Lord Bates
Main Page: Lord Bates (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Bates's debates with the Home Office
(9 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, following on from what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has just said, it may be possible to add to the amendment the words, “or in the case of emergency”.
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for giving us an opportunity to discuss this issue again. It was part of a very large group of amendments in Committee, so I would like to put on the record some additional remarks which I hope will provide further reassurances about the circumstances in which the power may be exercised.
The Government are absolutely committed to the appropriate and proportionate use of the power to seize travel documents. The impact of this amendment would be to reduce the effectiveness of the power and the speed at which it could be used. We should remember that the context for this is that we have up to 600 people suspected of travelling to Syria and engaging in terrorism-related activities. It is in that context that we are seeking to disrupt, if not stop, such actions. This gets to the heart of the purpose of this power, which is to disrupt immediately the travel of individuals who are reasonably suspected of travelling for terrorism-related activity and to give the police time to investigate them.
It may of course be, as my noble friend Lady Buscombe mentioned, that this happens in the context of a tip-off, which might be from a security source or from a family member who at that point has some fear of the individual. There could be reasons why it is not possible to give more detailed reasons. However, a police officer of superintendent rank would have had to have been satisfied that the reasonable suspicion grounds had been met. It would be inappropriate to reveal the source or content of that information. There would need to be a full consideration of what the individual could be told, and this is likely to involve gisting—which I will come back to in a second.
Given the immediacy of the power, it would be impractical to conduct this consideration at port, and it would potentially damage prosecution prospects to do so at this point. However, if the police apply to extend the retention period, they must give as much information as possible about the reasons the individual’s passport was retained, without prejudicing national security. The Bill contains robust authorisation and review processes to ensure that the power is appropriately and lawfully used.
I did not make the following remarks in Committee—I am trying to add to the reply which I gave then. First, the reasonable suspicion test must be met. The use of reasonable suspicion as an evidential standard is used in relation to many other police powers. What constitutes reasonable suspicion will depend on the circumstances in each individual case, but there must be an objective basis for the constable’s state of mind, based on the facts, and it must be specific to the individual. At the point of seizure, the individual will be informed that their travel documents were seized because there were reasonable grounds to suspect that they were intending to travel overseas for the purpose of involvement in terrorist-related activity outside the UK. The police are not detaining the individual, nor are they permanently removing the individual’s passport privileges.
Secondly, the police are under a statutory duty to return the travel documents as soon as possible if the test is no longer met and investigations do not substantiate grounds to support further action being taken in respect of the person. Thirdly, a senior police officer of at least superintendent level must authorise the decision to exercise the power. Fourthly, this senior police officer’s authorisation is further reviewed by a police officer of at least the rank of chief superintendent, and this review must be started within 72 hours of the seizure. Fifthly, the reviewer’s findings must be reported to the chief constable of the force which exercised the power and he or she must consider those findings and take appropriate action. Sixthly, unless a court agrees to extend the retention period, the police must return the travel documents after 14 days from the point at which the documents were seized.
The whole process is further governed by a statutory code of practice, which my noble friend Lady Hamwee referred to in her introduction, which makes provision for how officers are to exercise the power and ensures proper use of it. The code also provides that a person who has had their passport seized may write to the police requesting that the reasons are provided for the exercise of the power. The police must respond, following detailed consideration of any sensitive information. Therefore, an individual can receive more detailed reasons as to why the power was used in their case, even when the passport is returned very promptly.
As the Bill stands, there is a clear threshold that must be met to justify the exercise of the power. The disclosure of any information relating to national security requires careful consideration on a case-by-case basis. This amendment would require such considerations to have taken place before the power could be exercised. A police officer at port would not be able to make this judgment. As I said, this would have the effect of preventing the power being used as intended as a disruptive measure. In the light of this and of the extensive and robust safeguards already in place to govern the exercise of this power, the Government believe that the change proposed in this amendment is not necessary and would have the consequence of inhibiting the use of this important power.
My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Buscombe, quite reasonably asked us to imagine a situation. I understand what she described. But perhaps we should also imagine the reaction of the individual—so the whole of the scene.
My noble friend the Minister talked about the return of documents as soon as possible, senior authorisation, the 72-hour limit, the role of the chief constable and the court, and so on. None of those is likely to satisfy the individual at the point at which they have been stopped. Let us say that you are an outraged, innocent traveller. Everything that has been described by way of safeguard is after the event. On the point about profiling and discrimination, perception is so important. The safeguards will not answer that point.
My noble friend said that the amendment was not necessary. It may not be necessary in terms of reasonable suspicion—that is not my argument—but something is necessary, even if it is difficult. On giving reasons at the earliest opportunity, I take the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Buscombe, that the police may not know at this point. I can imagine that there might be an urgent phone call to the effect that so and so is likely to go through border control in 30 minutes’ time or on to such and such a flight, and the services will need time. However, that having been said, the code does not even provide for an explanation at the earliest opportunity. It talks about “requesting reasons”; it puts the onus back on the traveller. However, the officer may not know the reasons—so you can request them as much as you like but you will not be given them by somebody who has not been informed of them.
I take the point about security. I suspect that these situations might all be emergencies. To conclude, is there some way of encapsulating and dealing with this concern? If it is not in the Bill at Third Reading, could there be at the very least a change to the code to make the arrangement more human for the person affected? I would be very happy between now and next week to try and thrash out how this might be provided.
On the latter point, of course the code is open to consultation. I certainly give an undertaking that my noble friend’s remarks will be fed into that consultation process.
I thank my noble friend and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I return in this set of amendments to matters that I raised in Committee. I do so as a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which is concerned about the inadequacy of providing for the right to a fair hearing on these matters under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. I say immediately that we recognise the availability of judicial review but the availability of JR alone is not sufficient to satisfy the requirement of the right to a fair hearing under Article 6.
I remind the House that this Bill gives a significant power to the authorities to remove a passport and prevent someone travelling. It provides for a judicial consideration only after 14 days, so you do not go immediately to a court unless you seek judicial review. However, after 14 days the judge is under a duty to extend the period of retention of the passport for a further 30 days so long as he or she is satisfied that the investigation into the person is being conducted “diligently and expeditiously”. That is the only test for the judge at that point. We can well imagine someone turning up to say, “We need to keep this passport longer because we are still making our inquiries and working as fast as we can”. All of us who know how the courts work know that it is very hard for a judge to go behind the simple statements presented to the court.
The Bill provides for a closed material procedure at that hearing but makes no provision for the interests of the excluded party to be represented by a special advocate. You can ask for an extension, and for the person whose passport has been removed and the counsel representing them to remove themselves from the court. While in other circumstances that would immediately give rise to the special advocate procedure, here it does not.
It was the view of the Joint Committee that the best way to ensure compatibility with Article 6 was to amend Schedule 1 to the Bill so that it provides a genuinely judicial system of what we called “warrants of further retention”, directly analogous to the system of warrants of further detention of terrorism suspects in Schedule 8 to the Terrorism Act 2000. In fact, that has been used as the model in these circumstances, except for this set of provisions. I know that in Committee the Minister said that detention warrants were of greater seriousness than removing someone’s passport, but we would remind the House that interfering with family and private life by seizing someone’s passport is rather important and a significant intrusion into one’s liberties. However, the standards that we would expect seem to be absent.
The amendments put forward in my name fall under a number of different headings. The length of the period of retention concerns us; it should be seven days, not 14. The grounds that must be satisfied for a judicial warrant of further retention should be gisted and a summary of the withheld information, at least, should be provided to the court. That is different from the position proposed in the previous amendment because although lawyers would be involved at that point, a constable at the scene, say, could not be expected somehow at short notice to provide a statement that did not in any way risk disclosure of sensitive information. In this case, lawyers would have already been involved and gisting would have been perfectly possible.
Therefore, my set of amendments deals with these matters and reflects the amendments proposed in Committee. They provide for proper judicial oversight, which should happen speedily—not within 14 days but seven. We would expect, as in any other procedures whereby liberty and citizens’ rights were seriously being interfered with, there to be opportunities for knowing, at that point and in gisted form, the reasons for retention. If there are going to be closed procedures, the special advocate procedure should be invoked. That is what this set of amendments seeks to do. Given the seriousness of this matter—because it is a great intrusion—I hope that, having had some time to reflect, this House, the Minister and the Government will decide that that is the proper way in which to deal with such a significant interference with citizens’ rights. I beg to move.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness for again moving the amendment. At the outset, I should say that I recognise absolutely that we are talking about a serious matter here and that there should be safeguards. The issue between us—and the Joint Committee, for that matter—is on whether we believe that the safeguards are indeed adequate.
The noble Baroness is suggesting that taking a passport for up to 30 days is an infringement of liberty, and we accept that. However, for reasons that she pre-empted, we do not accept that that is equivalent to the pre-charge detention arrangements under Schedule 8 to the 2000 Act. This is very much a disruption technique. Of course we recognise that this is an infringement and it needs to be carefully monitored. Her amendment would name an extension of the seizure period a “warrant of further retention”, and seeks to draw an analogy with the Act to which I have just referred. I hope that noble Lords will agree that this is not an appropriate analogy, for the following reasons.
Individuals subject to this power will remain at liberty. Their passport privileges are not removed permanently. During the period that the police hold that person’s passport, the police and others need to work diligently and expeditiously to investigate further the nature of the information. Due to the nature of the hearing envisaged in a number of the amendments in this group, the court would need to provide for closed material proceedings with the appointment of special advocates. As the House will know, closed material proceedings are resource intensive; it would be challenging, if not impossible, for such a hearing to take place within that initial seizure period. Indeed, by the time that it is heard, the travel documents might already have been returned, or alternative disruption action might have been taken. This power is already subject to considerable safeguards, which are proportionate to the level of interference.
Let me briefly reiterate the measures in place to ensure that this power will be used in a fair, reasonable and lawful manner. First, the reasonable suspicion test must be met. I will summarise the points because they also relate to the previous group. This is a clear threshold that is well understood by the police to justify the exercise of the power. At the point of seizure, the individual will be informed that his or her travel documents are to be seized because there are reasonable grounds to suspect that he or she is intending to travel overseas for the purpose of involvement in terrorism-related activity outside the UK. The disclosure of any further information would require careful consideration on a case-by-case basis.
My Lords, Amendments 3 and 4 are also in this group. In Committee, I raised the issue not only of “arrangements”—the term used in the schedule—for persons unable to leave the United Kingdom after the retention of travel documents, but arrangements for their travelling companions. The Secretary of State can make arrangements for the person concerned, but often people do not travel by themselves, and those who are with them will be affected as well, as the noble Baroness just said. My noble friend Lord Ashton said that the debate had,
“highlighted a potential gap in the current provisions”,
and said that,
“the Government are committed to considering this issue in greater detail”.—[Official Report, 20/1/15; col. 1257.]
My question is, of course, whether the Government have now had a chance to consider the situation. If we do not refer to other people in the Bill, and if it is a fair point that arrangements for companions of the traveller in question should be considered, is there some other basis on which the arrangements could be made without the provision being ultra vires? I beg to move.
My noble friend Lord Ashton indeed undertook to go back to consider whether the intention was that those travelling companions would be covered. The brief answer is that I can confirm that parliamentary counsel’s view is that that is indeed the case under the current wording. I hope that that will provide assurance, but for the purpose of the record, I can confirm that paragraph 14 of Schedule 1 already gives the Secretary of State sufficient scope in appropriate circumstances to make arrangements for travel companions of a person whose travel documents are retained. That is because such arrangements will relate to the person subject to the exercise of the power. An amendment to the Bill to apply that provision to travelling companions is therefore in our view, and that of counsel, unnecessary.
Amendment 3 would widen the ability of Paragraph 14 to include where a person is,
“unable to make the journey to which the travel relates”.
The additional wording is unnecessary, as it is captured in the current drafting of,
“unable to leave the United Kingdom”.
For that reason, we are unable to accept the amendment; but I hope, having had the opportunity to clarify that important provision, that my noble friend will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, that is good news. I had not thought that the words “in relation to” the person could extend to “in relation to relations”, as it were. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I want to add words of support for the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. Providing the “gist”, as it was referred to by the Joint Committee, would certainly dispel some of the concerns that could arise about the potential random use of these powers, even if they were not so used. Providing that little bit more information, with individuals having direct experience of the reasoning, rather than the oversight process that would follow, would have a useful purpose.
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for moving this amendment and for giving me the opportunity to put further remarks on the record in relation to the imposition and operation of temporary exclusion orders. The amendments tabled by my noble friends seek to make provision for the Secretary of State to provide a temporary exclusion order subject with a summary of the reasons for the decision to impose the order on them. They also seek to ensure that a permit to return is not invalidated if the individual who fails to comply with a specified condition has a reasonable excuse.
My noble friend tabled an amendment similar to Amendment 8 during Committee. I responded at the time by providing the reasoning for the decision on the subject of the temporary exclusion order. In her previous amendment, she sought to oblige the Secretary of State to disclose the reasons behind her decision. In Amendment 8 she seeks to oblige the Secretary of State to disclose a summary of these reasons. However, the very nature of the information on which the Secretary of State is likely to base the decision to impose a temporary exclusion order means that its disclosure, whether in full or as a summary, could damage national security and might put lives at risk.
As I told the Committee when we discussed this matter previously, it is of course important that the individual is informed that they are subject to a temporary exclusion order, that that is done as soon as possible and that they are given an indication of why this is the case. However, again this must be balanced against the implications of the disclosure of such information. The Government take very seriously the decision to impose counterterrorism measures on individuals and the responsibility to provide those individuals with an indication of why the measure has been imposed. However, the Government also have a responsibility to protect the national security of this country and to ensure the safety of our citizens, which could be put at risk by the disclosure of such sensitive information.
I therefore trust that your Lordships will understand that it would not be appropriate for a temporary exclusion order subject to be provided with a summary of the reasoning behind the Secretary of State’s decision. Any notice given to the individual will state that the Secretary of State has reasonable suspicion that they have been involved in terrorism-related activity abroad. We believe that that is sufficient disclosure and that it informs the individual of the basis for the decision, while protecting sensitive information.
Amendment 9 would prevent the permit to return being invalidated where the individual had given a reasonable excuse for failing to comply with the conditions of the permit. Again, this is similar to an amendment tabled by my noble friend in Committee, during which my noble friend Lord Ashton assured her that the amendment was unnecessary. If a temporary exclusion order subject fails to comply with the conditions of the permit to return due to circumstances outside his or her control, the individual would be able to show a reasonable excuse for returning other than in accordance with a permit to return. In those circumstances, the person would not be criminalised. The objective of the amendment is therefore already achieved by the current drafting relating to the offence.
In the event that the individual failed to comply with a condition of the permit to return before travelling back to the UK, the Government would apply discretion to issue a new permit without the condition in question. Any other failure to comply due to the actions or decisions of the individual would understandably result in the invalidation of the permit to return. The Secretary of State will only place conditions on the permit to return that she deems necessary to manage the safe return of the individual and minimise the threat that he or she poses to the UK. Failure to comply with any of these conditions is a serious matter and must be handled accordingly.
Before the Minister rises, I will just say that, as I understand what is proposed by my noble and learned friend Lord Brown, he is not saying that the courts’ powers should be in any way unusual. This is really giving them an ordinary responsibility within the scope of judicial review as I have always understood it.
I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for moving the amendment. I was conscious of disagreeing with only one element of what my noble friend Lord Howard said. He said that he was going to disturb the tranquillity of the proceedings. From the perspective of the Government Whips’ Office and of Ministers, tranquillity is quite a sublime quality in debate on these matters. These matters evoke strong feelings on all sides of the House. My noble friend Lord Tebbit brought home from his personal experience the point that we are dealing with real threats to real lives. That is the ultimate threat to liberty that we are seeking to legislate for in the Bill before us.
I said that I would reflect on the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, last week, as I took it as seeking clarification. I was grateful to him for the time which he gave me, my officials and the legal team from the department in reviewing this matter. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Howard, put so succinctly, this is a matter of principle. It is a well observed principle that, in the realm of national security, the Executive have ultimate power, responsibility and accountability. That is the way that it has been, whether it is in relation to exercising royal prerogative over passports, temporary exclusion orders, interception of communications, excluding foreign nationals or deprivation of citizenship for those with dual nationality —I could go on. The principle is this: when it comes to national security, the Executive have to take the responsibility. That is an onerous responsibility to take. It is also entirely right, as the Bill provides for, that there should be an ability to challenge such a decision of the Secretary of State by way of judicial review and the courts.
I promised the noble and learned Lord that I would seek to put some additional words on the record which might give him some comfort. They are in relation to the technical legal point that he touched on, as did the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, but they do not seek to move away from the fundamental grounds on which the Government are resisting this amendment, that of not wanting to sacrifice the principle that it is the Secretary of State who should decide.
As part of the review of the TPIMs imposed in the cases of CC and CF, their legal representatives argued that in TPIM cases the reasonable belief test,
“requires that at least the foundation of past facts upon which the belief is predicated must be proved on the balance of probabilities”.
As part of Lord Justice Lloyd Jones’s consideration, he applied Judge Collins’s judgment in the case of BM, who said that,
“to found a reasonable belief that a subject is or has been involved in TRA”—
that is, terrorist related activities—
“and that a TPIM is necessary does not involve the requirement to establish involvement in specific TRA to any higher standard than that which can properly give rise to such a belief. No doubt some facts which go to forming the belief will be clearly established, others may be based on an assessment of the various pieces of evidence available. But there is certainly no requirement that particular TRA needs to be established to the standard of at least more probable than not”.
Based on this precedent, we expect that the courts will see the balance of probabilities as a higher standard and that this will impact on their consideration.
As the noble and learned Lord will be aware, the court will also seek to interpret the difference in wording, as it is entitled to do. His amendments seek to differentiate between the test which the Home Secretary is required to apply and that which the court is to apply. Given her remit in relation to a range of aspects of terrorism, the Home Secretary remains best placed to make a holistic decision to impose a TPIM notice in order to protect the public from terrorism. The Government hold firm to that principle, which has had cross-party support. I express my gratitude to my noble friends who have spoken against the amendment, I hope that, with that additional explanation, the noble and learned Lord will see why the Government take the position that they do and will not be able to support the amendment if it is pressed.
My Lords, I am grateful to all those who contributed to this debate and to the Minister for the words which indeed provide a little comfort. Perhaps my gratitude to the noble Lords, Lord Howard and Lord Tebbit, is slightly less pronounced than to others. I venture to suggest that the logic of their position would be that one should revert to the original test that the Secretary of State set for him or herself as to whether to make these orders: not one of reasonable belief but the lesser test of reasonable suspicion. The question in the present proposed Bill is simply, “Who ultimately should be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that this person is or has been involved in terrorism-related activity?”.
We are all against terrorism but we are also—I venture to believe and hope—all in favour of basic human rights and not making orders too readily against those who may well be as innocent as the day is long. In fact, Mr Anderson said in making this recommendation that it was in large part to give legitimacy to the process that we should make the court the final arbiter. He said that in fact he thought it would have made no difference to any of the earlier TPIM cases—but just think what assurance the public would have that only the right people were targeted.
As to the Minister’s point about it being invariably a matter of principle that the court’s powers did not go beyond those of judicial review, with respect—as I ventured to point out in Committee—that is not so. In the 2005 Act, Section 4(7)(a) provided in terms that the court could confirm a derogating control order only if,
“it is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the controlled person is an individual who is or has been involved in terrorism related activity”.
However, there it is. Given what may be thought to be the somewhat inactive—I restrain myself from saying “pusillanimous”—stance adopted by the Opposition here, clearly I will not divide the House. However, I suggest that there remains time, with a week before Third Reading, where the Minister could still come to recognise that there is much to be said in favour and, on true analysis, very little to be said against this amendment.
In terms of the Government’s position on this, it is a principle. We gave it a great deal of reflection and that is the position. I am afraid that I am not able to give any commitment that the government position will change between now and Third Reading. Therefore, should the noble and learned Lord wish to test the opinion of the House, he should do so now.
I was not relying on any reconsideration as a basis for not dividing the House. I merely say that it still remains open to the Government if they suddenly see the light. In the mean time, I take such comfort as I can from the words uttered today by the Minister. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, this has been an excellent debate. The points which have been raised have in effect focused on six main areas: the threat, the power, the amendments themselves, the draft Bill, the technology and the procedure. With the leave of the House, I will use those as the outline for my remarks.
I shall first say something about the nature of the threat because context is all in the legislation we are bringing forward. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, expressed his concerns about the nature of the threat. It is important to remind ourselves that since April 2010, more than 750 people have been arrested for terrorism-related offences. More than 210 have been charged and over 140 have been successfully prosecuted. In Committee, the former Director of Public Prosecutions, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, outlined some of the content of those cases and the intended acts of terrorism which those who were prosecuted had intended to carry out. We were horrified at the list he presented. Let us be clear: we are seeking to address a very real threat.
Other noble Lords, including my noble friend Lord Paddick, have made reference to the use of technology. Perhaps I may put this into context for the benefit of the noble Baroness, Lady Smith. Certain caricatures are not helpful here. Clearly she dealt with one, but let me deal with another one, which is that this legislation has somehow been left on the shelf to gather dust. That is not the case because of the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014—legislation that came directly out of the draft communications data Bill. That legislation was taken through this House on a fast-track basis last July. The IP and the technology elements contained in this Bill are also drawn from the communications data Bill. Moreover, since the start of this Government, the Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit has secured the removal of 65,000 items from the internet that were encouraging or glorifying acts of terrorism. More than 46,000 of those items have been removed since December last year. At present, content relating to ISIL, Syria and Iraq represents around 70% of the unit’s caseload. I do not want the House to be under any misapprehension as to the seriousness of the threat or that the police and the security services are not making daily efforts using the powers they have to keep us safe, and we should express our gratitude to them.
It is worth making another important point here. To say that taking forward measures of this nature to attack terrorism might somehow be seen as alienating the Muslim community—which was the example that was given—could not be further from the truth. Bombs and bullets do not discriminate between religions and faiths, as we saw in Paris where the personal protection officer for one of the journalists who was also murdered was a Muslim. We need to remember that as we move forward, and we also need to remember that we might not just be looking at terrorism by jihadists. Mohammed Saleem, an 82 year-old Muslim from Birmingham, was stabbed to death by a far right extremist who then went on to try to bomb mosques in Walsall, Wolverhampton and Tipton. These threats cross cultures and religions. We have talked about republican terrorist threats in Northern Ireland, but those are different. What we are talking about here are the specific acts of people who seek to subvert the democratic process and curb people’s freedom and liberty by undertaking violence in order to advance their cause.
Those are the points I wanted to make in relation to the threat, because it is real. Is there a gap? Yes, we believe that there is a gap, and that has been repeated on many occasions. The security services believe that these additional powers are absolutely necessary as a matter of urgency in order for them to work on closing the gap. We must recognise that the nature of the threat is mutating, if I may use that term, on almost a daily basis, such are the advances in the technologies and in the capricious use of them by those who seek to do us harm.
Perhaps I may turn now to the draft Bill which was under consideration. My noble friend Lord Carlile dwelt heavily upon this. We did have a debate in Committee and during that debate I did say that I would look again at what we could actually share with the House at that point. I have to say that we tried—again, I do not want to be caricatured by the notion that the Government took away a request that was made by a highly respected source, the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and then somehow forgot about it. We worked on that very seriously. When we looked at it carefully, there was a view that the amendments which had been shared with the noble Lords, Lord Blencathra and Lord Armstrong, were draft clauses and in many cases had been superseded by legislation which was contained in the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act and in this Bill. It was therefore felt that it would be unsafe to do anything at that stage. Moreover, those particular clauses were under the active consultation and review of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, as well as that of the police and the security services. For a whole host of reasons, it was felt that they would not be advisable. We did try to secure the review for noble Lords, but we were not able to do so at that time.
I turn now to the amendments which are before us. The amendments are significant, and I pay tribute to my noble friend Lord King, who has been tenacious in the way he has advanced his cause and pressed us on this issue over the past week. When a phone went off and the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, commented that it could be the Home Secretary for my noble friend, that might in fact have been the first hour that has gone by over the past week when there has not been a telephone conversation—not that the content of them could ever be disclosed, under any circumstances, under present legislation. There has been regular contact.
My right honourable friend the Prime Minister has said very clearly that he regards this as a priority and as a pressing need. The Home Secretary has said it is a priority and a pressing need. The important thing to say is that we do regard it as a priority, but not the amendments before us at this stage. This is a principal part of what we say to the sponsors of these particular amendments. It is perhaps made more difficult because of the legislative stage we are at with the Bill. We would be faced with sending the 14 pages and 18 or 19 clauses down to the other end, not for them to consider at Second Reading or to discuss and run through in Committee, but for them to vote on in a fairly truncated parliamentary procedure. That might be something which would cause concern. I am simply placing pieces of a jigsaw here to try to explain to my noble friend why, reluctantly, the Government feel that they are not able to support these amendments in their present form.
Then, of course, there is the procedure that we move on to from here, which has been settled. Section 7 of the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act says:
“The Secretary of State must appoint the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation to review the operation and regulation of investigatory powers … The independent reviewer must, in particular, consider … current and future threats to the United Kingdom … the capabilities needed to combat those threats … safeguards to protect privacy … the challenges of changing technologies … issues relating to transparency and oversight … the effectiveness of existing legislation (including its proportionality) and the case for new or amending legislation”.
That commitment was made in legislation and has to be delivered by 1 May. Further consideration is under way by the Royal United Services Institute, in addition to further consideration undertaken at the present time by the Intelligence and Security Committee, of which my noble friend is a distinguished former chairman. That work will be extremely important in informing us all in Parliament what the scope and content of that Bill should be.
Finally, I want to come to the point about timing. This is probably the strongest argument which my noble friend Lord King has put forward. The threat is real, and the need is now. We cannot see this as something which can be kicked into the long grass; it has to be a priority for the new Government. I believe that there is just reason to claim that that might be the case and that it may not be subject to the kind of experiences that I acknowledge he may have had with previous legislative arrangements. The Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act is sunsetted to the end of December 2016. If we work back from that, as we have done, we realise that we need legislation to replace that well in advance of that date, as there certainly cannot be any gap in the coverage of that very important power. If it needs to be in place before that, it necessarily needs to be introduced very early on in the next Session, to allow it to follow its appropriate course through Parliament.
I thank the Minister for giving way. Is he saying then that this will be a manifesto commitment?
The noble Lord will recognise that I am a little too junior to actually write the manifesto. What I can say for absolute certain is that the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary have made clear, in the most forthright terms, their personal belief that this legislation is needed and that it must be introduced as a matter of urgency in the new Parliament. I hope that that will deal with some of the scepticism which there might be about the power.
I was trying to set out that there is a particular legislative need. Whatever Government are there after the general election, they will have to start to do something very early on, simply because it will take seven to nine months to actually get it in place. However, when it does start, it will start with due consideration of the Joint Committee’s work and the excellent work of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. It will start with the excellent debates and consideration that we have had, thanks to my noble friend’s putting forward these amendments in Committee and now again on Report. It will have the benefit of the input of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, of the Intelligence and Security Committee and of other individuals who work in this area. It will be a better piece of legislation for that, providing that it is enacted.
With these comments, I am trying to be as frank as I can in explaining, in a transparent way, where we have got to—where we are—and where we need to be as a matter of urgency in the next Parliament. I hope that my noble friend will see that the Government are grateful for his urging and that we have responded by being more forthright than perhaps we have been before about our intentions. In that spirit, I hope that he will feel reassured enough to be able to withdraw the amendment at this stage.
My Lords, we have had another most excellent debate in what the whole House, I believe, recognises is an extremely serious and dangerous time. It is right that the House should be addressing this issue. I start by thanking the Minister for the way he has responded successively to two very important debates, first in Committee and now on Report. I thank him also for the extremely courteous and constructive way in which he has responded to the representations that I and other noble Lords have made. I thought that we were going to fall out for a moment, because I thought he said I had been tendentious—but I was corrected very quickly by my noble friend beside me, who told me that the word he had used was “tenacious”, which is certainly much more acceptable.
I will just address some of the comments that have been made. I do not mean to be unkind to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, but he rather repeated the speech that he made in Committee. He spent some time criticising the amendments we have put down, but these are not the amendments that we wanted to move. As he knows, we tried to change them but the Government did not feel able to co-operate in that respect, so we had to make do with what we had. I also draw some comfort from this quote from his own Joint Committee’s report:
“Our overall conclusion is that there is a case for legislation which will provide the law enforcement authorities with some further access to communications data”.
I will be the first to say that that sentence then has various other qualifications about the need for improvement—the committee had lots of worries and concerns about it—but that is the basis on which we went forward.
My noble friend Lady Neville-Jones answered the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, very well. The noble Lord’s weekend of research brought out very clearly how difficult this issue is, how complicated it is and how much will have to be done before this can actually be brought in. Some might argue that if you have all those complications before this gap—which has been generally recognised to exist—can be closed, leaving open the inability of our country and our security agencies to necessarily meet the threats that they may face, then we had better get cracking on that now. Dealing with the international complications and the issues around encryption are very important points which need to be dealt with.
The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, who I get the impression is against the idea of having any Bill at all—although I may be misrepresenting her—slightly misrepresented the position taken by the noble Lord, Lord Blair. He did not say that the terrorist attack in Spain caused the change of government. He made a very interesting point that I had not quite focused on. In the context of the time in which we live, as we move towards an election, I understood him to be referring on the Spanish connection to the way in which terrorists have often used election time, a time of political uncertainty, to cause an outrage. That would appear to have been the case in Madrid.
Our debate has brought out some general concerns. I do not think that there was any argument whatever about the threat. The noble Lord, Lord Harris, made a most interesting and constructive speech on the challenges that have to be faced, including the challenge of looking at both sides of the problem. Of course, we are aware at all times of the risks of overstepping the mark and of alienation. I lived through a time in Northern Ireland when the measure of internment without trial—a necessary measure at one time—had undoubtedly significantly increased the problems of terrorism that we then had to face. We in this House and others have a responsibility as legislators to get that balance right.
I am impressed by the statements of the Prime Minister, the leader of the Opposition, the shadow Home Secretary, the Home Secretary and both Front Benches, who make no apology for saying that the threat is severe. That is its standing at the moment. For anybody who did not understand what “severe” meant, those statements were made before events in Paris and Belgium. We are undoubtedly in a time when we need to be able to ensure that our defences are as strong as we can make them.
I understand that it is unusual for such a substantial amendment to be put down at the Committee stage of a Bill in this House. I was not sure whether the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, was suggesting that it is for this House only to do modest revisions to what comes from the Commons and not for it to be on occasions an initiator, inviting the Commons to give their views on what we are putting forward. I certainly do not sit in this House on the implication that I am not allowed to initiate good ideas if I think them necessary, particularly if I think that they will support the security of our nation—but I may have read too much into that.
What we have got out of this debate is not, unfortunately, co-operation on the tabling of more up-to-date amendments which might have given the House of Commons a chance to consider whether they could be incorporated in the Bill. We now move forward to an uncertain time: an election time with no certainty as to who the Government may be or how long it will take to undertake any of the new legislation which I think everybody—certainly, all those in positions of responsibility in the major parties—believes is essential. At such a time, we have to ensure that in every way we can we give support to our security and intelligence agencies in their work. My noble friend Lord Howard said in debate on an earlier amendment that the security of the nation is the first responsibility of the Home Secretary. She has made it absolutely clear that she wishes to see this legislation in place as soon as possible but has set out her own timetable for it. I am quite clear what the positions of the Government and the Opposition are in not supporting these amendments, but at least we have given the opportunity for these matters to be thoroughly examined.
I do not think that when this Parliament resumes, in whatever guise it is, people will have any excuse for not knowing what the strength of feeling is on this issue. I think that a number of us, who fortunately do not have to stand for election, will be on their tails in this matter. We will be able to resume the charge and try to ensure that, at the earliest possible opportunity, the security of our nation is supported in the best way we can. Against that background, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.