National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Exemptions for Certain Foreign Power Investment Funds, Education, Government Administration and Public Bodies) Regulations 2025

Lord Cryer Excerpts

Thursday 5th June 2025 Grand Committee

[Viscount Stansgate (Lab)]

My Lords, I will not detain the Committee for long. I am in favour of the foreign influence registration scheme and I well remember when the Act went through the House in 2023. I support the transparency that my noble friend the Minister talked about, and I hope that this works. I echo what my noble friend said towards the end of his remarks, which is that registration in itself does not mean that someone is doing something wrong, but it will be part and parcel of what we hope will be a successful series of measures in support of the Act.

I will raise a few items in the order in which they are laid before us, which is not quite the order in which my noble friend took us through them. The first relates to the exemptions for certain foreign power investment funds and so on. I understand—my noble friend made this point—that the exemptions are designed to ensure proportionality by reducing the amount of routine activity required. I am all in favour of increasing the transparency of foreign-power influence over UK democracy.

I refer to Regulation 3 which exempts financial arrangements to provide financial support to students in FE and HE. It says and uses the phrase

“where foreign powers give directions to the student or to the education provider”.

I hope my noble friend will not mind if I ask exactly what that phrase means.

The National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Publication) Regulations 2025 are very important. I do not know how big a website we will end up with. Regulation 3 provides a whole series of exemptions. They seem to add up to quite a lot and made me wonder whether we might end up with so much of the information being exempt that it might not yield very much. What is the procedure for the Secretary of State to exercise one or more of these exemptions under Regulation 3 of that SI?

On the regulations on Iran, I entirely understand—and this goes with the regulations on Russia—why Parts 1 and 2 cover the areas of official and government organisations and so on. In relation to the impact on businesses, charities and smaller micro-businesses, which the Explanatory Memorandum acknowledges will be the case, there are figures given about how long it will take to register—it is only £9.67 and so on. The draft impact assessment states that:

“Registrations are likely to be completed by an employee in a Human Resources or legal compliance department”.


Forgive me, but it seems that many micro-businesses do not have human resources or legal service operatives, so can my noble friend tell us whether that might prove to be a problem?

On the last regulations, those in relation to Russia, the Explanatory Memorandum states:

“Without this instrument, it would only be necessary for people acting at the direction of Russia to conduct political influence activity in the UK to register with FIRS”.


That would not be enough. What in these regulations might be helpful in relation to the daily cyberattacks conducted on the UK? We have reason to believe that they emanate from hostile actors that might be based in Russia or acting on behalf of a hostile state.

Finally, this is not in any of the regulations in this group, but I noticed the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee has asked—and I ask now—why, at the moment, has China not been the subject of this SI process? Can the Minister give some idea of the Government’s thinking at the moment about whether China might in future, and, if so, when, come within the purview of the operation of the Act that we are discussing and the regulations that seek to give it effect?

[Lord Cryer (Lab)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for bringing these SIs to the Grand Committee. Like my noble friend, I shall speak briefly about one or two points, in my case, specifically about Iran and the provisions that apply to Iran and, more specifically, about the effectiveness of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which has developed a notorious reputation over the past 30 or 40 years. It came along with the revolution in 1979 and has established itself as an arm of the Iranian state since then.

I particularly want to talk about Iran for one reason: Iran is probably the only significant world power that is effectively run by clerical fascists. I cannot think of a parallel country. It is a state that uses proxies all over the world. We all know about Hamas and Hezbollah, but there are other proxies, and this has been covered extensively in the mainstream press. The IRGC uses criminal gangs to further its aims in this country and other countries across Europe and the world.

I have two questions for the Minister. Can he confirm that anybody who does not register a relationship with the Iranian state, who fails to register an interest or a connection, will be committing a criminal act and be subject to criminal prosecution? Does that also apply to anybody who has a clear relationship with an IRGC or Iranian state proxy, for instance Hezbollah or Hamas?

Would that also apply to others? For instance, there have been parliamentarians in the past—I hope that there are none now, but there probably are—who have accepted money from PressTV. They will have to register that in the normal way, but do they also have to register it under the provisions of the statutory instruments that we are talking about today?

Counter Terrorism Policing: Arrests

Lord Cryer Excerpts

Wednesday 7th May 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Cryer (Lab)]

My Lords, I appreciate my noble friend’s efforts and words in coming here today to make this full Statement, but—I think he sensed there was a but coming—on a subject I have raised often, in both this place and the other place, as night follows day, the malign hand of the IRGC will be in the middle of this. This looks like a serious escalation in Iran’s terror threat towards the West, and particularly towards Britain. I am not asking him to comment on that; I am just giving him and the House the benefit of my views. Surely now we are in a position where we should move to full the full banning of the IRGC.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

It is no surprise that my noble friend raises the issue that he has. I know he has raised it in both this House and in the House of Commons when he was a Member of that establishment. As I have said, I cannot routinely comment on proscription decisions. The House will be aware of our grave concern, long before these operations, about the arrest of Iranian nationals and the activities of different arms of the Iranian state in the UK, putting people’s safety at risk on UK soil. We are continuously undertaking serious security assessments, which are being instigated and updated as a result of incidents. We will continue to resolve and examine action that can be taken and will keep the House updated as soon as possible.

I know this may not be helpful to my noble friend at this moment, but the review that Jonathan Hall KC is undertaking for the Government has been completed and will be published in relatively short order. There will be a response from the Government to that, which will cover some of the issues that my noble friend has mentioned to date. Counterterrorism proscribing is an important tool, and we are not going to shy away from it, but we are waiting for that review to give factual information for us to make decisions, which we will report to the House at the earliest opportunity.

Overseas Companies: UK-registered Subsidiaries

Lord Cryer Excerpts

Monday 17th March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Leong (Lab)]

The noble Lord is absolutely right. If we have a free trade agreement with a particular country then we have to follow international obligations by allowing foreign companies which have got an office registered in the UK access to public procurement. Obviously, following Covid, the Government are committed to using every means possible to recoup public money lost in pandemic-related fraud and contracts that have not been delivered. The Government are determined to ensure that we go after any contracts that have been committed to under some kind of fraud case. The Government have appointed Tom Hayhoe to be the Covid Counter-Fraud Commissioner, and he will use every lever to go after any such fraudulent contracts.

[Lord Cryer (Lab)]

My Lords, following on from the initial Question, what assistance can Ministers give to British-registered SMEs in procuring public sector contracts?

[Lord Leong (Lab)]

I thank my noble friend for the question. It is important that SMEs have fair access to public contracts, which drives economic growth and the strength of public supply chain requirements. All central government departments, including executive agencies and departmental bodies, must set a three-year target for direct spend on SMEs from 1 April this year and a two-year target of direct spend for voluntary, community and social enterprises from 1 April 2026, and they have to report this annually. This is good news for SMEs.

Iranian State Threats

Lord Cryer Excerpts

Thursday 6th March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. I will draw his comments to the attention of my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary. I am not aware of whether representations have been made in the specific cases he mentioned, but it is a matter I will look into after today. I will write to him with a response from the Foreign Office on those matters; I understand that they are of an urgent nature, so I will do that for him today.

On transnational repression, let me be clear, as I have said already, that it will not be tolerated and it will not be supported. We will take action on these issues. If anyone is concerned for their safety in the United Kingdom, in the first instance they should contact the police, who have had training to ensure that they are aware of the potential threats and dangers. As I have already said, the police are raising both the awareness and capability of front-line officers and staff across the United Kingdom to include an understanding of how threats from foreign powers are presented and how to respond to reports made by members of the public to police forces about potential areas of local concern. The National Security Act, which had cross-party support, strengthened UK legal powers to counter foreign interference, including actions on what would amount to transnational repression. I assure the noble Lord that it is a matter of concern for the Government that we keep citizens safe in this United Kingdom, whatever their nationality.

[Lord Cryer (Lab)]

My Lords, I want to press my noble friend the Minister further on the question that has been raised repeatedly on the IRGC. It is clearly a bunch of clerical fascists and homicidal maniacs who specialise particularly in the rape, torture and murder of women, among others. They will not stop perpetuating their poison and using proxies to do the same, whatever we do. Further to the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Polak, I realise that the Minister cannot make a commitment today, but what does the IRGC have to do to lead to it being completely proscribed—not just the proscription of individuals but complete proscription?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am afraid that I may sound like a broken record, but the Government keep under review, at all times, the option of proscription. We will not publicly speculate in the House about the line that needs to be crossed to have proscription. However, I hope that my noble friend can be reassured that it remains an option that the Government can consider and can bring before both Houses.

Irrespective of proscription, the National Security Act, which this House passed in 2023, specifically bans assisting foreign intelligence services, such as the IRGC. The Act also criminalises receiving material benefit—such as payment—from these types of organisations. The maximum penalty for transgressing that Act is 14 years in prison, the same maximum as a proscription offence. Although proscription remains an issue for the Government to consider, there are now specific powers to ensure that individuals who find themselves on the wrong side of the National Security Act face severe penalties and jail.