Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Beecham
Main Page: Lord Beecham (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Beecham's debates with the Wales Office
(12 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this amendment speaks to the question of consumer law and seeks to restore it to the scope from which it is removed by the Bill. Consumer law covers a multitude of cases but in particular contract law, consumer credit and professional negligence proceedings.
In 17th century terms, I view the noble and learned Lord as a Roundhead—or in view of his provenance, perhaps as a Covenanter—rather than as a Cavalier. However, I am afraid that “cavalier” is the only word that I can apply to the Government’s attitude to access to justice in this and other contexts. That attitude is well illustrated by the airy dismissal of the views of those whom they consulted on whether consumer law should be kept within scope. The Government carried out a consultation exercise and reported:
“Of those respondents who commented on this aspect of the proposals, almost all were opposed to removing these cases from scope”.
Two of the grounds that were raised are relevant for today’s purposes. The response stated that,
“some respondents argued that consumer cases should be retained, in particular professional negligence cases where negligence may have resulted in serious consequences for the client … in some professional negligence cases clients would need expert reports to prove negligence and without legal aid individuals would not be able to afford these”.
The Government concluded:
“Having considered the responses … we confirm our intention to remove consumer and general contract cases from the scope of legal aid. Whilst there are some difficult cases, in particular professional negligence cases, these are still essentially claims concerned primarily with recovering damages, and that means that we consider that their relative importance is generally low, compared, for example, with issues of safety and liberty”.
That is a classic case of an argument reductio ad absurdum. To say that life and liberty are more important than contract law or divorce is axiomatic: it does not advance the argument one whit. The Government also said, as we are so used to hearing in debates on this Bill:
“There are other sources of advice available in relation to consumer matters, for example, from Trading Standards and Consumer Direct”.
Here I ought to declare a non-pecuniary interest as an honorary vice-president of the Trading Standards Institute.
The Government continue:
“There may be alternative non court based solutions in some cases, for example, through regulators and ombudsmen”.
I am rather surprised that they did not add Which? and the helpful columns in the Guardian and weekend newspapers while they were at it. However, that is a considerable oversimplification and an underestimate of the problems which people face. Professional negligence is not merely confined to the recognised professions of solicitors or accountants, for example. Even members of the Bar can be sued for professional negligence, and that has been the case for some time. The conduct of financial advisers, like that of some other professions, might result in considerable loss to people. There is also the builder who botches the job or the architect whose design is defective. All these matters can affect many people and involve them in considerable financial loss.
It is certainly possible to obtain some alternative advice. On Monday, my noble friend Lord Stevenson spoke to an amendment about debt. He is the chairman of an organisation called Consumer Credit Counselling Service, which offers advice in the realm of consumer credit. However, that is not face-to-face advice and anything more complex has to be referred on. My noble friend advised me that that organisation tends to refer matters to the citizens advice bureaux. There is an assumption on the part of the Government that the capacity of organisations such as the citizens advice bureaux, law centres and other bodies is capable of infinite expansion. Apparently, they will be able to undertake the very large volume of cases which will henceforth be denied legal aid or legal advice. However, not only will it be impossible to obtain legal advice from solicitors, but when the very funding of those organisations through government grant for legal advice and assistance will also be cut, they will have a massively increased demand and a diminished resource with which to meet that demand, unless they obtain a soupçon from the £20 million which the noble Lord, Lord McNally, has waved about as being available for some indefinite time to assist in dealing with these problems. That is an extremely unsatisfactory solution to the problem because it is no solution. It is interesting that the Government do not specify in any detail their assessment of the availability of these possible alternatives, simply relying on the fact that there may be alternative non-court based solutions.
The really worrying feature, which again underlines the unsatisfactory nature of the Government’s attitude to this and other cases which we will be considering and have already considered, is summed up in their response to the consultation when they say:
“Although there may be exceptions, in our view the individuals bringing these cases are not likely to be particularly vulnerable compared with, for example, those in the mental health category”,
for which, in fairness, provision will be made. But, again, that is a comparison which has no significance at all, and it is not the comparison that the person who is denied access to justice will make. He or she will rightly make the comparison with somebody who has the means to afford that advice and representation. We are creating a two-tier system of justice, one in which you can buy your way in if you have the means and another in which you will effectively be denied it if you do not have the means. In areas such as this where significant harm can be inflicted on individuals—admittedly, that is not physical harm but pecuniary harm, stress and distress—it does not seem appropriate to deny them the access which the very modest funding that is involved currently allows.
The Government should look at this matter again. Over recent years, Governments of both political persuasions—perhaps one should now say of all three—have championed the cause of consumers. We are talking now about predatory capitalism or responsible capitalism and the rest of it. We ought to be looking at the bottom of the scale of providers, if you will, and at how people can be best enabled to pursue remedies against those who inflict harm on them, because this Bill does not assist in that respect. I beg to move.
This is another important amendment and I would like to support my noble friend Lord Beecham, who has moved it. If the Government suggest that caveat emptor is a sufficient answer to the case made by my noble friend, they would be wrong. If the Government say that it is simply up to the consumer not to buy shoddy goods or not to avail themselves of shoddy professional services, it will not do—particularly in the provision of services.
Professional self-regulation is not always all that it ought to be. Although we should always guard against the assumption that things are not what they used to be—a view that we are a little bit liable to become attached to in your Lordships' House—none the less, I think it is fair to say that the professional ethic has become somewhat attenuated over recent decades. We see, for example, the advertising of professional services in ways that we did not in the past. We see the marketisation of professional services, arising in part out of contracting out, and the general widespread extension of market values and market practices, which in many cases have led to greater efficiency and greater availability of services. However, they also carry the risk that those who offer these services may become a degree less scrupulous when the ethos is that of the market.
People find themselves beset by parasitic professionals. The purveyors of subprime mortgages may have been the most offensive instance in recent years that one can imagine, but there are many other cases. It will not do to leave the ordinary citizen vulnerable to predatory, grubby and dishonest so-called professionals. The issue of equality of arms that arose in the previous debate on employment law arises here, too, because the ordinary citizen may come up against professionals, or those who represent them, who are highly articulate, able to speak the jargon of a specialised field and can afford expensive advice. It must be an elementary principle that there is access to justice on sufficient equal terms to enable citizens who have been poorly, dishonestly or improperly served by professional advisers to have some remedy.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for setting out that position. As he said, we will come to issues of criminal legal aid later today—I hope; I am sure.
This is going over old ground, but it is important. The scale of the deficit reduction that has been required exceeded what many of us thought before we came into government in May 2010. As I said, that has resulted in some difficult decisions. On two occasions, the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, said that it was unfair to make that point with regard to professional negligence cases. He cited the response to the consultation, when we said that those were claims concerned primarily with recovering damages and that we considered that their relative importance was generally low compared, for example, with issues of safety and liberty. He seemed to say that that is so blatantly true that it does not add anything.
If one has limited resources, those are the kind of priority judgments that must be made. In Schedule 1, we have tried to apply those priorities in different circumstances. Again citing the response, he said that people who would be bringing damages claims were not likely in general to be vulnerable compared with detained mental health patients and elderly care home residents, who are unable to present their own case. He agreed that that is clearly the case. If we have to establish priorities, I think he would agree that priority would go to a detained mental health patient or an elderly care home resident.
If there was an unlimited fund of resources, the noble Lord’s point would have far more force, but given that there is not, given that decisions have had to be made as to what comes within scope and what does not, I think the balance that we have sought to strike of giving precedence to issues of life, liberty and homelessness is proper.
It is for that reason that we did not include consumer claims within the scope. The noble Lord raised the question of professional negligence cases. It is fair to say that, when we come to Part 2, conditional fee agreements may be available for cases involving damages. That makes the provision of legal aid in such cases less likely to be justified. As has already been well rehearsed, other sources of advice are available on consumer matters. There are trading standards officers, Consumer Direct and alternative non-court based solutions through regulators or ombudsmen—such as the Financial Ombudsman Service for people with complaints about financial services or Otelo for complaints relating to telecommunications.
The noble Baroness, Lady Howe, talked about the cut in CABs’ funding. Of course, there will be an impact on CABs’ funding from legal aid, although it is estimated that that is only 15 per cent of CABs’ funding. At the risk of saying this yet again, the Chamber will be well aware that the Government announced a further £20 million funding in June last year for not-for-profit advice agencies and are considering funding for future years. Last February, £27 million was announced for continued funding administered by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills for this financial year to maintain the face-to-face debt advice programme in citizen's advice bureaux and other independent advice agencies across England and Wales.
To pick up the important point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, additional funding has been announced for not-for-profit advice agencies, and the Government are considering funding for those organisations for future years. As parallels the previous debate, we will retain legal aid for consumer matters where they concern an alleged contravention of the Equality Act 2010. Many cases involving the Equality Act will be within scope.
At the end of the day, it boils down to the fact that, with finite resources, priorities have to be made. We have had one of, if not the most, generously funded legal aid schemes in the world. Even after the changes are implemented, should the House pass the Bill, it will still be a very generously funded legal aid system. Regrettably, some choices are very difficult, but I hope that the priorities we have identified stand up to scrutiny. It is more than axiomatic that when you have limited funds, life, liberty and dealing with homelessness and discrimination are important and that people who are less able to articulate their case or defend themselves should have priority. On that basis, I urge the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friends Lord Howarth and Lord Clinton-Davis, my noble and learned friend Lord Goldsmith, and the noble Baroness, Lady Howe, for their contributions. I am also grateful to my noble friend Lord Bach for his intervention, although if the Government were proposing only to decimate legal aid—to take 10 per cent off—I would almost be prepared to accept that. I think he was using the phrase in the vernacular sense rather than the literal sense, because we face a much bigger reduction in legal aid and advice on funding than the 10 per cent actually means.
To refer back to my noble friend Lord Howarth's contribution in an earlier debate, he was asking about the knock-on costs of some of the changes. It may interest him to know that I have tabled a Question for Written Answer inviting the Government to say what estimates they have made of the cost to other government departments and whether those departments have accepted them or made any representations about them.
The noble and learned Lord again advances the mantra about life and liberty, and of course they are most important. I am tempted to say that the Government believe in life and liberty but not in the pursuit of remedies, to paraphrase. More importantly, we are seeing the virtual death of equality before the law. There are areas where inequality will be deepened for a modest saving, at the very best. That is a socially divisive measure. It runs contrary to the big society concept and some of the words that we are hearing. The practical effect will be the denial of justice to far too many people. At this stage, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment, but it is a matter to which we may well return.
My Lords, like the Minister, I learnt tort. In my case, it was at the feet of no less a person than the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hoffmann, and I remember those days with great affection, but in the course of my career I have also been involved in criminal injuries compensation cases, and I shall refer later to some of the problems that they throw up.
Once again, the Government have consulted about these matters, and once again the response from those consulted has been almost wholly negative. Nevertheless the Government, on the grounds that we are now very familiar with, are clearly going ahead with their determination to withdraw any form of legal support in the way of advice—representation was not covered—from the scheme.
This scheme is so simple that it takes only 55 pages to set it out in the statutory instrument and a mere 113 pages in the guide to the scheme that is available to potential claimants. It is fair to say that the guide also includes the tariff that for some time now has been substituted for what was a wider area of discretion for tribunals to award.
Before I come on to the issues that can confront claimants, one of the points that the Government have made is that support is available from other sources, including the compensation authority itself and Victim Support. However, Victim Support does not provide legal advice, and it is very questionable whether a telephone, or even online, conversation with the authority can help all claimants, or indeed perhaps the majority of them, because there are issues. It is not simply a case of having to establish that a criminal injury has been sustained; there are issues that can be taken into account by the tribunal in determining whether to grant an award or to reduce an award that would otherwise be available.
A number of factors come into play, such as the conduct on the occasion of the claimant, a procedural delay in reporting the matter, or a failure to co-operate with those inquiring into the matter. These might be for inadequate reasons—sloth, neglect or reluctance—but they might arise from concerns about whether bringing a claim might provoke an assailant, for example, or because the situation has created such stress that the person may not feel able to pursue matters. There are other matters too; a criminal record might disqualify or allow an abatement of an award that would otherwise have been made. Those matters—the matter of conduct, for example—are matters on which applicants might very well need advice and assistance. It will not be legal aid advice or assistance if this clause stands.
I clearly recall representing a client where conduct was an issue. He had to be advised about that, and as I was representing him I had to put the case about those matters. Equally, I had to deal with someone with a criminal record. It was not particularly relevant. He had not been convicted of a violent crime, so it was not particularly germane to whether he should have a deduction or, at any rate, a significant deduction. One of my most vivid recollections is of a very sad case of a lorry driver who was driving his lorry and was the victim of a road accident in which the driver of a sports car rammed into him head on and went underneath the cab of this client’s vehicle. He sustained some physical injury but, much worse, he sustained severe post-traumatic stress.
This was a complex case in medical terms and in terms of the quantum that the client might be seeking—at that point, there was no tariff. The case took a considerable time, and we were able to secure an interim payment for him. Tragically, this man took his own life as a result of the post-traumatic stress. In those circumstances, his widow had a sustainable claim, and the case went on. I am not saying that that was a typical case, but it is an example, perhaps a most acute example, of a case where legal advice and assistance was indispensable to the client. There will be others of that kind for which such advice will not be available in future. That cannot be right. I simply add this to the list of cases for which the amount that it would cost to restore or retain legal aid and advice to scope would be relatively modest, and accordingly I beg to move.
My Lords, I have listened carefully to the representations and arguments put forward. Amendment 90 would delete paragraph 16 of Part 2 of Schedule 1:
“Civil legal services provided in relation to compensation under the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme”.
I think I am right in saying that the architecture does not apply right across the board for criminal injuries, but only in cases that are brought within scope under Part 1.
I note what the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, said about the potential complexity of applying and the advice given to possible applicants, although I think it is fair to say that applications can be made online and by telephone, and the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority itself provides help and guidance.
I rather suspect that the numbers involved are small, although I could not indicate just how many, but I have listened, I believe that some important points have been made, and I want to reflect on this—without any commitment. On that basis, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
I am extremely grateful for—not to say surprised and delighted by—the noble and learned Lord’s generous offer, and I hope that we can take matters forward in the spirit that the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, referred to. I withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, in the interests of life, liberty and the pursuit of nourishment, I will be uncharacteristically brief in moving these amendments which relate to Clause 10 and the qualifications for civil legal aid.
Amendment 93 seeks to delete subsection (4):
“In setting the criteria, the Lord Chancellor must seek to secure that, in cases in which there is more than one description of service that could be provided for an individual, the individual qualifies under this Part for the service which in all the circumstances is the most appropriate having regard to the criteria”.
What that means and how significant it is escapes me. Perhaps in replying the noble Lord, Lord McNally, could amplify the meaning of it. In addition, another curious subsection states:
“The criteria must reflect the principle that, in many disputes, mediation and other forms of dispute resolution are more appropriate than legal proceedings”.
It may be a fact but it can hardly be a principle—but that may be me being pedantic again. I have already been rebuked by my noble friend Lord Bach for correcting his use of the word “decimate”. The noble Lord, Lord McNally, may wish to rebuke me in this context.
Amendment 95 is simply designed to ensure that, if regulations are made, draft regulations should be laid before and approved by an affirmative resolution in each House of Parliament. We have had this amendment moved in respect of other regulations. It seems appropriate in this case that we should follow that course. I beg to move.
My Lords, I would not dare to try to correct the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, on his English. I am still recovering from being corrected by the noble Lord, Lord Prescott, earlier in the Bill. I move in these circles with due caution.
I will address Amendment 95 first, which echoes the recommendation by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee to subject changes to the merits criteria to the affirmative resolution procedure. We have given careful consideration to what the committee said in its report about the procedure for the regulations under Clause 10(1)(b) and it is our intention to bring forward an amendment at a later stage to provide for regulations under Clause 10(1)(b) to generally be subject to the affirmative procedure. However, the amendment will also need to provide for a procedure along the lines of but not necessarily identical to that in Section 9(7) and (8) of the Access to Justice Act 1999 to allow for changes to be made quickly if necessary. With that explanation and assurance, I hope the noble Lord will not press his amendment.
Amendment 93 seeks to remove Clause 10(4) from the Bill. Clause 10(4) is based firmly on Section 8(4) of the Access to Justice Act 1999, which also contains an equivalent provision about the merits criteria. The funding code criteria made pursuant to Section 8 of the Access to Justice Act enshrine this principle. The purpose of Clause 10(4) is clear. It ensures that, where more than one level of service might be available, the merits criteria in the regulations under Clause 10 should be sure that the individual qualifies for the services which in all circumstances are the most appropriate having regard to the criteria. Often, one level of service will be most appropriate at the beginning of a case but the need of the applicant will change over time as the case progresses. Section 8(4) of the Access to Justice Act accounts for this.
The benefits of the provisions in Clause 10(4) are twofold. First, we can avoid unnecessary spending by ensuring that the appropriate level of service is funded. Secondly, applicants will benefit by receiving the level of service most appropriate to their needs. This is not a one-way street. There are likely to be instances where it would clearly be more appropriate for representation rather than help to be provided. The assessment will be an objective one, based on the criteria and all the circumstances of the individual case. In those circumstances, I hope the noble Lord will withdraw his amendments.
I am grateful to the noble Lord for confirming that changes will be made with respect to the regulation. I am happy to accept his explanation of what seemed beyond my limited intellectual grasp in that subsection. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.