Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Lord Bach Excerpts

Tuesday 10th May 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, in the Constitution Committee, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, asked my honourable friend Mr Mark Harper about opinion polls which showed public support for establishing fixed terms. These are not old opinion polls: the Populus survey conducted for the Times, published on 30 May 2009, found that 74 per cent of those surveyed supported the establishment of fixed terms; a poll conducted by ICM Research for the Sunday Telegraph, published on 26 May 2010, found that 63 per cent of those surveyed supported the establishment of fixed terms; and a survey by the Scottish Youth Parliament conducted in August 2010 found that 76.4 per cent of the young people surveyed were in favour of establishing a fixed term for the United Kingdom Parliament. I accept that the question as to whether it should be four or five years was not put, but there was clearly in the surveys support for the principle of fixed-term Parliaments.

My noble friend Lord Dobbs talked about the opportunity for policies to mature and to be assessed. Therefore, there is an opportunity for accountability because the electorate can see what has been delivered, not only by this Government in the present Parliament, where it may take some time for the necessary remedial measures to work through, but by other Parliaments. It is possible for a Government coming into office at the beginning of five years to plan their legislative programme and the other things that do not require legislation, and at the end of which the public can make their decision and judgment on the effectiveness of the Government over those years. That will help accountability.

Practical issues were raised by a number of noble Lords, not least by my noble friends Lord Renton and Lord Blencathra. The questions of stability, practicality and allowing for accountability point to five years.

[Lord Bach]

Something is troubling me. If the noble and learned Lord has all these strong arguments against four years rather than five, why was it that his party went into the 2010 general election supporting a fixed-term Parliament of four years? What changed? When did the noble and learned Lord change his mind?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, if the House will bear with me, I shall find the quote from the Liberal Democrat manifesto of last year. It states:

“Introduce fixed-term parliaments to ensure that the Prime Minister of the day cannot change the date of the election to suit themselves”.

As my noble friend Lord Rennard indicated, there is not a reference to four years. However, in the past the party has supported—

[Lord Bach]

Is the noble and learned Lord really suggesting that the Liberal Democrat party was in favour of five-year fixed Parliaments at the time of the general election of 2010? We know about the Private Member’s Bill that was supported by many of those who are now prominent in Government. Liberal Democrat policy has always been four years. Why has it changed so suddenly?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

What the noble Lord claimed was in the Liberal Democrat manifesto was inaccurate. I am not shying away from the fact that four years had been Liberal Democrat policy, but everyone knows that you have to have negotiations if you want to get the outcome of a fixed-term Parliament, and that was the negotiation. I have listened to the argument and, heaven forfend, I am persuaded by it. The arguments that have been made for five years are very compelling indeed.

On the point made by my noble friend Lord Blencathra, although there has been a great deal of opinion in favour of four years, we have heard in today’s debate—and from the noble Lords, Lord Armstrong and Lord Butler, in Committee—that the evidence points in favour of five years. I urge the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Lord Bach Excerpts

Tuesday 29th March 2011 Lords Chamber

That was Mr Mark Harper, the Minister of State—

[Lord Bach]

Parliamentary Secretary.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I make it clear that my error is in no way intended to undermine him. He is the Parliamentary Secretary responsible for political and constitutional reform. It is his view that the Government appear to take in relation to these issues. It is a matter for this House as to whether it is guided more by the views of the two ex-Speakers or by the evidence of Mr Mark Harper. Speaking entirely for myself and having heard the two ex-Speakers, I found the evidence of Mr Harper wholly unconvincing. It suggests to me that not enough thought has been given to this provision.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Lord Bach Excerpts

Tuesday 29th March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rennard]

My Lords, briefly, I support the broad principle of extending the election timetable, largely for the reasons given by the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark. In particular, I feel strongly that we have too short a timetable for elections, which denies many service voters the opportunity to vote because of problems with issuing postal votes, getting them back and so on. However, it seems to me that the length of election timetables should be dealt with for all elections—council, European et cetera—not just Westminster general elections. However, while the problems that he suggests are very real, they will be addressed for general elections if we establish the principle of fixed-term Parliaments, which is the primary purpose of the Bill.

[Lord Bach]

My Lords, in supporting my noble friend on his amendment I invite the Government to think very carefully indeed before rejecting it, if that is what they intend to do. I speak from personal experience: in a former life, my noble friend was the regional secretary of the Labour Party in the east Midlands, so I worked extremely closely under him for many years and I can speak to his expert knowledge about running elections. I dare say that the Minister could talk about other individuals whom he worked with in that capacity and, no doubt, those from the Conservative Party could as well, while the fame of the noble Lord, Lord Rennard, goes before him. When you have such experts as my noble friend and the noble Lord, Lord Rennard, speaking with one voice, it behoves the Government to think carefully before rejecting what they suggest.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, for his amendment. Clearly, it seeks to dissolve Parliament 21 working days ahead of polling day rather than 17 working days. It is fair to point out that a 21-day timetable would be novel. It is not currently used in local or parliamentary elections; that in itself raises issues. I understand that the Electoral Commission, with which I know the noble Lord has an association, has previously suggested that the electoral timetable might be extended to 25 days. That would, not least, support participation by service voters. The commission has highlighted problems caused by the current election timetable and its associated deadlines for electors, candidates, political parties and electoral administrators. Those were reflected in the experiences that the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, mentioned. My noble friend Lord Rennard also has experience of them.

The Electoral Commission notes that this change should not be made without a review of further changes that might then be required to the electoral timetable. I assure the Committee that the Government agree that this is an important issue. My right honourable friend the Deputy Prime Minister indicated during Second Reading in the other place that we believe there is merit in exploring an extension to the timetable. I note that, at present, there are different timetables for the elections to the Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales and, I think, the Northern Ireland Assembly. Therefore, there is merit in looking at this not just in relation to this Bill and future elections to the House of Commons but in looking generally at the election timetable.

The Electoral Commission has pointed out that the matter requires a thorough review to ensure that any change is coherent across the piece. There are practical issues and consequential complexities that have to be considered. It is not as simple as omitting “17” and replacing it with “21”. There are issues about the judgment on where particular milestones would best fall within an extended election timetable. For example, there may be competing views as to when they should fall with regard to nominations. We are anxious that, if we are to extend the timetable, we should find the most effective solution. The deadline for registering to vote is another important issue, as are the current deadlines for postal and proxy votes.

As I have indicated, we do not have experience of a 21-day timetable but the Government agree that this is an important issue and we want to set out our proposals on how we might address it in the future. In asking the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment, I hope he will accept that the Government recognise that there are much wider issues to deal with here, and that 21 days is perhaps not the appropriate length of time. We should look at the totality of a longer electoral timetable, but it would not be appropriate to amend it in this Bill.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Lord Bach Excerpts

Monday 21st March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Desai]

My Lords, I have already raised my worries about the extension power that a Prime Minister has beyond five years. On this group of amendments I am aware that there is a problem, but I am not as worried as my noble friend Lord Howarth about the Prime Minister's ability to go to the country earlier than five years. I do not mind that.

I very much worry about the two-month extension beyond the five years. It would be very reassuring if the Minister took away, for example, the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Norton, and produced a schedule of possible circumstances. I know that nothing is certain—there can always be the black swan which we cannot anticipate—but if we were told under what circumstances a Prime Minister could be permitted to go to Parliament about a postponement, that would put my mind at rest.

In a sense, this power goes beyond the 1911 Act, and we should take it very seriously. I calculate that, given the current date of election in the Bill, there will be 61 days in the two-month delay; 61 is not a perfect multiple of seven, so the Prime Minister may be tempted to go for 63 days. One can go on like that. We need some idea of the circumstances in which a Prime Minister could claim.

Secondly, as the noble Lords, Lord Rennard and Lord Cormack, said, the provision should be brought to both Houses of Parliament. We have a constitutional position in this question, and it should not be left to the other place alone. I can envisage circumstances under which a Government with a two-thirds majority could arbitrarily give themselves authority to extend the election for two months. I would be very worried about that.

We should have safeguards in the Bill to make sure that both Houses are consulted, that we know the possible circumstances under which the Prime Minister can exercise the power and that we can be certain that such powers will be used only in exceptional circumstances.

[Lord Bach]

That was a most interesting, if short, debate on an important series of points. From the Front Bench, I thank all those who have taken part and who have drafted and spoken to their amendments.

I will be very short. The case has been made out that an earlier calling of an election should not be in the Bill at all. I very much look forward to hearing the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, explaining to us the circumstances in which that might be even feasible under a fixed-term Parliament. I am absolutely with those who have spoken on that and tabled amendments on it.

As for postponement, the Committee should be grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Norton and Lord Rennard, and others on those Benches who have tabled Amendments 24 and 25. We see the strength of what they argue. I just add one caveat and invite them, before we get to Report—because this is a very important matter, as the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, said, and might well be divided on then—to see whether their wording is absolutely right. I am sure that they intend to.

In 2005, under our present system and four years into a Parliament—not five years into a five-year fixed Parliament—his Holiness the Pope died. As I understand it, the general election plan for a certain date was postponed for a week because of that fact. No doubt various considerations were thought about very carefully: some people were grieving; others had things on their mind. That was considered and made public—it was not hidden away by politicians as a calculation.

[Lord Rennard]

My Lords, in my recollection of 2005, the general election happened on the same day as the council elections, which had been agreed and planned for years. There was no postponement in 2005, not even by one week.

[Lord Bach]

My understanding is—and if I am factually wrong of course I apologise—that all elections were put back one week in that year for that reason. I use it by way of example if it is not factually correct. In other words, if something has happened that is important to many millions of potential voters, does it fall in to Amendment 24, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Norton? If it does not, should some account be made for such unforeseen circumstances that might affect turnout or a number of issues? That may not be the best example, but one can think of other examples of the same kind.

[Lord Tyler]

Is that not a very good argument for adopting the solution that we are proposing that it should then be a political decision and that we do not try to foresee unforeseen circumstances? I speak as somebody who fought a by-election at the height of the Falklands war. That was unforeseen, but I did not think that that was an improper occasion to hold an election. What was significant about 2001 and foot and mouth was that it was impractical to ask people to go to the poll in large areas of the country, including my own. That was what was particular about those circumstances. Therefore, I think the solution that we are proposing from these Benches is preferable. A political consensus across the two Houses of Parliament is preferable to trying to write in advance circumstances that are by nature unforeseen.

[Lord Bach]

The Committee will see the powerful nature of the argument the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, makes, but whether that absolutely precludes some amendment of the type that the noble Lord, Lord Norton, has put before the Committee tonight, I am not so certain. To have both would be a kind of double of lock that would not exist if we just relied on Parliament in this instance. There may be other instances that are not covered by Amendment 24 that the noble Lord, Lord Norton, might want to consider. That is our position at the moment. We are slightly sceptical that the solution has yet been found.

How wonderful it is to see the noble Lord, Lord Rennard, in such fighting form on this Bill. We missed that fighting quality so much in the weeks and months that we spent on the previous Bill. Keep it up.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Wallace of Tankerness)]

My Lords, I think my noble friend Lord Rennard, with his spirit on the previous Bill, managed to get some concessions out of the Government. Who knows what might happen?

Before addressing the amendments that have been spoken to in this group, I shall briefly speak to Amendment 26, which is a government amendment and implements a recommendation made by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. In common with the other amendments in this group, it concerns Clause 1(5), which confers a power on the Prime Minister to vary the date of a general election by up to two months earlier or later by order, subject to the affirmative procedure.

I am sure the House will be grateful to the committee for the careful scrutiny it generally gives to legislation but has specifically given to the Bill. In its report, the committee concluded that the delegated power taken in Clause 1 was not inappropriate in principle and recommended that, when seeking to vary the date of an election under the power in Clause 1(5), a Prime Minister must lay a statement before both Houses setting out the reasons for proposing the variance of the date.

The committee itself recognised that it would be unrealistic to specify a constraint which would embrace all the possible circumstances in which it would be appropriate to change the polling day. Instead, this is why the committee focused on the importance of ensuring that each House is fully aware of the reasons why the Prime Minister has proposed changing the polling day. That is an approach with which the Government agree. I am sure that your Lordships will be pleased to hear that the amendment implements the committee’s recommendation and provides that a statement must be laid before both Houses of Parliament setting out the reasons for proposing a change to the date of a scheduled general election. I certainly urge your Lordships to accept this amendment when the time comes.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Lord Bach Excerpts

Monday 21st March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, accepting, as I suspect we all do, that this is a matter of judgment, I suggest to the Committee that the judgment referred to by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, is best made by a serious assessment of the balance between, on the one hand, the likelihood—although not the certainty under the provisions of the Bill—of less frequent elections and, on the other, the stability that a five-year Parliament offers and the opportunity for the electorate to bring a greater maturity of judgment because of the experience that they have of the Parliament and the Government after five years rather than four years. In making that judgment I suggest that the historical precedents since the war are of limited assistance, precisely because we have not had fixed-term Parliaments.

One complaint of those who argue for four years is that the Bill substitutes five years for a maximum of five years and a norm of four years. That is the effect of the Bill, but the complaint ignores the fact that the effect in practice of the 1911 Act has been that, where a Government have had a working majority, the Parliament has lasted five years if the Prime Minister has believed that he or she will lose, which means that he or she has stayed for the full term. The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, and the noble Lord, Lord Martin, argued that the fifth year tends to be a lame-duck year—an ineffective year. The noble Lord, Lord Grocott, said much the same thing. It is an ineffective year because, it is said, in the case of five-year Parliaments, the Government is tired and expects to lose. However, you cannot deduce from that that, where everyone knows that the next election is fixed for the end of the five years, there will be similar exhaustion.

In the past, when a Prime Minister has expected to win, he or she has gone after four years. That analysis is borne out by the elections of 1964, 1979, 1997 and 2010. In each of those years, the election was held at the end of five years and the Government went on to lose. An exception is the election of 1992, when the Government expected to lose and were rather surprised to win. The only other exception to that analysis, although it is not a real exception, is the election of February 1974, which noble Lords will know was held for special reasons. However, that election gives us a useful analysis of whether it is true to say that there would have been four fewer elections or whether you can count the elections and say that there would have been that many fewer. I suggest that under the provisions of this Bill it is highly likely that there would in any case have been an election in 1974 because when the then Prime Minister said, “I want an election to determine the issue of who governs the country, the Government or the miners”, the then Opposition to Mr Heath would have accepted the challenge and voted for an election, so that Parliament would have been dissolved on a two-thirds majority basis. It is not possible to say how many fewer elections there might have been. The Bill makes the basis for Dissolution more logical and removes what we say is the unfairness of allowing the Prime Minister sole charge of when there is an election.

As we know, the average length of Parliaments since the war has been three years and 10 months. I suggest that the calculation of that average term is of no assistance. The principal point against the relevance of such an average is that it takes into account all those early elections called by the Prime Minister in the exercise of precisely the power that the Bill is designed to remove. Secondly, it takes into account the very early elections of 1951, 1966 and October 1974. In that sense, the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, is right to say that it leaves out the ducks, but those ducks are important to leave out because, in the calculation of a sensible term for a Parliament with a working majority, those Parliaments where the Government had no working majority and had to go to the country early are of no assistance.

[Lord Bach]

I am interested in the noble Lord’s arguments. He knows that his party’s policy for many years was, honourably, that there should be fixed terms for four years. Did he support that policy? If not, was he always a five-year man? If he did support that policy, when was it that he changed his mind to five years? Was it, by any chance, around the time that the coalition was formed?

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

That is a perfectly fair question, because it is well known that it was Liberal Democrat policy to go for four-year fixed terms. However, it is quite clear that the formation of the coalition caused people to consider their policy and the arguments one way or the other. The coalition has put forward a programme for government. It is a considered view—which, I suggest, is no less right because it is a view come to after negotiation, the negotiations to which Mr Laws refers in the book that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, is now reading—that that period gives more stable government. The question for this House is, in the light of what has happened, to consider whether five years is better than four. The history of the Liberal Democrat policy on the point does not assist us. We have to bring a new and balanced judgment to the question now before Parliament.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Dobbs]

Did I? My memory does not go back quite that far but I thank noble Lords. I can confirm that there was nothing mythical or mystical about it and least of all could the process be described as ethical. There is only one reason why Prime Ministers choose this or that election date and that is because he or she thinks that the chosen date gives them the best possible chance of winning. For a party leader, elections are rather like the gunfight of the OK Corral. There is no future for the loser; they are likely to be dragged out of the arena feet first and never seen again. Prime Ministers sweat over these decisions—even the fragrant ones.

We keep hearing that four years is best. The question remains: why have Prime Ministers so often chosen to hold an election after just four years? The answer is very simple. Except in the most extreme circumstances they do not go earlier because there is nothing to be gained: they will only be accused of cutting and running. They do not often carry on beyond four years for fear of running foul of events or the economy or the private excesses of some wayward Cabinet Minister. I am afraid that these decisions have nothing to do with the astrological significance of the figures four or five. It has simply been a matter of self-preservation.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, spoke about the natural rhythms. I think that in a previous debate we heard someone refer to the natural biorhythms of the British constitution, a point picked up in the Select Committee report. I admire the noble and learned Lord almost beyond expression. His knowledge of our constitution is profound but I fear that his romantic nature might have led him astray on this one. In my less than humble experience—Conservative chiefs of staff do not usually do humble or, if they do, they do not tend to survive—it has nothing to do with biorhythms: it is simply the uncertainty of that fifth year that leads Prime Ministers to opt for four—nothing else. But remove that uncertainty, as this Bill does, and I suspect that we will find that Prime Ministers are more than delighted to soldier on to the end with absolutely no complaint. They will carry on in Downing Street, their biorhythms entirely undisturbed. After all, Prime Ministers love office. They never know when to give up. They hang on as long as possible, and almost always too long, leaving their fingernails in the Downing Street carpet as they say goodbye.

Another argument, which was picked up by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and the noble Lord, Lord Martin, is that somehow a fifth year is always unsatisfactory; that for some metaphysical reason the Government will run out of steam after four years. We have heard of the term, the lame duck—the least glorious of years—but it is only the uncertainty that causes distraction, which is what this Bill does away with. Give a Prime Minister a certain election date and, instead of confusion, there will be a reasoned, possibly somewhat reckless, campaign of tax cuts, heady promises and kissed constituency babies—in other words, business as usual.

Of course, another argument has been put forward; namely, that a five-year term deprives the electors of a more frequent choice than four years. The logic of that is, of course, indisputable. But, if the noble Lord will forgive me, it is also absurd. Follow that logic and we would end up with elections every three years or two years or perhaps every year. Looking at the US congressional system where politicians are constantly campaigning, I am inclined to suggest that there is no obvious connection between more frequent elections on the one hand and better government on the other. Above all else, it is better government that we should be seeking.

There is no democratic deficit of the sort suggested by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, and the noble Lord, Lord Grocott. There is no shortage of elections. We have more elections for more Parliaments than at any time in our history. But whether all those elections and elected politicians have given us better government I suspect is a matter to be discussed on another day.

The crucial point is this: should it be four years, should it be five, or three point something or other? Having dismissed the relevance of so many statistics, let me offer a few of my own. Looking back over the last eight elections, which takes us back an entire generation or more to the dark days of 1974, the average lifespan of a Parliament has been nearly four and a half years. To me that is just as legitimate as the figure which is so often quoted, that of three years and 10 months. But we are told that four years is what the people demand. If that is the case, where is the surge of public indignation, the outrage that our biorhythms have been disturbed and the voters left short-changed by four-and-a-half year or five-year parliaments? The argument about four years and only four years simply will not wash.

To garble the phrase, there are exaggerations, irrelevancies and political evidence. We have heard plenty of all three in this debate. If we are looking for a norm, it is four and a half years, not three years and 10 months, at least in our recent history. What should we read into that? Precisely nothing. Except that in every one of the last eight elections, the Prime Minister chose a polling date that was thought to be in his or her interest. It is self-interest, not the national interest, and there is no magic in a term of four years. That is because, of course, Prime Ministers have a terrible habit of stumbling to the conclusion that they are the national interest, and that is what lies behind these statistics, nothing more. Statistics will not resolve this issue for us; it is up to us.

[Lord Bach]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. He has mentioned the last eight elections. I may be slow in my arithmetic, but I think that would take us to 1979 as the first one he has chosen since there have been eight elections since then. I think he said that in the last eight elections, the Prime Minister has always chosen the date for his own benefit. I do not think that that is something James Callaghan could be accused of.

[Lord Dobbs]

I think it takes us back to 1974. I well remember Lord Callaghan, as he became. Indeed, he first introduced me to this House by giving me tea here. I owe him a great deal and I have the most profound respect for him. But I am surprised that the noble Lord should quote 1979 as being the pinnacle of constitutional principle. It was sheer self-interest based on the opinion polls, like it was for all other Prime Ministers.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, for this interesting amendment, which has given rise to a number of interesting questions. As the Committee well knows, a cross-party committee has been considering reform of this House and the Government intend to publish a draft Bill shortly. I could not possibly comment on what will be in that draft Bill as it will be subject to pre-legislative scrutiny. We hope that that will be done by a Joint Committee of both Houses. I am sure that some of the important issues which the noble Baroness raised will be brought before that Joint Committee. My noble friend the Leader of the House answered questions on some of the issues she raised regarding the relative standing of both Houses last week, if not the week before. However, I do not think that it is appropriate to deal with them in the context of this Bill.

[Lord Bach]

The noble and learned Lord says that that draft Bill will be subject to pre-legislative scrutiny. That is great to hear, but why was that not the case with this Bill?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, for his amendment, which would provide for a minimum of five parliamentary Sessions in every five-year Parliament. I have a lot of sympathy with the spirit of what is proposed, but I will explain why I do not think that it should be enshrined in statute. I accept that having five annual Sessions in a five-year Parliament makes considerable sense. Indeed, under this Bill is it likely that the Parliament elected in 2015 will have five Sessions. The only reason that this Parliament is likely to have four—I will deal with this in more detail in a moment—is the transition to fixed terms and spring state openings. It would not be appropriate to put the amendment into statute; the current arrangements should remain. As the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, recognised, even if the Bill did not exist, it would still be possible to change the length of a Session.

I will answer the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer. It was very obvious that the decision to move to spring 2012 was not taken in the early days of this Government. By the time the announcement was made in September, the Bill had already been published. I cannot remember the exact date; it must have been around the time the Bill got its Second Reading. I am being told that in fact it was the same day. That might explain why the Bill did not have pre-legislative scrutiny. I know that I have not answered this point to the satisfaction of the Opposition, who will come back to it time and time again. However, we wished to have this Bill in the first term. It was not in order to get this Bill through that we decided to extend the Session. It is very clear that the reason for the extension was that we wished to move to an annual Queen's Speech in May and therefore an adjustment was required.

We could have reduced the length of this Session, but to have done so half way through would have caused a number of difficulties. That is why it was decided, as a one-off, to extend this Session until spring 2012. There is nothing sinister in that. Most of our legislation would have been passed in any event. The noble Lord, Lord Grocott, indicated that there is provision for carry-over. I pause to reflect that the fact that this Session is longer may bring a ray of hope—with reference to the previous debate, I believe that hope was the last thing to come out of Pandora's box—to Members whose Private Members’ Bills are so often frustrated because there are not enough Fridays in the Session to get them through. To suggest that this is a sinister plot on the part of the Executive is grossly misplaced. The purpose is to get into a position where we can have annual Sessions that begin in May. It will be our intention thereafter to have Sessions that run from spring to spring.

It is not appropriate to enshrine this in statute because there may be a case where, if the Bill is enacted, an incumbent Government lost a vote of no confidence and a new Government was formed within 14 days. It is possible in such a scenario that it would be felt that the Session should come to an end and that there should be a new Queen's Speech. Nobody would think that that would be unreasonable in the circumstances. It might be very difficult then to fit in five Sessions. That is why it is better not to stipulate in statute that there should be five Sessions in any one Parliament. A Session might begin after an election in February and come to an end in May, which would not make much sense. It would have to be brought artificially to an end to ensure that the requirement of five Sessions was met.

Having annual May-to-May Sessions will ensure that the final Session of the Parliament is more likely to be much more meaningful and worth while than one which, for example, begins in late November and lasts until the wash-up in late March. The noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong, says, “We’ll see”, but nothing could be less exciting or satisfying than what we experienced in the wash-up last year when we tried to deal with so many Bills that had barely got anywhere. Parts of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill, which had had only a Second Reading in this House, were passed with only the briefest scrutiny. It had some pre-legislative scrutiny, but no scrutiny in this House. I hope that noble Lords would agree that at the end of the day actual legislative scrutiny is more important than pre-legislative scrutiny.

[Lord Bach]

It is best to have both; I quite agree. That Bill had enormous pre-legislative scrutiny, but should have had more legislative scrutiny. There, I have said it. Now perhaps the noble and learned Lord will admit that his Government, too, are in error. More importantly, they are passing legislation now, so they should learn from any mistakes that we may have made.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

This legislation is having ample legislative scrutiny and I suspect that in times to come we will move towards having much more pre-legislative scrutiny. That is why I argue for five-year fixed terms; there will be more opportunity for pre-legislative scrutiny as well as legislative scrutiny. I simply make the point that to truncate one Session into two or three months would not be sensible. Future Sessions will last for only 12 months. What is happening in this Session is a one-off adjustment so we can get into the pattern of spring to spring Sessions that would fit the election timetable of fixed-term Parliaments with elections in May. For these reasons, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Lord Bach Excerpts

Tuesday 15th March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Cormack]

I obviously listened carefully to what the noble Lord said, but there have been some disturbing accounts of the way in which postal voting has been conducted, and he knows that as well as I do. The security of the postal vote does not begin to compare with the security of the personally cast ballot. I am glad to see him nodding assent at that.

When it comes to the day, for the reasons that I indicated earlier, I have great sympathy with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and I see no need to depart from Thursday. It is good that we should discuss it and maybe consider experiments with more local elections. I would not be averse to that. However, I believe that Thursday is tried and tested for general elections, and I hope that the Government will stick to that, certainly for the foreseeable future as foreseen in the Bill. I very much hope that they will consider the issue of postal votes and how postal voting is conducted and made more secure. It is important for the House to look at this and for another place to have another chance to look at it. Obviously, it would be quite wrong to press any of the amendments to a Division today, but I hope the Minister will be able to tell us that the Government have taken on board the points that have been made and will truly reflect on them.

[Lord Bach]

I hope that the Committee will forgive me if I speak from the opposition Front Bench at this stage. I am not for a moment trying to shorten the debate. It is a very important subject and the noble Lord, Lord Rennard, among others, has waited for years for a proper debate on this topic. The last thing I want to do is to stop that debate. The Minister knows, and I have told the Committee, that I have some personal difficulties that require me to leave in fairly short order. I hope that the Committee will forgive me if on this occasion I put the view of the opposition Front Bench very briefly and then leave. Of course the opposition Front Bench will be filled very adequately in my absence.

I say briefly that the Committee should be very grateful for the two opening speeches in this debate—the introduction from my noble friend Lord Howarth and the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Rennard, about weekend voting. At the very least it is necessary for the Government to think very carefully about the advantages—and the disadvantages, which the noble Lords, Lord Cormack and Lord Pannick, have hinted at—of changing from Thursday voting to weekend voting. It is an issue that ought to have been debated in Parliament a long time ago; I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Rennard, exactly about that. It was particularly interesting, sitting where we sit, to hear the language used by the noble Lord, Lord Rennard, in the sense that he was looking not just for a debate that would end in a few fine words but for some kind of decision on this issue. If I heard him right, he thought that this was the appropriate Bill for such an issue to be finally resolved under. Am I wrong about that?

[Lord Rennard]

For clarification, I was not necessarily suggesting that this Bill should determine the issue but that, if we were assured that it would not close this issue and that we would properly and seriously consider the issue in Parliament in due time before 2015, I would not necessarily want to press the amendments at this stage.

[Lord Bach]

I understand what the noble Lord has said. He mentioned the magic date of 1 October 2013. My advice to him, if I dare give advice to someone so expert in this field, would be just to beware the words that you hear from the Government when they have had time to consider this issue, even though they will be honeyed by the tones that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, will undoubtedly use both today and when the matter is raised again on Report. The noble Lord will be promised the earth but I am not sure that there will be any delivery within the timescale that he is looking for.

It seems to us an attractive idea in principle that we should consider very carefully whether weekend voting is more appropriate and will lead to greater turnout. I do not think that we should assume that it necessarily will. There are people who would not dream of voting at weekends who will vote on a weekday, but I think that more people will be more tempted to vote if they are given a period, such as some part of Saturday and some part of Sunday, to do so. This is a very important issue not just for turnout but for other issues around British elections. The Opposition wish these amendments well. We hope that the debate continues, and we look forward to playing a full part in it.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Lord Bach Excerpts

Tuesday 1st March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bach]

My Lords, here we are again, less than two weeks have passed and here we are, debating another constitutional Bill, claimed by the Government to make a long-term constitutional change based on principle, thought through, properly considered, well researched and thoroughly argued in another place, but which in reality—as nearly everyone acknowledges—is a short-term measure, with its driving force the political necessity of the coalition and its need, given the desperate lack of confidence between its parties, to ensure that it survives until at least May 2015. In other words, it is a short-term political fix masquerading as serious constitutional reform. Of what other Bill—I ask rhetorically of course, but I may give a clue—what other Act of Parliament does that remind noble Lords?

In these circumstances, it is perhaps not too surprising that the Bill is so deficient in so many ways. From the choice of five-year terms to the lack of any clarity on the issue of confidence Motions, the Bill looks what it is—a ridiculously hurried, unconsulted-on piece of rushed legislation, whose consequences, if it were passed unamended, might well be dire for our constitution. Surely our duty, as a revising House, is clear; we must do all we can to improve the Bill, to build up consensus around the House that says that the Bill in its present state is deeply unsatisfactory. The least the House can expect—and here I really am looking at the Minister—is that the Government remain open-minded to sensible changes. Not just Ministers in this House—I am sure they are open-minded to sensible changes—I mean the Government as a whole.

Having set out the Opposition Front Bench’s view, let me say, in case I should be accused of being a trifle negative, that the Second Reading has given rise to an excellent debate. It would have been surprising, given the expertise, experience and indeed wisdom of noble Lords who have spoken, if the debate had not been good. There have been some very powerful speeches on all sides of the House; it would be quite invidious to pick out any in particular. However, I do want to say that the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, was very impressive indeed. For those of us who have not heard him speak before, either in another place or elsewhere, it was a breath of fresh air to hear what he had to say. The House very much appreciated the way in which he said it and looks forward to hearing a lot from him in the months and years to come.

A whole number of issues have been raised but there are three I wish to concentrate on. The first is whether the practical effect of the Bill as drafted would be seriously to circumscribe a Prime Minister’s powers or whether the Bill allows, frankly, for a coach and horses to be driven through the principle of a fixed-term Parliament. My noble and learned friend Lord Falconer of Thoroton and others too have dealt effectively with this issue. Having listened to nearly 30 speeches, no noble Lord has been brave enough to attempt any serious criticism of my noble and learned friend’s analysis of the Bill in this regard. It is sad but true that any consideration of how Prime Ministers are likely to act in the future should start from a fairly cynical viewpoint. If legislation allows Prime Ministers to behave badly then I am afraid to say that there will be occasions when they do behave badly. Mr Harper in Canada is no worse or better in that respect. As the noble Lord, Lord Armstrong of Ilminster, said, any Act of Parliament based on this Bill would inevitably be stretched as far as it could be and then perhaps—and here I am speaking rather than the noble Lord—a little bit further too if the survival of a particular Prime Minister was in question.

Secondly, there is the issue of four or five years. That is a very significant issue, not a minor one, which goes to the heart of the Bill. We do not think that the Government have ever really even begun to explain why five years is to be preferred. The consensus, not universal of course, is that four years is to be preferred. I accept that the Liberal Democrat Benches have been loyal to a man and that the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, and also perhaps, on occasion, the noble Lord, Lord Dobbs, have been in support of the Bill. No other Conservative was actually very supportive at all. Both Select Committees, in our House and in the other place, came out in favour of four years. Academic opinion seems overwhelmingly in favour of four years, yet the Government say five.

The noble Lord, Lord Rennard, asked us, the Labour Opposition, to adhere to the principle of fixed-term Parliaments. Perhaps he should ask his colleagues why they are not adhering to their commitment to four-year fixed Parliaments. We all know about the Liberal Democrat policy paper of 2007 in favour of a four-year fixed Parliament. Even more telling was David Howarth’s Private Member’s Bill, whose Second Reading was heard on 16 May 2008 in another place. That Bill was a model of brevity and simplicity: the kind of Bill that my noble friend Lady Gould was talking about when she complained about the complexity of this Bill.

From that Bill—remember, this was a 2007-08 Bill—it said, at Clause 1(1):

“The next general election shall take place on 7th May 2009”.

Clause 1(2) said:

“Each subsequent general election shall take place on the first Thursday in May in the fourth year after the previous general election”.

That is pretty simple and clear. When the Bill was published in December 2007, who supported David Howarth? It is a stellar list. It has Westminster glitterati of the highest order, who would grace any Oscar shortlist. Let me remind the House who supported that proposition by supporting that Bill in print. First, there was David Heath, now the Deputy Leader of the House of Commons. There were two who are now Cabinet Ministers: the right honourable Chris Huhne and the right honourable Danny Alexander both put their signatures to that Bill. There were two who are now junior Ministers, as I understand it, Ms Featherstone and Mr Burstow. Then there was the Colin Firth of the list, the Oscar winner himself who is now the Deputy Prime Minister, the right honourable Nick Clegg.

All those Members of another place put their name to a Bill that was clearly stating four-year fixed Parliaments. I pose the question: what has changed all their minds so that within three years they are voting for a five-year period, attacking a four-year period and arguing strongly for the five years. Not just one but all of them seem to have changed their minds simultaneously. Is it some sort of Pauline conversion on the road to Whitehall?

[Lord Greaves]

The noble Lord is having his bit of fun. I think he has come to the end of it now. It is of course a matter of whether noble Lords think four years or five years is fundamental or not. I understand that they do. Will the noble Lord now answer the basic question that the noble Lord asked: do he and his party still support the principle of fixed-term Parliaments?

[Lord Bach]

I will of course be more than happy to answer the noble Lord’s question. I was waiting for it. We have not changed our position on the Front Bench since the last election—an election, I remind the House, that we lost. We support fixed-term Parliaments. Thus we are doubly disappointed by this disaster of a Bill, which has been rushed through with no proper consultation—no real consultation at all—and thus got so many vital, important things entirely wrong. First, on five years instead of four and, secondly, on the no-confidence safety valve, as it is called. That is drafted in a completely unsatisfactory way. It is unclear and, indeed, may turn out to protect the power of a Prime Minister so that there is no point at all in a fixed-term Parliament in any event. I hope that answers the noble Lord’s query.

[Lord Grocott]

I wonder whether my noble friend will give way for what I hope he will think is a helpful suggestion. Although he is quite right in describing the Labour Party’s current position in the aftermath of a general election commitment, any prudent party, when it has lost a general election, looks again at the policies that were in the document that it put to the electorate. I strongly suggest that that would be a good move and that it might result in our deciding that the commitment to a fixed-term Parliament was not the election winner that some might have thought it was.

[Lord Bach]

My noble friend is certainly right in one regard; it was not an election winner. On the other hand, I understand that the main opposition party is quite rightly considering all its policies, bearing in mind that it is in opposition and is likely to be in opposition for a little while longer.

I had not quite finished my fun, so perhaps I should not have given way to the noble Lord opposite so quickly. I hope that it will not be ungallant to suggest that this simultaneous change of mind might have something to do with the aftermath of the 2010 general election and the need to have a short-term arrangement that has the best chance of sticking for five years. If that is what was intended, fair enough. Political parties are absolutely entitled to come together on whatever terms they like, but why is there a need to cover up this short-term political necessity with a Bill that will change our constitution for ever? Let me be fair. At least those distinguished Members of Parliament took a little time to change their minds, unlike the right honourable gentleman the Prime Minister, who, as we have heard during the debate, suggested right in the middle of the election campaign that, far from fixed-term Parliaments, when a new Prime Minister took office there should be legislation insisting on a fresh general election within six months. I ask what has made him change his mind.

On this issue, the noble Lord, Lord Hennessy, and, in my view, our Constitution Committee, got it right. The noble Lord talked about the biorhythms of our national politics. I think I understood what he meant, even if the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, did not. He said that five years does not capture it, and he seems to have got that precisely right. Our Constitution Committee dealt very thoroughly with this issue at paragraphs 62 and 63 of its report, from which I shall quote:

“Whilst acknowledging the case made by the Deputy Prime Minister for a five year term, nonetheless the majority of the Committee consider that a four year term should be adopted for any fixed-term Parliamentary arrangement at Westminster. In the view of the majority, the shift from a five year maximum to a five year norm would be inconsistent with the Government’s stated aim of making the legislature more accountable, inconsistent with existing constitutional practice and inconsistent with the practice of the devolved institutions and the clear majority of international legislatures”.

I say to that: game, set and match. The response so far to the Constitution Committee report is, by any test, very weak. To set out as part of that response a number of countries that have a five-year maximum is hardly the point.

My final point—and I am sorry that I have gone on for so long—is that many of the problems could have been solved if the Government had not rushed this legislation. It is such an obvious point and it has been made by many noble Lords, but it is worth repeating. At least, as I think the noble Lord, Lord Norton, said, with the AV Bill, whatever we may have thought of it, the importance of 5 May—at least to the Liberal Democrat part of the coalition—gave some excuse and reason for rushing that legislation. In this Bill, what is the hurry? What is the rush? What is the excuse for having no consultation, no pre-legislative scrutiny, no Green or White Papers?

I hope that the noble and learned Lord will spend a little time explaining why it is necessary for this Bill to go through Parliament without any outside consultation. We are told that when the next piece of constitutional legislation comes along—the Lords reform Bill—there will be pre-legislative scrutiny and the full works will be brought out, and quite right, too, but if for that, why not for this? I could mention the large number of noble Lords who have raised this point in one way or another during the debate.

In Chapter 5 of its report, our Constitution Committee absolutely slaughtered, if I may use the expression, the Government’s arguments for this legislation. Of course, it did so in parliamentary language and absolutely appropriately. If noble Lords think I am being high minded about this, I am not. I was the Minister who received our Constitution Committee’s report on the CRaG Bill, and only that Bill got a worse press than this one from our very much respected Constitution Committee, so I sympathise with the noble and learned Lord. I know what it is like after such a Second Reading when the whole world—apart, of course, from the Liberal Democrats—has been against you. I know what it is like, but the Constitution Committee has been absolutely clear and I do not want to allow the agony to continue by quoting from the report. The Minister and others on the Front Bench know exactly what it says.

I am sure that the noble and learned Lord will agree that our Select Committee criticised the Bill in a powerful and fundamental way. It did not believe, first of all, that the case for fixed-term Parliaments had been made. It did not believe that the case for five years rather than four had been made, and it severely criticised the Government for not taking time to consult and think more about the Bill. It is a pretty comprehensive attack, and the response, which I know the House was grateful to receive before Second Reading, is laughable. The letter from the Minister was well meant, but it was making the very best of a pretty bad job.

I end by asking the Minister what the Government’s serious answers are to the criticisms made by the Select Committee and many noble Lords around the House today. Why the urgency for the Bill? Surely what should happen now is that the Government should take the Bill away, consult on it and come back with a proper and suitable Bill for our consideration. Surely our constitution is vital enough not to be the plaything of temporary politicians who are just a little too eager to get power and much, much too eager to keep it.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Lord Bach Excerpts

Tuesday 1st March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, the House of Commons would determine this. As the noble Lord, Lord Richard, said, the Government might then be of a different composition, but they would come from those who have been elected to the House of Commons for a term of five years. If they cannot form a Government and no Government can command the consent to a majority in the House of Commons, there would be an election. If that could not be done within 14 years—I mean, within 14 days. [Laughter.] That is probably wishful thinking on some people’s part. If that could not be done within 14 days, there would be an election.

Clause 3 makes the key necessary changes to electoral law and the law concerning the meeting of Parliament in light of fixed days for elections. It provides that Parliament dissolves automatically 17 working days before the polling day, which has been fixed for the general election under the Bill. It means that Her Majesty the Queen will no longer be able to dissolve Parliament in exercise of the prerogative. This is a safeguard against a Prime Minister deciding that he wishes to ignore the requirements of the Bill and advising Her Majesty to exercise her power to dissolve Parliament.

Clause 4 deals with certain supplementary and consequential matters. It preserves the Queen’s power to prorogue Parliament. Subsection (2) preserves the traditional way in which the sealing of a proclamation summoning a new Parliament under the great seal of the realm is authorised, which is by Order in Council rather than by warrant under the royal sign manual.

Clause 5 sets out the short title of the Bill and the schedule contains consequential amendments to a number of Acts of Parliament. I do not intend to go through them all, but included among them is the Septennial Act 1715, which, after amendment by the Parliament Act 1911, set the current five-year term for Parliament.

The Fixed-term Parliaments Bill will be seen as a stabilising measure. It will reduce opportunities for partisan game playing. In a situation where we are so often told that the Executive are trying to gather power to themselves, under the Bill they will give power to Parliament, and it is right that they do so. I look forward to the debates that we will have in your Lordships' House. The points raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris, will undoubtedly be ones to which we can return in Committee. I look forward in the course of this debate to hearing a maiden speech from my noble friend Lord Cormack, with whom I was privileged to serve for many years in the other place.

It was quite obvious from reading the record that the Bill was the subject of some lively debates in the other place, where—I should put on record—extra time was provided for consideration in Committee.

[Lord Bach]

Oh!

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

It is absolutely true, the Bill was given extra time at Committee—a Committee of the Whole House. I am certain we will not all see eye to eye with the noble Lords opposite, although I recall that they supported the idea of fixed-term Parliaments in their manifesto. There is therefore some broad consensus on what this Bill seeks to do.

This Bill demonstrates the commitment of this Government in bringing forward much needed political and constitutional reform. It will go a long way to restoring trust in our political institutions and I therefore commend this Bill to the House.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Lord Bach Excerpts

Tuesday 8th February 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lipsey]

This amendment follows on from one that I moved in Committee. In that one, I favoured seven years, which was the time given in the original amendment in the name of my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer. However, I am a sinner who repenteth and have changed my mind, now believing that 10 years is the right period. I am trying to prevent perpetual revolution in constituencies, allowing MPs to be MPs and not—as they would be should the system under the Bill survive the 2013-15 experience, which it might well not—turning them into carpetbaggers, devoting their lives to finding new seats instead of doing what they and every Member of that House would want them to do, which is to serve their constituencies and our country.

The advantage of 10 years over any other period is that it would accord with the five-yearly elections proposed in the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill. I think that it provides the right balance between updating population changes and so on—which we all want because we want greater equality in constituencies—and providing a measure of stability for the Members of another place that will enable them to do their jobs properly without keeping half an eye on their next move. I beg to move.

[Lord Bach]

My Lords, I will speak to the one amendment in this group that has now been moved but, first, I apologise to the House. Having studied the lead amendment in this group, which is in our name, we find that it is defective. Perhaps that is partly a symptom of the absolutely ridiculous haste with which we are being asked by the Government to table amendments for Report. The noble Lord says from a sedentary position that there is no excuse at all—he says that when the gap between Report and Committee is cut from a fortnight to in effect one sitting day. Mistakes were bound to occur. We own up to having got one amendment wrong, which is why we have not moved it. However, the matters that we hoped to raise are effectively covered by my noble friend’s amendment, to which I shall speak briefly.

There is a balance to be struck on the timing of the boundary review process. The more frequent the boundary reviews, the more up to date the electoral registers on which they are based. In the light of our previous amendment and concern about the accuracy and quality of the registers, we do not judge eight or 10 years to be an advisable interval between reviews. On the other hand, frequent boundary reviews lead to more frequent disruption of the UK electoral map, especially if such reviews take place on the basis of the narrow parity law contained in this Bill. Such disruption has been confirmed in evidence to the bodies that have often been mentioned during our proceedings—the Constitution Committee of this House and the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee of another place. A serious issue arises from regular and widespread disruption—one can ask any Member of Parliament about that—and that is the disconnect that it might cause between Members of Parliament and the electors they represent, many of whom will find that their constituency will change at each review in each Parliament if the Government’s proposals are implemented. Therefore, we are grateful to my noble friend for moving his amendment.

[Lord Strathclyde]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Lipsey, for moving his amendment. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Bach, for not moving his amendment, as he had spotted that it was defective. It raises remarkably similar issues, so he will get a remarkably similar answer—or he would have done if he had been able to move it.

On the question of the disconnect for Members of Parliament. I do know whether this has been said before—if it has not, it should have been—but this is not being done for the convenience of Members of Parliament; it is being done to equalise the electorate across the whole country and to try to create a fairer system. Once we have the 600 seats in place with equalisation of the electorate, I do not believe that minor changes every Parliament will be an insurmountable burden.

The amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Lipsey, requires the Boundary Commission to report every 10 years after October 2013 instead of every five, as laid out in the Bill. The Parliamentary Constituencies Act 1986 requires reports from the Boundary Commissions every eight to 12 years. The intention of the Bill is to increase their frequency, ensuring that boundaries are more up to date than at present. There is a cost implication to holding more frequent reviews, but this is offset by the estimated £12.2 million in annual savings made by the reduction from 650 to 600 MPs.

Many noble Lords have rightly spoken in Committee and on Report about the important issue of the accuracy and completeness of the electoral register. That work is incredibly valuable in enabling people to participate in the democratic process, but it will not be reflected in their constituency boundaries if reviews are insufficiently frequent. That is why we advocate reviews every five years. I know that noble Lords opposite might feel that we have not gone far enough on the accuracy or completeness of the electoral register, but I hope that they will accept the logic of having reviews every five years. The Government’s view is that reviews can be completed once a Parliament, giving sufficient time for the commissioners to do their work and for parties and electors to familiarise themselves with new boundaries before the next general election. If that is the case, I see no reason why we should make do with more out-of-date electoral data. We should have reviews during each Parliament so that boundaries remain refreshed; and more frequent reviews will limit the degree of upheaval each time.

I know that the noble Lord, Lord Lipsey, was trying to be helpful and constructive, but I hope that he sees the force of the argument of having regular reviews every five years.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Bach]

I have some brief comments. I congratulate my noble friend on her amendment. The House knows that when she speaks, she does so with a great amount of experience and expertise in this field, and the House should take note of what she has said.

I shall concentrate on the phrase that she uses in paragraph 1 of her amendment:

“The number of constituencies in the United Kingdom shall not be substantially more than 600”.

The Front Bench, as the House will know already, thinks that a number nearer 650 is to be preferred. If we put that one side for a moment, the way that my noble friend phrases that is taken—I hope she will forgive me for saying so; in fact I am sure that she will not have to forgive me for saying so, because it is obvious—from Schedule 2 to the Parliamentary Constituencies Act 1986, an Act passed by a Conservative Government and one that they should be proud of. Schedule 2, relating to the rules, says:

“The number of constituencies in Great Britain shall not be substantially greater or less than 613”.

When you add the number for Northern Ireland, the total is around 630. The crucial point is that it does not say, “it shall be 600” or “it shall be 650”. Subtly, and, I would say, in a pretty obvious British tradition, that Act is very cautious in its wording. I therefore congratulate my noble friend on the way she has phrased her amendment. The Government propose a blunt 600. It would not matter what the number was in one sense—a blunt 500, a blunt 700. But the fact that the Government through Parliament are trying to put forward an exact number still seems to me constitutionally offensive.

Even after all the days that we have debated this Bill, the Boundary Commission for England’s Fifth Periodical Report has not been quoted from. Let me change that briefly. At the very end of the report, on page 485, paragraph 6.25, it says:

“We do not consider it right”—

this is the Boundary Commission speaking—

“for us arbitrarily to set a fixed target number of constituencies and adhere rigidly to that number”.

That is the phrase it uses. It is almost as though it is a given that you would not expect an exact number to be put down in legislation. What is depressing about this Bill—one of the many things that are perhaps depressing about Part 2 of this Bill—is that, however hard we have tried and others from other parts of the House have tried, that exact number of 600 stands. That is a real shame. It marks a change in the constitution of this country. I much prefer the way in which my noble friend has phrased her amendment.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, first, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady McDonagh, for her amendment. In a number of ways it brings together issues that have been debated both in Committee and this evening and, I suspect, will be debated in future groups of amendments.

On the rules of the Boundary Commission and the number of seats, as the noble Baroness indicated, her amendment has a number of parts to it. First, it would set a target of 600 seats, not to be substantially exceeded. Secondly, it would introduce a fixed electoral quota of 72,000 voters and a tolerance of 7.5 per cent on either side. Finally, it would require the Boundary Commission to draw up recommendations for boundaries that do not cross historic county boundaries or English local government wards, and cross London borough boundaries only where absolutely necessary and where sympathetic to local ties and natural boundaries. The Government have on each of these issues already made their view clear in the debates that we have already had on this Bill. I am sure that there will be other opportunities to revisit them before the Bill leaves your Lordships’ House.

I start with the noble Baroness’s suggestion that there should be a target of 600 seats. The noble Lord, Lord Bach, referred to the Parliamentary Constituencies Act 1986, in which the figure of 613 seats was set using similar wording.

[Lord Bach]

Plus Northern Ireland.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

Indeed. The figure is 613 for Great Britain, which, with Northern Ireland, takes it to 630. We are agreed on that. That, in many respects, just underlines the problem. Even with that wording, if you subtract the 18 Northern Ireland seats from the current 650, you get 632, so we are already some 19 seats up. Noble Lords might recall that when the 1986 legislation was passed, it also had the provision that there had to be at least 71 or 72 seats in Scotland, which is now down to 59, so we can perhaps add another 12 to that. Not only are we 19 up, we have a further 12, so we would have drifted upwards by some 31 from the target figure.

The noble Lord, Lord Bach, quoted the fifth report. I do not dispute that no one else has, but I do think that somewhere along the line there have been some quotations from it before, although that is neither here nor there. While he indicated that in the view of the Boundary Commission it was not right for it to set a fixed target or adhere to a fixed number, I rather think that, given the rules under which it operates in the 1986 legislation, that is probably a proper way for it to go about its business. The whole point is that Parliament is setting a figure of 600. It is not the Boundary Commission but Parliament that will set a fixed number.

The Government’s position has been made clear; there needs to be a legislative cap on the number of seats to control the ratchet effect of the current legislation, under which the number of seats has increased at every review—with the exception of the post-devolution review—since 1950. It is likely that the target would be missed under the noble Baroness’s amendment even at the first review, since the 2009 electorate divided into constituencies at an average of 72,000 would fill 631 constituencies. Indeed, she said that we would be invited to address the issue of constituencies of around 100,000, but that is wildly out of kilter with anything that is being proposed here. That is not what Parliament is being asked to address. We are looking at a quota of approximately 76,000, with a variation of 5 per cent on either side—a band of 7,600.

Setting out the size of the electoral quota in the Bill poses some problems for the way in which the noble Baroness’s amendment is framed. However, the way in which the Bill is written allows for changes in the number of registered voters while maintaining a smaller House of Commons. A specified quota, such as that proposed in this amendment, would mean that the number of seats will rise as the number of registered electors rises, making it yet more unlikely that the commissions will ever meet the target of 600 seats.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I hear my noble friend and, although I do not have an exact figure, a significant number of county boundaries within England are crossed by constituencies. I am not quite sure whether those counties would be defined as historic.

[Lord Bach]

Which other examples does the noble and learned Lord have in mind? He is quite right to mention Oldham and Saddleworth. Our point is that if this Bill is passed as it stands, there will be many more Oldham and Saddleworths. Those of us who visited that lovely part of the world a few weeks ago will know that it is a constituency of many parts that are absolutely different from each other. Do the Government really want boundaries with no links at all—never mind historic links—that are just jammed together for political convenience? The Government should want to avoid that, rather than encourage it. I ask again—does the noble and learned Lord have other examples?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I do not have the figures immediately to hand, although before I finish I might be able to provide the number of county boundaries that are crossed by constituencies. I accept that the number of constituencies that cross county boundaries is different. From my recollection of our previous debates on this issue, a number of county boundaries are crossed by constituencies. I hope that by the time I conclude my remarks I can advise the House as to the exact number of county boundaries that are crossed. I am sure that in each case it is thought the counties are properly historic.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Bach]

21A: Clause 11, page 10, line 8, at end insert—
“( ) In England the Boundary Commission should where practicable have regard to the boundaries of counties and London boroughs and in any case no constituency shall include the whole or part of more than two counties or London boroughs.”

[Lord Bach]

My Lords, other noble Lords have also tabled amendments in this group. They would insert a number of additional factors for Boundary Commissions to take into account when drawing up constituencies for the four parts of the United Kingdom. In particular, they would insist that regard should be had to the boundaries of English counties and London boroughs. It would also place greater emphasis on the importance of electoral wards in the boundary-drawing process.

At present, the new rules for drawing constituency boundaries proposed in the Bill are dominated by the overriding requirement for every constituency, with very few exceptions, to fall within the margins of 5 per cent either side of a new UK-wide electoral quota. Although in rule 5 of Schedule 2 under Clause 11 a number of further factors are listed which the Boundary Commissions may also take into account when drawing constituencies, these additional factors are of course subordinate to the numerical prerequisite.

Independent electoral experts and the heads of the four Boundary Commissions have all made it clear on the record that, in order to meet the proposed numerical targets, individual wards will almost certainly need to be divided. The four heads of the Boundary Commissions told the Political and Constitutional Reform Select Committee:

“The changes to the total number of constituencies, and the tighter limits on the number of electors in each constituency, will result in a complete redrawing of constituency boundaries ... The electoral parity target may require the Commissions to work with electorate data below ward level in many cases”.

That statement is utterly at odds with the words of the right honourable gentleman the Deputy Prime Minister, who told your Lordships’ Constitution Committee that,

“we must be able to use wards as the continued building blocks of constituency boundaries”.

Splitting wards in many cases will, as the Boundary Commissioners warn, result in major changes to the established pattern of political representation, and that is true of England in particular. The secretaries of the four commissions went on to tell the Select Committee:

“The electoral parity target will result in many constituencies crossing local authority boundaries. Early modelling suggests that in Scotland between 15 and 20 constituencies (of 50), and in Wales between 23 and 28 constituencies (of 30), would cross a local authority boundary ... the application of the electoral parity target is likely to result in many communities feeling that they are being divided between constituencies”.

The fracturing of wards and the crossing of county and local government boundaries would create administrative confusions that would feed into a sense of social dislocation. It would create particular problems for political parties at a structural level, especially in the case of the Conservative Party and my own party, the Labour Party, which are both organised on a constituency and ward basis. Significantly, Professor Ron Johnston, whom the Government are always praying in aid, told the Political and Constitutional Reform Select Committee that one academic study had shown that,

“when a ward was split a lot of the ward activists drifted away. They had lost their rationale to represent this place, this place no longer existed, it was in two parts and political activity declined”.

That will mean, of course, very great organisational challenges for local parties, especially with the much more frequent and disruptive boundary reviews that the Bill envisages. Our amendments would provide more solidity to the boundary review process, better balance to the process for drawing constituencies and a greater understanding about the potentially damaging knock-on effect of the rigidly mathematical framework on which the Government are currently fixated.

I hope that the Government can respond favourably to these amendments and, in particular, I hope that they are able to accept Amendment 21C, which would insert into rule 5 of Schedule 2 in Clause 11 the following statement:

“Wards shall be the building blocks for parliamentary constituencies”.

That is word for word what the Deputy Prime Minister said to your Lordships’ Constitution Committee. I wonder whether the Minister is able to concede an amendment to the Opposition that merely requires the Government to agree with what the Deputy Prime Minister said. I beg to move.

[Lord Tyler]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 27A, 27C and 27D. I want to pay tribute to my noble friends on the Front Bench because this responds directly to a request made in Committee by my noble friend Lord Rennard and me that we should have some very simple, practical rules in the Bill to deal with the issue to which the noble Lord, Lord Bach, has just referred. These amendments together seem to us fully to meet our concerns. I think that they are practical and sensible, but they recognise that in certain parts of the United Kingdom it will be very difficult to be precise; for example, in a big city like Birmingham where the wards are very big indeed—I believe that they run to hundreds of thousands of people. In those circumstances, obviously you cannot have a hard-and-fast rule. However, Amendments 27A, 27C and 27D meet fully the requirements of a realistic appreciation that wards will indeed be the building blocks of constituency size; but we have to have some flexibility to meet the particular concerns and needs of different parts of the United Kingdom. I am very grateful to my noble friends.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords who have taken part in this debate, and I thank them for the amendments they have tabled. We have focused on the important issue of boundaries, particularly ward boundaries. I especially thank my noble friend Lord Tyler and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Stamford, for acknowledging that, in response to representations they made earlier, the Government have brought forward amendments that reflect the importance of using wards in the Boundary Commission’s deliberations and determinations.

The Government have listened, and I hope that our amendments will satisfy the House. They reflect the variations in local government geography in the four constituent nations of the United Kingdom. We have taken the local government boundaries that we know each Boundary Commission considers when drawing up the constituencies and the amendment puts them on the face of the Bill. The Boundary Commissions will have the discretion to consider ward boundaries along with the other local government boundaries referred to in the debate.

The noble Lord, Lord Howarth of Newport, and the noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong, mentioned the position of the unitary authorities. In the other place, the Government listened to the matter raised by the honourable Member for Slough regarding the unique position of the unitary authorities in Berkshire, which are districts. The Government listened and made an amendment to ensure that their boundaries were included. They will still be covered by our amendment which refers to all council areas in England, whether unitary or two tier, and for that reason we believe that there is no need for the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Howarth of Newport, although I accept the rationale behind them. The government amendment already allows the Boundary Commission to consider unitary authorities.

Amendment 21A would prevent constituencies including the whole or part of more than two counties or London boroughs. I note that the honourable Member for Dumfriesshire, Clydesdale and Tweeddale, Mr David Mundell, represents a constituency which contains parts of three council areas, including my own native parts in Dumfriesshire. It shows that Members of Parliament can perform this task. Indeed, at the last general election Mr Mundell was returned with an increased majority, which, given that he is the only Conservative MP in Scotland, was no small achievement. The administrative convenience of MPs should not be set above other factors to be considered by the Boundary Commissions.

The amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Davies, would prevent wards being split except in exceptional circumstances. The difficulty with exceptional circumstances is that in some of the largest wards of around 20,000 electors, there could well be perfectly valid arguments that it might better reflect the community characteristics for them to be divided between two different constituencies. In an earlier debate the noble Baroness, Lady McDonagh, recognised that wards are already split by parliamentary constituency boundaries in Scotland, where, because of the single transferable vote system of local elections, wards are by their very nature considerably greater.

We believe that the best approach is to give discretion to the Boundary Commissions. We should not forget that the secretary to the Boundary Commission for England said in evidence to the Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee in September of last year:

“We have done some modelling earlier in the year … and it appears possible to allocate the correct number of constituencies using wards. However, it may be necessary to use a geography below ward level”.

So we expect wards to continue to be used as the building blocks of constituencies in England.

I am sympathetic to the intentions of opposition Amendment 21C. However, the Government favour placing a discretion on the commissions in the form of our amendment. I hope we agree that it is helpful for the commissions to be able to have regard to the boundaries of wards and other local government boundaries, and it is for that reason that we have placed them in the Bill. I urge the noble Lord, Lord Bach, to withdraw his amendment and the other noble Lords not to move theirs. I will move Amendments 27A, 27C and 27D in good time.

[Lord Bach]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in the debate, not least to the Minister for his comments. At the start of my speech I did not thank the Government for the move that they have made on this issue, which I now acknowledge from the Front Bench. Our problem is that they have not moved far enough. My amendment and the amendment of my noble friend Lord Davies of Stamford seem to be stronger, tougher and more likely to mean that wards would not be divided in the changes to come. However, we have had a full discussion on this issue today and the Government have at least moved some way in this field. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 21A withdrawn.

Moved by

[Lord Bach]

21B: Clause 11, page 10, leave out lines 12 to 19.

[Lord Bach]

My Lords, rule 4 is designed to place a limit on the territorial extent of a constituency. That rule is deemed necessary because, if the principle of the equality of representation was continued to its logical end, we would see at least one gigantic parliamentary constituency in the highlands of Scotland. This is because the scarcity of population in that part of the United Kingdom means that a constituency would have to cover an enormous area if it was going to attain the proposed electoral quota of approximately 75,800 electors.

The electoral parity rule, born out of rules 2 and 5(3) in the Government’s scheme, is clear that every seat in Britain, save for the two Scottish island seats—and now, by the will of your Lordships’ House, the Isle of Wight—would have to have an electorate of between 95 per cent and 105 per cent of that UK average electorate. This would mean between about 73,000 and 80,000 voters. Rule 4 overrides that requirement. It states on the one hand that no constituency may exceed 13,000 square kilometres in size and, on the other, that a constituency may be exempted from the rule requiring it to meet the electoral quota in the event that it has a land area of over 12,000 square metres.

The first question that stems from rule 4 is: what was the basis for these numbers? So far as we know, there has never been a statutory limit on the size of a constituency, still less on electorates, and an exemption from that limit based on territorial extent, so where did these numbers come from? Rule 4 can conceivably apply in only one part of the United Kingdom—namely, the Scottish highlands—but why should the geography of that area be the only geography to qualify for special recognition in the construction of parliamentary constituencies? We understand why it might be sensible to put a limit on how large a constituency should be allowed to grow territorially in pursuit of the electoral quota, but would it not be sensible to place other protections on potentially undesirable geographical entities that could be produced as a consequence of the electoral parity rule? If the Minister tries to explain the rule by referring to the accessibility of a constituency, which I suspect he might be tempted to do—for example, the ability of the MP to travel round his or her constituency—why is Argyll and Bute, with 13 islands, or St Ives, which incorporates the Isles of Scilly, not also included as exceptions to the parity rule? If he uses the accessibility argument, I should like an answer to that question.

It might be possible to prioritise either the geographical size of constituencies or the number of electors in a constituency, but the Government should not attempt to do both, so why were these figures of 13,000 square kilometres and 12,000 square kilometres chosen? The Government obviously had a particular area in mind, but we would like to hear from the Minister what led the Government to come to that view. I beg to move.

[Lord McNally]

I will not refer to the accessibility argument. Amendment 21B seeks to remove the provision for an exemption for geographically extremely large constituencies provided for by rule 4 in the Bill. As the Government said when the noble Lord, Lord Bach, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, raised this issue in Committee, this exemption exists to ensure that constituencies are not created that would be impracticably large, damaging the valuable link between constituent and MP. The noble Lord asked why these numbers have been included in the Bill. We have set a limit roughly the size of the largest existing UK constituency, as the Boundary Commission for Scotland felt able to recommend a constituency of this size at the previous review, and that independent judgment seemed to us to be the best basis for a provision of this kind. The range of 12,000 to 13,000 square kilometres is simply to avoid the Boundary Commission having to draw a line resulting in a constituency at exactly 13,000 square kilometres, which might involve a very unnatural boundary.

As the noble Lord rightly says, the provision is almost uniquely applicable to the Scottish highlands. The consequences of this amendment would not, of course, be fully known until the Boundary Commission had made its report. However, it is inevitable that constituencies in sparsely populated parts of Scotland would be enlarged if rule 4 were removed. The provision at rule 4 would not preserve the boundaries of any particular existing constituency, nor was it ever intended to. Like all the Government's proposals, it is designed to allow sensible reform without departing too far from the existing experience. Some noble Lords claim that the Government are inflexible and yet support the removal of one of the provisions of the Bill designed to allow flexibility to take account of particular local circumstances. They may do so in support of an alternative scheme to deal with the highlands, although that would not be the effect of the amendment. Whatever the merits of alternative schemes, the amendment before us would simply delete sensible and practical flexibility for the Boundary Commission. On that basis, I urge the noble Lord to withdraw it.

[Lord Bach]

I shall withdraw the amendment; I thank the Minister for his reply. However, it seems a remarkable feature of the Bill that it picks out one constituency or part of the United Kingdom in this way. The figures referred to are those given in the Bill. I understand that the Government are unlikely to give way on this issue, and I do not think that it would be sensible to divide the House on it, so I seek leave to withdraw it.

Amendment 21B withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Bach]

21J: Clause 11, page 10, line 28, after “ties” insert “, including wards,”

[Lord Bach]

My Lords, this is a very simple amendment which we feel the Government should be able to accept without any fuss. It makes a minor textual change that does no more than include in the Bill a statement of fact made by the government Front Bench. It proposes that the reference to “local ties” in rule 5 of Clause 11 should also include a reference to local wards. There should not be much argument about this because in Committee the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, told your Lordships that,

“wards are in many cases already the building blocks of constituencies. They are the level that can often reflect local community ties”.—[Official Report, 24/1/11; col. 743.]

Today, he has gone further and the Government have moved an amendment, which has been passed, that will strengthen that to some extent. Therefore, the case for adding the expression set out in my Amendment 21J is sensible, clear and unarguable. I hope that the Minister will accept it. I beg to move.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, as I understand it, what the noble Lord intends is for rule 5, on factors which the Boundary Commission may take into account, to read:

“A Boundary Commission may take into account, if and to such an extent as they think fit … any local ties, including wards, that would be broken by changes in constituencies”.

The reason for our not wishing to accept the amendment is, as has already been indicated—we have already had a good debate on wards—that “wards” will be inserted in the Bill by Amendments 27A, 27C and 27D when they are passed. As the noble Lord knows, wards will in that way be imported into the Bill, so the position would in many respects be duplicated by his amendment. I do not think that there is any dispute between us as to the importance of wards, but I believe that the amendments which the Government will move when we reach the appropriate part of the Marshalled List will address the point that the noble Lord makes.

[Lord Bach]

My Lords, I thank the noble and learned Lord for the speed with which he found the passage. Oh, did he not? I take back those thanks at once but thank him for his response.

He is being too cautious here. This is such a small amendment and it fits in exactly with what he told the House about how important the Government now feel that wards are in the whole structure of the new process. I will of course withdraw the amendment but ask him, please, to go back and consider whether adding those words in that part of the Bill would really not be an improvement. There is no adverse reason why that should not happen. I ask him, before Third Reading, to go back and consider that but for now I beg leave to withdraw my amendment. I am grateful to the House for its indulgence.

Amendment 21J withdrawn.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Lord Bach Excerpts

Monday 7th February 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, has moved an amendment which would change the referendum question to ask voters whether the supplementary vote system should be used instead of first past the post rather than the alternative vote system. It will come as no surprise, because it is the content of the Bill, that the Government are committed to providing for a referendum to be held on whether the alternative vote system should be introduced for elections for the other place. We had these debates on a number of occasions in Committee.

I know the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, has a degree of authorship of the supplementary system that is used in the London mayoral election. We have heard on a number of occasions his concern about the alternative vote provisions in the Bill. It is always very invidious to say how people might hypothetically have voted when that was not the system that was used. The comments made by the noble Lord and the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, were quite legitimate points to be made in the referendum campaign, when the parties and the different participants will take their own view about the merits and demerits of the alternative vote system. I can confirm that under the provisions in the Bill, which the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, accurately described, voters may express a preference for as few or as many candidates as they wish or, indeed, for one. As the noble Lord rightly said, that could mathematically mean that not all Members elected to the other place had secured 50 per cent. As we debated last week when we were considering the material now on the website of the Electoral Commission for discussion, which will be sent out to stimulate interest and to explain the proposition before the voters on referendum day, that point is made in the material that it will be putting out.

Clearly the noble Lord’s amendment to adopt the supplement vote system will limit voters’ choice in expressing preferences for candidates standing at the election as they would be able to express a preference for one or two candidates only. The Government are not persuaded that the AV provisions in the Bill should limit the number of preferences that any voter may express at an election. We consider that not limiting the number of preferences that a voter may express under the alternative vote will enable MPs to be elected with a broader level of support, although I make the qualification that as you can cut off and do not need to vote for everyone, it will not necessarily mean that an MP will achieve 50 per cent.

As my noble friend Lord Strathclyde explained in Committee, the Government believe that the optional preferential form of the alternative vote is the right form of AV to be put before the people. For elections to the House of Commons, voters will be able to express preferences and should be able to express as many or as few preferences as they choose. They should not have their ability to express preferences constrained in the way proposed in the noble Lord’s amendment. The optional preference form of AV avoids voters being forced to vote positively for political parties that might be distasteful to them, such as those on the extremes of politics. There is no indication in the amendment about how in detail the supplementary vote system would work. The attraction of the Bill as it stands is that for all the arguments that might take place about how AV works, the Bill sets out that process in Clause 9 and Schedule 10. Questions about how AV works can be resolved by looking at the Bill. That would not be the case with the amendment, which lacks clarity. I therefore urge the noble Lord to withdraw it.

[Lord Bach]

I understand that the supplementary vote system is used in mayoral elections. Indeed, on 5 May, there will be a mayoral election in what I describe as God’s own city, Leicester. It is the first mayoral election that will presumably be under the supplementary vote system. If the Government get their way on this, it will be slightly ironic that at the next general election the public will also be asked to vote on whether an alternative vote system in the manner set out in the Bill should be adopted for the United Kingdom for future general elections. Do the Government intend to do anything about the way SV is used for mayoral elections, or are they content with it for that but not for AV generally?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I think the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, helped to devise the system for mayoral elections that we have inherited. There are no proposals to change it. We are talking about elections to the other place. I have made it very clear that we see the merit of a system where preferences can be expressed as far or as little as individual voters wish. For the purposes of electing the House of Commons, we prefer it to the supplementary vote which by its very nature limits the extent of the preferences that the individual voter can indicate. On that basis, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.