Defence Personnel

Debate between Lord Arbuthnot of Edrom and Angus Robertson

Thursday 6th December 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr James Arbuthnot (North East Hampshire) (Con)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered the matter of defence personnel.

If I may, I would like to begin, rather oddly, by congratulating my hon. Friend the Member for North West Cambridgeshire (Mr Vara) on the previous debate, which was outstanding—despite the fact that it has taken time away from the defence debate. I think that it was a really worthwhile way of starting today’s Back-Bench business.

I am grateful to the Backbench Business Committee for granting us a debate on personnel issues. We discover that there is a disadvantage in having this debate during the week of the autumn statement, because it has been relegated to the end of a day after not only the important debate we have just had, but important statements that have to be made following the autumn statement. Because there is less time than there might otherwise have been, I will take as little time as possible in order to allow everyone who wishes to speak to do so.

There will inevitably be subjects I do not cover. I am afraid that I will not cover the important issue of reductions of certain historic and well-recruited regiments, but I hope that, by not speaking about that, I will allow other right hon. and hon. Members to do so, and with greater knowledge than I could possibly show. I shall say little about redundancies or reservists, because the Defence Committee has recently conducted a number of inquiries into those subjects. Yesterday, we took the unusual step of announcing in advance the Committee’s programme for the remainder of this Parliament. It will include inquiries into some of these important matters.

One of the advantages of having the debate today is that it seems to have prompted the Ministry of Defence to produce lots of documents, including its accounts for 2011-12 and the annual report on the covenant. It is always nice to have the MOD’s accounts, even if the auditor qualifies them, as always, by saying that they do not show a true or fair view of the state of the MOD’s finances. It would have been nicer still if we had had the accounts in June or July, when we should have done, but no doubt the accounting officer will be able to give an explanation when he comes before us next week—an event to which I know the whole Defence Committee will be looking forward enormously.

Today’s annual report on the armed forces covenant is welcome. It reflects many of the suggestions made by the Committee in its continuing series of inquiries into the covenant, for example on doubling council tax relief, on the false economy created by the pause in the refurbishment of single living accommodation, on home ownership and on health care, particularly mental health care, for veterans and reservists. Those are not acknowledged as being the Committee’s suggestions, but we know the terms of trade and do not mind that, so long as the MOD from time to time listens to what we say and does something about it.

The relationship between the MOD and the Select Committee needs to contain an element of constructive tension—almost scratchy; never cosy. Sometimes there is more tension than constructiveness, but I tell the Minister that the more open his Department is with the Committee, the more we can help to get his policies right. We shall shortly be producing a report on the Service Complaints Commissioner, who, as usual, gave us most helpful evidence a couple of weeks ago. I hope that the Minister will listen and respond positively to what we will say on Dr Atkins’ extremely valuable role.

The MOD does sometimes help us. Last week it helped the Committee to have an extremely valuable visit to Afghanistan as part of our normal programme of visiting our armed forces wherever they are deployed. Several issues arose, and they are what I want to concentrate on for the remainder of my short remarks.

I will touch first on welfare matters, starting with decompression. At the end of a six-month tour, we consider it essential to ensure that our troops are provided with a period of what is known as decompression. Often that takes place in Cyprus on the way home, when the returning troops, over a few kegs of beer, are reminded that their spouses will have been living their own lives while they were away and will not necessarily understand exactly what they have been through. These are absolutely essential reminders.

However, apparently, decompression is not considered essential when our forces return for a two-week break in the middle of a tour. That suggests that we need to rethink the entire concept of the two-week break, not of decompression itself. Is the two-week break necessary or a good thing? For example, when our troops are working alongside the Americans, who, unlike British forces, get travel time taken off their break but get only a two-week rest and relaxation break in a one-year tour, does that create resentments on either side? Is the entire concept of a break destabilising? If, for operational reasons, someone’s break comes very near the beginning or end of their tour, what good does it do? The armed forces and the Ministry of Defence need to begin to think about these things very seriously.

The armed forces sometimes need to make serious and difficult choices between welfare and operational output. I suspect that in 2014 the welfare of our troops in Afghanistan will be pretty minimal, frankly. We will have drawn down and taken away much of their support system, and, as we were told, they will be living out of the backs of their vehicles. The troops and, just as importantly, we need to know that, think about it, and accept it now. This is not about stopping looking after the armed forces who do so much for us; it is about putting it in the context that their primary task is operational, and that when they signed up they also signed up to an element of austerity when necessary.

Another issue that arose was detention. There is a genuine problem over the legal ability to transfer those whom we detain to the Afghan authorities, which were accused in the past of mistreating one of the people we had previously transferred. We visited the detention facility in question, and we were impressed with the new deputy governor, who has a good international track record in observing and enforcing human rights. Nevertheless, we remain concerned that there should be a speedy solution to this problem. We must not run the risk of being forced to hold on to people whom our troops detain, because that might lengthen our involvement in Afghanistan in certain respects far beyond the period for which we would wish to be so involved. Still less must we put our troops at risk of being subject to any legal challenge regarding a failure to obey international law in what they have done. I suggest that in future there should always be an Afghan element in the capture, interrogation and detention of those suspected of insurgency or dealing in narcotics so that in all cases the detention is Afghan, not British, and the problem therefore does not arise. However, such a solution would require complicated discussions between ourselves and the Afghan authorities, and I appreciate that it will not be easy to achieve.

Our role in Afghanistan now is to step back, and that is a very difficult thing for the British armed forces to do. Their natural inclination, as the sort of people they are with the sort of qualities they have, is to step in and help; that is what they are trained to do. However, we are now reaching the stage in Afghanistan where the best help we can give is not to help. One aspect of this is the insider threat, which is sometimes referred to as “green on blue”. One of the soldiers we talked to in Camp Bastion said that it is absolutely galling that the very people we are there to help might turn on us. The risk is not going to go away; all we can do is minimise it. My own view—I do not know about other members of the Defence Committee—is that we are doing our very best to achieve that. If we draw the conclusion that we cannot trust the Afghan security forces, we will be quite wrong. It is a fantastic country with wonderful people who are, let us not forget, being asked to learn in a few years what it took us centuries to learn. It will still be necessary for our troops to help to use the ISTAR—intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance—assets that we have and to call in the medical helicopters that are so highly regarded, but it will increasingly be less necessary for them to patrol alongside the Afghan patrols, which are becoming more capable day by day.

We came away from Afghanistan with a strong message. At the end of the summer, an instruction went out to the insurgents that they should fight their way through the winter. Despite that, the insurgency dropped away very suddenly. The insurgents are finding it increasingly hard to raise and retain their money and resources. They are also finding it very difficult to persuade their co-insurgents to fight Afghan soldiers, who are becoming increasingly competent. That competence is likely to increase with the advent of the academy for officer training, to be run along the lines of Sandhurst. We went to visit it. It is currently a building site, true, but the Afghans have begun to identify their first training officers and non-commissioned officers, who are clearly of extremely high quality. They have set themselves some enormously high challenges—for example, to have 150 female officer cadets a year passing through the college. In the long run—this point was most validly made to us by President Karzai—the issue of the equal treatment of women is likely to be resolved not by western influence or by the hectoring of countries such as ours but by education and the visibility of the outside world provided by the internet.

We found that security is no longer the primary issue of concern for most Afghans. There is still fear when people travel from one part of the country to another, but the ability of Afghans to farm in peace, and to get their goods to market on an increasingly secure road network, is being greatly improved. This has been achieved by a combination of the actions of our troops and the actions of the Afghan national security forces—police and army, pleasingly—in doing what our troops are training them to do.

Some say that we should leave Afghanistan now. In one sense, that is what we are doing. If we wanted to leave tomorrow, it would in fact take us about 18 months to do so. We are doing it by leaving in place a working security apparatus that will help to ensure that Afghanistan does not again become a threat to this country. By staying involved after the end of combat operations in 2014, we will ensure that there is transition, not abandonment. The strongest message that we received from our personnel in Afghanistan was that we should hold our nerve and stick to the plan, which is a good one.

Here I should acknowledge something: I was wrong. I believed that by setting a date for us to leave Afghanistan we were playing into the hands of the Taliban, who would just wait us out. I told the Prime Minister that if we concentrated on success, we would make it easier for us to leave, whereas if we concentrated on leaving, we would make it harder for us to succeed. It is hard for me to say this, but the Prime Minister and my hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle (John Stevenson) were quite right and I was quite wrong. In practice, the Afghans needed us to step back, and they needed a timetable. Arguably, by setting a date in 2014 the Prime Minister bought more time for the international security assistance force to achieve transition than it would have had if the time scale had been left open-ended.

Finally, I would like to pay tribute to our armed forces. They are going through a tough time at the moment, as is the entire country. They know they are not immune from the financial hardship afflicting us all. They are facing redundancies, reductions in the pensions they can expect and a smaller total expenditure on defence.

[Angus Robertson (Moray) (SNP)]

Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that many service personnel want clarity from the Ministry of Defence on what will happen to arrangements for units in which husbands and wives are based? They, like the right hon. Gentleman, perhaps, and me, were under the impression that we might learn that from a statement from the MOD as soon as next Tuesday. Is he aware of reports suggesting that that announcement will not take place next Tuesday and does he know of any reasons why that might be? If not, perhaps the Minister on the Treasury Bench could clarify whether that is correct.

[Mr Arbuthnot]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. The Chief of the General Staff was asked a similar question when he appeared before us yesterday. Unsurprisingly, the timing of statements is a matter for the Government. We will have to wait to hear from the Minister whether this has been affected by the changes announced in yesterday’s autumn statement, but he will have heard the hon. Gentleman’s intervention and will no doubt be eager to cover it in his contribution, even if he does not look too eager at present.

As I have said, the Chief of the General Staff appeared before us and he said that this was a worrying and destabilising time for the armed forces. Picking up on the hon. Gentleman’s point, it is certainty that the armed forces want—they just want to know where they stand so that they can plan their lives accordingly.

It is our job as a Parliament to recognise what our armed forces do for us and to thank them for it. I am pleased that the country seems to be well aware of how much we owe our armed forces, and today is our opportunity to acknowledge it and to thank them.