Lord Anderson of Swansea
Main Page: Lord Anderson of Swansea (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Anderson of Swansea's debates with the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
(13 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in contributing to the welcome debate of the noble Baroness, I shall focus mainly on relations with the European Union. However, as a preliminary point, I should stress our interdependence, which many colleagues have mentioned and which is evidenced today by the signing of the declaration on the Nabucco project by the Presidents of the European Union and Azerbaijan.
It goes without saying that Turkey has a dynamic economy, and I will not rehearse the numbers mentioned by earlier contributors to the debate. Turkey is an old nation with a young people, and its foreign policy is based on that new economic dynamism. There is an assertiveness, which is mostly but not always welcome, a new independence from the old role as the spearhead of NATO, and a return to a more active regional role. A mere glance at the map will show the importance of Turkey playing that role, and not just in its region. One has seen this in its mediating role in the Balkans and the rather surprising alliance with Serbia. One sees it in its relationship with Russia and the improved commercial relationships with the Turkic-speaking countries to the east. Perhaps I may say in passing that Turkey’s relationship with that region is much more welcome than a relationship between the Iran of the mullahs and that region. Turkey’s role in the Middle East is also obvious.
On EU entry, a decade ago it was easy to ask, “Where else could Turkey go?”. Now, with this new self-confidence, the answer is more likely to be, “Yes, the EU remains our preferred option, but we have shown that we can stand alone in our region, if necessary”. However, this assertiveness is often accompanied by a strident populist anti-Americanism. Anti-western feelings are demonstrated by the gloating over the discomfiting of the US at the United Nations in the vote on sanctions against Iran. In a recent visit to Turkey, under the auspices of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, I was surprised at the number of senior politicians to whom I spoke who were very ready to give Iran the benefit of every doubt on the nuclear issue.
Greece used to be known as the “asterisk country” in EU foreign policy. If Turkey were to join the EU, it is likely that it would speedily replace Greece as the asterisk country that differentiated itself from the policies of the other EU countries. In respect of Israel, the position has worsened since the AKP came to power. This has recently been highlighted by the flotilla incident. Let us hope that when the UN Security Council report emerges in mid-February, it will calm matters. Certainly the referendum in September is very welcome.
Where does Turkey stand now in relation to EU entry? Its ambition is to enter by 2023, the anniversary of the foundation of the republic. By 2023, the EU might be very different. By that time, Turkey, too, might be very different. There is thus an argument for looking at the long term. A number of countries in the Balkans have overtaken Turkey in their EU ambitions. Some argue that Islamophobia has played a part. I believe the part has been minor. The recent EU Commission report on enlargement, for example, very warmly endorsed Albania, another Muslim country.
The problem with Turkey is its size, various cultural matters and its dynamic demography. Even without the major problem of Cyprus, the EU is clearly deeply divided. We perhaps forget too readily that France would have to have a referendum, which might make Turkish accession very unlikely. Therefore, one must look at other options. If immigration is to be such a sizeable obstacle, why not look at going ahead without freedom of movement? We need to show the importance that we attach to aiding Turkey in its fight against terrorism. We need to seek to join Turkey in EU foreign policy discussions. Why should Turkey not be linked with the CFSP? There is clearly a divergence between the elites in Europe and the people, and it is clear that demography and immigration are very much behind that.
My final remark is about how we see our relations as Europeans. The safe course for Europe would be to have a zone of comfort and to have a comparative and rather genteel decline, with special relations with its periphery: Ukraine, Russia and Turkey. The bolder and perhaps more turbulent course is to recognise that the Turkey of today is not ready for entry, but we need it—if it satisfies the Copenhagen criteria, perhaps with derogations—to give a certain dynamism to Europe. Currently there is stagnation, indecision and a degree of hypocrisy on the issue in the European Union, but the crisis looms this year or next. The choice is there, the drift cannot continue and it is for us as Europeans to choose the nature of our future.