(10 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe amendments proposed by my noble friend Lord Berkeley, which he says are probing amendments, seek to extend the powers available for designation to PCSOs. We debated the issue of the powers of PCSOs in Committee in the light of a government amendment extending their powers. It is hardly a surprise that we now have an amendment which, on the face of it, wants to go further.
In his response to the debate in Committee on 11 December, the Minister said that it was,
“right that the chief officers should have the freedom to take account of local circumstances and priorities when determining how their PCSOs are deployed”.—[Official Report, 11/12/13; col. 822.]
He also referred to a police and crime commissioner who had indicated a desire to see PCSOs tackling traffic offences. If the Minister accepts that my noble friend’s amendments on PCSOs’ powers go beyond those proposed in the Government’s amendments, agreed on 11 December 2013, but is not going to accept my noble friend’s amendments, can he say why, before Christmas, on 11 December 2013, he felt it right that the chief officers should have the freedom to take account of local circumstances and priorities when determining how their PCSOs are deployed but on 20 January, after Christmas, he does not?
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, for his amendments. I suppose there was a general answer when he was talking about dotted lines and straight lines. I was told from a very young age that whenever you crossed the line, it was not the right thing to do. That is something all should keep in perspective when looking at these issues. The noble Lord spoke to the subject in his amendments with a great deal of expertise and insight. I fully acknowledge his work as president of the Road Danger Reduction Forum and as vice-president of the Cycling Touring Club.
The noble Lord’s Amendment 94D would mandate that all PCSOs must undergo a cycle training course before a chief constable designates cycle-related powers. We recognise that, as a result of these changes, additional training will be required to ensure PCSOs have the right knowledge, skills and expertise to exercise these powers. We do not agree that this should be mandated specifically by Whitehall, but we are confident that the police and the College of Policing are best placed to deliver this. I will bring this to their attention. The noble Lord was speaking with insight and I am quite happy to facilitate a meeting with the Roads Minister to see how we could talk about these subjects in terms of their wider application. I think he would agree, from his personal experience as a cyclist—and an avid cyclist at that—that across Britain and in our cities as well we are going through an evolutionary change on cycling. There is a ready acceptance now that cycling is something that is to be encouraged as part of the transport mix. When you go to cities such as Cambridge, for example, you actually see how it operates more effectively than in other parts of Britain. We need to share good practice across the country.
I now turn to Amendment 94C regarding the updating of regulations. The Department for Transport has consulted on the simplification of the current regulations with groups including the police. Revising these will form part of their ongoing work on the red tape challenge. Granting PCSOs the power to enforce regulations on cycling without lights will have a real impact on improving the visibility of cyclists and will help prevent road traffic accidents. The noble Lord acknowledged this himself in speaking to his amendments. That is why we believe that delaying the introduction of this power until after the regulations are updated would not achieve our objective of improving the safety of cyclists and other road users as quickly as we want to. His point about the pedals on cycles is well made. I remember years ago passing the cycling proficiency test and there were certain things which were “dos” and “don’ts”. He is correct in saying that many cycles now in Britain do not have reflectors and there is a need for those regulations to be updated. His point of raising these issues with manufacturers is also well made and noted.
Amendments 94A and 94B seek to grant PCSOs the power to issue motorists with a fixed-penalty notice for failing to comply with traffic directions and for failing to comply with advance stop sign regulations. We recognise that PCSOs have a key part to play in tackling issues around road safety and have consulted with the police and other key stakeholders on this matter as part of our ongoing work to explore the development of the role and powers of PCSOs. I am grateful to the noble Lord for suggesting these further enhancements to PCSO powers and I will certainly take his suggestions away to consider them as part of the wider work on reviewing PCSO powers that is already taking place. However, we want to understand fully the implications for PCSOs, the police and the public and until we have completed that further work I think it would be premature to make these changes at this time. I am aware that there is some concern that our proposals will result in cyclists being picked on by PCSOs. Let me assure the noble Lord that that is clearly not our intention. The powers in the Bill are not new, as a police officer can already exercise them. Just as police officers use their discretion, we expect that PCSOs will also do so.
Perhaps I may pick up on a couple of points made by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. Of course, the extension of these new powers is very much in the hands of the chief constable. PCSOs have 20 standard powers and another 22 discretionary powers. These changes bring a further 19 discretionary powers. It is really down to the chief constable to make the decision from an operational perspective as to what powers should be extended to PCSOs. We believe that is the right thing to do. We know that the public really value the role PCSOs play in tackling low-level crime and anti-social behaviour and we believe that this package of measures will ensure that they can continue to play a key part in providing the best service to the communities they serve. Given these reasons and, I hope, the assurances I have given to the noble Lord that we will continue to consider the points he has raised and the powers available to PCSOs, I hope the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
(10 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberI remind the House that we are on Report and that, after the Minister has spoken, unless it is a point of clarification or elucidation, normal convention is that there are no further interventions.
I note what the Minister has said about the situation in Scotland. I do not know whether that means he has had further information since we discussed it in Committee, but the Government said then:
“The Scottish Government, who we have talked to about this issue, say they do not currently hold any information about the numbers of convictions or, as yet, any evaluation of the effectiveness of the new offences”.—[Official Report, 4/12/13; col. 279.]
It appears from what the Minister has just said that, since 4 December, the Scottish Government have now said to the Westminster Government that the provision is not working. I do not know whether the Minister has had that information since we discussed it in Committee.
A Freudian slip there perhaps. Maybe I was honest in my first assessment. Nevertheless, I listened very carefully to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, when he talked about victims. In my own life serving the public in local government, quite often I came across a victim of crime—we are not talking about someone who serves the public, but any victim of crime. The noble Lord painted a scenario about that person having to return to their place of work. If someone has been assaulted in their own house, on the way to work, catching a train, at a bus stop or a station, there is equally a sense of great trepidation when the person has to return. It is important when we look at these issues that we put them into context. Ask any victim of crime, particularly serious crime, and the trepidation and fear that they feel in overcoming those challenges are intense.
Of course I acknowledge what the noble Lord is saying. When we face public life where does it stretch? The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, contributed with his experience of the judiciary. Often, the judiciary are in the front line when they have to sentence people. There is an issue to be tackled there. Here, we sit in the Lords and many have served in representative office. Politicians put themselves in the front line when they face the public and indeed there have been instances where they have been assaulted in their own offices.
We argue that the degree of seriousness depends on the particular facts of the case. Why should it be worse, for example, or more traumatic for someone to be assaulted at work rather than on the bus going to work, or for that matter when locking the front door when leaving for work, or as a result of an intrusion into the home? The simple truth is that every case is unique and may have aggravating and mitigating circumstances that should be taken into account. That is where the judiciary comes in. We rely on the judiciary, guided by sentencing guidelines, to do just that.
Specific issues and questions were raised by the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, and others on issues vis-à-vis the police. First, assaults against people whose work brings them into contact with the public should receive the same sentence as an assault on a constable. That is already the case. With regard to the offence of an assault on a constable, we accept, as my noble friend Lord Taylor said previously, that the police do occupy an important role in society and a slightly different one by virtue of the role that they have to perform. But that does not mean that an assault on someone else, while being a distinct offence, carries a different maximum penalty. Both offences, be it on the police constable or anyone else, carry a maximum penalty of six months’ imprisonment or a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale currently set at £5,000.
The noble Lord, Lord Davies of Coity, also raised the issue of young women. Again, I would say, as the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, said about the Asian community, that there are particular circumstances that have to be looked at. We maintain that the current law provides protection. He mentioned the case of Kim and I listened very carefully. It is a great concern that there are harrowing experiences of victims of assault and noble Lords have shared those with the House today and in Committee. As I have already said, there are lasting consequences from these attacks. It is down to the individual and how they deal with it. It is the role of government, community and society to provide the support and protection they need. It concerns me greatly that individuals are not reporting serious crimes because they believe that nothing will be done. But we believe that having a new offence will not make a difference to that issue.
The noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, pointed to the experience in Scotland. I take the point on board about the higher number of people being charged. It may well be that offences are currently being prosecuted under the legislation protecting emergency workers as an alternative to common assault. But I will certainly take their comments back, make inquiries with the Scottish Government and write to them in that regard if I may.
In closing, I assure the House that the Government are committed to improving things for victims of crime. Since 2011, the Ministry of Justice has provided—and continues to provide—more than £50 million in funding per year to diverse victims’ organisations, including a £38 million per year grant-in-aid agreement with Victim Support. My noble friend is not in her place, but I remind noble Lords of the appointment of my noble friend, Lady Newlove, as Victims’ Commissioner. As noble Lords know, she has personal experience that she brings to bear to protect and help others and ensure that we can tackle these issues with people who have tragic experience in this regard. I pay tribute to her work.
The new victims’ code recently came into force. It explains what victims should expect from the criminal justice system, who to request help from and how and where it should be provided. The code also holds those in the criminal justice system to account, makes victims their priority and gives victims a clearer means of redress if they are not given the support they deserve. We all believe that victims need to know that the criminal justice system will work as hard as possible to deliver justice for them and help them recover and move on with their lives. As I said, ask any victim of crime; that is exactly what they want to do. Indeed, often we hear that they do not want to be known as victims of crime: they want to know that they are survivors of crime because they have moved forward with their lives.
The noble Lord is a man whose contributions I am sometimes amused by and often entertained by. They often add to the spirit, detail and diversity of debate and discussion. Moreover, they add to the quality of debate we have in this House. I hope that, with the reassurances and explanations I have given, he will be minded to withdraw his amendment.
The Minister sought to argue when I said that staff working with the public and facing assault were to some extent different from others. He sought to say that that was not the case. Does that mean that it is the Government’s view that in offences committed against those working in the public sector or providing a service to the public that should not even be an aggravating factor?
The noble Lord is being somewhat disingenuous with the comments I made. The parallel I was drawing was with victims of crime. Of course, there are aggravating circumstances and the Government take them into account. But I was trying to highlight to the noble Lord and to the House that if you ask any victim of crime they will tell you that in the circumstances that he was painting about somebody having to go back to their place of work that the same is true of someone who has been assaulted in the street or at the bus stop. It is our belief that people should be treated according to the law in a fair and just system. I believe that the current law does just that.
(10 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberAs has been said, the Home Office has already published draft guidance for front-line professionals. The purpose of these amendments is to refer to it in the Bill, with the conferring of powers on the Secretary of State to issue it. In one of the letters sent to us, the Minister also said that:
“We also undertook in response to yet other amendments to revisit the terms of the draft guidance for frontline professionals”.
That letter set out a list of the areas where they would review the draft guidance.
Is the outcome of that review known or is it still taking place? If it is still taking place, is the intention that we will see the outcome of the review of the draft guidance and know what it is before we get to Third Reading? We have at least had the advantage in the discussions we have had so far of knowing what was in the already published draft guidance and, if it is being looked at again, we ought to have sight of any revisions being made to it before we conclude our discussions on the Bill. That would be extremely helpful. Is it now the Government’s intention to review the draft guidance in the light of the carrying of the amendment earlier today, which must presumably have some impact on the draft guidance that has been issued?
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Greaves for his amendment and his comments. I have scribbled down here that I would convey his thanks to my noble friend Lord Taylor of Holbeach. I have so conveyed them and he has obviously heard them, so there we are.
Turning to Amendment 57, I can assure my noble friend that any guidance produced under the new clause proposed in Amendment 56 will automatically apply to any person or body designated under the new clause proposed in Amendment 53. We will come on to that amendment later in our proceedings but suffice it to say that, by virtue of subsection (2) of the proposed new clause, any designated person or body would be treated as a local authority for the purposes of Chapter 2 of Part 4 as a whole. As such, the guidance produced for local authorities under the terms of Amendment 56 will be applicable to persons or bodies designated in accordance with the provisions in Amendment 53. I hope that reassures my noble friend in relation to his amendment.
On the questions raised by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and taking the second question first on revisions to guidelines in the light of the vote, obviously the vote has happened and we shall look at the outcome. The guidelines will be finalised once the Bill has reached its final stages in Parliament.
As to where we are on the guidance, we are currently working with councils, the police and others. Over the coming months we will discuss the effects of the guidance but any results and further alterations will, unfortunately, not be available before Third Reading. However, the final draft of the guidance will reflect the terms of the Bill as enacted.
With those reassurances to my noble friend, I hope that he will be minded not to move his amendment.
My Lords, I shall speak to government Amendment 53, to which my noble friend has just spoken. In responding to my amendment in Committee, my noble friend Lord Ahmad was kind enough to acknowledge that there appeared to be a strong case for extending the availability of public spaces protection orders to bodies other than local authorities. I am most grateful that further consideration has confirmed that view. I know also that the City of London Corporation, whose position prompted my earlier intervention, is grateful for the constructive and open-minded approach taken by officials during discussions on this point. No doubt, other bodies that manage public spaces under statute but are not local authorities will also find the change helpful.
My noble friend will recall that in my amendment in Committee, to which Her Majesty’s Government have now helpfully responded, I alluded to Epping Forest. In this appreciation of the Government response, I quote a testimonial about the Corporation of London from 1979—35 years ago—when I moved in the Commons the Second Reading of a private City of London (Various Powers) Bill on behalf of the City which primarily related to Epping Forest. Two of my noble friends who are now in your Lordships’ House spoke in that Second Reading debate: my noble friend Lord Tebbit, then MP for Chingford, and my noble friend Lord Horam, then replying to the Bill as Under-Secretary for Transport. They were thus witnesses to the quotation uttered by the late Arthur Lewis—then and for the previous 34 years Labour MP for West Ham, where he was Tony Banks’ predecessor—when he spoke in that debate. I quote the conclusive passage in his speech:
“I do not trust the Department of Transport. By its actions over the years it has not proved that it has the best interests of the people at heart. The City of London has proved this. It has done so for 100 years, and certainly to my personal knowledge for the past 34 years … I have gone along to many Ministers, ministerial advisers and local government officers. I have never found any of them so accommodating or helpful as the City of London authority and its officers. They have not put themselves out in the way that the City of London’s officials have. When I have problems or difficulties over Wanstead Flats, West Ham park or Epping Forest, I know that I get better treatment from the authority’s officials than I do from ministerial Departments”.—[Official Report, Commons, 6/3/79; col. 1203.]
I am confident that the Home Office will be rewarded by the Corporation of London for government Amendment 53 with just such similar imaginative service in future.
Finally, to wind up, I also thank the Minister for taking up the drafting point in Clause 67(2) that I raised in Committee in relation to the interpretation of Chapter 2. I note that this has been addressed in the Report stage print of the Bill now before us and I express appreciation for the Government’s reaction to that.
I will just raise one or two questions on these amendments. Again, I look particularly at what was said in the letter we received from the Minister. On these particular government amendments, that letter ended by saying that any public spaces protection order,
“made by a designated body under the provisions of the new clause would take precedence over a PSPO made by the local authority in whose area the land is situated”.
As I understand it, that means that a PSPO made by the City of London Corporation—if it was so designated—would take precedence over a PSPO made by the local authority covering the area of Epping Forrest, Ashtead Common, Hampstead Heath or any other areas. I would be grateful if the Minister could confirm whether that is the case. It is what the last sentence of his letter dealing with these government amendments says, as I just read out.
On the face of it, that would appear to be rather odd because Clause 55, which deals with public spaces protection orders, says that two conditions must be met, the first that,
“activities carried on in a public place within the authority’s area have had a detrimental effect on the quality of life of those in the locality”.
If the City of London Corporation has responsibility for managing an open space, presumably most of those who will be deemed to be affected on the basis of the,
“quality of life of those in the locality”,
are unlikely to actually live in the open space and likely to live in the areas surrounding it, which are presumably within the area of the local authority.
I am not seeking to raise some frivolous point, and my intention is not to oppose this amendment. What I am getting at is whether there are potential areas of conflict now between what the City of London Corporation may deem to be necessary or desirable in a public spaces protection order and the views of the local authority, bearing in mind that it is surely only the local authority that can make the judgment on whether activities were being carried on which had a detrimental effect on the quality of life of those in the locality. I would be grateful if the Minister could clear that up. Perhaps I have misunderstood it. If I have, I am sure the Minister will explain that when he responds.
My Lords, first, I thank my noble friend for his kind remarks and I reiterate the Government’s thanks for raising these issues. On the noble Lord’s point on clarification of the letter, it is my understanding—and we are just double-checking—that the letter got the position the wrong way round, so we apologise for that. I trust that clarifies the point.
If I may confirm what the letter should have said, it is that the PSPO made by the local authority has precedence over that made by the City of London or a designated body. That clears it up. I thank the Minister very much.
(10 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in developing our anti-social behaviour reforms, the Government have, both formally and informally, sought the views of the front-line professionals who will use the new powers. We have listened to them and, where appropriate, have accepted constructive proposals to improve the measures in the Bill. The amendments in this group exemplify this approach.
Under Clause 1(8), applications for injunctions against over-18s to prevent nuisance and annoyance will be heard in the county court and applications against under-18s will be heard in the youth court. However, some cases of anti-social behaviour involve mixed groups of under and over-18s. To allow for such cases, Amendment 19 would enable rules of court to be made which would, in turn, enable the organisation applying for an injunction to seek permission from the youth court for the application against the adult—or, indeed, applications if there is more than one adult—to be heard in the youth court alongside the applications in respect of one or more under-18s. The youth court may grant the application if it is “in the interests of justice”. If not, the application will be denied and the application in respect of the adults will be heard in the county court in the normal way.
If the case is heard in the youth court and an IPNA is granted, Amendments 8, 9, 10 and 11 provide that any subsequent proceedings in relation to the adults will be heard in the county court—for example, if there are proceedings for a breach. Only the initial application for the grant of an injunction will be heard in the youth court.
Amendments 6, 7 and 21 are consequential on Amendment 19. These amendments help put victims first. In most cases, it will prevent them having to attend court and give evidence twice. The amendments will also reduce costs and save court time. By linking these hearings in the youth court, we will retain the experience and expertise of its judges in protecting the best interests of respondents under 18. I beg to move.
We understand the reasons for these amendments and for wanting to try to ensure that cases involving those under 18 and those who are adult, where they relate to the same issue, can be tried or dealt with in the same court. Therefore, I certainly have no wish to argue against the principle of what the Government are seeking to achieve. However, in the letter that the Minister sent to us on 18 December, in which he outlined these amendments that were being tabled, he said in respect of this issue:
“We believe that it is in the best interests of respondents aged under 18 for linked cases involving adults to be transferred to the youth court rather than vice versa”.
Can he confirm that that means that a case could not be held in the adult court if somebody aged 18 was involved? Perhaps for the sake of argument I may take as an example—perhaps it is very exceptional—a case where there are, say, four or five adults and one person under 18 who happens to be 17 and a half. Under these amendments, is it the Government’s position that it would not be possible, if the parties wanted it, for the matter to be dealt with in the adult court? Are they saying that if the cases are going to be dealt with together, that can happen only in the youth court? I should be grateful if the Minister could clarify that point.
I stress that we are not opposed to what the Government are seeking to achieve, but I pose the question in the light of the sentence in the letter that was sent to us where reference was made to believing it to be,
“in the best interests of respondents aged under 18 for linked cases involving adults to be transferred to the youth court rather than vice versa”.
Does that mean that they could never be held in the adult court, even if for example there were four or five adults and one under 18? I think that I know the answer to this, but could the Minister say why the Government believe that it is in the best interests of respondents aged under 18 for linked cases to be in the youth court rather than vice versa?
My Lords, I will clarify that. As was put down in the letter of my noble friend on the final point, there is an understanding and appreciation that with youths under 18, youth courts have certain specialist knowledge in dealing with these cases. The point, which has been raised over and again, is that one of the key things, especially when it comes to such matters, is reforming and addressing particular issues, and ensuring that we prevent reoffending. We feel that the youth courts, particularly in the cases of under-18s, are best placed to deal with these issues. I can confirm that a case involving a person under 18 cannot be transferred to the country court in any circumstances.
My Lords, this amendment follows up the debate in Committee initiated by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, about Clause 13. This clause preserves an existing power available to social landlords to apply for tenancy injunctions to prohibit anti-social behaviour which relates to or affects their management of their housing stock.
In Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, sought to challenge Clause 13 on the grounds that its provisions were not tenure-neutral. As I have indicated, Clause 13 simply preserves an existing power available to social landlords under Section 153D of the Housing Act 1996. That section, which, I might add, was inserted into the Housing Act by the previous Administration in 2003, responded to calls from social landlords that they needed to be able to hold their tenant responsible for the behaviour of visitors. However, strictly speaking, Clause 13 is not necessary, as an injunction under Clause 1 can be used to achieve the same end of holding the respondent responsible for the anti-social behaviour of the visitors to their property, regardless of tenure.
We included Clause 13 in the Bill because social landlords were familiar with tenancy injunctions. However, given the points raised in Committee by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and after further consultation with social landlords, we have decided to remove the clause to ensure that the injunction is completely tenure-neutral. This will fit in with our wider approach of simplifying anti-social behaviour powers through the Bill, while ensuring that social landlords, like the police and other agencies, will have access to the tools they need. I beg to move.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing the government amendment. Any move towards increasing tenancy neutrality in the Bill is to be welcomed. I will raise one issue with the Minister, which arises from the letter that he sent to us setting out the reasons for the changes that were being made. The paragraph in question states:
“However, as the IPNA can do everything a tenancy injunction can do, we are satisfied that there is no compelling case for retaining this bespoke provision for those living in social housing”.
Earlier in the letter, the Minister had said:
“The provisions in respect of the IPNA are tenancy neutral”—
I am not sure whether that is regarded as different from tenure-neutral—
“save for the provisions in clause 13”.
From that, one would assume that if Clause 13 is disappearing from the scene, then the provisions in respect of the IPNA are indeed neutral. With the comment in the letter that,
“the IPNA can do everything a tenancy injunction can do”,
that was why the Government felt that they could withdraw Clause 13. Of course, not only does Clause 13 cover what is said in Clause 12(1), that an injunction,
“may have the effect of excluding the respondent from the place where he or she normally lives”,
it also states:
“The court may include in the tenancy injunction a provision prohibiting the person against whom it is granted from entering or being in … any premises specified in the injunction (including the premises where the person normally lives)”,
and,
“any area specified in the injunction”.
In the light of the statement in the letter that the IPNA can do everything a tenancy injunction can do, are we to assume that that part of Clause 13(3) would or could apply to any tenure and not simply to those tenures previously covered by the tenancy injunction? As I understand it, the Government appear to have moved on that point and the provisions in respect of the IPNA are now neutral. Bearing in mind what Clause 13(3) said, which went beyond merely,
“excluding the respondent from the place where he or she normally lives”,
which covered,
“any premises specified in the injunction”,
and,
“any area specified in the injunction”,
is that something that is still to be reserved for social housing tenants or is it something that, if it was deemed necessary or desirable, could now be applied to anybody in any form of tenure?
My Lords, to clarify, as I said earlier in moving the amendment, an IPNA could impose the prohibitions that were specifically referred to in Clause 13 as well. For example, an IPNA could be used to deal with visitors to a property. As such, the provisions are covered in an IPNA. Therefore we have tabled the amendment in light of the comments made by the noble Lord in Committee.
That would be irrespective of tenure? It would not apply purely to social housing?
As I stated earlier, the purpose behind the IPNA is that it would be tenure-neutral.
(10 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, perhaps I may say first that when those PCSOs arrived at the door of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, I am glad that they did not take him away. We would have been without his expertise and input in this Bill, so we are grateful for that. Equally, he made an important point in mentioning it. I come back to a point I made earlier: PCSOs are distinct from police officers, and I think I made that clear in my comments. What they do in terms of reassurance is something that the police themselves do. Again, speaking from my experience of working with neighbourhood teams when I was a local councillor, the police also did similar reassurance exercises.
I turn now to the specific questions that have been put to me. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked why we are proposing this now. Of course, we are responding in line with the scrutiny of the Bill in the Commons. My honourable friend Stephen Barclay raised the issue, but it did go wider and beyond the specifics of his amendments. This is not something that the Government have only just thought about. I referred in my earlier comments to a Labour police and crime commissioner, Paddy Tipping, who wants us to go further. We have consulted on this and we have looked at the position with relevant experts in the field to understand the implications of the change. We have included discussions with the police at both the operational and the strategic level, the College of Policing, the partnership agencies and, indeed, national police leaders. As I said in my earlier remarks, this is about enhancing the powers of PCSOs and not about taking away from their engagement. We believe it is right that the engagement role performed by PCSOs is vital in making police accessible to all, and we do not want to overburden them with enforcement powers that would detract from that. That is why we have taken a considered position on these new packages.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, also asked whether we will consider more powers. These changes will mean a significant increase in the number of powers available for designation to PCSOs. That is an important distinction: this is not something that is carte blanche; it is right that the chief officers should have the freedom to take account of local circumstances and priorities when determining how their PCSOs are deployed. That will be the case in these additional powers that are being proposed. That is why we have taken the time to consider and, while we will be exploring a wider role for PCSOs, the Government believe that their particular role is being enhanced.
I hope that I have covered the specific questions asked by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser.
There was not a general consultation with all local authorities but, in our consideration, as I have said, we talked to partnership agencies and national police leagues; that, of course, in some respects includes local authorities’ opinions. This is not trying to take away from local authorities: anyone who has worked at local government level knows that local authorities, the police et cetera all work in partnership in ensuring that we get the maximum level of reassurance.
I turn briefly to the points raised by my noble friend, who speaks with great expertise in this area. I would not in any sense seek to challenge that. I believe that the vital distinction remains between police officers and PCSOs. We are merely seeking to enhance the functions of PCSOs to allow them to engage more effectively in the community and to address the very issues he has raised about their effectiveness when they arrive at a particular point. Our proposals are a proportionate response to what is needed. It will help in community engagement and effective enforcement in respect of some of the lower-level issues that are raised. Neighbourhood policing will be in a better place for that. I beg to move.
(10 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, child sexual exploitation is an abhorrent crime and we are determined to stamp it out. In the past, all too often these crimes were largely hidden, but now child sexual exploitation is rightly centre stage as an issue that we must tackle. We are strengthening the system of civil orders used to manage the risk of sexual offences through Part 9 of the Bill, which noble Lords have already considered in Committee. The provisions in this group of government amendments provide an additional power to tackle the problem from a different angle. They will make it harder for child sex offenders to be able to use the anonymity of hotels and similar venues to commit offences against young people and children. A number of recent high-profile cases, such as in those in Oxford and Keighley, have shown that offenders have used the cover of hotels and bed-and-breakfast accommodation to commit sexual offences against children. By introducing these new powers, we will help the police to tackle child sexual exploitation where there are reasonable suspicions that offending has taken place or will take place.
Already, police forces are actively tackling this issue, as evidenced by the increasing number of cases that the police are bringing before the courts and the significant sentences being handed down to perpetrators. In addition, on a national level, we have strengthened the response to this issue through the inclusion of child sexual exploitation within our strategy to combat organised crime. The newly established National Crime Agency is strengthening the UK’s capability to combat child abuse online with some 4,000 specialist officers. We have also set up a Home Office-led national group through which agencies are working together to better identify those at risk and create a more victim-focused culture within the police, health and children’s services. Whether exploitation is happening now or has happened in the past, we will continue to ensure that victims are not left to suffer in silence and that those who exploit them are rightly brought to justice.
The Government want to support the police in their efforts to vigorously pursue perpetrators of this despicable crime. Targeted new powers of the kind that we are proposing will provide additional help to law enforcement agencies by allowing the police to obtain information about guests staying at hotels, guest houses and B&Bs where they suspect sexual exploitation could be taking place. If there is a reasonable suspicion that premises are being used for child exploitation, a police officer of at least inspector rank may issue a notice to the owner, operator or manager. That person would then be required to provide the police with information over a specified period of up to six months about guests who check in on and after the date on which the notice takes effect. This could include information such as the name, age, address and relationship of guests, which would be used for vital intelligence and evidence-gathering. Where there is information that a child is potentially at risk, police would use existing powers to protect the child and pursue offenders in the normal investigative process.
It is essential that this new power is taken seriously and can be enforced. That is why it will be an offence for a person served with a notice to fail to comply, and they will be subject to a maximum penalty of a level 4 fine, currently £2,500. However, clearly there should be safeguards. An offence will not have been committed if the person has a reasonable excuse for failing to comply or if reasonable steps were taken to obtain or verify the required information, and an appeal against the notice can be made in a magistrates’ court. The intention of the new power is to create a proportionate and targeted tool that will be used in an intelligence-led way to help prevent abuse, and I commend these amendments to the Committee.
My Lords, as we know, hotels do not require a specific licence to operate unless they are licensed to sell alcohol, and they certainly have no specific duties to report suspected child abuse. Clearly we are at one in wanting to eliminate child sexual exploitation as far as is possible, which is the objective of these amendments. However, I will raise one or two questions.
In the information that the Minister sent us, he said that it is not expected that this targeted power will be used more than 10 times a year, and that,
“as such, the impact on business is expected to be minimal”.
I do not ask him to tell me why he thinks that the figure is 10 rather than nine or 11, but it would be helpful if he could give some indication as to roughly where that figure of 10 came from.
Amendment 56YA defines “hotel” as,
“any guest house or other establishment of a similar kind at which accommodation is provided for a charge”.
I imagine that it must be possible to find some accommodation that is provided which is similar to a guest house but with no charge—something might conceivably be run by a charity. I want to confirm—and this is not particularly a criticism—that the wording would mean that that kind of establishment was excluded from the provisions of that clause.
The view of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee is that it considers that regulations specifying additional categories of information should be subject to the affirmative procedure. I understand that the Government do not envisage that. If I am correct in making that assertion, perhaps the Minister could say why. If I am wrong, and it will require the affirmative procedure, I will be very pleased indeed.
On this requirement under the clauses we are discussing, to provide information, for example in relation to addresses of guests at the hotel, is it the Government’s intention—I assume that it is but just want to clarify it—that it will apply only in relation to this particular kind of offence? One can think of situations in which a hotel was used by individuals to perpetrate other forms of quite serious crimes. Child sexual exploitation is obviously very much at the top end, but a hotel could be used to enact or plan other forms of crime. Do the Government intend that this provision will apply over a wider field than child sexual exploitation, which obviously we all accept is a very serious crime?
On the information about guests that might be gleaned, if that information does not result in a charge or a successful prosecution, for how long can it be retained by the police? Can it be retained in perpetuity or will it have to be given up or destroyed after a certain period of time? Since I do not think that that is indicated in the Bill—I am sure that if I am wrong, I will be corrected—for what purposes may the police use any information obtained about guests, and are there any restrictions on possible use of information provided to the police under these clauses?
My Lords, I will turn to some of the issues—if not all, I will certainly write to the noble Lord in that respect. On the issue of the Delegated Powers Committee’s recommendation that the order-making power in Amendment 56YA should be subject to the affirmative procedure, that report has come today, we are considering it and we will respond to the committee’s report in advance of Report stage.
The noble Lord raised the issue of the application of these particular proposals just for child sexual exploitation. It is their primary aim to target that particular heinous crime. I am sure that all noble Lords would agree that this is something that needs to be tackled head-on.
As for the figure that the noble Lord asked about in the briefing, that was a matter that I raised, too. This figure is indicative; one would hope that it was zero. That is the sentiment that I would express from the Government, but it is an indicative number only.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked about accommodation provided for a charge. The provision is aimed at hotels and bed-and-breakfasts; it would not cover accommodation provided for free, such as accommodation run by a charity. I trust that that has answered most, if not all, of his questions, but if there is anything pending I shall write to him.
(10 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberI am sure my noble friend saw me nodding. That is quite correct.
We certainly support these amendments as they address gaps in the legislation and will enable more effective and comprehensive monitoring of firearms licensing. It is interesting to note that the Government’s intention to close loopholes in firearms licensing seems to stop at those on suspended sentences and at tightening regulations on antiquities. Although we agree they are important areas, the Government’s legislation, as we said on the previous amendment, does not extend to other rather more serious areas of activity or to preventing people obtaining a firearms licence. The Government seem to be keen on addressing loopholes in certain aspects of granting firearms licences but not, apparently, in others.
I believe my noble friend Lord Taylor has already dealt with that issue.
(10 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, one of the issues that my noble friend Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede raised is the apparent extent to which Clause 94 could be used to keep cases that would justify court proceedings under the terms of the Bill out of the courts, where an individual has admitted to engaging in anti-social behaviour or committing an offence to a constable, investigating officer or a person authorised to issue additional cautions. Even where such a person thinks that the evidence is enough to seek an injunction under Section 1 or to take other court proceedings, they can still make a decision not to seek an injunction, not to take court proceedings, not to give a caution and not to give a fixed penalty notice. Instead, they can tell the offender to carry out any action listed in the community remedy document, including making a payment to the victim.
Since the Secretary of State is to issue guidance to local policing bodies on how they should discharge their functions in preparing or revising the community remedy document, can the Minister say what will be the maximum penalties that can be provided for in that document, including the maximum payment that can be ordered to be made to the victim? If an offence has been admitted, can the offender insist on being taken to court or receiving a caution or fixed penalty, rather than carrying out an action listed in the community remedy document?
Will a constable or investigating officer be able to act under Clause 94(3) if the offender has previously committed offences, or will it be only if the offender is not previously known? Will a record be kept and, if so, by whom, of any actions under Clause 94(3) that an individual who has committed anti-social behaviour or an offence has been told to take? Since the community remedy document is to apply not only to anti-social behaviour but to an individual who has committed an offence, what kind of offences will be deemed suitable to be dealt with under Clause 94?
My noble friend Lord Ponsonby spoke about the issue of scrutiny and the apparent inadequacy of the scrutiny that is likely to take place. Certainly, there do not seem to be watertight provisions in the Bill to ensure that such scrutiny takes place of the use of the powers under Clause 94.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, for tabling his amendment. As he explained, it is probing in nature and seeks to establish a local panel to scrutinise the strategy and use of cautions and out of court disposals in particular. I listened carefully to the reasoning given for the reduction in crime; there were some interesting comments.
I draw your Lordships’ attention to the out of court disposals review that is currently taking place, in partnership between the Ministry of Justice and the police, and in conjunction with the Home Office, the Attorney General’s Office and the Crown Prosecution Service. The review will look at all out of court disposals currently used against adults and consider how they might be reformed. The aim is to ensure that out of court disposals are as effective, simple and transparent as possible. The review includes conditional cautions and community resolutions, both of which will be subject to the community remedy. This public consultation was launched on 14 November to seek the views and experiences of professionals, victims’ organisations and the public. The consultation will conclude on 9 January and the review as a whole will conclude later in the spring.
Two key themes of the review—picking up on a point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby—are transparency and accountability. The consultation asks the public to consider whether they think there is more information about out of court disposals that should be shared; whether they are able to hold the police to account for the way that out of court disposals are used; and how they think that the Government can make the out of court disposal system more accountable.
In particular, the consultation asks for views on what sort of offences out of court disposals are appropriate for. I agree that the use of cautions for serious offences and repeat offenders requires careful consideration in each specific case. The Review of Simple Cautions, to which the noble Lord referred, has already been completed. The review made it clear that cautions should no longer be used for indictable only offences, and certain serious either-way offences, unless there are exceptional circumstances, and that those who persist in criminal activity should no longer expect to receive a caution. Those changes have been made to the guidance on simple cautions.
The out of court disposals review is also looking at this issue. Currently, the guidance for all out of court disposals indicates that they are available for all offenders, but are primarily intended to address first-time offending. The latest data, for 2012-13, show that 60% of those getting a caution—that is, either a simple or a conditional caution—have not received a previous caution.
On the issue of senior officer oversight, the simple cautions review recommended that there should be greater local accountability and scrutiny of decision-making. The review further recommended that each force should have a senior officer identified as responsible who would provide local leadership and accountability and who would make use of local scrutiny panels. We are considering that recommendation carefully as part of the wider out of court disposals review. There are clearly links between the matters considered in the simple cautions review and the out of court disposals review, and we will consider these alongside each other. Further, I assure the noble Lord that the issues he and others raised in this debate will be fed into the out of court disposals review.
The draft guidance on the community remedy signposts existing CPS guidance on the use of conditional cautions. The community remedy will work with any changes to conditional cautions or community resolutions that take place as a result of the review, but we need to be careful not to impose anything in the Bill or the guidance that will contradict or restrict any changes to those systems.
I will pick up a few points made by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. He asked about the crimes for which the remedy might be used. They are low-level criminal damage, low-value theft, minor assault without injury and anti-social behaviour, and are currently set out on page 15 of the draft guidance. In addition, the noble Lord asked whether the offender could insist on prosecution. The answer is no. He asked whether the community remedy only applied to first-time offenders; I have already covered that particular issue. I was asked what records are kept. The police will keep records in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998 and will retain them if there is a specific police purpose. As I said, a much more detailed review will end in January of next year.
The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, indicated that this was a probing amendment. I hope by what I have said that that I have conveyed that there are broader issues to consider as well. We will undoubtedly return to this issue once the current review results are out. In the interim, I hope that the noble Lord is reassured both by my explanations and my commitment that the content of this debate will be included in that review, and that he will be minded to withdraw his amendment.
(10 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, we have tabled amendments 21E and 21F to seek to clarify the effect of changes made to Clause 12 on Report in the House of Commons. As I understand it, the effect of those changes is that the ability to exclude a person who is the subject of an injunction under Clause 1 from the place where he or she normally lives in cases of violence or risk of harm can now apply across all tenures, including owner-occupiers, and not just the social housing sector, as I think was originally proposed. Will the Minister confirm whether that is now the case?
If Clause 12 now applies across all tenures equally, what powers are now given under Clause 13 that apply only to someone with a tenancy agreement but do not apply to someone normally living in owner-occupied property who is also the subject of an injunction under Clause 1? One would have assumed that all tenures were now being treated equally but I take it that Clause 13, by its very wording, does not apply to a person in owner -occupied property. If there is still a difference in the powers available under Clauses 12 and 13, depending on the form of tenure, will the Minster say what those differences are and why they are necessary? Will he also say whether Clause 13 applies to the private rented housing sector or to just the social housing sector? Presumably the private rented housing sector is now covered by the changes made to Clause 12, so if a private sector housing tenant is not covered by Clause 13, in which ways does it mean that someone in social housing accommodation is being treated differently from someone who is a private sector housing tenant and who is also the subject of an injunction under Clause 1?
Amendment 21F would give local authorities extra flexibility in tackling anti-social behaviour in the private rented housing sector when private landlords refuse or are unwilling to act. It would be helpful to have the Minister’s comments.
Finally, under Clause 12, the injunction may exclude the respondent from the place where he or she normally lives. Under Clause 13, the tenancy injunction may include a provision prohibiting the person against whom it is granted from entering or being in any premises or any area specified in the injunction. What is the reason for the difference in wording apparently based on form of tenure?
My Lords, I totally understand the noble Lord’s concern that anti-social behaviour powers in this Bill should be, as far as possible, tenure-neutral. He is quite correct that this came up during the debate in the other place and Clause 12, which provides for exclusion, is now tenure-neutral following amendments made on Report in the Commons. Of course, it is of no consequence to the victims of such behaviour that the perpetrator is a tenant of social housing, in the private rented sector, or is indeed an owner-occupier. What matters is that action can be taken.
Clause 13 makes special provision for tenancy injunctions so as to preserve the powers in housing legislation. For the most part, the housing injunction can be used in the same way as an injunction to prevent nuisance and annoyance. However, it makes the express provision for a tenancy injunction to be made in some circumstances where the tenant allows, incites or encourages anti-social behaviour by another person and this constitutes a breach of the tenancy agreement. Such behaviour could be committed by a visitor or lodger, for example. Front-line professionals have demonstrated through discussions held that they value this power and that is why we have retained it.
I assure the noble Lord that we are satisfied that Part 1 already enables the police, a housing provider or a local authority to apply for an IPNA to prevent a person allowing, inciting or encouraging someone else to engage in anti-social behaviour. It can be used in this way not only against tenants in the social and private rental sectors, which are the sectors that these amendments are concerned with, but against owner-occupiers. Given that, we do not need to extend the tenancy injunction provisions to cover a wider category of persons, as these amendments seek to do.
I also assure the noble Lord that Clause 13 applies to anyone who has a tenancy agreement with a local authority or a social landlord, so it does not cover the private rental sector.
Based on the assurances that I have given in terms of the extension and the provisions that were discussed in the other place, I hope that the noble Lord is content to withdraw his amendment.
I am still not entirely clear what the position is in the light of what the noble Lord has said. As I understood it, he seemed to be at some pains to say that the content of Clause 13 is also covered by Clause 12 because the police, or somebody making the application, would have the powers to make that application in respect of somebody in the private rented sector, or presumably even an owner-occupier, who was,
“allowing, inciting or encouraging any other person to engage or threaten to engage in anti-social behaviour”.
I think that that is what the noble Lord was seeking to tell me. That wording appears in Clause 13 in relation to tenancy injunctions but it does not appear in Clause 12, although the Minister is seeking to say that that is what Clause 12 actually means. Therefore, if owner-occupiers and the private rented sector are covered by Clause 12, why do we need Clause 13 to put in different wording for a tenancy injunction when the noble Lord is apparently seeking to say that that is already covered in Clause 12?
In my contribution, I drew attention to Clause 13(3), which says:
“The court may include in the tenancy injunction a provision prohibiting the person against whom it is granted from entering or being in … any premises specified in the injunction (including the premises where the person normally lives)”,
so it clearly covers premises other than where the person normally lives, but the subsection goes on to say that it could also apply to,
“any area specified in the injunction”.
Do the terms of Clause 13(3) apply also to owner-occupiers and the private rented housing sector or are we treating differently people in the social housing sector who may have one of these injunctions and who it is proposed should be excluded? Are the people concerned in the three different types of tenure all being treated equally or is there something different in this for the tenant of social housing accommodation? If there is no difference and it is all covered by Clause 12, why do we need a separate Clause 13?
I repeat that as far as the first clause is concerned, the intention is to be tenure-neutral. As I said, we have considered the discussions that took place on Report in the House of Commons and have made appropriate amendments. I also repeat that the specific purpose of a tenancy injunction is to capture behaviour where a tenant has breached, or it is anticipated that they will breach, their tenancy agreement by engaging, or threatening to engage, in anti-social behaviour. We have tried to cover all elements in both clauses. As I have said before, it does not matter to the victim whether the perpetrator is a tenant of social housing or in the private rented sector. What matters is that action can be taken, and Clause 12 covers that.
With great respect to the Minister, I do not think that he has explained why Clause 13 is necessary. He keeps saying that Clause 12 is tenure neutral. If it is tenure-neutral, it covers social housing tenants as well as those in the private rented sector and owner-occupiers. Therefore, why do we need Clause 13? He refers to Clause 13 relating to anti-social behaviour, but Clause 12(1)(b)(i) also refers to anti-social behaviour. It also refers, in subsection (1)(b)(ii), to,
“a significant risk of harm to other persons from the respondent”.
The Minister has not addressed another question that I asked. Clause 12 refers to,
“excluding the respondent from the place where he or she normally lives”,
but in Clause 13, which covers tenancy injunctions, a prohibition can apply to,
“any premises specified in the injunction (including the premises where the person normally lives)”.
I therefore repeat that the provision envisages that the scope can extend beyond the premises where the person lives. There is also a phrase about preventing a person,
“from entering or being in … any area specified in the injunction”.
Is the Minister saying that the terms of Clause 13(3) are also included in Clause 12? He cannot have it both ways. He cannot say that Clause 12 covers all forms of tenure and then say that he still needs Clause 13.
I can only repeat what I have already said: Clause 13 makes special provision for tenancy injunctions so as to preserve specific powers in housing legislation. In this case, it also makes an express provision for a tenancy injunction to be made in some circumstances where the tenant allows, incites or encourages anti-social behaviour by another person. This constitutes a breach of their tenancy agreement. As I said earlier, such behaviour could be committed by a visitor or a lodger. The reason for Clause 13 is that front-line professionals value this power. That is why we seek to retain it.
Why is it not equally important that the provision about,
“inciting or encouraging any other person to engage or threaten to engage in anti-social behaviour”
should apply to the private rented housing sector, and to owner-occupiers? Is the Minister saying that only somebody in social housing might incite or encourage others to engage or threaten to engage in anti-social behaviour, and that that would not apply to the private rented sector or to owner-occupiers? Of course it applies there, too. This is not tenure neutral. If it were, Clause 13 would not be needed.
My Lords, either I am failing to comprehend totally what the noble Lord is saying, or vice versa. I am listening very carefully to what he is saying, but, rather than repeating myself, I think it would be in the best interests of making progress if I wrote to him about this. I hope that he has been reassured by some of what I have said, and by the commitments and assurances given by the Government. On that basis, I again ask him to withdraw his amendment.
Obviously, I accept that the Minister will, without any commitment, have another look at this and write to me—which presumably will require him to reflect on everything that has been said before his reply is signed and sent. On that basis I will withdraw the amendment. However, I put to him again this simple question: if he is arguing that Clause 12 is tenure neutral, why does he need Clause 13? I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
In direct response to that, I can say that representatives from the LGA and other organisations have attended meetings with my noble friend with regard to this Bill. I again reassure her that, as the guidelines are reviewed, I am sure that the LGA will be making representations and will be part of that process.
I certainly will withdraw my amendment but can the Minister respond to two of the questions I asked? Can the youth offending team oppose an application for an injunction under Section 1 for someone aged under 18 and can it oppose it in court? Will the court hearing an application for an injunction under Section 1 have to be told the outcome of the consultation with the youth offending team and the view of the youth offending team?
The youth offending team cannot actually veto an application. If it objects to a particular application, we expect further dialogue to take place on what it has submitted, but that does not mean that the process should be dragged out unnecessarily.
I accept that the team cannot veto it, but my question was: if it does not agree with it, can it oppose it in court? When the thing goes to court, will it be necessary for the court to be told of the outcome of the consultation of the youth offending team and the view of the youth offending team?
This is a specific issue. As I said, I would expect that the court would consider all consultations that had taken place and advice that had been received in considering this element. Certainly, the intention in providing for these orders would be that the youth offending team had a central role. It would also be represented in court. If there were an occasion where the team felt strongly enough, yes, the short answer is that it would be represented at the court hearing if it thought that its issues were not being considered in the right way.
I thank the Minister for his response to the question and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
I am very interested to hear the Minister’s response on all the issues that have been raised, particularly about the duration of a criminal behaviour order. This has already been stated. For those who reach the age of 18 there is a,
“fixed period of not less than 2 years, or … an indefinite period”—
then it says in brackets—
“(so that the order has effect until further order)”.
I am not quite sure what that means. What is the further order that is envisaged? It does not say, “until further notice” but “until further order”. Perhaps the Minister will clarify what that actually means.
As far as the order being allowed to go on for an indefinite period, the Minister has been quite eloquent during the passage of the Bill, telling us all about some of the existing provisions, how they are not working and how they are not having any effect. Bearing in mind that it says in the draft guidance that the criminal behaviour order,
“is aimed at tackling the most serious and persistent offenders where their behaviour has brought them before a criminal court”,
then I suggest that if such an order has been in effect for five years but has not had any impact and has not managed to tackle the most serious and persistent offenders, it is unlikely that it will do so beyond five years.
On how long the order period should last, if the Minister is determined that the facility should be there for it to continue for longer than, say, a period of five years and to go on indefinitely, does he not think it appropriate that there is a proper review to justify the need for it to continue on the basis that one would have thought five years a reasonable time to show the effectiveness, or otherwise, of an order?
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Hamwee for her explanation of these amendments and for sharing her thoughts about a group yet to come. It gave those of us on the Front Bench advance notice of what she might be saying, so I thank her profusely for that.
Amendment 22E seeks to require a court to consider the proportionality, as my noble friend said, of positive requirements for including them in a criminal behaviour order. Positive requirements are of course an important element of both the criminal behaviour order and the injunction to prevent nuisance and annoyance. As currently drafted, the Bill states that the court must receive evidence about the suitability and enforceability from the person or organisation that will be supervising compliance with the requirement. Proportionality will therefore routinely be considered by a court as part of this decision.
The Bill sets out clear limitations on courts when determining whether to agree any positive requirement proposed in the application. The court must not impose any requirement that conflicts with, for example, an individual’s religious beliefs, or interferes with their work or education. Ultimately the court will have regard to an individual’s human rights—for example, Article 8 rights—when deciding to include positive elements. Such qualified rights can only be infringed where to do so is necessary and proportionate in pursuit of a legitimate aim. Proportionality, therefore, is a relevant legal consideration for the courts.
Amendment 22G, which the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, focused on as well, would remove the ability of the court to grant a criminal behaviour order that lasted longer than five years. Of course, I understand the reasoning behind this. However, where the courts are dealing with the most anti-social individuals, they should have the option of imposing an order for a longer period. The courts, as I am sure all noble Lords will agree, will always consider the reasonableness and proportionality of a longer order before granting it. They will have access to relevant information about a particular case. We believe they are best placed to make a judgment about the appropriate length of an order. What is more, the offender has the ability under Clause 26 to apply to the court to vary or discharge the order at any time.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, sought clarification about the words “further order”. This refers to a further order of the court, not a further CBO.
Finally, I understand that Amendments 22H, 22J and 22K are designed to ensure that all orders are reviewed annually. As your Lordships are aware, we have ensured that this is the case for under-18s. We recognise the importance of frequent monitoring as a young person matures during the duration of an order. However, in respect of adults we have left the decision open to the relevant police force as to whether there should be such a review. In such cases where an individual is behaving in a way that is seriously anti-social, it may not be appropriate to review the case after 12 months, as this would be too soon and would simply result in an unnecessary burden on the police and courts. Again, we wish to make sure that such decisions are made by those on the front line who are best placed to assess each individual case.
(10 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I extend our thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, and his committee for their report. It contains a clear recommendation that there should be a reasoned opinion concluding that the proposed regulation and directive do not comply with the principle of subsidiarity.
As has been said, psychoactive substances are natural or synthetic substances that affect the central nervous system, and induce a stimulating or depressing effect in the same way that illicit drugs such as cocaine or ecstasy do. They are often marketed as legal alternatives to illicit drugs, which is why they are called “legal highs”. Like illicit drugs they can cause considerable harm to those who use them, including severe physical or psychological harm, or even death.
Many new psychoactive substances have or could have other uses in, for example, the medical, chemical or high-tech industries. Around a fifth of the substances notified through the EU-level mechanism of exchange of information have some other legitimate uses. New psychoactive substances are not, however, subjected to control measures under the UN conventions on drugs and are not therefore covered by a Council framework decision of 2004 on the approach to the fight against illicit drug trafficking.
However, the number of new psychoactive substances emerging and spreading increasingly quickly in the European Union is rising fast, and more than 300 new substances have been detected in Europe since 1997, with the number of substances identified between 2009 and 2012 tripling from 24 to 73 a year. The rise in the availability of such substances has led to an increase in consumption across the EU, and 80% of new psychoactive substances are reported in more than one member state.
As we have heard, the European Commission considers that the current EU instrument of 2005 on the information exchange, risk assessment and control of new psychoactive substances is unable to provide an adequate response to this growing challenge, because it does not enable harmful substances to be withdrawn from the market quickly enough, or provide a response proportionate to the level of risk involved. The Commission’s new proposals that are the subject of this report seek to establish rules for restrictions to the free movement of new psychoactive substances, and are also intended to enable quicker and more proportionate measures to be taken on such substances.
The measures proposed would be introduced within weeks in case of an immediate risk and would restrict the sale of new psychoactive substances to consumers across the EU for one year. Alternatively, they could be introduced within 10 months and would restrict the sale of a substance to consumers across the EU and, in cases of severe risk, even their use in industry. They would be directly applicable in the member states and would not need to be transposed into national law. According to the Commission, under the current system the entry into force of restriction measures takes up to 24 months.
The Commission proposal also seeks to provide for the most harmful new psychoactive substances to be covered by the same criminal law provisions as substances controlled by the UN conventions. The proposed regulation is also intended to improve the functioning of the internal market in respect of legal uses of new psychoactive substances by reducing obstacles to trade and increasing legal certainty to economic operators.
Under the Commission’s proposals the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction—the EMCDDA—would be advising the Commission to take no further action in respect of a substance assessed as low risk. We would have concerns about this, because it is not clear by which means or form of testing the EMCDDA would come to this conclusion, and how it would assess long-term and psychological harms. We do not agree with ceding to the EU powers to classify drugs, but we certainly agree with EU-wide co-operation on a laboratory with power to give advice and information, as has been pressed for by the United Kingdom Drug Policy Commission and others.
The Commission considers that its proposal is consistent with the principle of subsidiarity, because member states alone cannot reduce the problems caused to the internal market due to their divergent responses to the new psychoactive substances, and because EU-level action is necessary to ensure that potentially harmful new substances can be identified, assessed and, if necessary, withdrawn quickly from the market across all member states. The EU committee report disagrees with the Commission’s assessment that its proposal satisfies the principle of subsidiarity, which provides that in policy areas that do not fall within the exclusive competence of the EU, but where competence is shared with the member states, the European Union can act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states.
The EU committee, as the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, has set out, has given its reasons for believing that it is actually the member states that are best placed to decide how to respond to the proliferation of these substances in a manner that best fits the circumstances in their jurisdictions, and that it is of the utmost importance that member states retain their ability to decide what action should be taken in their jurisdictions regarding new psychoactive substances. On improving the functioning of the internal market in respect of their legal trade, the EU committee says, as once again the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, has said, that the UK Government’s evidence indicates that the legal trade in such substances is not sufficiently extensive to warrant the Commission’s proposed action that the committee thus regards as a disproportionate response.
We share the committee’s view, in respect of new psychoactive substances, that the case has not been made to justify transferring member states’ decision-making power to the Commission, and that the proposed regulation and directive do not comply with the principle of subsidiarity. But I have a couple of points to raise with the Minister.
The United Kingdom appears to have Europe’s largest legal highs market. At present it is not that far short of 100 new psychoactive substances arriving on the UK market per year. Yet the Government’s temporary banning order has been used just some three or four times. There appear to be two reasons. The first stage of the process is, I believe, a letter from a Minister to the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs—the ACMD—but with the letter seeming to take some time to be sent. The second reason is the resource capability of the ACMD that apparently can assess only two or three new substances a year. Perhaps the Minister could comment on this situation and give us his view of the reasons for it.
The EMCDDA produces lists of new psychoactive substances. Despite requests, no explanation has been offered to date as to why there are substances on its list that have not made it on to any Home Office list. Perhaps the Minister could provide this explanation. As things stand, it seems that we will never be able to keep up with the number of new such drugs on the market, despite the apparent universal concern, including from the EU committee, about the risk of harm to the health and safety of citizens across Europe posed by the creation, availability and use of these new psychoactive substances.
In conclusion, I reiterate that we support the recommendation in the EU committee’s report.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, for tabling this debate and through him, as chairman, thank the other members of the committee. The EU proposals published on 17 September on new psychoactive substances raise many issues around the principle of subsidiarity, and I think that warrants the attention of this House.
My noble friend pointed out that the Minister for Crime Prevention, Mr Norman Baker, gave evidence to the European Scrutiny Committee on 16 October. The reason for the debate today is to consider how the House wishes to respond and whether it wishes to issue a reasoned opinion to the EU institutions.
The European Commission’s draft regulation and directive aim to strengthen the European Union’s ability to respond to new psychoactive substances. The new regulation will replace the existing EU instrument, council decision 2005/387/JHA. The directive is a consequential instrument for member states to enforce the regulation through appropriate criminal penalties for new psychoactive substances categorised as severe risk.
In recent years, new psychoactive substances—NPS or, as already referred to in this debate, legal highs—have rapidly changed the nature of the global drugs market. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, made this point very well. Substances that are not under international control but mimic the effects of controlled substances are now widely available. They have the potential to pose serious risks to public health and safety. My noble friend Lord Sharkey highlighted recent cases and the tragic responses. The speed at which the market has developed, the wide availability and accessibility of NPS legal highs and the concern about their increasing use makes this a significant issue that is not just national or European but global in nature and requires collective action at all levels. We have a comprehensive and well recognised response to new psychoactive substances that covers early warning, legislation, demand reduction and treatment, as well as galvanising international co-operation and activity. I will come to that in a moment.
In our legislative approach, we have deployed generic definitions whereby entire families of drugs are brought under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. This approach has continued to place the UK in a much stronger and more durable position. Temporary class drug orders enable us to ban NPS in weeks rather than months where there is an immediate concern. Through these mechanisms, we have controlled the majority of NPS seen in the EU since 2005. Since 2010, we have controlled in excess of 200 new psychoactive substances including 15 currently under temporary control. That point was also made by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser.
While the EU-wide NPS identification and monitoring component has been very useful to us in complementing our own drug early warnings systems, it is harder to see the benefit of the risk assessment and banning process. To date, the requirement for member states to ban certain NPS has had little impact for the UK. Just 13 risk assessments have been conducted, and only nine NPS have been subject to this requirement, of which eight had already been controlled in the UK, including mephedrone.
As my noble friend Lord Bridgeman pointed out, the principle of subsidiarity is that decisions should be taken as close as possible to the citizen. As such, the EU should act only where it would add value. The Government are concerned that, as drafted, Article 4 of the regulation would fetter our discretion to respond flexibly to national issues with NPS as they arise. All noble Lords have made this point. The proposals are currently drafted under the Article 114 legal base, which is about internal markets and makes this a harmonisation measure, rather than setting out minimum standards under Title V.
Given that only 13 risk assessments have been conducted under the existing NPS instrument since 2005, it is difficult to see how, without significant additional resources in the early warning and risk assessment processes, the proposals will impact in any notable way on the NPS market. With many member states over the past four or so years bringing in extensive domestic measures to control such substances, the value of the potential control measures under the new proposals is unclear.
Beyond the concept that there is a legitimate trade in NPS that needs to be accepted and, indeed, protected, the fact that the UK has placed restrictions on the majority of NPS seen in the EU undermines the suggestion that the proposals would add value to the UK’s current approach. The noble Lord, Lord Hannay, pointed this out.
(11 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, briefly, we await with interest the Government’s response. Certainly, the amendment would appear to fill in a gap in this part of the Bill, since one’s understanding of restorative justice was that it was at least as important, if not more important, for the victim as it was for the offender. Yet while the relevant clause provides for participating,
“in an activity … where the participants consist of … the offender and one or more of the victims”,
it then goes on to say,
“which aims to maximise the offender’s awareness of the impact of the offending concerned on the victims”.
It would appear as though the view in this part of the Bill is that the offender’s needs and awareness are regarded as rather more important than those of the victim or victims. I conclude by saying that my understanding of restorative justice is that it is there for the benefit of the victims at least as much as, if not more than, that of offenders.
My Lords, I welcome the enthusiasm and support for restorative justice from across the House. Indeed, at the recommital stage of the Bill my noble friend Lady Linklater moved an amendment in relation to pre-sentence restorative justice. That amendment added an explicit reference to restorative justice meeting the needs of the victim.
Her Majesty’s Government entirely agree that RJ, when used appropriately, can be an extremely positive experience for victims. For example, our own research has shown that 85% of victims participating in direct RJ conferencing with their offenders were satisfied. We therefore gave an undertaking to consider the amendment in advance of Report. I assure the House that we are fully supportive of the intention behind the amendment. We consider that the phrase,
“meet the needs of the victim”,
needs more explicitly to reflect the benefits provided by restorative justice. Victims may have many needs as a result of a crime, and we should be clear about which of them RJ may meet.
I am sure that noble Lords will agree that one of the most important benefits of RJ is to give victims a voice in the criminal justice system. The amendment therefore seeks to reflect this. It puts an equal emphasis on victims and offenders in defining RJ requirements by focusing on victims’ need to have their voice heard. It also seeks to cover the different ways in which victims might want to express themselves. The phrase, “talk about” seems to us a direct and simple way of describing what might happen in the majority of cases—victims talking at a face-to-face meeting or mediation about the impact of the offending. The words,
“or by other means express experience of”,
is intended to cover other ways of sharing experience, thoughts and feelings.
In short, we appreciate that some victims may be too traumatised, or otherwise unable or unwilling, to talk about their experience. Instead, they may want to express their feelings in writing or drawing, or through other means. We therefore believe that the amendment will strengthen the role of victims in the restorative justice process. In the light of this, the Government propose to accept the amendment.