a while; some of us need some time to recover.
I am grateful to the ministerial team and, indeed, to noble Lords—especially noble and learned Lords—who have contributed so much to a very considered deliberation of an important measure.