Ukraine

Lord Anderson of Swansea Excerpts

Thursday 21st September 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Swansea (Lab)]

My Lords, I commend the debate in the other place on 11 September. Sometimes I detect a certain air of superiority here against the House of Commons, but it was a debate of high quality informed by a number of parliamentarians who had recently visited Ukraine, been on the front line and spoken to Ukrainian soldiers who, perhaps surprisingly, had a certain respect for the readiness of the Russian military to stay in their positions. It is well worth looking at that debate.

Yesterday, today and tomorrow—the war in Ukraine has lasted only 574 days. I am glad that the Minister counted them for us. Yet already there has been a profound change, obviously in Ukraine itself, in Europe and, in my judgment, in geopolitics.

I was present in Ukraine in November 2021 before the war broke out. I was the only UK parliamentarian at a conference in Odesa. I was impressed by a vibrant city; young people; a café culture; architecture of high quality and a city that could easily slide into western Europe unnoticed. A little later—just before the invasion —I was at NATO in Brussels where I spoke to senior officials and our own representatives, and was told that if there were a Russian invasion, which there was just a few days later, they expected Ukraine to fold and Kyiv to be reached within a few days. It did not happen because of what I think the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, called the will to fight of the people of Ukraine. Perhaps we underestimate too often the role of morale— I think the noble Lord, Lord Owen, spoke about Vietnam and Afghanistan—in warfare and concentrate just on weaponry.

Traditionally, we thought of Ukraine almost as two countries: the east versus the west; Catholic and Orthodox; Russophone against the Ukrainian speakers. One result of the illegal invasion is that a new unity has been forged in what is, to adapt Yaroslavsky, the “grand patriotic war of the people of Ukraine”. Putin has forged that new national unity—another of the miscalculations which he has made.

As mentioned in earlier speeches, we see in Ukraine today a remarkable resilience, as well as the production of drones and the adaptation of civilian instruments. Serious shortcomings have been revealed in the Russian military, and internal strains were shown by the abortive revolt. Russia is also desperately seeking manpower assistance from Cuba and weaponry armaments from North Korea and Iran. The delays in the western supply have been important: think of the debate over the supply of main battle tanks and the current debate over the supply of sophisticated fighter aircraft. The Netherlands and Denmark are now at last supplying F16s, but these delays have clearly impeded the counter-offensive. The pause has allowed the Russians to build what appear to be pretty effective defences.

One of the distressing features of the conflict— I think the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, dwelt on this—has been the response of the global south, as seen in the United Nations General Assembly resolutions and the BRICS meeting. There has been a wish by some to have a certain neutrality between the aggressor and those aggressed. India is close to neutrality; the response of Commonwealth countries has been very distressing. The Commonwealth has, in effect, been irrelevant as a force for good in the world politically. What is our FCDO doing to tell those countries that are reluctant for a number of reasons—anti-colonialism, investment in them by China and Russia—the facts about the aggressor, and has there been any success with that? I note the weak paragraphs in the G20 communiqué, which is very sad. Equally, it seems unlikely that the nature of the current offensive will achieve its aim of closing the land bridge between Russia and Crimea.

What of the lasting changes? Now during the course of the conflict, we see only through a glass darkly, but some trends can be discerned quite clearly. There is a deepening polarisation in the world between those in the western democratic orbit and in the Russian-Chinese authoritarian orbit, unwilling to accept the rules-based international order. Part of the challenge for the West is to get closer to those in the middle who have not yet declared themselves definitively and to talk about global implications of the invasion. At its meeting on 24 August, BRICS would not have issued the invitations, as it did, to six countries to join by the beginning of next year, were it not for the invasion.

I turn to Europe itself, which has been profoundly changed by the conflict. For NATO, it has emerged much stronger and is not brain-dead. It would be useful to have the government perspective on the current position of Sweden, for example. The Turkish President has said that he will submit a proposition to their Assembly by the beginning of next month. Now, a new obstacle has possibly emerged in Hungary, a spoiler both in the European Union and in NATO— I speak as someone who has lived in Hungary as a diplomat and been decorated by the Government of Hungary for my contribution to bilateral relations. How do the Government read the position of Hungary? What concessions do they expect? How far will they go in their attempt to gain concessions? It is true that the Hungarians buy all their aircraft from Sweden, yet they have this position currently. Will they yield immediately when Turkey concedes?

Another factor is that NATO will be strong enough next spring to hold a major military exercise, its grandest since the end of the Cold War, and bring in a number of peripheral nations in doing so. The best way for us in Europe to allay the fears of US critics is through burden sharing. At the moment, only eight of the 31 NATO countries spend 2% of their wealth on defence; even Sweden will rise to 2% by next year. The conflict underlines the fact that our US allies are by far the most important NATO country, now spending $110 billion on Ukraine. We in Europe need to counter the propaganda in the US, knowing that Putin is playing for time in the hope of a Trump victory.

The European Union is also likely to be profoundly affected by the conflict, both in deepening and widening. We see the increasing integration in areas such as energy and defence and an accelerating of the process for Ukraine, which applied for membership in February 2022, was granted candidate status shortly after that and, we hope, will begin negotiations next year, along with the western Balkans, with the first accession assumed by 2030. That poses the question for us: where do we now focus, as we look ahead?

I have one final reflection. I understand the reluctance of the Government to discuss the endgame, with all the current uncertainties, but all conflicts ultimately end in deals. There is some evidence that President Zelensky is moving from a maximalist position, step by step, preparing his public opinion for compromise. Perhaps the Government could comment on that.

Of course, we must stick with our Ukrainian allies, who are defending our interests so bravely, even if we do not grant them an absolute veto over acceptance. But we should be open to discussion, and to various options on the future of Ukraine, including how to hold Russia to account for its war crimes, for the killing of civilians and, as the noble Lord, Lord Alton, has said, for the abduction of those children.

Defence Policy (International Relations and Defence Committee Report)

Lord Anderson of Swansea Excerpts

Friday 30th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Swansea (Lab)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, ever travels in hope for glad tidings; I fear that he and the committee may be disappointed yet again. Traditionally, it is generally accepted that the two core roles of government are internal security and external defence. As many noble Lords, including my noble friend Lord Robertson, the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, and the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, have said, it is therefore surprising that so little attention is given to the subject in this House at a time when a war is raging and we would likely be affected massively one way or another if Russia were to succeed in that war—and all the more so because we have in this House what the noble Lord, Lord Hennessy, calls the “warriors’ Bench”, together with a former Secretary-General of NATO and other people eminently qualified to contribute to that debate. Yet this debate is at the fag end of the week, on a Friday afternoon.

That said, I very much support this welcome report from the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, and the committee. She was an outstanding chair. I also welcome the massive contribution made by the excellent staff. The committee covered a wide canvas. It posed serious questions that need answers on, for example, the bet on new technology against mass, as highlighted by the war in Ukraine; the irrelevance of the “just in time” doctrine to actual conflict; the need for stocks because of the attrition rate of modern warfare; the effect of inflation being higher in the defence field than elsewhere; relations with industry; and the organisation of the Ministry of Defence. The committee gave itself a wide remit, and therefore one can concentrate on only one or two reflections.

My first reflection is on the effect of the pace of change. In defence terms, the classic example is the Upholder submarine, which was obsolete as soon as it was launched. I have seen massive changes in my own lifetime. Eighty years ago, as a little boy, I strutted around the streets of Swansea chanting, “We won the war”. Fifty years later, that same little boy was decorated by the German Government for contributions to British-German bilateral relations. Over the following years, we had a series of reality checks for our nation: Suez, east of Suez withdrawal and the Falklands—magnificent, but the last hurrah. Never again could we mount such a magnificent unilateral action.

These cases all emphasised the need for alliances. I recall us debating in the 1990s the need for 40 destroyers and frigates. Now we are down to 18, and next year it will be 17 or even 16. Yes, we still have a key role in the JEF, Five Eyes, AUKUS and so on, but over the past 10 years there have been so many warnings from experts. In recent weeks there have been warnings from insiders; for example, General Sir Tim Radford, who is about to retire as Deputy SACEUR, perhaps demob liberated, forecast in the Daily Telegraph on 20 June that we risk losing our “fortunate” position in NATO if we do not invest for the future and said that we are “just holding on” to our NATO influence. Again, I invite noble Lords to read the evidence of 20 June to the Defence Select Committee from the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Houghton of Richmond, the former CDS. He argued:

“It beggars belief to me that we have a reduced size of army … We don’t have a properly functioning reserve. To me it’s a national embarrassment”.


My second reflection is this: hindsight gives 20/20 vision. Forecasting is particularly hazardous in the defence field, as we have seen recently in the attempted putsch in Russia, which could not really have been forecast. The world is moving on from western dominance. Just look at the voting in the United Nations General Assembly on the invasion of Ukraine. So much for those who yearn for Commonwealth political solidarity. We have to seek alliances, even with imperfect partners.

Yes, Russia is reduced as a threat. It is weakened, but the threat remains because so many assets have been unused in Ukraine. It seeks western vulnerabilities—for example, underwater cables—and is increasingly dependent on China.

China has moved from a regional to a world superpower, powerful across the board. The point about Taiwan was well made by my friend, the noble Lord, Lord Alton.

The Middle East has been neglected by the IR, but there are major changes. Saudi Arabia is distancing itself from the US in relation to Iran and, indeed, to China.

NATO is not brain-dead but has a new vitality and relevance. Finland and Sweden will both be major contributors of personnel and equipment. Think of the new contract with Saab over NLAWs.

The US is our major key ally. It is dominant, but we will nevertheless have to look to a possible Trump presidency and the effects of that in our contingency planning.

I have two final reflections. The first is the looming financial question posed by defence inflation. Can we continue to seek excellence across the board, or must we increasingly look for co-operation with allies, which will assume niche roles for us?

Secondly, the committee argued for cultural change in planning and defence in terms of openness, including openness to Parliament. When I chaired the Foreign Affairs Committee, I used to ask our own intelligence people to please recognise, like the CIA, that we are on the same side, even if we need positive vetting and special private sessions in relevant parliamentary committees.

I recall being one of the new entrants to the senior branch of the Foreign Office 63 years ago. We were lectured by the head of the security department, who sermonised on 1 Peter, chapter 5, verse 8, advising us to be vigilant, as the devil, our enemy,

“prowls around like a roaring lion looking for someone to devour”.

Today, at a time when the future of Europe will be determined by the outcome of the war in Ukraine, we need not only vigilance but resilience and resources. The report highlights many of the key problems we face and merits a very serious response from the Government.

Ukraine: Ministry of Defence Strategy

Lord Anderson of Swansea Excerpts

Thursday 15th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

Yes, and I think there will be almost unanimity in response to the noble Baroness’s point. The challenge is finding a mechanism through which to disseminate that information. As your Lordships will be aware, that is a very challenging proposition indeed in certain countries. We in the UK are determined to play our part and do what we can to use communication to spread information and provide up-to-date positions. We can only hope that some of that is landing, as I said earlier to the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours.

[Lord Anderson of Swansea (Lab)]

My Lords, however this conflict ends, and end it will, the threat from Russia will remain. What is the position of the United Kingdom Government on security guarantees, in advance of any possible NATO membership, to protect Ukraine from any future Russian threat?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

As the noble Lord will be aware, the UK is supportive of Ukraine’s accession to NATO. We think that is a very important step forward in relation to Euro-Atlantic security. As he will be aware, that is for the member states of NATO to determine, and it will be for them to determine whether any other criteria have to be taken into account.

UK Undersea Infrastructure: Hostile Activity

Lord Anderson of Swansea Excerpts

Tuesday 25th April 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

A critical element of this debate is resilience, which is partly a matter for government in consultation with industry and certainly a matter for individual private infrastructure operators. As my noble friend will be aware, a raft of government departments has responsibility for this: the Cabinet Office, the FCDO, DSIT, the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero —for which I shall not try to use an acronym—and the MoD. While there is a holistic framework of government activity, my noble friend is correct that resilience is the key to good protection.

[Lord Anderson of Swansea (Lab)]

How significant do the Government consider the reports of the recent accelerated activity around our shores of Russian vessels, particularly those purporting to be either research or fishing vessels, but which are near oil installations?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

We view that activity with great gravity. As I said earlier, we are aware of that activity and we constantly monitor it, but I am unable to disclose further information.

Top Secret Document Leaks

Lord Anderson of Swansea Excerpts

Thursday 20th April 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I do not have the response which my right honourable colleague promised in the other place, but I undertake to ensure that a copy is forwarded to the noble Baroness whatever that response is. Our private contractors operate under a very strict regime, not just in terms of vetting the people they have who have access to sensitive material, but also, in terms of undertakings, those individuals must comply with the Official Secrets Act and with the rules, protocols and all the security practices which we expect. There have been instances where these have been breached and prosecutions have ensued. Therefore measures are in place, but I will make the further detail promised by my right honourable friend in the other place available to the noble Baroness.

[Lord Anderson of Swansea (Lab)]

My Lords, the leaks reveal the US assessment that there will be an imminent vulnerability of Ukraine to Russian aircraft. What lessons have we learned in terms of early provision of aircraft and countermeasures to Ukraine?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

As I indicated yesterday in responding to a question about Ukraine, we are working in lockstep with our allies through forums such as the G7 and NATO and efforts such as the UK-led International Fund for Ukraine to get Ukraine the firepower it needs to rapidly regain its territory. We are in daily contact. Tomorrow the Secretary of State for Defence will be at Ramstein, the airbase in Germany, at a meeting hosted by the United States. We are also anticipating the NATO summit in Vilnius in July, and we have constant bilateral engagement with our other partners. Everything is being done to ensure that we can respond as meaningfully as possible to what Ukraine thinks it needs.

Integrated Review: Update

Lord Anderson of Swansea Excerpts

Tuesday 31st January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

The noble Lord will understand that, in this day and age, we cannot look at one aspect of capability on its own—that is not how we deal with and address threats now. The key to how we operate is, first, co-operation with allies; it is also agility in how we respond and making sure that we have the technology and equipment to respond. Although there is no denying—and I have not attempted to deny—that we have seen a hollowing out of our land capability over some decades, it would be quite wrong to give the impression that MoD in the UK does not have a very solid capability: we do. It is important, particularly having regard to the instability in other parts of the world, that we do not talk down our Armed Forces, not least for the morale of the men and women who serve so bravely in them.

[Lord Anderson of Swansea (Lab)]

My Lords, since publication two years ago, surely there has been a major global change—namely, the illegal invasion of Ukraine. Is not one of the lessons of those two years that we should concentrate more on European defence and give up the illusion of a greater tilt to the Indo-Pacific?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

We do concentrate on Euro-Atlantic security, and the swiftness with which we responded—indeed, led the response—to the illegal invasion of Ukraine is tangible evidence of that. But I agree with the noble Lord: the threats that we face nowadays are multifaceted, and it is important that we devise a capability that can respond to the character of that new threat. The noble Lord will be aware that we are dealing not just with traditional land, sea and air domains; we now deal with space, cyber and electro- magnetic domains. It is a complicated world in which we live.

Ukraine: Update

Lord Anderson of Swansea Excerpts

Thursday 19th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My understanding is that the United States has sent tanks. It has also sent Bradley vehicles. I think I am correct in saying that, in addition to the UK, France and Poland have sent tanks. As to what pressure we can bring to bear, the meetings to which I referred in my responses to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, reflect exactly the comprehensive and high-level discussions that are taking place. Everybody is clear that we all have to pull together in support of Ukraine. There is no doubt that, if the Leopard tank could be part of the facility provided to Ukraine, that would be an important addition.

The right reverend Prelate also asked about existing capability in the UK. I will say just two things about that. We have a mixture of equipment that we have provided and, if we take the recent example of the Challenger 2 tanks, I can assure him that there will be no long-term capability gap. We currently have 227 Challenger 2 tanks; we are giving 14. We will operate 148 upgraded Challenger 3 tanks in future so this donation will not reduce the total number of tanks that the Army holds. As to the other equipment, munitions and related material that we have provided, we are very careful to ensure that it does not in any way imperil the capability that we need to protect the security of this country.

[Lord Anderson of Swansea (Lab)]

My Lords, those of us who have been sceptical about the Government’s pretention to leadership post Brexit must surely applaud their leadership in respect of Ukraine, particularly in the provision of tanks. Are we confident that the Ukrainians will have sufficient training to deal with these tanks in time for the anticipated Russian onslaught in the spring? What precisely is the position of Germany in respect of those countries that need its permission to supply the German tanks? I have one final thought: what do we now understand as the war aims of Putin? Are they limited to the four areas that he purportedly annexed in the past?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

Perhaps it is easier if I tell the noble Lord what I cannot reply to. I do not know what is in the mind of President Putin—does anyone? As to the attitude of Germany, I have said before that this is a subject of fluid discussion at these important fora, and that discussion is taking place as we speak. I very much hope that the force of that discussion will be to make clear the desire for the Leopard tank to be included in the facility being provided to Ukraine.

On training, I said in response to an earlier question that the UK will train Ukrainian detachments to operate all the platforms we donate. That will start as soon as Ukrainian troops arrive in the UK, which is likely to be by the end of this month. There is a mutual interest in making sure that training is conducted as effectively and swiftly as possible. The estimate is that the equipment we are announcing will be operated by Ukrainian troops on the battlefield in the coming months. I obviously cannot be more specific than that.

Ukraine: Lethal Weapons

Lord Anderson of Swansea Excerpts

Tuesday 5th April 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I think my noble friend Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon answered a Question recently on this very issue. He was quite clear that, although normalisation of relations with Russia is not possible at the moment, robust diplomatic engagement is necessary. This is very much an FCDO responsibility. I can reassure the noble and gallant Lord that the MoD is regularly in dialogue, not just with our defence allies and partners—whether within NATO or outwith—but also, of course, with the armed forces of Ukraine.

[Lord Anderson of Swansea (Lab)]

Can the Minister confirm that there are considerable logistic problems in the supply of main battle tanks, which are, of course, vulnerable to air attack, and political problems in the supply of aircraft, which, again, are much needed? However, there are no such problems in the supply of air defence systems and, possibly, of missiles, which might protect Odessa from attacks from the sea. So will such be delivered?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

The noble Lord will be aware of the mixture of anti-tank missiles that we have previously supplied. We have also taken the decision to supply Starstreak high-velocity man-portable anti-air missiles. This will allow the Ukrainian forces to better defend their skies.

Ukraine Update

Lord Anderson of Swansea Excerpts

Thursday 10th March 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

The noble Baroness makes a really important point and one that has registered with many people, not least Governments. It is somewhat wide of my area of departmental responsibility, but I hear what she says and will reflect that back to the department.

[Lord Anderson of Swansea (Lab)]

My Lords, many serious analysts expected Kyiv to be taken via Belarus within two days or so. Clearly President Putin did not factor in the remarkable resistance of the people of Ukraine and their morale, in spite of the imbalance of forces. Quite rightly, we have decided to give sophisticated weaponry to Ukraine, but that surely needs very good training. Where will this training be done—outside the borders of Ukraine?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I can confirm the first part of the noble Lord’s question: yes, there will be a degree of training required. He will understand that, for reasons of operational discretion, I am not going to be more explicit about that.

Ukraine

Lord Anderson of Swansea Excerpts

Friday 25th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Swansea (Lab)]

My Lords, I join with the noble Lord, Lord King, and the noble Lord, Lord Sedwill, in his admirable maiden speech, in calling for a global response.

We are in dark days, the like of which we thought we would not see again in our time. My theme is simple: the current invasion was predictable—indeed, it was predicted—and much of it depended on the gullibility of the western response. So far as the predictability is concerned, much of that has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Robathan. On the Russian domestic side, I just mention Magnitsky, Navalny and the blows to the freedom of the press. Abroad, we of course had Skripal in Salisbury and the invasions of Georgia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014. It was predicted. Indeed, looking back, historians will see the triumph in particular of US intelligence in predicting what would happen: the incremental deceit, step by step leading to the actual invasion.

Then we have the question of the nature of President Putin—once a member of the KGB, always a member of the KGB. I was in the foreign service in the 1960s and I recall that there was no Soviet speech possible without talking about revanchist West Germany and about the encirclement of the Soviet Union. Putin mentioned Nazis in respect of Ukraine, which was an echo of the 1960s. Of course, he had the humiliation of Yeltsin and Gorbachev, and Monday’s speech spoke volumes of his nature. Where will it end? Putin has not actually declared his war aims. The minimalist aim is surely the water supply of Crimea and the Mariupol corridor; the maximum is the restructuring of the whole of the security architecture of Europe according to his will.

All this has been aided by the West, which has given Putin the benefit of every doubt. President Macron talked about being deceived—surprise, surprise. To turn the spotlight on the UK, we have allowed so much Russian gold to come in; I congratulate Mr Tugendhat on the Foreign Affairs Committee in the other place. Let us look also at our overseas territories, which are a gap that has not yet been filled. Yet Russia is relatively weak. On analysis, I do not accept what some Americans tell me about Russia being only “a gas station with nukes”; it has a powerful military but, overall, it is still relatively weak and we should appreciate that. Will it be able to sustain a lengthy occupation of Ukraine?

What should be the response? Yes, sanctions could make Putin pay a price. There has been approval of the brave decision of Germany in respect of Nord Stream 2. The Ukrainian people have responded well thus far. I was at a conference in Odessa two months ago as the only UK parliamentarian and was most impressed by the morale of the people. There will be much greater resistance than Putin so far assumes.

I ask the Minister, if I may, about China. China will presumably veto any United Nations Security Council resolution. Is it likely that Russia will now become increasingly dependent on China? What has been the Chinese response, in spite of the Chinese line of “no interference in internal affairs”?

Obviously the West must underline our own red lines, as my noble friend Lord West said. What are the consequences? We must be honest: we must be ready to pay a price ourselves. We must look to make Russia a pariah. I mention the Council of Europe: Putin is not going to lose any sleep over it, but how absurd it is that Russia is allowed to remain a member of what is the key human rights organisation in Europe. NATO must give a united response. One unintended consequence of Putin’s advance and invasion is surely this: there will be a united NATO, which will respond as such, and it may be that Sweden and Finland will look at their own interests and decide that they too must become members of the alliance.