Future Army 2020

Debate between Lord Arbuthnot of Edrom and Bob Russell

Thursday 6th March 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Arbuthnot]

In answer to the hon. Gentleman’s final question, I would say that we may be too late for that, because the recruitment notices have probably already been delivered. However, it is worrying that the 82,500 figure does not appear to have been subjected to any tests or experiments to establish whether it adequately addressed the threats that the country faces. As I said in my brief statement, I think it should have been a reiterative process. Obviously, there is a financial envelope within which we all have to work. Whether that is large enough rather depends on the threats we face.

[Sir Bob Russell (Colchester) (LD)]

I would like to place on record my appreciation of the right hon. Gentleman, who steps down as Chairman of the Defence Committee shortly. Does he agree that as the final five or six years of this decade unfold, if circumstances require it—notwithstanding the fact that civil servants determined the size of the Army—the Government should step in and increase recruitment so that the country gets the Army it should have?

[Mr Arbuthnot]

I do agree with the hon. Gentleman, who also does assiduous work on the Defence Committee. It should not be civil servants who determine the size of the Army; it should be this House that determines the size of the Army—it should be Ministers. Ministers are, of course, in overall control, but these are issues that should be discussed by the House of Commons on a regular basis and determined by Ministers.

Defence and Cyber-security

Debate between Lord Arbuthnot of Edrom and Bob Russell

Tuesday 4th March 2014 Commons Chamber

[Sir Bob Russell (Colchester) (LD)]

We are talking about cyber-technology, but may I use an old-fashioned phrase in warning of the danger of having all our eggs in one basket?

[Mr Arbuthnot]

Yes, and I entirely agree. I have discovered a new organisation being set up in Cambridge called the centre for the study of existential risk, which is right up my street. Being a gloomy sort of person, that is precisely the sort of thing I am worried about, and the hon. Gentleman will not be surprised to hear that I am already in deep contact with the centre.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Arbuthnot]

The Committee visited Estonia in 2009. It has still not been conclusively established who precisely was responsible for the attacks that took down much of that country’s banking system, although we have our suspicions—they may have been marching around in unmarked uniforms. We discovered that the attack had been comparatively easy to achieve. It was a distributed denial-of-service attack that did real damage. We also discovered the international centre of excellence in Estonia, which at that stage the Government were not contributing towards in dealing with cyber-attacks. I am delighted that they have since decided, perhaps as a result of our incredibly effective report, to contribute to the centre.

[Sir Bob Russell]

I was biding my time, but the intervention from the hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) has prompted me to intervene. Has any evidence yet come forward to suggest that what is going on in Crimea has involved cyber-security breaches either way?

[Mr Arbuthnot]

If there is evidence of that, I do not yet know of it. All I can say is that before the invasion of Georgia there was an extensive cyber-attack on its computer network that was very similar to the one on Estonia. I suspect that it is now a new method of fighting wars that we must all get used to.

The need to share information is critical, as I have said, and important mechanisms for that exist, such as the cyber-security information sharing partnership, which is now open to companies beyond critical national infrastructure sectors, including small and medium-sized businesses. CISP analysts will be expected to feed into CERT once it is fully operational.

The Committee produced many recommendations, but our final conclusion was that the cyber-threat, like other emerging threats, has the capacity to evolve with almost unimaginable speed and with serious consequences for the nation’s security. The Government need to put in place—they have not yet done so—mechanisms, people, education, skills, thinking and policies that take into account both the opportunities and the vulnerabilities that cyber presents. It is time the Government approached the subject with vigour. I am pleased to see the actions that they have taken since we issued our report. Clearly there is much more to be done—in the cyber world it is a matter of constantly playing catch-up—but I personally have the impression that the Government are, at the very least, joining in the game.

Maritime Surveillance

Debate between Lord Arbuthnot of Edrom and Bob Russell

Thursday 7th February 2013 Westminster Hall

[Mr Arbuthnot]

The hon. Gentleman might say that, but as a former Chief Whip, I couldn’t possibly comment.

The threats that require maritime surveillance are evolving and have become more non-military in nature. The Mumbai terrorist attacks in 2008 rather illustrate that, in that they were launched from the sea. Our report concluded that it was a weakness that there was not a single individual within the Ministry of Defence who should be responsible for maritime surveillance. The Government did not agree.

We acknowledged that the new joint forces command could have a role in delivering, co-ordinating and strengthening maritime surveillance. We are nevertheless disappointed that the Government do not think that there is a requirement for an individual within the MOD to take responsibility for maritime surveillance. We accept that it is not the JFC’s role, but we are concerned that the left hand of the MOD may not know what its right hand is doing, let alone be able to co-ordinate the interests of the MOD with all the other Departments and agencies that require maritime surveillance capabilities.

Here I begin a number of requests to the Minister for information, which I will be grateful if he responds to, if not in today’s debate, perhaps in writing later, with whatever degree of classification he considers necessary. It will be helpful if he first outlines how the co-ordination that we are concerned about is being taken forward, particularly as the MOD starts work on the 2015 SDSR. Our concerns were highlighted when we were told that there was an “informal group of Ministers” who were responsible for taking forward maritime surveillance issues.

Although decisions may ultimately be taken in Cabinet or the National Security Council, we thought there should be greater ministerial involvement. This contains an echo of our report, “Defence and Cyber-Security”, published in January this year and our report, “Developing Threats: Electro-Magnetic Pulses”, published in February last year: we worry that Ministers faced with a threat or a vulnerability that crosses departmental responsibilities have inadequate structures and insufficient practice in getting together to work out responses, which may be needed very quickly indeed.

Against that, we welcome the establishment of the maritime security oversight group and the National Maritime Information Centre. The Government told us that the risk assessment was expected to be completed in December 2012. Will the Minister update us on progress? What threats, including new ones, have been identified? Such strategic analysis is important. Future threats are increasingly likely to be identified through intelligence gathering.

Maritime ISTAR—forgive the acronym, which stands for intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance—of which maritime surveillance is a part, will be essential. Without effective surveillance, both maritime and elsewhere, the UK armed forces are operating at a much reduced effectiveness.

[Sir Bob Russell (Colchester) (LD)]

As the Chair knows, we are holding an inquiry into the consequences to the UK of an independent Scotland. How would Scotland becoming an independent state impact on future maritime surveillance for England, Wales and Northern Ireland?

[Mr Arbuthnot]

Maritime surveillance is carried out at the moment in a nationwide fashion. To my mind, it is difficult to see how smaller units or entities could have a separate capability not backed up by MOD resources. We as a Committee have not reached that conclusion however, as my hon. Friend knows, because we have not yet concluded our inquiry into the defence consequences of an independent Scotland. When making their decision on independence, the Scottish people will need to take that issue very seriously into account. I am grateful to my hon. Friend for raising that important point.

The 2010 SDSR gave a commitment to enhancing ISTAR. In reply to the debate or later, will the Minister say what progress has been made in taking forward the development and strengthening of maritime ISTAR? What actual measures can he tell us about? What risk are the Government taking in delivering maritime ISTAR for the future?

Our report also looked at the future of maritime surveillance capabilities and what was required. We thought, frankly, that the MOD was sending out mixed messages. On the one hand, its studies identified a maritime patrol aircraft as the solution in the short to medium term, but on the other hand, a maritime patrol aircraft is not in the equipment programme. The MOD seems prepared to wait until the 2015 SDSR before making any decisions or assessing options. It seems to regard the risk as tolerable, on the basis that such equipment could be bought with unprecedented speed and efficiency. I have high hopes for the MOD’s acquisition process being reformed dramatically, but that might be the triumph of hope over experience.

Strategic Defence and Security Review

Debate between Lord Arbuthnot of Edrom and Bob Russell

Thursday 16th September 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr Arbuthnot]

The hon. Gentleman is rapidly taking on the mantle of our former colleague, John Smith, who made regular speeches on St Athan, and I pay tribute to him on that account and on many others. Training must be at the heart of maintaining the extraordinary quality of our armed forces. I hope that the process of getting to a proper result on defence training will be concluded at the end of the strategic defence and security review, because we need a degree of certainty, but so far we have had too much delay. My constituency used to contain a base at Bordon, which was seriously affected by the change to St Athan. We ought to leave the result on St Athan to the SDSR.

There has been insufficient consultation with the public at large, armed forces personnel, the defence industry and parliamentarians. With regard to the last of those, the review was initiated before the new Parliament properly began its business. There was a need for some speed in the review and it took six weeks to establish the Defence Committee, and I accept that neither was the fault of the MOD. However, only one debate has been held in the House, during which I was not fortunate enough to catch your eye, Mr Speaker. Much of the work of the review has happened during the parliamentary recess and the results will be announced shortly after the conference recess. I can best describe that as a sub-optimal process.

Our concerns include the startling speed with which the review is taking place; the influence of current operations on future capabilities; the lack of future ring-fencing for the Defence budget; the lack of public engagement with the process; the uncertainty over the future funding position of Trident; the MOD’s postponement of discussions on the potential savings that future procurement and defence reform could bring; the insufficient consultation with the defence industry; the lack of a proper review of the future of reservists; and a lack of symbiosis between structural change in the MOD and the MOD’s future direction. We ask whether operations will be funded in future by the contingency reserve. We are also concerned about the retirement within three weeks of senior people in the MOD who were deeply involved with the SDSR, and therefore that the implementation of the SDSR will be led by people who did not lead in its creation. Quite frankly, the report is a cacophony of anxiety boiled down to 23 pages.

[Bob Russell (Colchester) (LD)]

The right hon. Gentleman is presenting a devastating negative case. Can he bring anything positive to the House?

[Mr Arbuthnot]

That, of course, is the role of our hon. Friend the Minister, who will make his speech in due course. However, we need to recognise the need for speed. In discussions yesterday with the Defence Committee, some senior academics and senior retired military people suggested that delaying things would not necessarily produce better decisions.

[Bob Russell]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for allowing me to intervene a second time. I posed the question in my first intervention because I wished to be helpful to him. I agree entirely with the points he is making and I wish him and his Committee well, because the review is a rushed job.

[Mr Arbuthnot]

That, of course, is also what the Committee thinks.

One of the Committee’s principal objections is that the lack of general consultation may create a greater sense of disconnection between the Government’s decisions and the understanding of the people at large on defence issues. With regard to the public view of defence, there is a gap between what politicians say and what the public believe. In relation to Iraq, the British people became, towards the end of our engagement there, broadly opposed, mostly because of the very poor planning on what to do after we had won the war. There is a great degree of scepticism about the purpose of our deployment in Afghanistan. In my view, our people would support our deployment to Afghanistan if they thought we had a good strategy for winning, but at the moment they do not think that.

That gap between the public view and the country’s policy is both very important and deeply worrying. The SDSR was an opportunity to narrow the gap, but because of the speed with which it is being carried out, that opportunity has been missed. We in the defence community must therefore do all we can, not only in the UK but across Europe, to explain defence policy and our defence needs to the public. Without such communication, notwithstanding the country’s general support for the armed forces, defence will suffer.

That contrasts with the 1997-98 defence review, which was announced during the Queen’s Speech in May 1997 and reported, later than originally expected, just over 13 months later in July 1998. There was a good deal of consultation during the preparation of that review. The Defence Committee of the day played its part in that, holding 12 evidence sessions while the review was in preparation and eight more afterwards. It also produced a weighty three-volume report on the review—I do not know whether anybody read it, but at least somebody had the time to write it. It was a good review, but I would make two points about it. First, it ended up being underfunded, because it was overtaken by events. Secondly, I would caution the right hon. Member for Coventry North East (Mr Ainsworth), the shadow Defence Secretary, because it was held at a time when the British economy was strong, the Labour Government having received one of the best economic legacies in the history of this country. Before the shadow Secretary of State makes too much of his suggestion that this one is a cost-cutting farce—