Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill

Debate between Lord Anderson of Ipswich and Baroness Ludford

Committee stage
Thursday 2nd March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I would like to speak to Amendment 62, on which I welcome the support of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich. I will also mention Amendment 67, which is about Ministers being able to extend the sunset for the matters covered by Clauses 3 to 5, which at the moment is lacking. There are such powers for Clause 1, but there are not similar powers for the very important matters covered by Clauses 3 to 5. Amendment 137 is a consequential amendment and introduces our familiar theme of the affirmative procedure.

I want to concentrate on Amendment 62, because it is about removing

“the automatic deletion by the sunset clause of the rights, powers, liabilities etc currently recognised and available in domestic law by virtue of section 4 of the”

European Union (Withdrawal) Act. The amendment calls for no abolition until these rights, powers and liabilities et cetera have been identified, and subjected to consultation and to a report laid before the relevant legislature—Parliament or the devolved ones—detailing the consequences of abolition. We do not have a huge amount of time, so I will not laboriously go through the text of the amendment, which is before noble Lords, but they will recognise the structure of it. On these Benches, there is a pattern to the amendments that we have tabled—Amendments 48, 42 and others which escape my memory at the moment—which are all about this considered way of making decisions.

The point about Amendment 62 is that it reflects one of our consistent objections. When I say “our”, I think I can say that right across the House, at Second Reading and in three days of Committee, there is a concern that it would be almost impossible to know what domestic law would actually look like after the end of this year. This offends key principles of the rule of law, including the requirement of legal certainty, human rights protection and other matters. The risk that this amendment is designed to address is that retained EU law will be revoked unknowingly; it is particularly prevalent for Clause 3 as the dashboard is far from comprehensive on this non-legislative form of law.

These rights encompassed by Clause 3 were originally recognised domestically by Section 2(1) of the European Communities Act and were retained by Section 4 of the EUWA. However, the potential effect of Clause 3 is arguably more serious than that of Clause 1. This is because identifying retained EU law to be deleted by Clause 3 is even more difficult than for Clause 1. We have been extensively through the difficulties of identifying retained legislation. Clause 3 is not a cataloguing of legal instruments. It requires legal research, often into case law of UK courts and the ECJ, to identify which EU treaty or directive articles have been found to contain directly enforceable EU rights and obligations. There may be further rights which are so obviously directly effective that they have never been litigated, and that provides a further challenge to identifying them before the deadline.

The Government have hardly started. Of the 3,800 pieces of REUL identified so far on the dashboard, only 28 rights, powers et cetera caught by the Clause 3 sunset have been identified, and there is no power to extend the Clause 3 deadline if Ministers run out of time. The noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, has amendments to that effect, as we do in Amendment 67. To delete all those which are not saved by Ministers by the end of this year is reckless and unnecessary, so I am sorry but I am going to take a little bit of time. Unfortunately this group comes at the end of the day, and we are all tired and we all want to get home, but these are really important matters.

I have two examples which have not yet been identified on the famous dashboard so have not been subject to any consultations with affected individuals, organisations or businesses and could have a very severe impact if they are deleted by Clause 3. The first example is Article 157 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the TFEU. This goes much further than the right to equal pay under the Equality Act 2010 because it is less restrictive with regard to comparators. For example, under Article 157, a woman teacher can compare herself to a man employed by a different education authority. They do not need to have the same employer. That type of comparison is not possible under the Equality Act. It requires comparison with a man employed by the same employer—it is usually a man; it could be the other way round but, let us face it, it is a normally a woman claiming equal pay with a man—so it has had a pretty revolutionary impact on the ability of women to get equal pay. However, Article 157 is not on the REUL dashboard as a directly effective right, so it would be repealed as a directly enforceable right by Clause 3 at the end of the year and women’s equal pay protections will be severely weakened as a result. Frankly, every woman in this country should be bombarding the Government with that fact. The Government have told us recently everything they say they are doing for women. I welcome anything that they are doing, but this drives a coach and horses through those claims.

The second example is Article 6 of the habitats directive. We have heard quite a bit about that directive, which is about the conservation of natural habitats and fauna and flora. One of the obligations in that directive has been found to be directly enforceable. It is the obligation of the competent authority, in our case the Environment Agency, in special areas of conservation and sites of international importance to habitats and species to

“take appropriate steps to avoid … the deterioration of natural habitats and the habitats of species”

et cetera.

This is a proactive and preventive obligation. It is not enough to react to deterioration once it has happened; it requires anticipatory protections to prevent deterioration and disturbance of habitats and species. That obligation has not been fully transposed into our domestic legislation. There remains in domestic law only a weaker duty on the Environment Agency to have regard to the habitats directive, which has been found not to impose a direction obligation, as article 6 of the EU directive does. So neither the habitats directive nor the case law on it appear on the REUL dashboard.

I hope that in his reply the Minister can address those two specific examples, which are not airy-fairy but very practical and significant. As things stand, this obligation will fall off the radar at the end of the year and the requirements on competent authorities to protect special areas of conservation proactively will be weakened. I must confess that I would like to have the noble Lord, Lord Benyon, here and to hear what he thinks of that.

Lastly, I recall that among the matters that Amendment 62 would require consideration of is the effect on our obligations under the trade and co-operation agreement and the protocol on Northern Ireland. That is a consistent point that we need to make from these Benches.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, I have signed Amendment 62 from the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, and I take this opportunity to say a few words about Clauses 3 to 5 more generally.

I spoke at Second Reading and, although I have not so far burdened your Lordships by speaking in Committee, I have watched much of the first two days’ proceedings with what I can describe only as horrified fascination. Reference has been made today to the recklessness of the Bill. I hope to explain as briefly as I can that this recklessness is not confined to Clauses 1 and 2 but reflected just as strongly in Clause 3, as the noble Baroness just said, and indeed in Clauses 4 and 5.

The Prime Minister does not strike me as a reckless man. We do not know his view of the Bill but perhaps we can take something from the fact that when he was Chancellor, he was careful to ensure that the rules for which he was responsible were excluded from its ambit.

A constant theme of the committee debates on EU-derived legislation was what I think of as the warning lights on the dashboard: a catalogue of retained EU law that is not comprehensive, a hole of uncertain size where devolved legislation should be and, however much Ministers may wish to reverse the presumption of revocation, its application by default to any provisions that have fallen down what has been referred to as the back of the national sofa.

Clause 3 has attracted only a small fraction of the public attention devoted to Clauses 1 and 2 but is, if anything, even more productive of uncertainty. So far as I can work out, that uncertainty comes in three varieties.

The first uncertainty derives from the fact that, as the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, said, no definitive list exists of the rights, powers and liabilities referred to in Clause 3 or, in all probability, is even capable of being prepared. The rights, powers and liabilities referred to include all those provisions of EU treaties that are sufficiently clear, precise and unconditional to confer rights directly on individuals, together with directly effective rights from EU agreements with third countries and directly effective rights in EU directives, subject to qualifications. All those rights had been preserved by Section 4 of the EU withdrawal Act in the interests of legal continuity. All are now to be removed in a single big bang moment at the end of the year, with no provision equivalent to Clause 2 for extending that sunset to a later date, as highlighted in the amendments of the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh. These measures do not bear the brand “direct effect” on their foreheads; no one has ever made a full list of them. It is quite certain that the 28 directly effective rights listed in the dashboard, one of them repealed, can be only a tiny proportion of the total. No one has counted them, consulted on them or assessed the impact of their imminent removal.

National Security Bill

Debate between Lord Anderson of Ipswich and Baroness Ludford

Committee stage
Monday 16th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I assure the Committee that this will not be a one-woman show all afternoon. I can be very brief on Amendment 80 because we will be hearing about Amendment 81.

The Bill establishes an independent reviewer in relation to PIMs under Part 2 and the JCHR felt that this, while a welcome additional safeguard, was too narrow and it was unclear why the independent reviewer’s role should be restricted to Part 2, because there are also significant concerns about how powers under Part 1 will be exercised. So we made a simple proposal, reflected in Amendment 80, recommending that the independent reviewer’s role should be extended to cover Parts 1 and 2 and that the Government should consider whether it could cover other core national security legislation.

As I say, I can be very brief because I tabled Amendment 80 before seeing Amendment 81, and we are about to hear from the heavyweights on this subject that they propose to make it even broader under further parts of the Bill. So I beg to move Amendment 80 but do not expect to say much more about it.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, my Amendment 81 is a bit wider than that of the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, who is certainly a heavyweight in my book. I agree with what she has had to say about that.

Post-legislative scrutiny can take many forms, but where powers are exercised on the basis of secret intelligence, the options are more limited. Select Committees can do little, because they lack access to classified information. The Intelligence and Security Committee has that access, but its remit is focused on the intelligence agencies themselves. It is not equipped to review the operation by police and prosecutors of the new criminal offences in Part 1 of the Bill—or the new procedures in that part—or, indeed, to concern itself with the questions of damages and legal aid in Part 4.

The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation—its origins dating back to the 1970s—is the solution arrived at in one part of the national security landscape. The independent reviewer is an independent person with full security clearance—but without bureaucratic apparatus—reporting to government. Reviewers serve Parliament and the public by reviewing operational matters which, for national security reasons, neither they nor the usual inspectorates can scrutinise themselves. Their findings are often referred to by the courts and their recommendations taken on board by police, agencies and government.

The independent reviewer has spawned two imitators, in Australia and, more recently, in Ireland. I mention that because the independent monitor in Australia and the planned independent examiner in Ireland—the Bill has recently been published—are each entrusted with scrutinising the operation of national security law in its entirety, not just counterterrorism law. The same principle should apply here. The use of laws governing hostile state activity can be both as secretive and as sensitive as the use of laws against terrorism. That, no doubt—as the Minister said in the last grouping—is why the Government have already agreed to extend the jurisdiction of the independent reviewer to Part 2 of the current Bill, which is all about foreign power threat activity rather than terrorism.

Equally compelling, I suggest, are the arguments for independent review of Part 1. Part 1 is a complete recasting of the law against espionage, sabotage and acting for foreign powers. The offences and police powers are novel and untested; the risk of unintended consequences must be high. The offences will presumably be the subject of prosecutions. However, there is no mechanism for systemic oversight, either of the offences or of the far-reaching powers of entry, search, seizure and, in particular, detention, which are the subject of Clause 6, Clauses 21 to 26 and Schedules 2 and 6 to the Bill. Powers such as these can be controversial in their application: they are the meat and drink of the independent reviewer’s work.

Part 4 is all about terrorism and so falls even more naturally within the existing powers of the independent reviewer. History has shown the value of the scrutiny of the independent reviewer, not least in the years after 9/11, during which my noble friend Lord Carlile performed the role with such distinction. It is all the more necessary in this ever-questioning age. Indeed, something of this nature is a prerequisite for what has been called the “democratic licence to operate” that our secret state requires. The current independent reviewer, Jonathan Hall KC— who performs the role with imagination and acuity—has been consulted on this amendment. He is the obvious person to review Part 4 because of the terrorist connection. I suspect he could take on Parts 1 and 2 as well: our counterterrorism law is neither novel nor, for the most part, as controversial as it once was. But in case his apparently infinite energy should ever flag, my amendment—inspired by Clause 54, which it replaces—gives government the flexibility to appoint a different person to review Parts 1 and 2.

Coronavirus Bill

Debate between Lord Anderson of Ipswich and Baroness Ludford

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 25th March 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Ludford]

My Lords, my amendment is supported by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and I believe that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, is also in favour. It is pretty self-explanatory and should not cause the Government any problems in accepting it. Indeed, the Minister, in replying just now, talked about getting advice from scientists on what was necessary.

The Minister has made a declaration that the Bill is compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights, but the amendment would provide further reassurance. According to the long title, the Bill is to:

“Make provision in connection with coronavirus; and for connected purposes.”


That is quite wide. There are references to a test of necessity—or, variously, necessity and proportionality—in some provisions in the Bill but not in others. There is no consistency, for instance, even between Schedules 21 and 22.

Our Constitution Committee, which I thank for its report, says at paragraph 16 that

“there may be a need to resolve difficult legal questions concerning the proportionality and necessity of restrictions and directions, and of their compliance with the Human Rights Act 1998”,

and by “resolve” it means in the courts. It would obviously be preferable to front-load those tests by requiring the Government to observe them in exercising all their powers under the Bill, which is what this umbrella amendment would provide, rather than load up the courts.

In parallel with these tests, the Delegated Powers Committee report, which I thank the committee for, drew attention to the absence in some clauses of a reference to the coronavirus crisis as justification. That mainly concerns postponement of elections, but not exclusively. I am therefore doing precisely what the committee suggests in paragraph 9 of its report—I have given the Minister notice of these requests: I

“seek an explanation from the Minister about why these powers are not, on the face of each individual clause, explicitly linked to coronavirus”,

and

“look to the Minister to provide an ironclad assurance that the powers contained in the Bill will be exercisable in relation to the coronavirus outbreak only and in no other circumstances.”

Lastly, will the Minister clarify the situation with regulations? The ones issued last Saturday under the Public Health Act, on premises, are not abolished by the Bill, but the February ones, on persons, are. In a reply during Second Reading yesterday, the Minister said that the powers to enforce the Prime Minister’s instructions regarding essential travel and gatherings

“will be introduced by regulations under the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984.”—[Official Report, 24/3/20; col. 1733.]

But I have learned from tweets by journalists that those will be introduced tomorrow, when we are not here. As I asked at Second Reading yesterday, how will these regulations mesh with the Bill and with regulations to be made under it? I beg to move.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich]

My Lords, I signed Amendment 13 and I offer two sentences on it. The amendment will have no legal effect because, admirably, nothing in the Bill seeks to oust or modify provisions of the Human Rights Act or the Equality Act. But if the Minister can confirm that there is no intention of departing from those important statutes, that would be a powerful signal to the sceptics and conspiracy theorists, both here and abroad, who might otherwise wrongly suggest that in enacting this unfortunately necessary legislation, we are abandoning some of the fundamental legal and moral principles that bind us together.