Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Bach
Main Page: Lord Bach (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Bach's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(12 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberNoble Lords are learned if they are in the Supreme Court or have been a Law Officer. Others, regrettably, may be learned in fact but are not learned in name.
That helps me a great deal. I shall never refer to the noble Lord, Lord Bach, as learned again.
My Lords, I have stated as clearly as I can why the Government and the Commons have put forward their reasons. The emotional span of this debate is sometimes extended to question whether we are in favour of victims and their children. The answer is that yes, we are in favour of them. As I said in my opening remarks, this debate is about how and whether and within which ambit we provide legal aid in private law cases. It is difficult to go beyond that into individual cases, which have been cited in debate at every stage. In many of these cases, the suspicion is that they would qualify either by application for an injunction or by a finding of fact by the court. The latter is extremely important in the additional list that we have put forward to qualify people for legal aid.
As I said in my opening remarks, when addressing an issue such as this one, and within the constraints under which the Government are operating, lines have to be drawn. It is legitimate for the Opposition to argue that that line has been drawn in the wrong place or that a time limit has been put in the wrong place. In the end, however, Governments have to make decisions—and we have made decisions. As I said, I hope that the House will look at the decisions we have made and see that we have listened and acted in a way that puts us on the side of victims and their children and that, in practice, those who face the problem of domestic violence and who want to obtain legal aid for decisions in private family law cases will find that the concessions we have made and the rules and the guidelines we have laid down will give the women and children—I accept that there may be others, but mainly women and children—who are affected by this scourge access to legal aid. I therefore ask the House to support Motion B.
My Lords, I, too, have grave doubts as to whether a telephone helpline of the kind we are talking about can be regarded as fit for purpose if the purpose is to disentangle the client’s case with empathy and give appropriate advice on it. The matter is made worse if use of the telephone gateway is to be made mandatory. There may be a place for a telephone gateway—it can have a role in filtering cases, as the Minister said—but it is surely entirely inappropriate that it is made the sole route to discriminating and informed advice.
This is not a matter of speculation for we have been here before and we know what we are talking about. I am talking about the experience that we had with the student loans company when it took over the administration of the disabled students’ allowance. This was administered by a service staffed by the kind of people who will, presumably, be staffing the telephone gateway. They proved to have little understanding of or empathy with the kind of problems disabled students have and for which they were seeking the support provided by the disabled students’ allowance. In fact they were inclined to make light of them and even suggest that the students were somehow swinging the lead or making unmeritorious excuses for financial support from the state.
Those applying for disabled students’ allowance have much in common with the kind of vulnerable people we are talking about needing help with welfare benefits cases. I would not wish to place my confidence in a service of this kind as the mandatory gateway to legal advice and I do not think the House should either.
My Lords, it is rather disappointing to have to speak on this subject again. One hoped that the other place might take note of our amendment and carry it through. However, the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, has in her usual clear and well expressed way explained that our concern is not with telephone services per se. That is not the point at all. All of us here know the value of telephone services. I saw it at first hand as a Minister and I am delighted that the noble Baroness quoted me in her opening remarks. I hope that that excellent work continues and expands—of course I do.
However, the point is that in a limited range of cases, whether classified by the type of person, such as those with communication problems, or by the type of case, such as very complex cases or cases that require searching through reams of papers to identify the nature of the real issue—a point that was made very powerfully by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury—it is counterproductive to expect someone to go through a telephone gateway. In those cases there should be a provision for face-to-face advice from the outset. That is hardly an unreasonable request. Indeed, it is common sense.
I am not the first and I will not be the last to remind the House that today is St George’s day. Perhaps in rather a laboured way, I make the point that there is an English tradition of pragmatism, flexibility, seeing what actually works in the real world rather than what I fear is behind the Government’s stance: too much inflexibility, a kind of didacticism and, as I have described before using a French expression, a rather dirigiste approach towards this issue. It is an issue that cries out for flexibility and trying various ways to make sure that people who need this help can get it. The noble Baroness made her case very powerfully indeed and other speakers have supported her. I very much hope that we can ask the other House to think again on this.
I end by reminding the House of powerful words spoken by the deputy leader of the Liberal Democrat party in the other place just last Tuesday. He had listened carefully and he said this:
“I was grateful for the Minister’s reassurance, but I have to say that I am not persuaded. Like any MP with a constituency containing people from many different races and backgrounds, with many different first languages, and with all the disabilities that any mixed community has, I simply do not believe that a telephone route into deciding eligibility for legal aid is right for everybody. It may be right for many people, and I understand that it will be a good service, but if we ask constituents such as mine whether they have always been satisfied with the council response line—whether under Labour now, or with us running it, as previously—the answer is always no. That does not change, irrespective of who is running the show. I understand the Government’s position and I hear what they say about a review, although I add a request for the review to be regional as well as general, but I believe that the Lords who pressed for amendment 24 have a well-made case. I shall support the Lords in respect of amendment 24”.—[Official Report, Commons, 17/4/12; cols. 206-07.]
I do not always, or even often, agree with the right honourable Gentleman who I have just quoted at some length, but on this I do agree and I very much hope that the House will too.
My Lords, the case for this amendment was powerfully made in this House last month and in the other place last week, and I rise now briefly to add another voice in urging Ministers to think again, even at this late stage, and to try to find a constructive solution to this issue.
Before coming to your Lordships’ House, I was an MP in Swindon. Because of that town’s industrial history and particularly because of the large railway works, which employed many thousands of people over many years, this illness was known locally as the Swindon cancer. I, too, thank the noble Lord, Lord Alton, for his sterling efforts on behalf of all my former constituents who have suffered from this terrible disease and, I am afraid, will suffer from it in years ahead.
Ministers have claimed that it would be wrong for various reasons—I understand and completely accept what the noble Lord, Lord McNally, has said about this—to make a special case for this one disease. The fact, however, of this disease’s particular virulence, that it is inevitably fatal, that it progresses with terrifying speed, that it is hard even to find palliative care for it once it has taken hold, all argue powerfully for it being just such a special case.
It is unconscionable to force sufferers from this terrible disease, and their families, at a time when every hour is precious to them, to go through the processes required by this Bill to secure the compensation to which they are entitled. Those are fundamental points for me—whether they can secure lawyers and whether success fees are to be secured for the lawyers. Every hour is precious. The people who are diagnosed with this illness have months and sometimes only weeks to live. We should not force them to go through the processes required by this Bill.
As my noble friend Lord Howarth has already said, accepting this amendment would do no damage to the fundamental principles behind the Government’s reforms of the legal aid system. It is the only decent thing to do.
My Lords, it is the Opposition’s view that there should be no moneys taken from victims’ damages in these cases. That is the basis of our view. So we speak in favour of the amendment that has been so well moved.
There is a great feeling across this House that we have to protect victims of industrial disease and ensure that they and their families are not victims once again of reforms that are there to deal with dodgy whiplash claims and motor insurance premiums. In another place, as we heard this evening, there was a very powerful and intelligent debate on this subject. Those who often express the view that debates in this Chamber are always of a superior nature to those of another place should read Hansard carefully and look at what took place in that very short hour towards the end of Tuesday last week. It was a very good debate.
Honourable Members on all sides of the Chamber spoke with passion, knowledge and experience about this subject. Not least was Ms Crouch, a former insurance executive, who criticised both her Minister and the Association of British Insurers for their stance on these amendments. Indeed, as I understand it, she has spoken to the noble Lord, Lord Alton, today and has also put out a press release. I am delighted that a number of Members of Parliament on all sides who spoke in that debate are listening to our debate this evening.
I could also mention Mr Andrew Percy who represents Brigg and Goole, which noble Lords will know is famous for its historic shipbuilding past, and Mr Andrew Bingham, the MP for High Peak, an area that also has a high incidence of asbestosis. They spoke against the Minister’s proposals and, to their credit, voted in the Opposition’s Lobby. Their concern was perfectly understandable. Why on earth, with absolutely no savings to the state, are we reducing the amount of money that victims get from those who harm them, while handing that money to lawyers or insurers instead? Those Members on all sides who voted were not persuaded by the stupid assertions—if I may call them that—of the Minister in the other place that industrial disease sufferers should be treated in the same way as an organised gang faking whiplash injuries for payouts or someone lying about a slip or a trip on a pavement crack. Again and again, the other place heard stories of horrific suffering of victims—and the fact that you simply cannot fake cancer of the pleural linings, peritoneum or cardiac sheath.
The history of asbestos-induced diseases—and, indeed, general industrial diseases—is not a proud one for the insurance industry. It knew for decades that asbestos killed before it acted and only then at Parliament’s promptings. Insurers have fought cases—to the death—trying to get out of paying just awards to genuine victims. There is a long history of insurers fighting claims until after the death of the claimant. It is in part thanks to their tireless lobbying that compensation levels in England and Wales are not by any standard generous in cases of this kind. They are forensically calculated to reflect pain, suffering and loss of amenity and costs of past and future losses. They are far less than victims receive in comparable jurisdictions. For example, Mealey’s Litigation Report in 2007 maintained that the average jury award in the United States for mesothelioma was $7.5 million—the average award here is £65,000. Of course, the differences between jury and judge-calculated awards and our judicial systems apply, but there is a huge difference.
No one could argue that the damages victims of this disease receive are very great; they should certainly not be eaten into in the way that this Bill, if allowed, would permit. We start from a low baseline before we even consider docking damages to prevent these claimants coming forwards.
Does the Minister not support my argument that it is better that there should be no success fees at all, rather than that success fees should be claimed against the insurers, which is what this amendment amounts to—in other words, a continuation of the current system? Does the Minister not agree that in these cases, which are easy to prove once you establish the insurer, success fees are really irrelevant?
I am grateful to the noble Lord again for calling me the Minister—it is a couple of years, I think, since that was the case. I take his point though; it is a serious point. I am not convinced that lawyers who take up these cases, if this Bill in its present form becomes law, will not take success fees. In fact, I am pretty certain that they will. I cannot see why they would not. It may be a shame, but in the reality of the legal world, if they are entitled to take success fees, they will do so.
Does the noble Lord have any basis for saying that other than simply speculating?
I certainly do not have the experience of the noble Lord in this area of the law, but with the greatest respect I ask whether his view is not as speculative as mine. We just do not know, but I would have thought that the history of legal proceedings of this kind is that where success fees are available they will be sought. Maybe not always up to 25 per cent, but they will be sought.
Surely it would be for the Lord Chancellor to amend the regulations that he has to make to prevent success fees being charged in these circumstances.
That may be what the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, would suggest to the Lord Chancellor that he should do, but is there any indication that that is what will be done? Will regulations be put before Parliament that say it is forbidden to take a success fee in a case of this kind? If so, will not the Lord Chancellor run into exactly the same sort of problems that critics of this amendment raise here against the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and me? Will that not be the position?
Not if there is an abuse, as the noble Lord suggests. If claimants’ solicitors in cases which are not difficult to prove start charging success fees, which the Lord Chancellor or public opinion decide is simply not acceptable, then the Lord Chancellor will have the power to stop it.
It may not be difficult to prove, and I understand what noble Lords say about that. But there is a history, I have to say, of insurance companies taking an extremely long time to agree to settle cases of this kind. For whatever reasons—and I do not want to go though them tonight in this House—it may be that a case will take quite a considerable period of time, even if, at the end, liability is not denied. I want to stop soon and allow the Minister to respond.
Does the noble Lord agree that the crucial thing we have to decide this evening is whether we should send the amendment back to the Commons? I find that I now understand the issues put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Alton, much better than I did at earlier stages of our parliamentary proceedings. Given all the representations that we have received, that is probably true at the other end of the building as well. Therefore, there may be a strong case on those grounds for their reconsidering it. The argument is otherwise very simple, which is that they did not conclude the debate on this amendment in the previous exchanges in the House of Commons. Therefore, if we send it back, it will give them an opportunity to do that. Indeed, if the Minister sought the leave of the House at the end of the debate in the other place, he could actually reply to the debate, which he was prevented from doing by his own guillotine.
I am very grateful to the noble Lord—I think the whole House will be grateful to him—for shutting me up. That is the first thing that he succeeded in doing, but he also made the point that this is about whether this House believes that the other place should have a closer look at this. What worries me slightly is that, as I understand the programme Motion in the other place, there may be only one hour in the programme for all the matters that they have to consider; but I am not sure that I understand the procedures of this House, let alone those of the other place.
The noble Lord has persuaded me to sit down now. I think that was his intention. I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say in response to the points that have been made. Surely the other place should take up this matter again—it is of such huge importance.
I think it was the line, “I want to stop soon” that provoked my noble friend Lord Higgins to get to his feet.
Again, this has been a very useful debate, with two parallel arguments. I go back to my opening remarks: nobody underestimates the horror of mesothelioma and the importance of getting speedy redress for sufferers. Parallel to that, however, are the attempts that we are trying to bring forward to bring some order to the costs of litigation. It simply is not true that the Jackson reforms are intended just to catch dodgy whiplash claims. There was a general feeling that the amendments to CFAs which the previous Administration introduced brought in an overall inflation of costs in our legal system. We all pay for that inflation.
I hear what the noble Lord, Lord Wills, said, but the truth is that the present system which the sufferers have to use is slow and expensive. I repeat that the intention of this Government is to move as speedily as possible to get to where we can through agreement with the industry, to get litigation out of the way. It is true, as has been said by a number of noble Lords, that there was callous treatment of sufferers. There was slow movement in addressing the issue, but that accusation does not lie at this Government’s door. We have moved very quickly in our attempts to get agreement with the industry.
As far as that is concerned, the setting up of a body in order to get a move on with this was mentioned in a White Paper from the previous Government two years ago. We have seen absolutely nothing after two years to suggest that that body will be set up soon. Indeed, every comment made by the insurance industry as a whole has been opposed to any organisation that would stand in, as it were, when they cannot find who is responsible for these diseases being caused.
As I made clear in my opening remarks, my noble friend Lord Freud hopes to be able to make a Statement on this by the summer. The House, the insurance industry and sufferers from this disease should understand that we mean business on this. We are addressing this with a real sense of urgency. Whatever happens regarding this amendment, given the plight of sufferers from this disease, they deserve fairness and speed in settlement for the many reasons that have been put forward.
The noble Lord, Lord Howarth, said that there is no virtue in dogmatic consistency and he even had the strong support of my noble friend Lord Carlile in that. Certainly, there is no virtue in dogmatic consistency, but we need to consider the integrity of the legal system as a whole and fairness between different claimants. There are two parallel debates. There are the necessary Jackson reforms of legal costs, which will apply across the board, and the need to move with speed to get a system that deals with the problems of mesothelioma victims as quickly as possible. We can only make our impact assessments.
My noble friend Lord Carlile asked whether we thought that the Jackson reforms will prevent sufferers’ access to justice. We do not believe that. We would not have brought this forward if we had thought it. The point was made about success fees. I repeat that they are not compulsory. As my noble friend Lord Faulks has pointed out, there may be some proper, healthy competition among lawyers that will address the question of success fees.
It is not the responsibility of somebody suffering from a terminal illness to watch the clock as far as costs are concerned. It is the responsibility of government. The Jackson reforms take that responsibility away from claimants. Not just in this particular case but in the broad there was no responsibility on litigants or their lawyers to watch costs. That was the weakness of the whole system. The Jackson reforms put some emphasis back on to the responsibility to watch costs—not on somebody suffering from a terminal illness but through the reforms that we are putting through across the board in this area. For a claimant who does not have to pay a success fee, the 10 per cent uplift could mean more compensation than he or she would otherwise have got. I make no firm claim on that. It is not a question of being callous towards the sufferers. On the contrary, the Government are taking very speedy action to try to get in place an agreement which I am sure we all agree should have been in place many years before.
Sadly, this is not a problem that will go away. That is one of the reasons why I believe that we need a sense of urgency in our approach to this. Although we are now fully aware of the dangers of asbestos, this insidious disease can strike 20, 30 or 40 years after exposure. Therefore, there is a need not for a complicated, expensive, lawyer-based system of compensation, but for a system that will address the needs of sufferers. I am sorry that I cannot help more in relation to making it an exception. Horrific as the disease is, it is not an exception to the way in which the justice system should work. We should have a system in which lawyers get a proper return for the job that they do and in which those deserving compensation receive proper compensation. It is not a case of grabbing 25 per cent of that compensation. Competition and even some morality might drive that out of the system. Even bigger than that is the prize that the Government are seeking: a system that is not lawyer-based but one that is based on need, clearly agreed with the industry. As I have assured the House, we hope to make a Statement by the summer and we hope to have a system in place that brings speed and fairness to the sufferers of this disease. I ask the House to reject the amendment and to support the House of Commons resolution.
My Lords, the House of Commons has rejected this amendment on the spurious grounds that it is inappropriate. That is a matter of opinion and judgment, no more and no less. Amendment 32 would exempt industrial disease claims from these changes. I supported the amendment that has just been passed by the House that relates specifically to exempting cases of respiratory disease from these changes. Amendment 32 goes wider to cover all diseases, conditions and illnesses that arise from a breach of duty owed by an employer to an employee, some of which may be much more complex than cases of mesothelioma, as we heard a moment ago. In the debate in the House of Commons, the argument was put that there should have been no specific amendment for one condition, such as mesothelioma, but a general approach. By passing this amendment, we give the House of Commons an opportunity to consider having that general approach.
I wish to draw to your Lordships’ attention to the meagre hour allowed in the Commons for debating Amendments 31 and 32. The Minister, Mr Djanogly, concentrated overwhelmingly, almost exclusively in fact, on Amendment 31. He said:
“the amendments are unnecessary. The legal climate in which mesothelioma cases can be brought has wholly changed in recent years”.—[Official Report, Commons, 17/4/12; col. 264.]
The whole tenor of the debate was in the context of mesothelioma, which we dealt with in our debate on the previous amendment. Of the 20 MPs who spoke, 15 spoke specifically about mesothelioma and 15 supported Amendment 32 when it came to a vote. The case against Amendment 32 was just not made in the Commons. We are supposed to respond to what the Commons has told us. It had not debated it at earlier stages, and it did not debate Amendment 32 in the hour that it had on 17 April.
At earlier stages during the passage of the Bill, the case has been made on the basis of road traffic claims and the savings that could be made in that context. Industrial disease cases are wholly different from road traffic accident claims; and, as many organisations, including the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers, have advised me, in road traffic accident claims liability is far simpler to prove than in industrial disease cases. That is why we need to have support for those cases, whatever the condition arising from industrial disease, not just mesothelioma. There is a range of other diseases. In the earlier debate, the Minister referred to further thought being given to mesothelioma by the Government and the DWP later this year. Presumably, on the basis of the argument that he put a moment ago, that further thought will also be given to the more complex cases that arise from other backgrounds in the industrial context. It is important to have the Minister’s response on the record on that.
We have been through these arguments many times, and I am not going to take up the time of the House in reiterating them. I beg to move.
My Lords, I can be very brief on behalf of the Official Opposition. The Motion that was passed last time in this House was in my name, and it follows that we support the Motion in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, today. He has summed up the case extremely well, and in our view this amendment should be supported. It is quite wrong that any part of the damages awarded in industrial diseases should be taken from the successful claimant. In principle, it is wrong. Therefore we support the amendment.
My Lords, I can be very brief. There is a belief on this side that Amendment 32 would drive a coach and horses through the Jackson amendments, and we are broadly in support of the need to amend and reform conditional fee agreements and the like. I also draw the House’s attention to the fact that the wording of this amendment is extraordinarily wide. It will not apply just to cases of damages for industrial disease, as the heading would indicate; it will relate to any proceedings that include a claim for damages for a disease, condition or illness. That could be a minority part of the claim, and the rest, piggybacking on it, would also be outside the broad changes to these conditional fee agreements that have, in my view and in the view of the Government, had extremely unpropitious consequences for litigation generally, some of which we heard in discussion on the previous amendment. I am afraid that I oppose this amendment.
My Lords, this House dislikes the Bill. I am referring not only to the 11 defeats and two draws that the Government sustained on Report or the defeats today but to a wider feeling that Part 1 in particular is mean-minded, picks on the poor, disabled and vulnerable and is not worthy of this country’s traditions and its legal system. This view is held virtually throughout the House. There were more than 50 speakers on Second Reading, but it is difficult to recall anyone who spoke up for Part 1.
I believe that many Conservatives are offended by the way in which the Government have picked on the poor and the vulnerable. It is against their traditions and they are unconvinced that there are any savings to be made by decimating social welfare law, particularly as the Government have consistently refused to give figures, in spite of committees asking them to do so.
I also believe that the Liberal Democrat Benches are offended by the taking out of scope debt, employment, immigration and, if the Government have their way, welfare benefit cases. If they had been in opposition now, I venture to suggest that they would have opposed Part 1 of the Bill with all their might, yet somehow, with some brave exceptions, which I will not name, they have been cajoled into voting for exactly the things with which they disagree most. The Minister is a liberal and humane man and I occasionally feel sorry for him, too. He has been obliged to put forward, particularly in relation to Part 1, nonsense after nonsense in support of his arguments.
Of course we welcome the Government’s amendment concerning upper court appeals. It was always ridiculous that claimants at an Upper-tier Tribunal—the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court—should not automatically get legal aid to argue their case, which, as the Minister has just reminded us, can be only on a point of law. The Government knew all along that it was ridiculous and the Minister, to his great credit, never tried to argue seriously against it. We were always going to get this concession at some stage. I do not want to be difficult about the concession; we are grateful for it and for any part that the Minister may have had in getting it.
However, the position is still deeply unsatisfactory with regard to First-tier Tribunal appeals. Last Tuesday, in the other place, an extraordinarily unconvincing pantomime took place between the right honourable and learned gentleman the Lord Chancellor and the honourable Member Mr Tom Brake. I should explain to any noble Lords who do not know who Tom Brake is that he is the Commons equivalent of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford. That is meant as a compliment to him.
The Lord Chancellor hinted tantalisingly—using expressions such as “if we can solve the problems”, “if we can find” and so on—that an arrangement might be reached whereby a lower-tier judge could certify a point of law and give legal aid to a claimant. I do not think it unfair to describe that arrangement as vague, unthought-out, superficial, strictly back-of-an-envelope stuff and, as we know, arranged very much at the last minute. Amazingly, however, it resulted in the said honourable Mr Brake immediately withdrawing an amendment that he and others had moved—not unlike my amendment today, as it happens. I am afraid that no one was fooled by this last-minute arranged minuet of an agreement. In a boxing match, it was a clear fixed fight, with Mr Brake going down to a knockout by arrangement in the second round.
That is absolute rubbish. I say now—I would say it in a speech later—that it is not worthy of the noble Lord, Lord Bach, to attack Tom Brake in that way when he is not here to answer for himself. I am proud to be an associate of Tom Brake, who leads on legal matters in the House of Commons from the Back Benches, as I do here. He very bravely put forward that amendment and achieved a great success in getting the concession that he did, which I will develop at a later stage.
If that was the concession that was sought, it was very poor fare indeed. The reasons why the deal is so unsatisfactory are numerous. Let me be brief about them. First, it is utterly impractical. What happens in real life is that, following an adverse review by the DWP, a claimant will decide whether to appeal to the lower tribunal. At present the claimant will be able to see a specialist adviser who will tell him whether there is a case or not. This prevents hopeless cases from clogging up the First-tier Tribunal but ensures that good cases go ahead to the First-tier Tribunal, which is a tribunal of fact and law.
None of this will happen under the proposed arrangement. How can a judge decide whether a case has a real point of law until it comes before him or her? Without sensible legal advice, it may never come before the First-tier Tribunal. This will mean that in practice many good cases, when mistakes have been made, are never taken up and may well mean that rubbish, hopeless cases clog up our already overburdened tribunals.
Secondly, this distinction between pure law and pure fact is a chimera. It is a nonsense at this stage. The First-tier Tribunal is not just a tribunal of law in the way that the second-tier tribunal is. It deals with the whole position and makes decisions on fact and law as they apply. Indeed, no one made that clearer than the Conservative Member of Parliament Mr Robert Buckland, who said in an intervention:
“I am listening to my right hon. and learned Friend’s arguments with great care, but I am still puzzled about the unavoidable problem of the ability to work out what is a legal issue as opposed to a merely factual one. Fact management and legal issues often come hand in hand, and they are often best handled by a lawyer. I worry that we are making an artificial distinction”.—[Official Report, Commons, 17/04/12; col. 227.]
Later, in his speech, he said:
“A person does not come through the door of the citizens advice bureau, the law centre or the local practitioner saying, ‘I am a problem of fact’ or, ‘I am a problem of law.’ They come as individuals with a particular issue that needs untangling by somebody with expertise. That somebody will, I am afraid to say, often be a lawyer. That is a fact and we should not shy away from it. Often a lawyer can quickly, in the provision of advice—I am not talking about representation in the tribunal at this stage—”
I should say that nor are we, in the course of this amendment—
“sort out the problem effectively”.—[Official Report, Commons 17/4/12; col. 248.]
He could not have put the case better for the amendment and against the very vague arrangement that was mentioned in the other place last Tuesday.
Let us look at a real-life impact of the measure that the Government propose. According to official figures last year, 173,880 people appealed a benefits decision in the First-tier Tribunals. Of those, 161,400 related to disability benefits—that is, 80 per cent—including incapacity benefit, employment support allowance, and DLA or industrial injuries disablement benefit. About 60 per cent of all appellants who received advice from a front-line agency won their case but only 39 per cent of those who did not receive advice won their case. That is clear evidence of what can be called the advice premium.
In short, meritorious claimants are more likely to win their case if they have been advised in advance. Overall, 45 per cent of those before the tribunals won their case. I hope that that puts paid to any notion that the majority of appeals lack merit or involve chancers having a go. Clearly there is a substantial need for a mechanism to correct errors. We all know that the department makes errors all the time—and that will happen as long as life goes on.
I regret that I must note that 45 per cent represents a marked increase over the previous year, in which 38 per cent won their cases, itself the culmination of years of improvement. So last year represents a sudden and significant degradation in the quality of decision-making in state agencies, which is quite the opposite to the claims made by the Government that the DWP is working to make the system more effective. The worst degradation in decision-making was for employment support allowance, on which overall half the appellants won their case. To put that in numbers terms, more than 40,000 disabled people a year have their employment support allowance reinstated after a First-tier Tribunal ruling that overturns erroneous decisions from the DWP. Again, there are marked disparities in the percentage of appellants who succeed, based on whether they receive advice or not, with some 70 per cent of advised ESA appellants winning and only 43 per cent of unadvised appellants winning. We are talking about advice, not representation. The conclusion is that advice really matters.
We argue—and I hope that the House is with us—that the present system works all right. It is true that tribunals are already overburdened, but we are now in an age of austerity and we have coming up the road radical welfare benefit reform about to commence. There will be mistake after mistake made by the authorities, so how can this be the right time to take away or remove our fellow citizens’ rights to have wrong decisions corrected—decisions that for some actually make the difference between a decent life and one wrecked by poverty and insecurity?
If our amendment were passed, it would cost the Government at most £15 million. All commentators agree that the Government’s proposals will cost the state much more in the end because, if people do not get that expert early advice, their lives go wrong. The problems that they have can be dealt with, and have been dealt with for years, by not-for-profit organisations such as law centres and CABs, in which advice on social welfare law and the law for everyday life is given for free under legal aid. If that advice is no longer available, those problems get worse and multiply and in the end the state has to pay out much more in picking up the pieces.
We do not believe that, for £15 million, which is what the Government claim would be saved by changing this system—that is, by not allowing advice at the early stage—that can possibly be sensible. This Government have, for example, found £250 million in order that we might all have weekly bin collections, but they cannot afford £15 million per year in order that people can get advice. A system that was set up by a Conservative Government, under the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, and supported by previous Conservative Governments, as well as by the Liberal Democrats over the years, and by us, is to be completely overthrown in order, in fact, not to save any money at all.
Our amendment would allow early advice to see whether a case was one that was suitable for First-tier Tribunal or not. That is all that we are asking the House to agree to tonight. This is basically the same amendment that the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, moved on Report, but because there is financial privilege we have lessened it. It is not for the review period—the review to the DWP. It comes into play only when there is consideration of whether to go to the First-tier Tribunal. I beg to move.
On the contrary. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Bach, is ready to leap to his feet to draw attention to the fact that we have carried through the savings in criminal legal aid that the previous Administration put in train.
Yes, I am pleased that the Government have done that, but that figure is included in the 8 per cent that they have taken off criminal legal aid. They have taken 29 per cent off family legal aid, as well as 53 per cent off social welfare law. Why that distinction? Why take 8 per cent from a large amount on criminal legal aid, 29 per cent on family law but 53 per cent of a pretty small budget on social welfare law? That is deliberate, is it not?
The point is that it is still an appointed House and is an advisory and revisory Chamber. As such, where this House decides to draw stumps on a particular issue is a matter for its judgment. Although financial primacy may occasionally irritate this House, again, as a House of Commons man and as I said earlier, this is not something recently drawn up by the coalition agreement or even by the 1911 Act. It is 300 years of our much-valued history during which kings have lost their heads and their throne in the primacy of the House of Commons on financial matters. Much as I should like to flatter the House on this matter, I still believe that it is important.
I understand the desire to see more legal advice in these cases. As I said in my opening remarks, we believe that in most cases individuals will be able to appeal to the First-tier Tribunal without formal legal assistance. I quoted the president of the tribunal in highlighting that in many cases eliciting additional information from the appellant was the most useful exercise that the tribunal carried out.
I also think that we are not being idle while welfare benefit reforms are being brought forward. A number of proposals currently are being considered across government that should make it easier for people to receive the right provision of entitlement in areas such as welfare, benefits and education. The most notable of these is the universal credit which will help to reduce the scope of error significantly as it makes the whole benefit system simpler and easier to understand. We are working closely with DWP as part of its wider welfare reform programme to improve the quality and effectiveness of its initial decision-making.
As I have said, we have gone into this matter fully and it is not something that we have ducked. From the very beginning, from the first consultation paper, we took a decision that social welfare would be taken out of scope. I know how passionately the noble Lord, Lord Bach, feels about this matter. If he was in my position, it is not the road he would have taken to fulfil his party’s commitment to cut legal aid. That is the nature of things. This is the judgment of the Government.
We are not looking at complex points of law in other areas at the moment. As the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, said, the problem is that if you make a concession somebody immediately stands up and says, “Why not look at it in other areas?”. We can build on what the Lord Chancellor promised about talks with the DWP. The noble Lord, Lord Thomas, in explaining what he was proposing, illustrated why we have been careful in putting this matter forward. We will look at it carefully and I will draw to the attention of my right honourable friend the Lord Chancellor the specific proposals he made in his speech.
As I have said before, we have had a very thorough debate on this. It has certainly been very thoroughly debated in this place over the past year. I believe that it would be better now if the House were to accept the Commons amendments and the noble Lord were to withdraw his.
I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. We have had the expertise of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Low, both of whom are experts on the disabled and the problems that they face. I am also very grateful to my noble friend Lord Howarth and the noble Lord, Lord Martin of Springburn, for their very knowledgeable contributions on this matter, and not least to the Minister for what he has had to say.
This is one of the central and most important debates of this whole Bill. It goes to the very heart of what the Government are seeking to do, which is effectively to ask whether social welfare law will survive in our jurisdiction. We currently have a system of social welfare law that we can be proud of. It is not perfect; it makes mistakes and it probably does not have enough money spent on it but it is not a bad system, where not-for-profit organisations around the country—CABs, law centres, other advice centres and some Law Society solicitors—do wonderful work at very low rates, giving advice to the most vulnerable, the disabled and the poorest in our country.
The issue is whether claimants will continue to get the advice that they have been entitled to in the past—because there has been a consensus of the political classes of all the parties that that is the proper way for a mature legal system to behave—which helps them decide whether or not they have a case when they are dealing with the state. Without that advice, how will these people get to the tribunal in the first place? The Minister quoted the president of the Social Entitlement Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal. Is that the same president who has publicly said that he is appalled at the prospect of more and more claimants coming before his tribunals who have not had the benefit of any legal advice?