Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill

Debate between Jonathan Edwards and Andrea Leadsom

Tuesday 9th July 2013 Commons Chamber

[Andrea Leadsom]

I am delighted to be able to speak about this Bill on banking reform, which is so crucial to the future success of the British economy. All that time ago, Adam Smith said in “The Wealth of Nations” that for free enterprise to exist one needed both free entry and free exit of market players. Over the past 20 years, we have had neither in banking. Failing banks have certainly not been allowed to exit the market, hence all the problems with “too big to fail” and the massive taxpayer bail-outs. New players have also not been able to enter the market, as there have been enormous barriers to entry, and my new clause is an attempt to establish a real game-changer once and for all for the fate of competition in our banking sector, to enable new entrants to come into the market.

I know that the Government have already done a huge amount of work to change the plight for would-be banks. For example, we already know that the new Prudential Regulation Authority and the Financial Conduct Authority have made it easier for new banks to apply for a banking licence. Previously, there were enormous regulatory hurdles to entering the market for new banks, but now it has become slightly easier because they can get a banking licence that is conditional on their being able to recruit the right people and so on. They do not have to spend millions of pounds up front to evidence the fact that they can be competent as a bank.

The regulatory barriers to entry are gradually coming down, but an incredibly significant point that has not been addressed until now concerns the competition barriers to entry for new players in the market. The Government have made great strides in that regard, not just through the Vickers commission and the recommendations on seven-day switching, which will be a game-changer in enabling individuals and businesses to switch between banks, creating the competition that has been so lacking, but through some of the structural reforms they have announced more recently and the amendments to this Bill.

When I was elected to Parliament in 2010, one of the first things that my colleagues on the Treasury Committee —who are almost all in the Chamber today—and I did was consider the proposal from the Payments Council to get rid of cheques. We discovered in our evidence sessions that the proposal came purely from the banks. It was convenient only for them and absolutely was not convenient for the millions of people in this country who rely on cheques to settle bills, to pay their window cleaner or newsagent or to pay the neighbour who picked up their shopping for them. Millions of people still needed cheques, but it was very clear that the Payments Council planned to get rid of them for the convenience of the banks that owned and ran it. For me, that was the road to Damascus moment; I realised that the banking sector is the last great closed shop. The Payments Council, owned and run by the banks, governs the payments system, the big banks are the clearing banks through which every new challenger bank must go, and the payments infrastructure, VocaLink, is also owned and governed by the big banks.

For decades, the Payments Council has been able to permit or deny innovation in the payments industry. The big banks have been able not to allow challenger banks direct access to the payments system and have required them to go through the clearers, charging them up to 10 times more for accessing the payments system than they have been paying themselves. The first significant decision on which I want to congratulate the Government is that to consult on a new independent payments regulator. That is key to breaking open the banking sector and enabling new competition and transparency. It will be interesting to see just what has changed after the new regulator’s first few months of operation; it will be fundamentally transforming.

Importantly—this is where my new clause comes in—and as the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie) has said, for decades there has been a key barrier to competition in the banking system: the inability to move bank accounts freely and easily. People might be sick and tired of their bank. The Treasury Committee took evidence on opinion polls that suggested that certain banks had negative values when it came to whether customers would recommend them to a friend. People would say, “No, whatever you do, don’t go to my bank.” It is unusual to have such utterly negative recommendation levels between friends for a supplier. Even the energy sector fails to achieve such low levels of recommendations between friends. Something is clearly desperately lacking in customer service.

The Committee also heard some pretty shocking statistics about the failure of certain key banks to respond to customer service inquiries, to manage their call centres properly and to deal with complaints when they happen. It has taken all these banking scandals—payment protection insurance mis-selling, the bank swaps mis-selling and various other scandals—before the weight of evidence became enough for regulators to take action. Clearly the banks have not been good at policing themselves, and clearly it has been extraordinarily difficult for individuals and businesses to vote with their feet and move.

The difficulty is not only the decision to move bank; the person making that decision also faces having to make arrangements as regards their online shopping, their contract with the milkman and newspaper man, and their standing orders for, say, their television licence or their car insurance. If they change bank account, they have to change all those things, because they change bank account number.

The issue is not just whether a person can be bothered to change and go through all that hassle; very often, because of the consolidation that has taken place over the past 20 years, banks will force that situation on a consumer. A colleague told me in the Lobby the other day that their bank had just notified them that they have to change their bank account number, credit cards, debit cards, and cheque-books—everything—regardless of the fact that they do not want to do that, because the bank decided, off its own bat, to send them to another brand name. Of course, there is no compensation, or any way to get the bank to help the person to make all the notifications that they need to make.

Many people, particularly the elderly, have a real concern that if they change bank account things might just not happen; their regular payments might not be made, and everything might go horribly wrong. That puts them in a very difficult position. Of course, there is plenty of evidence of things having gone wrong. Perhaps the seven-day switching process will solve the problem of switching simply going wrong.

It would be a far better solution if, when a person moved bank, they took all their bank details with them. A similar thing happens in the case of mobile telephones.

[Jonathan Edwards]

The hon. Lady alluded to the allegedly competitive market in the energy sector, where there is a right to switch, although it can be difficult to do so, as I found out. Switching in itself does not stop companies from acting as a cartel. How confident is she that switching in banking would lead to greater competition in the market?

[Andrea Leadsom]

I will come on to that, and that will become clearer in the course of my comments. Certainly, in terms of barriers to entry, the lack of competition and switching—in other words, people’s inertia—has meant that banks simply have not had to compete on customer service. They have not had to fight to keep their customers. As those of us who have been in business know, there are times when we have lain awake at night, wondering how to stop our customers from leaving us tomorrow; that is the big motivator, whereas in the past it was how to nick a tiny bit of market share from one of the big players. The fundamental point is: “How do I hang on to my customers?” Customer retention is always the biggest challenge for every business, where there is free and open competition. That is what bank account portability would ensure.

If a person was switching between banks, instead of having to change all their bank details and cards, and having to remember the new numbers and notify all their suppliers, they would simply take their bank details with them, just as a person who changes mobile telephone provider takes their telephone number with them. That is what the amendment proposes.

I am delighted that the Government have said the following, in a press release responding to the work of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards:

“On top of introducing 7-day account switching from September this year the government will ask the new payments regulator, once established, to urgently examine account portability and whether the big banks should give up ownership of the payments systems.”

I take that as a warm move towards the idea of bank account number portability.

Bank account number portability is a game-changer, but it is no surprise that the big banks, when asked about this back in 2010, virtually told us that it would cost so much that the entire world would end. That comes as no surprise to us; they would say that. However, if we scratch beneath the surface and talk to the likes of VocaLink, which provides the payments infrastructure, we find that many of the technological requirements of bank number portability already exist.

At the moment, the big banks own a person’s sort code and account number, and give the payments instructions that they hold for that person to VocaLink, so that it can make that payment. Instead of having that two-step process, in which a person instructs their bank, the bank instructs VocaLink, and VocaLink makes the payment, with bank number portability the consumer’s bank account number, sort code and payment instructions would be held within VocaLink. Instead of a two-step process with the bank at the front end, there would be a one-step process, in which the consumer communicated with VocaLink, and the bank instead provided the customer service front end and the customer proposition. That would completely streamline the system.

Connecting Europe Facility

Debate between Jonathan Edwards and Andrea Leadsom

Thursday 19th January 2012 Commons Chamber

[Andrea Leadsom]

Yes, I completely agree with my hon. Friend’s excellent idea. That would be high on my list of bits of wasteful bureaucracy to get rid of.

What sort of parallel universe is the European Commission inhabiting, if it thinks it reasonable to be expanding the European budget for 2014 to 2020 in the current climate? Why is the EU seeking to take power and control over these particular policy areas, at a time when they are already high on our own Government’s agenda? Requiring Britain to contribute to EU funds is not acceptable, and giving the Commission the authority to require Britain to make expenditure on its own domestic projects is equally unacceptable.

My second point is that the EU has proved itself time and again to be an inefficient allocator of scarce resources. In regard to structural funds, Open Europe estimates that Britain has contributed €33 billion between 2007 and 2013, and that we have received roughly €9 billion. If we took back control over that €33 billion, we might well wish to continue to contribute to the poorer EU member states—that is, those with a national income of 90% of the average or less. However, if we had contributed the same amount to those poorer member states, we could also have spent the same €9 billion that we received from the structural fund, creating a £4 billion saving. If Britain had allocated that same amount, €9 billion, to its own regions, plus the same amount to the poorer EU states, there would have been a £4 billion saving that could have gone towards reducing our deficit or investing further in the poorer regions of the UK. The difference identified by Open Europe’s estimate is a result of the leakage due to the recycling of cash between the richer countries.

It is interesting to note that the Department for International Development spends about 4% of its budget on administration, with a target of 2%. By contrast, the EU Commission spends 5.4% of its contributions to overseas aid on administration. No doubt it is very conscious of that figure, as it has been singled out for comment.

[Jonathan Edwards (Carmarthen East and Dinefwr) (PC)]

The hon. Lady is making quite an interesting point, but does she not agree that the problem with her argument is that the British state does not have any convergence mechanisms?

[Andrea Leadsom]

I am sorry, but I am going to have to ask the hon. Gentleman to repeat his question. It does not have any what?

[Jonathan Edwards]

It does not have any convergence mechanisms for redistributing wealth around the British state; that is the whole problem.

[Andrea Leadsom]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his question. He makes a good point, and he is absolutely right. It might interest him to know, however, that of the UK’s 37 regions—as defined by the EU—only two, Cornwall and west Wales, are net recipients of structural funds. All the other regions have been net contributors, including the highlands and islands region, which has contributed a net €66 million to structural funds over the past seven years, and the Tees valley and Durham region, which has contributed a net €453 million over that same period. He makes an interesting point, but in my view Britain would be far better placed to decide where to allocate those scarce resources.

Another illustration of the EU’s inability to do that job is the recent Commission study that found that 170,000 full-time equivalent personnel were needed for a whole year to administer the EU’s structural funds during the last budgetary period. That is an unbelievable number of people. On the grounds of efficiency, therefore, the allocation of funds would be far better being done at home.

My third point relates to legitimacy and localism, particularly in the areas of transport and energy. We are talking about huge, extraordinarily expensive projects that are deemed to be in the national interest. There is no doubt that, while we all want instant access to energy, we are not all so keen to have a nuclear power station two miles down the road. The case must always be made by democratically elected, legitimate leaders for the need for a particular project and/or location. HS2 is a very good example of a project on which a majority of those consulted rejected it, yet where the Government decided that it was in the national interest to disregard their views. In the case of the third runway at Heathrow, the Government decided that public opinion outweighed the national need for aviation expansion. My point is that the EU, with its remote and bureaucratic image in Britain, is hardly the right place from where decisions on projects that affect lives and communities should be taken. The great risk is that local priorities for infrastructure will be undermined while infrastructure for energy and transport projects will be forced on local communities that do not want them.

Let me end with a word of friendly advice to the European Commission. It should focus on facilitating the single market, expanding its membership and contributing to areas that are of common interest to all member states and where the EU together can add value. It should keep away from European domestic affairs and avoid the pernicious creeping power grab that this latest proposal so clearly highlights.