(5 years, 11 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, Her Majesty’s Treasury is in the process of laying statutory instruments under the European Union (Withdrawal) Act in order to deliver a functioning legislative and regulatory regime for financial services in the event of a no-deal scenario. The two SIs being debated in this group are part of this programme and will fix deficiencies in UK law relating to the UK’s prudential regime, which ensures that financial institutions hold sufficient capital and appropriately measure and manage their risks, and also relating to the UK’s bank resolution regime, which ensures that the UK authorities have the necessary tools to manage the failure of a bank, investment firm or building society in an orderly way. The approach taken in these SIs aligns with that of other SIs being laid and debated under the withdrawal Act by maintaining existing legislation at the point of exit to provide continuity but amending it where necessary to ensure that it works effectively in a no-deal scenario.
The first statutory instrument being considered today concerns the capital requirements framework, which aims to prevent the failure of financial institutions by setting prudential rules that apply to banks, investment firms and building societies. These rules are currently set through the EU capital requirements regulation and the EU capital requirements directive. The second statutory instrument relates to the bank recovery and resolution directive, which sets out the requirements that ensure that firms’ failures can be managed in an orderly way, avoiding the need for costly public bailouts. In a no-deal scenario, the UK would be outside the European Economic Area and outside the EU financial services framework. To ensure that the legislation continues to operate effectively in the UK once the UK has left the EU, these SIs will make amendments to retained EU law in relation to the capital requirements regulation and the bank recovery and resolution directive so that the legislation will continue to function effectively in a no-deal scenario.
I note that, in line with the general approach taken to the onshoring of EU legislation, both statutory instruments will transfer a number of functions currently within the remit of EU authorities, particularly the European Banking Authority and the European Securities and Markets Authority, to relevant UK bodies. These functions, such as the development of detailed technical rules on certain provisions of the regulations, will now be carried out by appropriate UK bodies: the Financial Conduct Authority, the Prudential Regulation Authority or the Bank of England. For example, the responsibility for binding technical standards under the bank resolution and recovery regime is being transferred to the Bank of England, given that it is the UK’s resolution authority. The PRA and FCA have extensive experience in setting firm-specific rules for international firms, and are therefore the most appropriate domestic institutions to take on these functions from the European supervisory authorities. The regulators are undertaking public consultations on the changes that they propose to make to binding technical standards.
These statutory instruments further confer regulation-making powers on the Treasury to replace delegated powers that were previously conferred on the European Commission, in line with the approach taken in other Treasury legislation.
The draft capital requirements regulations 2018 make changes primarily to the retained EU capital requirements regulation but also to certain domestic secondary legislation implementing the EU capital requirements directive. First, they introduce changes to the group consolidation regime. When the UK leaves the EU, we will also leave the EU supervisory regime. This means that we will need to limit the geographical scope of the capital and liquidity consolidation rules to the UK, rather than on an EU-wide basis as currently. This will introduce a new layer of liquidity consolidation in the UK, though it will not affect the application of consolidated capital requirements, which are currently calculated at the member state level.
Secondly, the draft regulations remove preferential capital treatment currently available for exposures to certain EU institutions and assets, including sovereign debt. The EU capital requirements regulation currently applies a zero-risk weighting to certain categories of EU assets such as sovereign debt. This means that firms do not have to hold capital for their exposure to such assets and are therefore incentivised to invest in them. In line with our general cross-government approach, it is our policy not to grant the EU unilateral preferential treatment in the absence of an assessment of equivalence after exit day. We will therefore end the preferential capital treatment for EU assets currently subject to the zero-risk weighting.
Finally, the draft regulations introduce changes meaning that UK regulators will no longer have to obtain approval from EU institutions before using macroprudential tools to address systemic risks, including in a financial crisis. This is appropriate given the UK would be a third country and will need the UK regulators to be able exercise macroprudential functions effectively in times of financial stress.
I turn now to the bank recovery and resolution statutory instrument, which amends the Banking Act 2009 and related domestic and retained EU legislation by making the following principal amendments. First, the draft regulations amend the scope of the UK’s third-country resolution recognition framework to include EEA-led resolutions. This ensures that, in a no-deal scenario, the same approach will be followed for both EEA and third countries in recognising third-country resolution actions.
Secondly, this statutory instrument removes deficient references requiring UK regulators to follow the specific operational and procedural mechanisms set out in the BRRD to co-operate with the EEA authorities. The removal of these references will not, however, prevent UK regulators from co-operating with their EEA counterparts after exit. UK regulators will remain able to share information with EEA authorities in the same way as they currently do with authorities in third countries such as the United States. Additionally, the UK will continue to participate in international crisis management groups which enhance co-operation between home and host authorities of systemically important banks.
Finally, the draft regulations address deficient cross-references to the BRRD in UK legislation and ensure that delegated regulations retained by the European Union (Withdrawal) Act continue to be in a workable form following exit.
To summarise, the Government believe that these statutory instruments are needed to ensure that the regulatory regime applying to banks, building societies and investment firms works effectively if the UK leaves the EU without a deal or an implementation period. I commend the regulations to the Committee.
My Lords, before the debate begins, it may be helpful if I explain that the rather quaint little hats sitting on the ends of some of the microphones are an indication that they are not working.
(8 years, 12 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Baroness is right, and that is why we have a ground-breaking, leading campaign called This is Abuse. The campaign plays a key part in that, as well as ensuring that there is appropriate sex and relationships education in schools. People need to understand the word “consent” and the meaning of the word “abuse”, and to live by those terms.
Does the Minister agree that, where different authorities and persons hold evidence, they should actually talk to one another?
That is absolutely right. It is very important that the cross-ministerial group, chaired by the Home Secretary, ensures that there is a joined-up response on these issues. That is also one of the purposes of the domestic violence disclosure scheme—the so-called Clare’s law—which allows people to find out whether a potential partner, whom they might be bringing into their home, has a violent or abusive past.