Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Bill

Lord Anderson of Ipswich Excerpts

2nd reading
Wednesday 23rd November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, two or three times a year I attend, for reasons unconnected with this Bill, human rights meetings of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg. The committee’s function is to supervise the execution of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. Its members are neither lefty lawyers drunk on the elixir of judicial power nor campaigners for human rights—far from it. They are the ambassadors of the member states, representatives of the Governments who routinely have to respond to human rights claims brought against them, either in their domestic courts or in Strasbourg. As potential defendants themselves, each has a strong interest in ensuring that any measures required for compliance are practical—there but for the grace of God go they.

The committee’s workload, brought from 46 countries, is immense, but it has chosen to make this Bill, in the context of the McKerr judgment, one of its very small handful of top priorities. It has been debated anxiously and at length in successive quarterly meetings. This September, the committee urged the Government to amend the Bill, including by—I quote its decision—ensuring that

“the ICRIR is independent and seen to be independent; ensuring that the disclosure provisions unambiguously require full disclosure to be given to the ICRIR; ensuring that the Bill adequately provides for the participation of victims and families, transparency and public scrutiny”.

The committee also urged the Government to reconsider the scheme for immunity and expressed “serious concern” about the arbitrary way in which ongoing inquests are dealt with. It will debate the Bill again next month.

The committee’s decision represents a consensus that Articles 2 and 3 as interpreted by the court require the Bill to be substantially amended in precisely the respects that have been identified by a wide spectrum of opinion, and not only legal opinion, here at home: consultation, independence, disclosure, participation, transparency and immunity.

Those concerns are close to those of the Commission for Victims and Survivors and reflect the principles that have been deployed to such good effect by Operation Kenova. Jon Boutcher’s remarkable work, and its legacy to date of more than 30 cases awaiting the decision of prosecutors, is proof that effective independent investigation can take place in a fully human rights compliant manner.

I invite the attention of noble Lords to the independent review of human rights compliance conducted last year for Kenova by Alyson Kilpatrick, who was my special adviser in Northern Ireland when I served as Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation and is now the chief commissioner of the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission. Ms Kilpatrick concludes of Kenova:

“without any hesitation, that in so far as Article 2 ECHR compliance is concerned, it is the exemplar of what such an investigation should, and can, be”.

So human rights compliance is attainable, even to the satisfaction of somebody the noble Lord, Lord Hain, rightly described as an exacting judge.

From these Benches, I can only guess at the political pressures the Minister is facing. He was an invaluable guide to me when I first started to visit Northern Ireland, he is engaged with us and he has given an impressive and heartfelt speech today. But this is not a happy time for the protection of human rights in this country. We somehow seem to be sleepwalking into a depressing world in which legal obligations are there not to be simply followed but rather to be taken into account, and in which Downing Street sources can be quoted as saying that the proposed Bill of Rights

“would allow UK courts to ignore European case law more often”—

as if departure from the international norms that we have done so much to create and to export across Europe is some sort of badge of honour.

In Northern Ireland, of course, the European convention is central to the political settlement and is understood by all communities in a way that is not always the case in England. If an excessively relaxed attitude to legal requirements cannot be eradicated from our political culture, let us at least ensure that it is excluded from the Bill.

We owe a great debt to the Joint Committee on Human Rights for its constructive work on these issues since the Bill left the Commons. The Constitution Committee has referred approvingly to its concerns. It was good to hear that the Government have sympathy with some of those concerns, though not, on the basis of what we have heard so far, those relating to the most fundamental issues in Part 3 of the Bill. In that connection, I hope the Minister will agree to reconsider the arbitrary distinction drawn between inquests in which a substantive hearing has or has not begun.

The elephant in the room is the issue of immunities for criminal investigation and prosecution for unlawful killings and torture. The McQuillan case is of course relevant to that issue, but not conclusive of it. I believe it is perfectly realistic to suppose that decisions to charge for Troubles-related crimes may be possible in England as well as in Northern Ireland and perhaps elsewhere.

I recall that even the overseas operations Act 2021, which caused your Lordships a good deal of unease and was substantially amended in this House, provided only for a presumption against prosecution, not for immunity. That Act affects the prosecution only of British forces. This Bill, as we have heard, will predominantly affect the holding to account of terrorists for their crimes. There seems to be something not quite right there. The Minister has indicated flexibility, and it sounds as though he may need it.

Let us turn over the stones that the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Eames, mentioned in his moving speech. The current situation is far from ideal, and the Bill too will not be ideal—but I hope we will end up with something we can live with.

Freedom of Establishment and Free Movement of Services (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Lord Anderson of Ipswich Excerpts

Wednesday 23rd October 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, the main issue from a legal perspective is how the use of delegated legislation can be justified, contrary to past undertakings, for a significant policy change that reduces, or appears to reduce, acquired rights. I agree with everything that the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, and my noble friend Lord Pannick have said about that, and I need not weary your Lordships with any more, but I shall address two other points. The first relates to the practical effect of what the Minister in the Commons accepted on Monday is the potential disapplication of rights. The Government must accept that those rights have some value, as my noble friend Lord Pannick said, because of the position that to maintain these rights in favour of EU-plus nationals might violate the most favoured nation principle of the WTO. Indeed, the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee records BEIS as saying that those rights afford a guarantee against,

“additional restrictions or barriers that may apply to nationals and businesses from other countries”.

I am puzzled by the suggestion that the removal of these directly effective rights, in particular the right not to be discriminated against in the delivery of services or in owning or managing businesses, will have limited or no practical impact.

The Minister has said, no doubt rightly, that our law will be in accordance with EU law on exit day, but because the rights have direct effect they afford protection, by definition, over and above that contained in domestic law. Without these rights, where are the equivalent entitlements and remedies not to be discriminated against to be found in our law? Nor am I entirely clear whether the right of all EU nationals to apply for settled or pre-settled status, even if that right is successfully exercised by the end of 2020, is a full substitute for the right of residence derived from the directly effective right of establishment under the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2016. Will he explain further whether it is the case—and if so, why—that the removal of these important rights, leaving aside the special issue of satellite decoders, will have only de minimis impact in the respect I have identified?

My last point relates to the specific power under which these regulations are made, Section 8 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, which is available only where there is a failure of retained law to operate effectively, or some other deficiency in retained EU law, as was said by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson. I make another point in relation to that: deficiencies in retained EU law are exhaustively defined in Section 8(2) and (3) of the Act, but I cannot find any definition there that fits the present case. There is some suggestion in the Explanatory Memorandum that the deficiency consists of lack of reciprocity, but it is not clear, certainly to me, how a deficiency could arise from the possibility that others might choose to withhold equivalent rights in their own law. If that were the case, then the scope of Section 8 would be very broad indeed. Can the Minister say any more about which provision of Section 8 is relied upon as a sufficient basis for these regulations and, if so, how?

[Lord Greaves (LD)]

My Lords, I have been listening with great admiration to the knowledge and expert understanding of all this of noble Lords who have spoken. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, for tabling his amendment and my noble friend Lord Oates for explaining it all, so that I understand it a bit more.

The right reverend Prelate and other noble Lords referred to UK citizens living in other EU countries and the effect that the whole Brexit thing is having on them. We have friends who live in the south of France and operate a small business there, and they have just held up their hands and applied for and obtained French citizenship as the only way they thought they could secure their position and their business there. There is a clear understanding among a lot of British citizens in other EU countries that in the negotiations so far, the Government have not taken their interests fully into account.

On this regulation, when we were discussing settled status during Question Time this afternoon, the noble Lord on the Opposition Front Bench declared a personal interest, so I suppose I ought to declare a personal interest in that my daughter’s husband is a European Union citizen and they live in this country. They work from home; I must confess that I do not know whether they are technically self-employed, have a zero-hours contract or both, but they certainly have a highly technical, successful operation, which is inherently insecure as it depends on the organisation that provides them with work. Sometimes there is none and at other times there is a lot. They are very concerned, not only about these regulations but about their position, so they asked me to take a look at this.

I looked at it and read the Explanatory Memorandum, knowing that this is where I would find the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth from the Government. It asks:

“Why is it being changed?”


As noble Lords have said, it says that Section 4 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act provides the rights in domestic law, and so on. It then says in paragraph 2.11:

“To address any inoperability and to ensure UK law continues to function effectively, with legal clarity, and that the UK is compliant with its World Trade Organization … obligations, including the General Agreement on Trade in Services, these rights need to be disapplied”.


I have read it again and again and I do not understand why, and I have heard noble Lords speak today and I still do not understand why. However, what concerns me is not that I do not understand this—what inoperability there may be or what conflicts there may be with the rules of the WTO—but that the Government do not seem to know either. The Explanatory Memorandum talks about “any inoperability”; is there any or is there not? I presume that the Government have taken legal advice on this and have a belief as to whether there is or is not. Because they think this legislation is necessary, I assume that they think there is, but they do not want to tell us exactly what it is.

Later, paragraph 2.12 says:

“These directly effective rights of establishment and free movement of services would appear to have limited practical effect, post-exit in a no deal scenario”,


but the Minister is telling us that the Government do not think that it will have any effect in practice. Will it have a limited effect or not really any effect? If it will have a limited effect, can the Minister tell us exactly what that limited effect is, in words that I, as a non-lawyer and a non-expert in these WTO matters, might understand? The Minister himself used the word “could” about three times—“It could have an effect”. But will it or will it not? What is the legal advice, or is it all very vague and nobody knows?

However, the Explanatory Memorandum reassures the individuals and businesses concerned:

“Individuals and businesses will be able to check published no deal planning guidance on gov.uk”.


If I were to look at GOV.UK this afternoon, would I find advice on whether there is inoperability and limited practical effect, or would it tell me not to bother because there is not? If it tells me not to bother because there is not, why is this all coming here anyway?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Duncan of Springbank]

I disagree with the noble Lord for one simple reason. This is the moment when we face the question of whether we shall exit the EU with or without a deal. The purpose behind my offer is to reassure those individuals who fear that they will be in some way undermined in their rights in this country. They need to be reassured and I would much rather do that today. I am not sure I can sign all the letters in one go but, over the next few days, I will be keen to write to all those individuals affected. In so doing so, I hope to reassure them that this instrument does not do what they are fearful of. That is the most important aspect: this does not do what they fear it does. It is critical that it is taken from this debate, however it resolves itself, that there will be no impact on the 2.3 million EU citizens residing here; they will be in no way affected. They will be able to do their business, be it in self-employment, the operation and delivery of services or any other aspect. That must be taken from the debate today, irrespective of how we get to that conclusion.

I hope that in so doing I can not only give confidence to the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, but, more importantly, give the individuals who have approached him and a number of other noble Lords the confidence that they need right now. On that basis, I beg to move.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich]

The Minister has addressed a good number of questions but I raised one relating to the legal basis for these regulations, which is said to be a power to prevent, remedy or mitigate deficiencies in retained EU law. Deficiencies are precisely defined in the 2018 Act, but I have not heard from the Minister what provision of Section 8(2) or 8(3) these regulations purport to be made under, and I do not understand at the moment what the deficiency is said to be. There is some reference in the Explanatory Memorandum to the WTO but, as I understood what the Minister said earlier, the Government take no position on whether there is an incompatibility with the WTO.

[Lord Duncan of Springbank]

I am very grateful to the noble Lord, who has given me the opportunity to find the other pieces of paper that I did not get to in answering his question.

With regard to which provision, it is a deficiency specifically envisaged by Section 8(1)(e) of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, which covers the reciprocal arrangements that no longer exist on EU exit. That is the specific element that I think the noble Lord is looking for. In extension to that, on why this has a limited impact—on which a number of noble Lords have taken the view that I am wrong and that it has a much bigger impact—I hope we can correct that today, irrespective of how we do it. The important thing is that the practical impact of these regulations is limited because UK legislation is currently compliant. That is the important part. However, should a future Government wish to amend the ability of EU nationals to provide services, that would be debated in this House and in the other place in the normal manner. This suite of statutory instruments is designed to address future Governments making future legislation by the established mechanisms in this place and the other place—not, as I hope we can take from this, the impact on the 3.2 million EU nationals who reside in the UK.