Afghanistan and Pakistan

Debate between Lord Spellar and Denis MacShane

Wednesday 6th July 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

We fully recognise how the extraordinary events of the past few days have impacted on the length of this debate and possibly on the attention that it will receive outside the House. It is probably true that

“The world will little note, nor long remember, what we say here”

today, but this debate is important, not least for those who have served, who have been injured and who have died in the conflict in Afghanistan.

In the time available to me, I want to deal with three main issues. The first is the prospects for Afghanistan and, as I stressed in our debate on this subject in May, the role of the regional powers. The second significant issue is the impact of all these developments on the stability of Pakistan. Finally, I want to talk about the report—and more significantly, the Government’s response to it—and the provision of equipment for our troops. As I have said, we debated this subject less than a couple of months ago. We have to address the tragedy of Afghanistan under Taliban rule and insurgency, and ask what our best approach is to enabling Afghanistan and its people to come out of this nightmare.

Interestingly, a number of Members of both Houses recently visited the exhibition at the British Museum on early Afghanistan, which presented a very different picture from the TV coverage showing a dusty wilderness and a population living in the middle ages. The exhibition showed early Afghanistan as an ancient centre of civilisation with a significant position at the crossroads of the ancient world and a rich cultural tradition. For an example, one has only to think of the Buddhas of Bamiyan, which were constructed in the sixth century and, sadly, destroyed by the vandals of the Taliban. In the Prime Minister’s statement today, he also drew attention to many of Afghanistan’s strengths, including abundant mineral wealth, fertile agricultural land and a position at the crossroads of Asia’s great trading highways.

[Mr MacShane]

Is my right hon. Friend aware that, up until about 1970, a Marks & Spencer was open and functioning in Kabul? Should it be an objective of British foreign policy to get M&S back there?

[Mr Spellar]

Similarly, the symbol of the end of the cold war was the appearance of McDonald’s in many capitals in eastern Europe.

We should also remember how much of Afghanistan’s ancient civilisation was destroyed by nihilist tribes, in a pattern not dissimilar to what is happening today. We need to focus on the process of political dialogue and reconciliation in Afghanistan, as well as on a political settlement in which enough Afghan citizens from all parts of the country have a stake. The central Government there also need enough power and legitimacy to protect the country from threats, from within and without. That first proposition depends on there being a new external settlement that commits Afghanistan’s neighbours to respecting its sovereign integrity, as well as a process by which the ex-combatants there can acquire civilian status and have an opportunity to gain sustainable employment and income.

Afghanistan will then require reconciliation. This will include ensuring that tribal, ethnic and other groups are represented and recognised. Parliament and parliamentarians should also be recognised and encouraged. In that context, we were all interested in, if not intrigued by, the proposal for an exchange of Speakers. We were wondering whether the Speaker might seek to delegate that responsibility, a prospect that caused some alarm to your predecessor in the Chair, Madam Deputy Speaker.

I shall turn first to Pakistan, however. I say to the Chairman and other members of the Select Committee that, if I have a concern about the report it is that the content does not fully reflect its title, “The UK’s foreign policy approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan”. The section on Pakistan takes up only about six of the 97 pages, and looks largely at the effect on the campaign in Afghanistan of action in and by Pakistan. Frankly, the more important strategic issue is the impact of Afghanistan on Pakistan.

Pakistan is a country of 160 million people. It is the second-largest Muslim country in the world, and it has a significant military and nuclear capability. It is also, as the Foreign Secretary has rightly acknowledged on behalf of Britain, a country that has suffered considerable losses from fundamentalist terrorism, and it continues to do so. We need to think seriously about Pakistan’s concerns and prospects, and to take into account a factor that is sometimes overlooked—namely, its need to recover from the horrific flooding that it has experienced.

That is why the announcement of continuing aid to Pakistan by the Department for International Development is encouraging, and welcomed by the Opposition, especially the scaling up of investment in effective, non-fundamentalist education to £446 million a year by 2015. Pakistan faces, in the words of a DFID publication, “an educational emergency”, with 17 million children not in school, half the adult population and two thirds of the women unable to read or write—and the population is escalating. We have to be clear in this context that there is a considerable onus on the Pakistan authorities to ensure that the money reaches its intended recipients. As DFID says, aid is

“dependent on securing value for money and results and will be linked to the Government of Pakistan’s own progress on reform, at both the federal and provincial levels, including taking tangible steps to build a more dynamic economy, strengthen the tax base and tackle corruption.”

That places a clear obligation on Pakistan to improve its administration, especially in tax collection, to foster a more open and pluralistic society and, last but by no means least, to engage in dialogue to reduce tension with India, which occupies so much attention and resources in both countries. My right hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham (Mr MacShane) mentioned the Indian obligations, and there is an obligation on both sides of the divide if dialogue is to be used to reduce that tension.

What of India and the other regional powers? They were mentioned by a number of hon. Members—the hon. Members for Stroud (Neil Carmichael) and for Cheltenham (Martin Horwood) and particularly the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind). It is true that all the regional powers could seek to pursue their own separate interests, looking on Afghanistan as a zero-sum game. We should make no mistake; it certainly could be like that. Indeed, if the situation in Afghanistan unravels, it could end up being a negative-sum game for those countries. The creation of a black hole of political intrigue, anarchy and violence in Afghanistan could impact in very different but very significant ways on all its neighbours.

China, as we know, has considerable Islamic problems in its western province, but also has considerable investment in Afghan resources. Russia faces the potential of instability on its southern flank and also has a significant drugs problem. Iran has a minority group in Afghanistan and also feels the impact of the drugs trade. Turkey has growing regional influence. India has a long and historic, but also a current and dynamic, interest in Afghanistan. Part of our strategy for disengagement will thus depend very heavily on the extent to which the regional powers can co-exist and work together for a progressive solution for Afghanistan.