Northern Ireland (Executive Formation) Bill

Lord Anderson of Ipswich Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 15th July 2019 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich]

6: Clause 3, page 2, line 16, at end insert “, which shall be considered by each House of Parliament in accordance with subsection (2A).”

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, Clause 3 already provides for the publication of regular reports on progress towards the formation of an Executive in Northern Ireland, and for those reports to be laid before Parliament—one by 4 September and another by 9 October, with further reports at intervals of no more than 14 days. Amendments 6 and 7, which have support from all parts of the House, require those reports to be debated in both Houses, pursuant to Motions to be moved within five calendar days of each report being laid. I hope that there will be as few of those reports as possible, because when they stop it will be because the Executive have finally been formed. I hope also that the debates that these amendments provide will help to keep up the pressure for that long-overdue development.

However, let there be no doubt about the main purpose of the amendments. They are defensive fortifications against the possibility—unlikely, no doubt, but pointedly not disavowed by the leading candidate—that the next Prime Minister will advise Her Majesty to prorogue Parliament for the express purpose of achieving a no-deal Brexit to which Parliament is opposed. I am no enthusiast for procedural gambits—today of all days, we should be wary of anything that is not cricket—but to my mind these amendments are abundantly justified by the extraordinary gravity of what is apparently being contemplated.

This would not be a standard prorogation of Parliament. The purpose of the prorogation extending beyond 31 October would be to bring about an irreversible change not just to our trade relations but to our central political and economic alliance, without putting anything in its place. If the House of Commons were to give its democratic approval to such a momentous step, of course it must happen—nothing in these amendments would impede, or is intended to impede, that—but for Parliament to have its voice removed precisely because of its anticipated opposition would be astonishing, unconstitutional and without precedent in recent times.

I accept of course that prorogation has attracted controversy in the past. A technical use of it was made in 1948 to fulfil the requirement in the Parliament Act 1911 that a Parliament Bill be approved by the Commons in three successive Sessions. In that case, though, a clear majority of MPs desired the legislation to pass and were in favour of prorogation for that purpose. That episode pales into insignificance when compared to what it seems is now so casually contemplated: a direct assault on the sovereignty of Parliament itself, aimed at circumventing its will irrevocably on one of the central questions of our time.

[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean]

My Lords, is the noble Lord right to describe what happened in 1948 as a technical matter? It was moved by a Labour Government to impose their nationalisation of British steel, which was opposed by this House, and to remove the ability of this House to delay the legislation. How can that be described as a technical matter?

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich]

What happened in 1948 was a prorogation to give effect to the provision of the Parliament Act 1911 that approval of the Commons was needed in three successive Sessions. The key distinction between that situation and what is proposed now is that it was a course that the House of Commons desired and was prepared to see go through.

[Lord Cormack]

Would the noble Lord also remind the Committee that in 1948 there was, relatively speaking, a handful of Members in this House sitting on the Government Benches, and several hundred on the Conservative Benches as the Opposition?

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich]

I am very grateful to the noble Lord for the point he makes. However, getting hung up on an entirely different precedent from 1948 and suggesting that it might be in some way determinative of the position which we are now asked to contemplate is, I would suggest, too ludicrous to bear.

[Baroness Smith of Basildon (Lab)]

It may help to remind the Committee that the position to which the 1948 prorogation gave effect was the commitment of the Government’s 1945 election manifesto, which had overwhelming support from the House of Commons.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich]

The noble Baroness makes another very good point. I refer to 1948 simply to say, first, that prorogation has been controversial in the past, and, secondly, that it pales into insignificance compared with what we are now asked to contemplate.

Those who contemplate prorogation not only are heedless of the sovereignty of Parliament but risk plunging the monarchy into the heart of an intense political dispute. We saw how this could happen in Canada in 2008, when the Governor General, as the representative of the Crown, was required to adjudicate on a request for prorogation that was widely seen to be politically motivated, and only granted it subject to an undertaking given by the Prime Minister. I appreciated the dry understatement of Catherine Haddon of the Institute for Government when she said last week:

“A constitutional showdown between Parliament and the executive of the order of the Civil War is definitely something that the palace would prefer not to be dragged into”—


but she made a serious point.

If agreed, these amendments will serve two purposes: the sending of a political message and the sharpening of a legal challenge such as that already mooted by Sir John Major, should it be needed as a last resort. My noble friend Lord Pannick made a powerful case in the Times last month for the proposition that the courts, if invited, would come to the rescue of parliamentary sovereignty, as they did on the basis of the noble Lord’s submissions in the Miller case. Over 30 years, I have learned to bet against the noble Lord only rarely and I would not do so on this occasion. One who has done so is the legal academic Robert Craig, who recently suggested that the courts would decline to intervene because,

“there is no particular statutory provision that would be frustrated by prorogation”.

To the extent that there may be merit in that view—and I accept that absolute certainty in this area is difficult to achieve—that is all the more reason for supporting these amendments.

I regret that it has been necessary to table them in the context of this Bill, but they will put beyond doubt the resistance of Parliament to an undemocratic and profoundly discreditable device. I beg to move.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, I rise very briefly to support the amendment which the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has argued for so eloquently. This amendment, to which I set my name, has only one purpose: namely, to make it more difficult—

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Duncan of Springbank]

It would be easy to answer that in a simple way, but I suspect that tucked inside the question is a matter for greater constitutional scholars than I. I stand before noble Lords not, I am afraid, as a lawyer but as a humble geologist. I therefore feel ill-equipped to answer a question of that august nature.

In returning to the point before us, I say that this is not the right way to achieve these ends. The other place has spoken on these matters. It has spoken in a voice which we have heard on other issues and should hear today. I would ask that these amendments should not be pressed. I do not believe that they give comfort to the ongoing talks in Northern Ireland, and nor do they progress the important aspects for which those talks have been set up.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister and noble Lords, and for the support that these amendments attracted. I hope it is now clear that it is not the purpose of this amendment to prevent the United Kingdom from leaving the European Union on or before 31 October; it would not be apt, and it is not intended, to do that. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord True, for his research and I am delighted to have him as a social media follower, but my views on the wisdom or otherwise of Brexit are no more to the point of this amendment than are his.

I listened carefully to everything that was said and it still seems inescapable that, if there are any fetters at all on the absolute power of the Government in this matter, those fetters must be in the courts, in Parliament or, as a last resort, in the person of the monarch. I did not detect any enthusiasm from those who spoke against the amendments for any of those options. I found myself wondering what checks or balances on the authority of the Executive they were minded to acknowledge —but there we are. In short, I am undeterred by what I have heard. It may be—it is very likely—that I will come back to this on Wednesday. But, for the time being, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 6 withdrawn.