(3 years, 2 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesWhen I first saw the amendment, I was slightly confused about its purpose. The idea that the Bill ought to refer to contradicting or overlapping—however one might phrase it—legislation and sets of guidelines is something that we have proposed in previous amendments, which I feel were slightly better worded.
I put it to the Minister that we need in the Bill a recognition that there are contradictory guidelines and that there will be guidelines to explicitly outline how duties and laws at universities will interact. That would relieve of a lot of pressure. We want surety that the guidelines will have that element to them in perpetuity, so that whatever new Government or office comes in, the guidelines will always outline how the Acts and duties interact with each other.
In that sense, I understand and agree with the spirit of the amendment, but the Bill probably needs something that goes further and has more detailed wording. I also understand that there have sometimes been cases in which either the Prevent duty as it is now, or the Prevent programme as it was, was used and had a chilling effect. We have heard that from different organisations. The Nottingham Two have been mentioned; that was a case of a PhD student researcher and a lecturer at the University of Nottingham. The university felt that it was its duty to report them to the police; they were arrested for downloading and disseminating the al-Qaeda manual and were refused bail for a period of time. There has been a lengthy court case on that. Compensation was paid to the two individuals because they were researching how terrorists radicalise people—the very thing we need researchers to be working on.
The law has helped to correct itself through the court process. I am not diminishing the awful effect it must have had on the two researchers, but they have received compensation and to some extent, unfortunately, these things do happen. Most institutions have already corrected their reporting mechanisms to ensure that that kind of thing does not happen. I am sure the example right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings gave us of the chaplain will be a one-off example that will help us to correct in the other direction as well. Those correction moments are sometimes needed, rather than using statute or legislation to do it.
One thing that should perhaps be included in guidelines is some idea of a process for when you are dealing with contradictory things, such as something that might breach the Equality Act but is necessary to talk about difficult issues that are discriminatory, or that might breach the Prevent programme in a literal reading, rather than its intended spirit. It is the same in universities when dealing with issues that might trigger a safeguarding process; a lecturer or researcher would write to the university to explain what they plan to do in order to get prior authorisation.
There are no key principles for how somebody gets referred to Prevent; it is actually about assessing someone’s vulnerabilities and a pattern of behaviour. There may be an example raising one issue that would automatically get people put into Prevent, but I think the structure is already there.
I totally agree. However, an example might be if a lecturer wishes to run a course about Islamic radicalisation. They might say to the university, “I need some extra safeguards put around this course because of the students it might attract and the topics we might be dealing with. It is important to teach this course for academic rigour, it is important to understand these issues, but it might attract people to join the course for undue reasons.” That is not to stop them from doing it; it is just to make sure there is a safeguarding approach. All of that kind of stuff needs to be in the guidelines, not here. I hope that that is what the Minister will say. I think a safeguarding, prior notification approach is what is needed here.
I did want to touch on the interesting contradiction brought up by this amendment. Prevent—although there is debate about its understanding and its use, I do not think that is relevant here—is an important programme to try to safeguard and stop the radicalisation of people in our country. However, it applies to the institutions, and the institutions cascade to bodies that work within them, such as student unions. It does not apply directly to student unions in terms of the duty. This does, which is an example of where this Bill overreaches.
If the Bill is going to have a deeper, more intrusive reach than the Prevent programme, we need either to revisit the Prevent duty or to say that this Bill is a bit of an overreach, that it is not necessary for it to be regulating as deep down as student unions and student clubs. This amendment helps to highlight that. That is an argument I have made many times in this Committee, so I will not go any further on that point.
(3 years, 3 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesIt does possibly explain a lot. He was also clerk to one of the parish councils that I served on, so our lives have been intertwined.
That case said that student unions are excepted charities. As a result of the Charities Act 2011, student unions are not only excepted charities and therefore exempt, but regulated directly by the Charity Commission. As charities, they have a duty to be non-partisan, to be balanced and to ensure that they fulfil all the requirements of the Charity Commission, and we know that the commissioners have great powers to step in if charities are being partisan. So we have a great deal of regulation for student unions already.
Of course, in the HE sector, which this clause covers, student unions are part of that broader assessment that Ofsted has to make when assessing the student unions of the further education college, so now we have a fourth piece of regulation.
Because, so far, student unions have not had that contractual relationship, with the ability of students to take them to court for failing to fulfil a service. That is my point about where the money comes from. At the moment, the student gives the money to the university. The contract for a basic service is between the student and the university. This extends that, so the student then has a direct contractual relationship with the student union.
If the hon. Member thinks that every single student will agree with what their student union is doing, and that no student will try it on, then I am afraid that his university experience was far too bland. My experience was of debate and contestation, and of people arguing and wanting to push the boundaries—quite rightly. This will not help that, because it will regulate student unions in a way that means they cannot then defend themselves properly. The reason for that is the financial point, which I was trying to come on to.
The university gets money from the student. They then give a grant—usually a small one—to the student union, which then spends, effectively, the university’s money. My understanding is that, according to the Education Act 1994, the university has an oversight role for how that money is spent. Yes, the student union can spend it how the students want, but within a framework that the university sets out and lays down. If the student union is liable, whose money are they liable with? That is what I am trying to get at.
If the OfS puts forward financial sanctions, whose money are they sanctioning at the student union? The student union’s money is just the university’s money, held in trust and spent on behalf of the university. Would student unions need to raise unrestricted monies, somehow? We know that most student unions do not raise unrestricted monies any more, because gone are the days of the bars. Or would student unions, if they were fined by the OfS, need to use their restricted university grants on this? If so, that clashes with the concept that that university grant is restricted to only the educational activities of the student—not for liability claims against the union. It seems strange that they would face this double regulation, and money able to be drawn from all different quarters, when they have no money themselves.
It is a bit unfair to call the hon. Member for North West Durham—my neighbour—“bland”, but anyway. Surely, what will happen is that student unions will take out indemnity insurance, whether they need to or not? That, again, is more money going away from education and into the coffers of insurance companies.
Either they will get indemnity insurance, or they will find a way to be covered by the institution’s indemnity insurance, which, again, defeats the whole point that student unions are regulated directly. We might as well regulate the institution, which would then have a duty—as they already do—to ensure that the student union is following the rules.
(3 years, 3 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesNo, it’s conscious bias—[Laughter.]
Dr Harris: Yes, absolutely. For instance, in the determination of curriculum content, that is something where there absolutely must not be imposition of bureaucratic standards. The example that I cited in the written submission was that of the University of Oxford’s music faculty, which decided to decolonise its curriculum. I should say that that is a legitimate exercise of academic freedom, but it then said, “Members of the faculty must not disparage the curriculum.” Obviously, curriculums are changed by disparaging them—that is how they came to be decolonised in the first place—so we cannot stop the process.
There needs to be, and I think the Bill could include, a right of consultation. It is academic good practice anyway, and it slightly demeans universities that they need to be told that, because it should be part of academic ethics. There is also the right to criticise one’s institution. That is part of the international law standard of academic freedom. It is embedded in a number of university statutes. Whatever happens, the standard adopted by the Bill should be at least what is already best practice in the sector. I do not think it should go beyond that.
Q
Dr Harris: Yes—
(3 years, 3 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesNo, it’s conscious bias—[Laughter.]
Dr Harris: Yes, absolutely. For instance, in the determination of curriculum content, that is something where there absolutely must not be imposition of bureaucratic standards. The example that I cited in the written submission was that of the University of Oxford’s music faculty, which decided to decolonise its curriculum. I should say that that is a legitimate exercise of academic freedom, but it then said, “Members of the faculty must not disparage the curriculum.” Obviously, curriculums are changed by disparaging them—that is how they came to be decolonised in the first place—so we cannot stop the process.
There needs to be, and I think the Bill could include, a right of consultation. It is academic good practice anyway, and it slightly demeans universities that they need to be told that, because it should be part of academic ethics. There is also the right to criticise one’s institution. That is part of the international law standard of academic freedom. It is embedded in a number of university statutes. Whatever happens, the standard adopted by the Bill should be at least what is already best practice in the sector. I do not think it should go beyond that.
Q The Bill is about trying to change cultures in universities. Surely that requires universities to train people about biases that they might have against right-wing or controversial views. Would you not agree that universities would need to implement training sessions and education programmes for their students and staff on those issues of freedom of speech?
Dr Harris: Yes—
(4 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberHe who waits it all comes to. I was going to answer that point in a minute.
The MOD argued two things in that case. First, it argued that the case was out of time, and the families won the limitation hearing to take the case forward. The hon. Member for Filton and Bradley Stoke (Jack Lopresti) has just said it would be within the six-year limit. No, it would not. Let us suppose they had taken the case not in 2016 but six years later. They would not be able to take a limitation hearing at all. The Minister does not quite understand that problem.
The case I raised in Committee was of an aircraft engineer who developed a very serious nerve condition from paint. The only reason he was able to take forward his case was because the technology had changed and research had shown that the paint actually damages people’s nervous system.
The Minister said in Committee that, somehow, he is on record in The Sun as guaranteeing that no one will lose out, but he cannot because that will not happen: as I said to him in Committee, using the Robin Day analogy, we are all here-today, gone-tomorrow politicians. Frankly, what will happen is that MOD lawyers will use this to stop people making claims.
Will my right hon. Friend give way?
My right hon. Friend does not have to if he does not want to.
Will the passing of the Bill mean that civilians working for the MOD down the road will end up having, in effect, more rights than Army service personnel who have served in operations overseas? Does that not bring us back to the fundamental issue of the breaking of the armed forces covenant, on which the Government really must think again?
It does. The Bill’s provisions will also mean that prisoners will have more right to sue the MOJ, for example, than armed forces personnel. The Minister said in Committee, “That’s terrible because you’re comparing armed service personnel with veterans”; no, I am not. I am saying that if the Bill goes through, prisoners will have more rights than armed forces personnel. That cannot be right. The Minister mentioned the 6%; I am sorry, but if even one veteran loses their rights under this Bill, I am not prepared to support that.
My next point is about the Human Rights Act. I support the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley Central (Dan Jarvis) and the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis), because it is about how this looks in terms of our international reputation. There is derogation in the Bill; I accept that there cannot be derogation for torture, but it can and will be used to stop claims by MOD personnel against the MOD itself. The Snatch Land Rover case was brought under the Human Rights Act. Some people have the idea that the Human Rights Act is there to protect nasty foreigners and people we do not like; no, it is not. It is there to protect us all, including armed forces personnel. I am sure that that derogation will be used again by the MOD to deny the rights of individuals to take cases.
People should look at the Smith judgment on that case. What were the Government arguing? They were arguing that combat immunity, which is covered and was reinforced by the Supreme Court judgment, applied in that case because it happened in Iraq. No, that was not the case; the case was actually about the design and the decision to procure those Land Rovers and put them into theatre. The derogation will clearly be used in such a way.
I wish to make one final point, about our standing in the world. I am a supporter of the service justice system—it works well and we should be proud of it—but the problem with the Bill is this: do I want to see British servicemen and women tried in the International Criminal Court? No, I do not. I want them to be tried by their peers in a court in this country. As the Judge Advocate General, Judge Blackett, said in Committee, under this Bill there is a danger that if we have a presumption against prosecution and the issue around torture, we will get a situation whereby individuals will be tried not here but elsewhere. That would be terrible, not just for those individuals but for this country’s international reputation.