Trident Alternatives Review

Debate between Lord Beamish and Bob Ainsworth

Wednesday 17th July 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Jones]

That is exactly the case, and I think that the Defence Secretary has said the same thing. It will be achieved not by sticking a finger in the air and thinking of a policy, but by thinking about what we need to keep our nuclear deterrent credible and by maintaining the important continuous-at-sea deterrent.

As has been said, we are convinced that the only credible way forward for a minimum nuclear deterrent is a continuous-at-sea deterrent; otherwise, the UK would be vulnerable. The Chief Secretary’s suggestion would not only make the UK more vulnerable, but lead to a situation where we would not possess first strike or even second-strike capabilities. It would also be a significant escalatory factor if the UK stepped up its armed CASD posture. It is simply not credible and it is also very dangerous.

There are options that the alternatives review did not consider, so why are the Liberal Democrats set on the proposals outlined by the Chief Secretary? I think it is the old Liberal Democrat trick—many of us who have dealt with them in local government have seen this over many years—of trying to ride both horses at the same time. They want to appease the party’s unilateralist wing and persuade them that they are scaling down the nuclear ladder, while simultaneously claiming to the electorate that they have a credible nuclear policy, but they have been found out by the alternatives review.

The Liberal Democrats have commissioned a review in Government time, using taxpayers’ money and resources, in order to supplement their own party’s policy manifesto for 2015. I tabled a written question to the Chief Secretary yesterday asking how much the review cost, and I await his response. The Lib Dem plans have been found wanting and they are now scrambling around frantically for a bizarre policy solution in order to advance their much-heralded differentiation strategy, through which they are trying to place themselves between the Labour party and their coalition partners.

We have all waited for the publication of this report and I think we all genuinely thought it would suggest a credible alternative. Our position is clear: we are committed to the minimum, credible independent nuclear deterrent, which is why we put that policy to the House in 2006. I completely disagree with the Chief Secretary’s comment that this is the most thorough review undertaken. That is complete nonsense, because that review was done in 2006. He should also look at the three comprehensive reports commissioned by the Defence Committee, which covered all the issues.

[Mr Ainsworth]

We consulted on it.

[Mr Jones]

As my right hon. Friend reminds me, we also consulted on the issue and did not conduct our review behind closed doors, as was the case with this one.

We also believe that the best way to deliver the nuclear deterrent is through a continuous-at-sea deterrent. The review does not appear to suggest anything to the contrary. In fact, it reinforces our point.

Defence Reform

Debate between Lord Beamish and Bob Ainsworth

Tuesday 26th June 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Jones]

I thank my hon. Friend for that. Let me quote from the evidence given to the Select Committee by the former Secretary of State. In response to a question from a Member, he said:

“There is a huge ability to reduce a very large proportion of that. My guess is that of that £38 billion we are talking of something like £8 billion to £9 billion, and that is a ballpark figure.”

During that evidence session, he gave a commitment to the Select Committee Chair that he would write giving details of how he arrived at that figure, but he did not. The Committee was still waiting for that information when the report was produced, but it did not appear. I heard one of the Government Front Benchers scoff when I said that certain things move in and out of budget, but they clearly do. My hon. Friend the Member for Bridgend (Mrs Moon) is right: the Government racked up everything in the programme over a 10-year period and assumed that it would all be delivered. That is similar to the argument used about pension black holes, the assumption being that all the money is paid out, today. That is not the way the defence procurement budget is structured.

[Mr Bob Ainsworth (Coventry North East) (Lab)]

The Government obviously intend to keep the myth going, and who could blame them for that? However, can my hon. Friend explain how, on two separate occasions—we should remember that this Government have only been in power for a little over two years—two separate Secretaries of State can have claimed that the £38 billion gap has already gone and that the budget is now in balance? If the imbalance was as large as they alleged, how on earth have two separate Secretaries of State been able to claim within two years that the budget is in balance already?

[Mr Jones]

My right hon. Friend, like me, knows the MOD budget very well. Clearly, what the Government have done is to take out in-year capability. We should also remember the reductions in armed forces personnel—the people who are paying for some of this. My right hon. Friend is correct: the idea that such a big black hole can be filled in two years is complete nonsense. [Interruption.] The Under-Secretary, the right hon. Member for South Leicestershire (Mr Robathan), says that it is 10 years, but that is not the impression the Government have been giving. All their decisions, such as slashing personnel numbers, are predicated on this £38 billion black hole. Earlier last year, the previous Secretary of State stopped using that figure—for a while. Suddenly, under the new Secretary of State, it has come back. The Government have got to explain their use of it, because it is the entire raison d’être for some of the cuts they are making.

Public Bodies Bill [Lords]

Debate between Lord Beamish and Bob Ainsworth

Tuesday 12th July 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Bob Ainsworth (Coventry North East) (Lab)]

I shall confine my remarks to the proposed emasculation of the office of the chief coroner. In the three years during which I had the honour to serve as both Minister of State for the Armed Forces and then Secretary of State for Defence, a high priority for me and the entire ministerial team was to improve the service we gave to the bereaved of our fallen. We did so not to waste public money, but because it was absolutely necessary and absolutely deserved.

Our proposals were supported by Members on both sides of the House. We created the Defence Inquests Unit to examine, chase and dig out problems within the Ministry of Defence and the individual armed forces themselves, and to make certain that failings were reported to Ministers so that progress could be made. In partnership with the Royal British Legion, we created the defence advisory service, which has just completed its first year of operation and is highly respected by those who, sadly, have to use its services.

During the years I served as a Defence Minister, I read many transcripts and followed many inquests, and I have to say to the Government and the entire House that there are wide variations in both the manner and quality of coronial inquests. From time to time—too often, I am afraid—they let down our armed forces and the bereaved. I would single out for particular praise Mr Masters, the Trowbridge coroner, who was unsurpassable in his dedication and ability. He certainly exposed failings within the MOD with regard to the XV179 Hercules crash, when we lost 10 personnel. We also lost 14 in the XV230 Nimrod crash, and we had to employ the services of Mr Haddon-Cave to get to the bottom of the problems. That was not a waste of money; it was an absolute necessity that that inquiry was carried out.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

My right hon. Friend and I had dealings with some of the families of those who served in Afghanistan and Iraq. Does he agree that what they want are inquiries that are not only thorough but conducted in a timely fashion, and that they also want the role of the chief coroner to be independent of the Ministry of Justice, not part of it?

[Mr Ainsworth]

Independence is absolutely essential, and if inquests are not carried out in a timely fashion, but instead unnecessary delay is caused, that leads to huge distress. Most important, however, is the quality of the investigation, because when people have lost their loved ones they want to know that lessons are being learned and others will not unnecessarily be subject to the same error that caused their loved one to lose their life.

From my experiences in this area, this is what I would say, with the greatest of respect, to the Government: Ministers cannot advise or train or lead an independent coronial service. It is preposterous for the Government to suggest that the functions of the office of the chief coroner should be rolled into some ministerial committee. They will not con the Royal British Legion in that regard.

In the course of my responsibilities, I met many bereaved families, who went through their bereavement with great dignity and very ably dealt with the problems they faced. None were more impressive than Mr and Mrs Dicketts—Priscilla and Robert. Robert Dicketts spoke in this House a few months ago, and he recognised the improvements that had been made, but he also said:

“However, until there is a Chief Coroner, through whom good practice can be driven through the coronial system, it is likely bereaved Armed Forces families will have to go through a system which is often inconsistent and desperately in need of modernisation.”

Sooner or later, Ministers will listen to the voice of the Royal British Legion and of people such as Robert Dicketts, and they will drop their proposal.