Higher Education: Overseas Students

Debate between Lord Bates and Viscount Hanworth

Thursday 10th December 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bates]

In terms of numbers, the UK remains the second most attractive country in the world for students to come to. After they have studied, if they apply for a graduate-level skilled job—which certainly someone graduating in the sciences would be able to do—they would be welcome to transfer from the tier 4 visa to the tier 2 visa; if they want to stay on for an internship they can apply for a tier 5 visa; and if they want to set up a business they can stay on under the tier 1 visa. There are lots of opportunities for the brightest and best people to stay on, and we want that to continue.

[Viscount Hanworth (Lab)]

Some institutions surely take in rather few overseas students. Has it not occurred to the Government that a percentage threshold of visa refusals is entirely inappropriate in such cases? Might they not think of an alternative threshold in such cases?

[Lord Bates]

The threshold is there to trigger whether there is a potential abuse of the system. When we came into power in 2010 we inherited the old points-based system. This was poorly run and not robust and we wanted to strengthen it with tests. That is why we closed down 900 bogus colleges. At the same time as the clamp-down on the bogus aspects of it, we have seen an increase in the quality of students who are choosing to make their investment in education in the UK. That shows that the system is working.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Debate between Lord Bates and Viscount Hanworth

Wednesday 4th February 2015 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Hanworth (Lab)]

My Lords, I had an opportunity earlier this afternoon to read the letter from the noble Lord, Lord Bates, to those who intended to participate in today’s Report stage. I express my appreciation of his consideration in writing, but I must observe that the fast-track schedule of the Bill is severely impeding its proper parliamentary scrutiny. The Government have not given themselves enough time to think.

The letter points to the Government’s amendments of Monday that represented their response to the widely expressed anxieties about the way in which the statutory Prevent strategy was liable to conflict with the duty of freedom of speech enjoined by the Act of 1986. The Government also tabled an amendment two days ago that is ostensibly intended to ensure that the guidance issued in connection with the Prevent strategy will be subject to parliamentary scrutiny. In the judgment of the proposers of the current amendments, the Government’s concessions are inadequate. They are therefore calling for something more extensive and secure.

The letter of the noble Lord, Lord Bates, observes that, between 1999 and 2009, a full 30% of persons convicted of terrorist offences associated with al-Qaeda had attended a higher education institution. It is difficult to place this figure in an appropriate context, but given the extent of participation in higher education of the relevant age group, this seems a strikingly low figure. It might be interpreted as an indication of the efficacy of higher education institutions in diminishing the threat of terrorism.

The effect of higher education is typically to stimulate individualistic freedom of thought—the very antithesis of the dogmatic nostrums of the radical Islamists, which differ so markedly from the religious injunctions of Islam. A liberal higher education is undoubtedly a most effective means of combating ideological extremism. The success of British institutions of higher education as effective agents of counterterrorism ought to be widely recognised. Instead, the Government’s statutory Prevent strategy, which promises to be clumsy and intrusive, threatens to subvert the role of higher education in countering Islamic radicalisation.

Another aspect of the statutory Prevent strategy disturbs me. It concerns the cost and bureaucracy that will be imposed on the designated institutions. As I observed in a previous debate, there has been a hypertrophy of bureaucracy in British universities for which the interventions of central government have been largely responsible. Nowadays, in almost every institution, the numbers of administrative staff exceed those of teaching staff—and by a significant margin in many cases. The Prevent strategy, with its specially appointed officers, mandated staff training courses, obligation to report compliance with its nostrums and duty to inform the police and others of any suspicions and anxieties, is a bureaucratic nightmare. Finally, I have to wonder whose opinions have been elicited by the consultation on the draft guidance. If, as I strongly suspect, those few opinions have come predominantly from the administrative faculties of universities, then I suggest they should be treated with due caution.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Bates) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for moving this amendment and giving the opportunity to put one or two additional points on record. This amendment would not permit guidance to be issued to universities until a report had been laid before Parliament setting out the impact of—

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Debate between Lord Bates and Viscount Hanworth

Wednesday 28th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Hanworth (Lab)]

My Lords, my name is also attached to the amendments in this group and I strongly support the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Phillips.

One of the most arresting testimonies that I have heard recently concerns the way in which the alienation and radicalisation of young British Muslims has been related to a rising tide of Islamophobia. It would be wrong to suggest that the existing Prevent strategy is grounded in Islamophobia, but there are clear indications that it has added to the sense of alienation. In other words, the strategy has already become counterproductive. By placing the strategy on a statutory basis and by mandating acts of surveillance on the part of various public institutions, the damage that has already been done is in danger of being exacerbated. The danger can only be averted if the Prevent agenda is pursued with sensitivity and with a light touch and if it is subject to careful and ongoing parliamentary scrutiny. Amendment 115A and the other amendments with which it has been grouped seek to ensure that there will be some scrutiny at the outset. I observe that these amendments are conformable with Amendments 112C and 112E, which concern the need to review the guidance on subsequent occasions.

The consultation document titled Prevent Duty Guidance gives an indication of what might transpire if the strategy were unleashed in an unbridled manner. It has the potential to give rise to an era comparable to the post-war era of anti-communist persecution in the United States, known as the era of McCarthyism. The document describes a duty to prevent people from becoming terrorists and a duty to challenge terrorist ideas. These duties will be imposed on specified institutions: hospitals, schools, prisons, young offender institutions, universities and local authorities. The intention is that the Secretary of State should have the freedom to specify the duties that will be incumbent upon each category of institution, without submitting them to parliamentary scrutiny. Little regard has been given to the potential within the institutions for fulfilling such duties. Nevertheless, it is proposed to establish an inspection regime that will determine whether the duties are being fulfilled. If they are not fulfilled, then it is proposed that penalties may be imposed.

Specially appointed agents may be assigned to the institutions to ensure their compliance with the statutory obligations. We are told that the specified institutions must demonstrate evidence of productive co-operation with local Prevent organisations, the police and local authorities. Those in positions of leadership must ensure that the staff of their institutions implement their Prevent duties effectively. To this end, they will need to ensure that the staff are appropriately trained.

People suspected of being involved in terrorist-related activities must be reported to the police. If I understand correctly, terrorist-related activities are deemed to include non-violent extremism, which would make the category very wide and ill-defined. All the activities in fulfilment of the duties must be recorded, and reports of compliance must be made available on request.

These provisions are quite sufficient for the creation of a totalitarian police state. If that sounds far-fetched, that it is only because, in view of the nature of British society and its ingrained resistance to tyranny, such an outcome seems unimaginable. However, I suggest that our complacency in itself is not a sufficient protection against tyranny. Instead, we need to ensure that our legislation does not sanction such dangerously oppressive powers. To fulfil the various injunctions of the statutory Prevent strategy, the institutions will need to establish specialised units. The Home Office will be charged with monitoring all the resulting Prevent activity and ensuring that every specified institution has a suitable inspection regime.

An immediate concern is the expense that would be entailed in even a partial fulfilment of the agenda of the statutory Prevent programme. In this connection, I can speak of what I have experienced within the university environment. There are already precedents that provide ample warning of the deleterious effects of centrally directed inspection regimes. I have in mind the quality-assurance regimes to which universities have been subjected since the late 1980s. These have entailed considerable expense. They have pre-empted the time of lecturers and others, who have been required to provide extensive documentation of their activities and to submit reports to demonstrate compliance with the nostrums of the regimes. They have inhibited flexibility and innovation and imposed a heavy workload. This is exactly what we should expect from a centrally imposed, statutory Prevent agenda. The superfluous compulsory training courses that it mandates and the reports of compliance that will be demanded are aspects that are all too familiar to those who have served in universities in recent years. The injunction that lecturers should spy upon their students will subvert the essential relationship between staff and students. It will make it difficult for those charged with the pastoral care of students to discern what is actually happening in their lives. The injunction that all visiting lecturers should submit their material to prior inspection is absurd and unworkable; others have already commented on this point.

Finally, I should say that there is no evidence that I am aware of to suggest that the existing voluntary Prevent programme has been effective in averting terrorist outrages. Instead, this has been achieved by careful police work that has depended on the close co-operation of the Muslim community. To an extent that cannot be determined, it has been assisted by covert—that is to say, non-intrusive—surveillance and cyber-intelligence. It is these aspects of the counterterrorist strategy that need to be enhanced. A statutory Prevent strategy will be of no assistance in either connection.

[Lord Bates]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for moving the amendment and giving us the opportunity to consider the important issues that he has raised. I agree with him that it is quite proper that the Government undertake reviews of policy and strategies from time to time to ensure they remain relevant and effective. The Government comprehensively reviewed the Prevent strategy in 2011. Since then, we have kept the various elements of the strategy under review. This has been part of regular business and in particular part of the annual report on our counterterrorism strategy, Contest, which is laid before Parliament. In the light of that, we have expanded the Prevent priority areas to reflect the changing threat, prioritised those that we feel are most effective and increased guidance and support for the voluntary Channel programme. In addition, the Prime Minister’s extremism task force was established in the wake of the murder of Drummer Lee Rigby,

“to identify any areas where the current approach was lacking”.

That task force reported in December 2013, just over one year ago. One of its conclusions was that delivery of Prevent should be put on a statutory footing in areas of the country where extremism was of most concern. The duty outlined in Clause 21 does just that. It does not limit itself to specific areas of the country. As the subsequent geographical spread of travellers to Syria has shown, such travellers can come from areas beyond those of most concern and listed under the current arrangements for Prevent.

Reviews of strategies can take many months to complete. It would be wrong in our view if we were to ignore the findings of the extremism task force and delay the implementation of this important duty in order to carry out yet another review. Should such a review take place at some point and recommend, in the light of actual experience of the implementation of the duty, that changes be made—for example to the authorities listed in Schedule 3—then the Government would be able at that point to lay regulations amending that schedule, which would need to be approved by both Houses.

Regarding the report to be provided prior to commencement, we have already published impact assessments on the measures in the Bill. As for the comparable legislation in other countries, the UK’s efforts in the field of Prevent are considered by most of our allies to be several years in advance of where they currently are.

I say to the noble Viscount, Lord Hanworth, who spoke on this, that when we are talking about a duty that is effectively about the upholding of democracy, tolerance and respect for others I do not think it is in any way appropriate to draw upholding those values akin to a totalitarian approach. I know that he was trying perhaps to provoke us into some further response. What we are talking about here is how, as a free liberal society, we react to a growing threat from within our society from people who seek to challenge those very basic freedoms and who pose a serious risk through potential violence to individuals, be they on campuses or in wider society. That was why when we had an extensive review of the Prevent strategy—which was launched in 2010 and, I think, published in 2011—it took the view that we should focus on national security as the priority of Prevent. That is why the Prevent programme has changed to being one of safeguarding and protecting people’s liberties in our society. I think that is right. It is kept under review, as I have tried to outline to my noble friend, and there are opportunities caused by that systematic review for Parliament to consider the progress of the strategy as it moves forward. In the light of that, I wonder if he might feel able to withdraw his amendment.