National Security Bill

Debate between Lord Beamish and Yvette Cooper

2nd reading
Monday 6th June 2022 Commons Chamber

[Yvette Cooper]

As I have said, these debates will rightly take place through the usual channels to ensure that we have that scrutiny. I am also keen to ensure that the evidence session can take place in plenty of time.



Another issue that Members on both sides of the House have raised is the absence of reforms to the Official Secrets Act 1989, and on that point I am slightly less clear what the Government’s intention is. My understanding from what the Home Secretary has said is that she does not plan to bring forward measures in this Bill but that she is looking at the issue further. The Law Commission has raised important issues about the need to improve prosecutions in certain areas and to have public interest safeguards, both of which are immensely important, as I think the Home Secretary has recognised. Will she and the Security Minister therefore engage at an early stage in discussions on this issue with Members on both sides of the House?

[Mr Kevan Jones]

Like my right hon. Friend, I am not clear what the Home Secretary’s timetable is for reviewing the 1989 Act. However, if the Bill goes through as outlined, some of the penalties in it will be life imprisonment, and some in the 1989 Act will be two years. Having the two Acts working together will create a very difficult process. Surely the obvious thing to do is to get the reforms into the Bill as it goes through Parliament.

[Yvette Cooper]

My right hon. Friend makes an important point, and he obviously speaks with the Intelligence and Security Committee’s insight on this issue. The only other consideration I would raise is that a last-minute proposal from the Government would be a problem, because we would end up not having full scrutiny, and this is an area where it is important to get the legislation right. On the points that the Committee has made about the importance of reforms to the 1989 Act, I encourage the Security Minister and the Home Secretary to have early discussions with members of the Committee, Opposition Front Benchers and Members on both sides of the House who have concerns. We will inevitably need to debate these issues during the passage of the Bill, even if the Government want to propose future legislation on a different timetable. Having those discussions at an early stage to try to get this right would be important.

We are also concerned about areas of the Bill relating to the ability of foreign powers to use misinformation and disinformation online, which the hon. Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Damian Collins) mentioned. My understanding of the interaction between this Bill and the Online Safety Bill is that some cases where misinformation or disinformation is repeatedly put online by a foreign state will not be covered and that there will not be a responsibility on social media platforms to remove some of that material, but it would be helpful to have some clarification from Ministers. Obviously that is an area where most of us in the House would want further action to be taken and would want there to be more responsibility on social media companies to take action. We would therefore like to explore whether there are further amendments that we could bring forward to this Bill or the Online Safety Bill. That would be very helpful.

We are also concerned about direct attempts to interfere with our democracy and elections. The Home Secretary has rightly included in the Bill measures to tackle foreign interference in elections but, as the Government will know, offences make little odds if they cannot be detected or measures are rarely enforced. As the Home Secretary will know, we have urged the Government to remove the loophole that allows shell companies to be used to make donations to political parties and to hide foreign donations and donations linked to hostile states. She will also know that the former director general of MI5, Lord Evans, who is now the head of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, has warned about the risks from shell companies, describing the risk from

“powerful forces out there that are trying to bring undue influence, part through parliament and part through money. We made some recommendations to close some of those loopholes but government hasn’t acted on them.”

Since the atrocity that is the illegal invasion of Ukraine, the Government have had to recognise that it has been far too easy for Russian money, built up through illegal activity or state-sponsored corruption, to find its way into the London economy. Again, we have both the follow-up economic crime Bill and this Bill, but I urge the Home Secretary to ensure that the loophole on shell companies is closed and that those weaknesses in our democracy are addressed, because the loophole in itself is a threat to national security.

My hon. Friend the Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) raised concerns about MPs being targeted. There are also concerns about Ministers potentially being targeted. The Home Secretary will know that the shadow Security Minister has raised questions about reports that the Prime Minister, when he was Foreign Secretary, met with a former KGB agent soon after the Skripal attack. I have not heard concerns raised that that was a planned or intended meeting, but nevertheless the reports of the meeting show how easy it is for Ministers, as well as MPs, to be targeted by agents of foreign and hostile states. I urge Ministers to provide some clarity about that meeting—whether it took place, whether civil servants were present—and about what protocols should govern how meetings take place for Ministers, what kind of debrief should happen afterwards and what kind of safeguards should be in place, and whether those will be covered by this Bill or we need additional protocols for civil servants, MPs and Ministers.

There are some areas where we will want to question the drafting of the Bill, because it is very broad. For example, there is obviously a difference between someone who is meeting the foreign intelligence agencies of our closest allies—for example an academic who meets with an Australian foreign intelligence service, providing it with useful information that might help with our joint Five Eyes security arrangements and might be in all our interests—and an academic meeting with someone from the Chinese intelligence agencies and handing over intellectual property or research information that undermines British industry.

We are keen to explore in Committee how those differences will be addressed in the Bill and how, for example, it will address some of the issues around co-operation with Ireland over Northern Ireland security issues, which will clearly raise some particular and special cases. We also want to explore what might incidentally benefit a foreign Government and what deliberately benefiting a foreign Government is, and how that is addressed. We also want to address some of the questions around the public interest and national security that hon. Members have raised.

We have already raised directly with the Minister for Security and Borders a series of questions and concerns about the drafting of clause 23, to ensure that it is not too wide and cannot be used to cover individuals committing serious crimes abroad. I welcome the letter we have received from him, but we want to pursue those issues in further detail in Committee.

Perhaps one of the most important issues that the Bill could easily address but does not yet is oversight. Because agencies rightly need to operate behind a veil of secrecy, there needs to be proper oversight to safeguard both those who work within the agencies and the national interest. The Bill rightly introduces an independent reviewer to look at the state threats prevention and investigation measures, and we know that is a parallel arrangement to the independent reviewer arrangements we have for terrorism prevention and investigation measures.

The Home Secretary will know that I have argued previously that it was wrong to replace control orders and that TPIMs were too weak. They have since rightly been strengthened. They are used in only a small number of cases, but it is immensely important that there is oversight of them, and there must be proper oversight of the STPIMs as well. It would not surprise me if they were used even less frequently than TPIMs, but there must be proper safeguards.

There is a gap in the oversight framework. The terrorism independent reviewer looks both at individual TPIMs and at terrorism legislation, so he can look at all of the aspects of terrorism legislation to see where there are gaps and whether it is not working effectively. The scrutiny by David Anderson and by Jonathan Hall has been invaluable. It has been good for Government, good for the agencies, good for Parliament, good for our national security and good for our historic freedoms and having the right safeguards in place.

That scrutiny by the independent reviewer has in the past identified weaknesses in terrorism legislation. Sometimes that has been exactly the point I raised about TPIMs becoming too weak and needing to be strengthened, but the independent reviewer has also identified areas where stronger safeguards were needed, particularly on digital measures, digital infrastructure and digital safeguards. There is a really strong case for having the same kind of independent scrutiny of the operation of these new powers on espionage. The Home Secretary has rightly said that this is important legislation, but also that this is the first time we are drawing up legislation in some of these areas and that some of the legislation has not been updated for many decades, so we should have some humility on this: Parliament will not get all the details right.

Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures

Debate between Lord Beamish and Yvette Cooper

Tuesday 21st January 2014 Commons Chamber

[Yvette Cooper]

My hon. Friend is right. Figures were given in briefings to newspapers of about £50 million of additional funding to the security services and the police as a result of the switch from control orders to TPIMs, but it would be helpful to have that figure confirmed by the Government. In addition, however, we do not know whether extra resources are being provided for the ending of TPIMs. That clearly creates additional pressures on the police and security services.

This country has always to be vigilant against terrorism, and we should thank the police and our security and intelligence services, which do a difficult job incredibly well, often behind the scenes and unnoticed. According to the independent reviewer of terrorism, the threat of a terror attack directly by al-Qaeda has decreased since the mid-2000s, but the threat from its affiliates and its power to motivate other extremists and provide training and planning support all remain. Over this Parliament, we have seen attempted bomb plots in the west midlands, plans to attack a Territorial Army base and target Wootton Bassett, and of course the dreadful murder of Drummer Lee Rigby last summer.

UK nationals attempting to travel overseas to fight and train are also potential threats to the UK, both to our interests and citizens abroad and to us here when they return home. The independent reviewer has warned that the Syrian conflict might begin to rival the traditional threat from al-Qaeda core and regions north of Pakistan. We need to be vigilant against these threats and ensure that the British people are protected, and to ensure that the terrorists do not divide us or undermine our democratic values. The laws we pass against terrorism need always to be proportionate and fair.

That is why, like control orders before them, TPIMs are exceptional powers and should be used only in exceptional circumstances, but there are difficult cases: where there is substantial evidence that someone poses a terror risk, but where convictions cannot be achieved—for example, if they depend on secret intelligence that cannot be used in court. Given the risk of harm and potential loss of life from terror attacks, Parliament and our courts have long supported preventive measures based on a clear legal procedure, with safeguards to reduce the risk to the public.

Three years ago, however, the Home Secretary decided to weaken those terror powers by replacing control orders with TPIMs, putting a two-year limit on each one and removing relocation and other restrictions from them. She said there would be a greater focus on prosecution and imprisonment.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

Does my right hon. Friend agree that the narrative being put out by the Conservative part of the coalition is that the legislative change that brought in TPIMs was a result of their coalition partners, the Liberals? Was not the start of this, however, in the Conservative party’s 2010 manifesto?

[Yvette Cooper]

My hon. Friend makes an important point, and I want to come to that. The Home Secretary ducks the issue if she simply blames the Liberal Democrats for this change in legislation, because she introduced it and Conservative MPs voted for, supported and defended it at every stage of its passage through the House, even when we raised questions and concerns.

Finance Bill

Debate between Lord Beamish and Yvette Cooper

Tuesday 6th July 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr Kevan Jones]

rose—

[Yvette Cooper (Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford) (Lab)]

rose—

[Danny Alexander]

I will give way to the hon. Gentleman and then to the right hon. Lady.