European Union (Referendum) Bill

Debate between Lord Spellar and John Baron

Friday 22nd November 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Baron]

I will not give way. If the hon. Gentleman does not mind, I will continue. We need time for the Prime Minister to try to repatriate those powers to the UK. Success will influence the outcome; failure—if no powers are repatriated—will be plain for all to see. I suggest that a referendum any earlier than 2017 would unfairly stack the odds in favour of staying in.

[Mr John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

Obviously, the hon. Gentleman does not want to delay the House for too long, but could he define which powers he wants repatriating? He could even give us a sample.

[Mr Baron]

From my point of view, there are no shortages of powers that need repatriating. Let us be clear—[Interruption.] Let me answer the question. If the Prime Minister fails to repatriate any powers, it will be plain for the country to see and it can adjudicate on that. I urge those Members who have tabled amendments to speak to them, but not press them to a Division. The British electorate deserves this Bill; it has waited too long, and, having reached this point, we must not now allow these amendments to scupper our chances.

Afghanistan and Pakistan

Debate between Lord Spellar and John Baron

Wednesday 6th July 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Baron]

The hon. Gentleman raises a serious point. I certainly think that our recent aggressive interventions have radicalised parts of the Muslim world against us—a fact that I think was confirmed by a former head of MI5 in giving evidence. I certainly do not think that our involvement has helped our situation, and I see no concrete evidence that the situation has improved in regard to the threat on the streets of London. If I am wrong about that, I am sure that the Minister will correct me.

The bottom line is that there is confusion of purpose, and the first distinction that we are failing to make is that between achieving the objective and the four main goals.

The second distinction that the Government are failing to explore rigorously is that between the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The relationship is complex and not well understood. There is no shortage of evidence—some was submitted to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee—to suggest that the Taliban would not necessarily allow al-Qaeda back into the country if the Taliban were to regain control of certain regions. They know that, ultimately, al-Qaeda led to their downfall. Indeed, US intelligence sources suggest that fewer than 100 al-Qaeda fighters and certainly no al-Qaeda bases are left in the country. To all intents and purposes, we have achieved our mission some time ago—a point that my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South (Richard Ottaway), the Chairman of the Select Committee, made well. We all know that the Taliban are not a homogeneous group, but there are fundamental differences between the Taliban and al-Qaeda—yet the threats from al-Qaeda and the Taliban have become conflated and almost synonymous.

[Mr Spellar]

Given the distinctions that the hon. Gentleman is making, why does he think the Taliban allowed al-Qaeda to establish themselves and a base in Afghanistan?

[Mr Baron]

The bottom line is that there are various factions of the Taliban, but the relationship between the Taliban and al-Qaeda is very complex and not well understood. I could return the question and ask: how is it that, given that the fundamental differences between the two are clear, we are failing to explore them? At the end of the day, peace is not made with friends but with enemies. We have got to initiate talks.

These two distinctions—the distinction between the key objective and the four main goals, and the distinction between the Taliban and al-Qaeda—are very important. If we are trying to build a more stable and secure Afghanistan and make it a better country, we will in all probability have to beat the Taliban. If, on the other hand, we are just trying to make sure that Afghanistan is free of al-Qaeda, we might not have to defeat the Taliban. That shows the importance of the two distinctions. What they lead one on to believe is the need for the Americans and the British to open meaningful and non-conditional talks with the Taliban in order to explore common ground.