Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon
Main Page: Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(11 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I support this amendment. For most of my 50 years in courts, this function was carried out by police officers who had the authority and the presence to be able to keep order. At times in my rather coloured career, that was necessary. At one time, we received intelligence that a gun was being smuggled into court to shoot either a witness or me or both of us. Happily, it did not arrive. The police presence was phased out, as it has been in other parts of the United Kingdom, and it has been necessary to appoint security officers. In my experience, they have never had to use these powers. They are needed because a lot more people attend the Supreme Court than used to attend the Appellate Committee upstairs or the Privy Council hearings. I support the amendment as one that it would be wise to have.
My Lords, this amendment concerns the security arrangements for the UK Supreme Court. As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has so elegantly explained, Amendment 112 would provide UK Supreme Court security officers with powers similar to those of court security officers appointed by the Lord Chancellor in accordance with the Courts Act 2003 in England and Wales and would address that gap.
The Government accept that UK Supreme Court security officers should have the same broad powers as court security officers in England and Wales, subject to appropriate safeguards, including in respect to training and security clearance. Having looked at the amendment, the Government are happy to commend it to the House.
My Lords, I rise briefly to place on record the full support of the Opposition for this amendment. I hope that the Government will accept its spirit, if not the precise wording, today. It seems to set the final stone in the arch, as it were, of the construction of the Supreme Court. It clearly makes sense and I endorse entirely the observations of noble and learned Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and my noble friend Lord Bach.
My Lords, I am minded of the fact that during the dinner break one of my noble friends remarked how cold the House had become given that we are in the winter months. I hope that some of my words may warm the temperature spiritually if not physically. Before I deal with the substance of what has been laid in front of us, I assure the House that Her Majesty’s Government fully and utterly respect the independence of the judiciary, and that there is no question of our duty to uphold that independence.
As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has alluded to, and as many noble Lords will recall, this House considered what are now Sections 48 to 50 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. Then, as now, the concern was how the court’s independence might be maintained following the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords transition into the UK Supreme Court. Several noble Lords have already made strong arguments as regards the current situation. I am not here to revisit arguments that have been raised historically. However, the Government retain a fundamental concern with regard to accountability and proper lines of accountability which need to be established so that the elected Government are responsible for the proper fiscal and managerial operation of the court.
The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, my noble and learned friend Lord Mayhew and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, who was the Attorney-General, made very specific points about the challenges faced by the Lord Chancellor in appointing the chief executive, and the fact that a chief executive appointed by the Lord Chancellor has two masters in effect—one judicial and the other ministerial—and, as was argued, this breaches the principle of the separation of the Executive and the judiciary.
As I have said, the Government will listen to the arguments and have an open mind on the issue. As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, alluded to, we are indeed engaging with the Supreme Court in order to consider the impact of this arrangement and of the amendment as tabled, and to resolve any concerns it may have about its independence and how this might best be preserved. However, it is our considered view that this constitutional change should not be rushed and that the Government and the Supreme Court should continue to discuss and consider together how any reform may be taken forward.
Reference has been made to Third Reading. I cannot at this time give an absolute concrete assurance from the Despatch Box, which I am sure noble Lords will appreciate, as to whether we will have concluded our consultation with the president of the Supreme Court, but these discussions are of course ongoing.
In lieu of these comments, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, will be content to withdraw Amendment 112A on the understanding that this is a live issue which is being looked at, and which has been raised directly with the president of the court.
I am very grateful to the Minister. Of course, he gives no absolute concrete assurance, but I take from that that he gives a more qualified assurance that he will at least do his best to ensure that these important matters can be brought to a conclusion in time for Third Reading. It may be appropriate to seek to bring these matters back at that time, particularly as I do not understand the Minister to have identified any factor that can explain how it can be compatible with respect for the independence of the judiciary—which he says, and which of course I accept, the Government fully uphold—to maintain the constitutional provisions that this amendment seeks to remove.
The only factor to which the Minister referred that could come anywhere near providing any possible explanation was accountability. However, the whole point about the independence of the Supreme Court is that it is not accountable to Ministers; it is accountable to Parliament, of course, and it is answerable to Parliament in the sense that Parliament can override any decisions that the Supreme Court makes, and it is Parliament which decides on the resources that are provided to the Supreme Court in order that it can perform its function.
We have not heard any possible explanation of how these constitutional arrangements can be maintained consistently with the independence of the judiciary. I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate. I will say to the Minister that I am sure that when and if it is necessary to bring this matter back before the House at Third Reading—I hope at an earlier time of day—there will be rather more noble Lords, and noble and learned Lords, who I am sure would wish to express similar views to those that the House has heard tonight. However, for now, I beg leave to withdraw this amendment.