Public Bodies Bill [HL]

Lord Adonis Excerpts

Tuesday 23rd November 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Adonis]

My Lords, the noble Baroness has made an immensely powerful case and the House is deeply indebted to her and her committee for the work that they have done. Essentially what is being introduced here is what on the continent would be called a decree-making power. There is now a capacity well beyond the usual use of ministerial orders for the Government to legislate by decree. One needs only to look at the scope of the Bill and the headings of Clauses 1 to 6 to see how significant this is. Clause 1 is entitled “Power to abolish”—that is, to abolish wholesale a whole string of organisations listed in the Bill which have been established under a proper statutory procedure. Clause 2 is headed “Power to merge”; Clause 3, “Power to modify constitutional arrangements”; Clause 4, “Power to modify funding arrangements”; Clause 5, “Power to modify or transfer functions”; and Clause 6, “Power to authorise delegation”. This is essentially a wide-ranging, decree-making power which, if the Bill is passed in its current form, Parliament will be conferring on the Executive. This has very significant constitutional implications, and the seriousness with which the House has been addressing the Bill is well merited in this case.

My noble friend’s amendment looks to me to be the minimum necessary to ensure that this decree-making power—because that is what it is—is kept within proper bounds and that there is proper parliamentary scrutiny, including a requirement in each case for the Government not simply to explain their reasons but to explain why they are seeking to reject the expert opinion of a committee of both Houses expressed upon proposals put forward by the Government. It seems to me that this is exceptionally important. The amendment of my noble friend Lord Hunt would require the Government to explain why they are not prepared to accept the reasoning of a committee of either House and, where that committee recommends for good and sufficient reasons that proceedings on an order should not take place, it requires the authority of the two Houses for proceedings then to take place. It is called a super-affirmative procedure and, as always when we are discussing new things, it appears to be a significant enhancement of parliamentary authority. However, looked at another way, conceptually this is putting a proper curb on a decree-making power, which in the opinion of the noble Baroness and her committee is probably one that should in any event be vested in the normal legislative process.

In order to see that the Bill is kept within proper constitutional bounds, I believe that the prerogatives of your Lordships should be respected. A move of this kind is essential or we will be faced with claims that we, as a House, have given the Government a power to legislate by decree without even the capacity for the recommendations of committees of our own House to be properly debated before the Government proceed.

[Lord Norton of Louth]

My Lords, I shall be brief because the noble Baroness, Lady Thomas of Winchester, has said everything that I would have wished to say. I welcome the fact that the Government clearly heard what was said at Second Reading and have taken on board the comments concerning the need for the procedure to be changed so that there is a greater role for Parliament in the process. Therefore, although the Minister has heard, perhaps the problem was that we were not shouting loud enough. I welcome the moves in the right direction and the fact that we now have Amendment 118, but it raises the question of why it was not in the Bill in the first place. However, the amendment goes only so far, for the reasons that we have heard. When one contrasts Amendment 118 with the super-affirmative resolution procedure, it is clear that Amendment 118 diminishes the role of Parliament relative to the super-affirmative resolution procedure, for the reasons that the noble Baroness mentioned. Therefore, I think that the Government should take away this new clause and come back with something that builds in the role of Parliament, akin to the super-affirmative resolution procedure, so that we play the role that we should be playing.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, this group of amendments concerns the central question of parliamentary scrutiny and procedure in relation to the order-making powers in the Bill. This group includes government Amendments 118, 126, 130, 173, 174 and 179. Perhaps I can reassure the noble Lord, Lord Clark of Windermere, that that is exactly what happens. It institutes a parallel framework for those sections of the Bill dealing with the Forestry Commission. The numerical sequence is exactly as he described. Amendment 122, in the name of my noble friend Lord Lester, and Amendments 3B, 120, 124, and 125 in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, and the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, are also in this group. In this debate, I will discuss in particular government Amendment 118, which relates to orders made under the powers in Clauses 1 to 6. Amendment 130 replicates this amendment in relation to orders made under Clause 11, and Amendments 173 and 174 make a similar provision in relation to the forestry provisions in the Bill.

We also intend to create similar provisions in relation to the powers conferred on Welsh Ministers by Clause 13, and are in discussions with the Welsh Assembly Government about how best to achieve this. As part of this process, I give notice of my intention to oppose the Question that Clauses 10, 12 and 19 stand part, as they are now replaced by the government amendments.

Government Amendment 126 specifies that an order made under Clause 11 may not be included in the same instrument as another order made under the Bill. Government Amendment 179 is a consequential amendment to Clause 28, which defines references to various periods of scrutiny used in earlier government amendments.

In the previous group, I noted the high level of consensus which had emerged regarding the requirement to consult in relation to the powers in this Bill. Similarly, there is much consensus around the idea that Ministers should ensure that Parliament is properly informed about the content and background of orders, through the laying of a draft order accompanied by an explanatory document, detailing the reasoning for the order and including the results of the external consultation which preceded it. In addition, government Amendment 118 requires this document explicitly to address how the matters in Clause 8 had been addressed.

I note that Amendment 124, which is tabled in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, and the noble Baroness, Lady Royall of Blaisdon, specifies that the explanatory document should include a regulatory impact assessment, and I appreciate the intent behind this addition. The use of impact assessments is set out by the Better Regulation Executive in the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. Departments are required to assess any policy of a regulatory nature that would affect the private sector, the third sector or public services against the impact assessment framework and are required to publish that assessment when the proposal enters Parliament. On this basis, I do not believe it is necessary to repeat this requirement in the Bill. Similarly, I do not believe it to be appropriate to set out in statute that Ministers should provide other information which they consider will be of assistance to Parliament given the difficulties in definition and the potential breadth of information that that would involve. However, these reservations notwithstanding, I hope that the noble Lords opposite will recognise the shared intent behind our amendments in this area and feel able to support the government amendments in question.

I now turn to the question of parliamentary procedure for orders made under this Bill as discussed, in particular, in Amendment 125 and in government Amendments 118, 130 and 174. At Second Reading, I made a commitment to noble Lords that the Government would produce a parliamentary procedure that will ensure enhanced parliamentary scrutiny. The government amendments I have tabled meet this commitment by giving Parliament the opportunity, within 30 days of the laying of a draft order, to require that an enhanced procedure is required for approval of the order. Parliament will make that decision. This enhanced procedure would require a 60-day period of consideration, rather than the standard 40 days for the affirmative procedure, and for the Minister to have regard to any representations, resolution or recommendation from Parliament in relation to the draft order before seeking approval by a resolution of both Houses. This procedure would give both Houses of Parliament an extended opportunity to scrutinise and comment on these orders, and I hope it provides the reassurance the House is seeking.

Amendment 125, which is tabled in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, and the noble Baroness, Lady Royall of Blaisdon, would introduce a new parliamentary procedure for these orders, going beyond the extensive super-affirmative procedure described in the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006 by giving a Committee of either House the opportunity not only to reject an order, but to amend it or to recommend that the proposals be taken forward only through primary legislation. I recognise the sentiment from which this amendment springs, but I cannot support it for a number of reasons.

First, it is my belief that the parliamentary procedure it proposes fundamentally changes the role of Parliament, and of this House in particular, in dealing with secondary legislation. This may be something that many noble Lords would welcome, but it is surely not a debate which should be resolved within the confines of deliberation on the Public Bodies Bill. In this regard, I wish to draw the House’s attention to the initial report on the Bill by the Delegated Powers Committee published on 12 November. The report described the suggestion that orders might be amended as “virtually unprecedented” and highlighted the difficulties inherent in seeking to produce a workable procedure of this nature, particularly in the event that the two Houses disagreed on the content of an order.

Secondly, a comparison to the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006 is telling. The order-making powers in that Act are far broader in scope than those in this Bill, which are restricted not only to a particular branch of statute—that relating to public bodies—but also to the specific bodies defined in each schedule. Perhaps I may say that I am very grateful for the intervention of the chairman of the Delegated Powers Committee, my noble friend Lady Thomas of Winchester, and for her contribution to this debate. It has been useful to have direct input from that committee—hot off the press, one might say—and it reinforces the importance of our debate about this procedure. I am also grateful for the acknowledgement that the Government have sought to address the Delegated Powers Committee’s concerns. The DPC’s second report suggests that the inclusion of the super-affirmative procedure in the 2006 Act, and the degree to which Section 2 of that Act is comparable to this Bill, provides a justification for the more restrictive parliamentary procedure. However, given that the super-affirmative procedure provision in the 2006 Act are designed to apply in general to the much wider powers in that Act, I maintain that this would not be a proportionate procedure for the Public Bodies Bill.

To suggest that this Bill requires a more restrictive scrutiny procedure than the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act therefore seems to me to be a somewhat disproportionate response, particularly in the light of the additional safeguards that we have sought to introduce. However, I acknowledge the differing position of the Delegated Powers Committee in this regard. I have listened carefully to the contributions made by the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, and my noble friend Lord Norton of Louth, which rather backed up the arguments presented by the committee. I acknowledge the differing position of the Delegated Powers Committee in this regard and will consider this matter further.

The question of disproportionality is none the less raised again by the fact that, under Amendment 125, the proposed procedure would apply to each and every order made under this Bill. As was stated repeatedly at Second Reading, and has continued to be stated to me by many noble Lords since, there is broad agreement for many of the reforms in this Bill. The application of the procedure proposed by the Opposition, particularly in such an inflexible manner, would constitute an excessive hindrance on the reform programme of the Government, as well as requiring significant parliamentary time. Our approach, however, gives Parliament the flexibility to select an enhanced procedure, while maintaining for government the reasonable ability to act to implement its programme.

I finally wish to address the question of this House’s ability to veto statutory instruments made by affirmative procedure. By convention, we do not vote such instruments down, and I know that this is a source of concern from noble Lords who believe that this Bill excludes them from the decision-making process. I can assure the House that this is not the case. The enhanced procedure we have proposed, in conjunction with the additional safeguards and the requirement for consultation, would significantly strengthen the scrutiny of orders under this Bill both inside and outside Parliament. In addition, I would make this point: no body can be subject to the powers under this Bill unless Parliament gives its approval to its inclusion in the schedules.

Many noble Lords have already taken the opportunity, by amendment, to exercise their right to debate the inclusion of particular bodies, and the Government will be held to account in this fashion. Similarly, any new body created following the passage, subject to the will of Parliament, of the Bill could itself only be added to the schedules via primary legislation. The Government are taking the opportunity, in primary legislation, to seek approval from Parliament to make a specific set of bodies subject to a specific set of powers. I believe that the approach we have proposed through the government amendments in the group is both sensible and proportionate, striking a balance between Parliament’s ability to scrutinise and the Executive’s ability to take forward its programme for government. In the light of these comments and in the context of my previously stated commitment to further consider the comments of the Delegated Powers and Scrutiny Committee on matters of procedure, I would ask the noble Lord to consider withdrawing his amendment.

[Lord Adonis]

The Committee will be extremely grateful to the noble Lord for indicating that he will consider this matter further and we applaud the degree of consultation that he is affording noble Lords. However, when he says that Clauses 1 to 6 confer specific powers on Ministers in respect of specific bodies, while he is clearly right in respect of the specific bodies because they are listed in the schedules, it is very debatable whether the powers are specific. For example, in Clause 3 the power is “to modify constitutional arrangements”. It states:

“A Minister may by order modify the constitutional arrangements of a body or office specified in Schedule 3”.

The clause is not at all specific as to what powers the Government will seek to take. That, it seems to me, is the whole point at stake in this debate. The powers given in Clauses 1 to 6 are extremely wide-ranging; they are not specific. If they were specific, your Lordships would be able to debate them and seek to amend them. So it is precisely for that reason that the fifth report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee states in its opening paragraph:

“The Committee considers that the powers contained in clauses 1 to 5 and 11 as they are currently drafted are not appropriate delegations of legislative power. They would grant to Ministers unacceptable discretion to rewrite the statute book, with inadequate parliamentary scrutiny of, and control over, the process”.

That seems to justify entirely the further look at these wide-ranging powers that the noble Lord has promised us, as well as at the case which has been made by many noble Lords for an exceptional parliamentary procedure to deal with an exceptional delegation of power, which this Bill proposes to give to Ministers.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

Perhaps I may respond to the noble Lord. I am grateful to him for making the point, which is perfectly valid. It is true that the powers are general in their scope within the context of a constitutional arrangement. It may well be that it will concern changes in governance and so on of a body, or its representation in the case of a body listed in Schedule 3—that is, how the governing bodies are appointed. There could be a number of different aspects. I agree that they will differ and, by necessity, that is why this has been put in the most general of terms.

We would argue that we are indeed trying to construct a special form of scrutiny for the orders that will be tabled under this Bill, and that is what our amendments seek to address. I have accepted that the comments of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee published this morning mean that we need to look at this again because we want to try to do this within the context of parliamentary accountability. That is the purpose of seeking to reconsider this matter. I think that I have set out the arguments for why we are where we are and what we are seeking to do with our enhanced procedure for parliamentary scrutiny. However, it is important that whatever we determine here has to be compatible with the procedures of the other House because we would not want ping-pong on statutory instruments. That would be pretty difficult, so we need a process which is capable of operating across Parliament. That is an important consideration of which we are mindful.