United Kingdom Internal Market Bill

Debate between Lord Anderson of Ipswich and Lord Stevenson of Balmacara

Report stage & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords & Report: 1st sitting & Report: 1st sitting: House of Lords
Wednesday 18th November 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, In moving Amendment 10, I also speak to Amendments 21, 41, 48 and 49, which together deal with various exemptions and derogations that we believe should be appropriate in the case of the market access principles. I thank the noble Lords, Lord Anderson, Lord Young and Lord Wigley, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles and Lady Jones, for their support, and I look forward to their contributions.

Now that we have accepted by a majority Amendment 1 from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and the Government have said they will not oppose Amendments 38 and 51, I hope we can assume that the common frameworks process will be at the centre of our future concerns about the internal market. We think it will ensure that the devolved nations will be able, within the limits of UK law, to formulate and apply policies that best suit their local circumstances, working together in order to enable the functioning of the UK internal market. Each devolved Administration will retain the ability to diverge from the harmonised rules in their territory within the mandate given to them by the devolution settlement, but only after consulting the relevant policy group to see if a common outcome can be reached and agreed to.

We fully accept that there have to be backstop powers retained by the UK Parliament that are subject only to the normal “consult and seek consent” modality, and we accept that that brings into play the market access principles system set out in the Bill. However, that does not operate by agreement. It is hard-edged; it is a set of strict statutory rules that do not permit any real divergence. For example, my noble friend Lord Foulkes mentioned in the last group that Clause 8, on the non-discrimination principle, refers to “legitimate aims” and limits them to

“the protection of the life or health of humans, animals or plants”

and/or

“the protection of public safety or security.”

So it is very tight—but does it have to be that way? Surely we want exclusions to permit various exceptions from the lists, as set out in our Amendments 10 and 41. Others will make the case for the extension of the legitimate aims in Amendments 21 and the rest, affecting services.

The Welsh Government put around a note, which they prepared in response to the papers put around last night by the Government. They argue that the Bill’s limitations have been too tightly drawn and that they go much beyond current international regulations, and effectively put new restrictions on devolved competence. One of the policy statements issued yesterday by the Government said:

“Each part of the UK will be obliged to follow a rigorous process to justify an exclusion. This will include suitable evidence and a risk assessment shared between UK administrations, to confirm the nature of the threat posed and the effectiveness and proportionality of any proposed measure in response.”


This is hard-edged. This is not the language of consult and seek consent, let alone of a Government trusting in the common framework process.

Our amendments seek to add significant exclusions to the market access principles for goods and services and in relation to the recognition of professional qualifications. We think they are justified, we think they are proportionate and, otherwise, will not have an adverse impact on the powers we think the UK Government must retain. I beg to move.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB) [V]]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, and to have put my name to five of the six amendments in this group. The purpose of these amendments is to preserve the potential for legitimate policy divergence that is inherent in the devolution settlement. That potential is squeezed out for the future, save in limited and inconsistent respects, by the non-discrimination and mutual recognition principles as they appear in the Bill.

The scheme of these amendments is to provide for derogations from the applicable market access principles, to be available on a consistent basis across Parts 1, 2 and 3 of the Bill. Such derogations would be safety valves against the pressures that build up when central and local interests clash—safety valves of the sort that the member states of the European Union were sensible enough to gives themselves in their treaties, and that exist in devolved, federal and confederal states all over the world. Their purpose is more than merely political. The exercise of devolved powers has, in the past, produced creative and positive results in fields ranging from the requirement of fire suppression systems to the sale of electric shock collars. Noble Lords drew attention in Committee to the potential for similar action in future, if not prevented by the Bill, from measures against obesity to bans on the sale of peat.

The amendments are not a recipe for pointless and obstructive barriers to trade, which I strongly agree are to be avoided, because the use of those exceptional powers would remain subject to strict statutory controls. If challenged, rationality and the absence of protectionist purpose would have to be demonstrated, much as when the Scottish Government were put through its paces on minimum alcohol pricing. Yes, there will be cases in which compliance has to be demonstrated in the courts. Who, if not the courts, can be the arbiter of whether public authorities, whether central or devolved, have exceeded the limits of their legal authority? Litigation is always an inconvenience, and I would not wish it on my best friend, but the universal fact that the scope of a legal power must, in the last resort, be determined by the courts is no sort of justification, I would suggest, for withholding or removing that power from the devolved Administrations.

As for cases that last 10 years, as a barrister I can only dream enviously of such a durable source of income. Urgent cases can be quickly resolved, and the major source of delay will be removed once we move outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union. Without its intervention, the time occupied by the Scottish case on minimum alcohol pricing —which delayed the introduction of that measure—would have been very much shorter.

The common frameworks incentivise consensus. Among their many advantages, therefore, is a likely reduction in recourse to litigation. So I welcome Amendment 1, which, if it remains in the Bill, will prioritise the common frameworks, and significantly narrow the circumstances in which the market access principles apply. For as long those principles remain in the Bill, it seems to me that something in the nature of these amendments is needed, if only and the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, as a backstop. These amendments would diminish, in a controlled fashion, the crudely centralising force of the market access principles. They would also help to preserve the mutual respect between nations that the perpetuation of our union requires.