(9 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberI agree that there is widespread concern about the operation of the common fisheries policy and the deal that it gives our fishermen, and I think that we would all like to see more local management of our waters. That is part of the agenda that the Government have pursued during their negotiations in Europe, which I think we would all support, and which the sector would certainly support.
There is also the question of the allocation of quota. The inshore fishing fleet has about 4% of the United Kingdom’s quota, although it supplies about 75% of the manpower for the UK fishing industry. Will the Minister consider making additional quota available for the inshore fleet? The fishermen tell me they need a substantial increase, and that they need it soon. The provision of additional quota in a year or two may come too late for a number of fishermen who are currently in great difficulty.
The question of conservation levels has been raised in the House recently, and, indeed, arose last week during questions to the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. It is especially relevant to sea bass stocks. Because sea bass is outside the quota, inshore fishermen in particular are going for whatever fish are available to supplement their catch, and sea bass is a good species to go for. It is possible that any concern about fish that are not on the quota will be exacerbated by the lack of quota for the inshore fleet.
I, too, congratulate the hon. Gentleman on raising this matter. Fishing is important in my constituency. Nephrops and prawns are stable species in the Irish sea, contributing some 60% of the value of landings. We think it imperative for an exemption to be made by means of the survivability clause, of which I am sure the Minister is well aware. Does he agree that that is vital to the fishing fleets of Northern Ireland, and particularly vital to the fishing village of Portavogie?
The Minister referred to the important issue during DEFRA questions last week, and I hope that he will say a little more about it this evening. Survivability rates are indeed important. In my constituency, plaice, skate and sole, including Dover sole, are an important part of the local catch. We know that survivability rates are good, and that fish that are caught can be returned. We also know that the gears that fishermen use often make it difficult to restrict catches, and that smaller fish, such as small plaice, cannot always be returned to the water, although they are normally thrown back as a matter of routine.
We do not want good fish, particularly smaller fish, to be left rotting in boxes on the quayside because nothing can be done with them, and we do not want fishermen to be unable to go out to sea because they cannot guarantee that their catches will not include fish that might tip them over the quota and that they cannot use, mixed up with other species. I think that when there is a good case for fish to be returned to the sea—and that certainly applies to flatfish—they should be exempt from the discard ban. Such an exemption would be greatly welcomed by the fishermen in my area of the North sea and the English channel. It would make the ban much more workable, as would additional quota for the inshore fleet.
The potential impact of the discard ban and the current lack of quota are crises with which inshore fleet fishermen must deal immediately, but in certain areas there is also concern about the impact of marine conservation zones. I thank the Minister and his team for their work in considering the proposal in tranche 1 of their consultation for a marine conservation zone in Hythe bay, and for deciding that the zone should go ahead only if it was compatible with the commercial interests of the fishermen. It is clear that there was no evidence to justify its imposition, and that the Government made the right decision. What has come from that is a proposal from the fishermen to create a permitted zone in Hythe bay, which would restrict access to the waters to larger vessels that operate heavier gear, which might damage the biodiversity of the bay, but would not restrict the current fishing rights that are enjoyed by the smaller vessels in the under-10 metre fleet and others that have certain rights to fish in those waters.
I think that is a good approach. It balances the need for conservation with the livelihoods of the fishermen. It respects the fishermen, particularly those in the under-10 metre fleet—they have the biggest vested interest in the sustainability of the waters they fish, because their livelihoods depend on it; they do not go deep out to sea, but fish from their local waters—and puts them at the heart of the management of future stocks. This proposal, which the fishermen are working on with the Inshore Fisheries and Conservation Authority, is a good approach. I hope that they can agree the proposals and present them to the Minister, and that this can be a model for the sustainable management of local waters, respecting sustainability targets. That is a much better model for the future.
However, that is part of an ongoing conservation. The urgent need for additional quota and exemptions in the discard ban to make it workable are the two pressing concerns now, and I ask the Minister to address those this evening.
(9 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberI have called this debate after several weeks in which FIFA, the governing body of world football, has once again been dragged through the mud. FIFA stumbles from one crisis to another, dogged by persistent allegations of bribery and corruption, involving some of its most senior officials, and unable to shake off the perception that it is a rotten organisation that is not fit to lead the world’s most popular game. It appears that some very ugly people have control of a beautiful game, and I believe that it is time that FIFA was subject to the full force of international law, not just left to investigate itself.
At the heart of the current crisis lie the persistent claims of bribery and corruption surrounding the bidding process to host the World cup tournaments in 2018 and 2022. These are serious allegations—that millions of dollars were paid by bidding nations in bribes to members of the FIFA executive committee in return for their votes. These are not just private matters for the FIFA family, as its president, Sepp Blatter, seems to want the world to believe. They are potentially criminal matters, which are of interest to law enforcement agencies around the world. For several years the FBI has been running its own inquiry into the bidding process, investigating whether corrupt payments were made to officials in return for their votes using servers and payment systems based in the jurisdiction of the United States of America.
In response to the widespread allegations that have been made, FIFA—through its ethics committee—launched its own investigation, led by the American attorney Michael Garcia. We were all promised that the process would get to the truth, that it would be transparent and that it would be independent from FIFA, but that has been far from the reality. FIFA has investigated itself, and has found itself to be not guilty. It set up a process which was always guaranteed to fail, and which is at the heart of my reason for initiating this debate. It was always going to fail because FIFA has no legal powers to pursue an investigation even against people within the organisation, let alone people outside it. It does not have the judicial powers that would enable it to request access to private correspondence and bank records. In fact, it could only request evidence that people were willing to supply.
According to information published in the most recent edition of The Sunday Times, it was also clear that FIFA could offer no anonymity or protection from prosecution to people who complied with its requests and took part in the investigation. Indeed, members of the England bid team told the newspaper that they had felt able legally only to supply information for which FIFA asked, and had not felt able to volunteer information that would otherwise have been helpful.
We know that the Russians told FIFA that all the computers containing e-mails and documents relating to their bid had been destroyed, and that they therefore could not comply with its request for information. As for the Qatar bid, we know that FIFA’s investigation report highlighted its concern about the role of consultants in that campaign, but stated that as those consultants had no official role in football, it had no jurisdiction to pursue them.
What angered me, and angered many football fans around the world, was the fact that, instead of acknowledging the limitations of its own inquiry, FIFA pretended that this was the last word, that there was nothing more to be said, that the World cups would go ahead in Russia in 2018 and in Qatar in 2022, and that no action would be taken against the bidding nations—although there remained the option of taking action against individuals. FIFA seems to pursue a line which involves corporate innocence, but individual potential guilt that warrants further investigation.
The world responded with alarm to the results of Michael Garcia’s inquiry. Of course, FIFA has banned the publication of the full Garcia report. Sepp Blatter is sitting on it personally, and does not want the full 430 pages ever to see the light of day. However, Hans-Joachim Eckert, chairman of the FIFA ethics committee, published a 43-page summary of the report, which Michael Garcia said contained
“numerous materially incomplete and erroneous representations”.
FIFA has now realised that people will not buy its white-wash, and has handed over its own investigation of the allegations of bribery and corruption surrounding the World cup bidding process to the Swiss authorities and the Swiss Attorney-General, believing, it said, that the report contained evidence of “unlawful” activity. FIFA has also stated that other “relevant national investigatory authorities” have a responsibility to investigate the allegations of bribery and corruption in the World cup bidding process.
Over the past few weeks I have written to the director of the Serious Fraud Office, David Green, asking him whether the SFO—as one of the '”relevant national investigatory authorities” described by FIFA—would look into these matters. He has assured me that the SFO has been monitoring the situation closely, and that it would act if it believed that it had the jurisdiction to do so. Furthermore, in a letter to me dated 25 November 2014, Alun Milford, the SFO’s general counsel, wrote that
“every reasonable line of inquiry, including working closely with appropriate overseas authorities, is being pursued to ascertain whether the director has grounds to open an investigation.”
I want to ask the Solicitor-General a number of questions. Can he confirm the following: first, that the Serious Fraud Office has entered into a process to determine whether or not it will open an inquiry or criminal investigation; secondly, whether the SFO has received a request for mutual legal assistance from other bodies, including the FBI; thirdly, whether the SFO has approached the FBI and the Swiss authorities regarding their investigations into FIFA; and fourthly, whether the SFO has, or might reasonably expect to, make a request to the Swiss authorities to view the Garcia report produced by the FIFA ethics committee?
The SFO has the jurisdiction to investigate events involving UK companies and citizens around the world, and under the Bribery Act 2010 has far-reaching powers to investigate any organisation that has commercial operations within the UK. I would be grateful if the Solicitor-General could confirm that it does indeed enjoy those powers and that there is a substantial difference between the powers that existed before the Bribery Act was passed by Parliament and the situation now.
A series of events falls within the jurisdiction of the SFO to investigate. We know from reports that the FBI has been working with the former FIFA official Chuck Blazer, that he has held meetings on behalf of the FBI where he has sought information from other football executives and other people he has met, and that he conducted some of these meetings, where he was under FBI surveillance, in London during the London Olympic games. Those meetings would be under the jurisdiction of the SFO and with the knowledge of the National Crime Agency, as is normal practice.
We know from the reports published in The Sunday Times this weekend that the England bid team gathered intelligence from around the world on not just the activities of members of the FIFA executive committee, but the World cup bids being prepared by other nations. It was alleged in these reports that this information contained intelligence passed through the British diplomatic network and intelligence services back to the FA. This information has never been fully published.
I served on the Culture, Media and Sport Committee in 2011 when we conducted a brief inquiry into the FIFA bidding process and invited people to submit evidence. The FA had the chance to respond at that time and did not do so. We took evidence from Lord Triesman, where he laid out substantial allegations against members of the FIFA executive committee, in his view seeking bribes in return for their votes. The FA launched its own inquiry into that and made no reference at any time to this intelligence information that it had gathered. I certainly believe that that information should be made available to the SFO to support its investigations and inquiries and to help it determine whether it can open a criminal investigation.
We know from Lord Triesman’s evidence that there were allegations against key FIFA executive committee members, including that Jack Warner—who is a senior member of FIFA, and who became embroiled in a scandal with Mohamed bin Hammam around the attempt to rig, as people saw it, the presidential elections—was at the heart of the substantial allegations made against the Qatar bid and that he received from Mohamed bin Hammam large payments that were intended both for himself and to be channelled to other FIFA executives. That is the substance and meat of the serious allegations that were made, and we know he had meetings with England officials during that bid process, including Lord Triesman, who states that Jack Warner effectively asked him for payment to secure rights to broadcast football matches in the Caribbean that Jack Warner already owned.
We heard that UK companies were involved in the Qatar bid and that PR executives, including Mike Lee of Vero Communications, worked closely with the bid process. We also know that other executives and companies were involved, such as Nigel Rushman and Rushmans, which offered a specialist service. It helps its clients bid for major global events. On its website it states that it was cheering Qatar all the way in 2010—and there are other reports that it still works closely with Qatar—and that its services to clients boast
“insightful people with enormous amounts of data and knowledge at their finger tips. Much of this sports event bidding information is not available elsewhere.”
If it has relevant information related to the FIFA World cup bids, perhaps it would be interested in sharing some of that with the SFO. There is also the role played by people like Peter Hargitay from ECN consulting group, who made millions from its consultancy work for the Australian 2022 World cup bid, and had previously asked for over £4 million to do the same for the England 2018 bid.
There is also the role of the Qatar bid whistleblower Phaedra Almajid, who provided information to The Sunday Times newspaper regarding the Qatar bid for the FIFA World cup, alleging that Mohamed bin Hammam, the former vice-president of FIFA, had established a network to support the payment of FIFA officials, to secure their votes for Qatar in the World cup bidding process. Phaedra Almajid gave evidence to Michael Garcia’s inquiry into this matter, including the reason why she had later retracted the evidence that she had first produced for the UK media as a whistleblower. Despite being promised anonymity by Michael Garcia, she was clearly identified in the summary of his report produced by Hans-Joachim Eckert. She feels that there has been a deliberate attempt to discredit her, and she has given me a statement to support that. In it, she discusses for the first time the pressure she was placed under to withdraw her allegations.
That statement is relevant to the debate and to the jurisdiction of the Serious Fraud Office to investigate these matters, and I should like to share part of it with the House. She says:
“I never set out to be a whistleblower. I have provided the information about what I witnessed as part of the Qatari bid in confidence, because I believe the World Cup bids should be won honestly. I continue to support an honestly awarded World Cup bid for the Middle East. The most publicised effort to discredit me relates to an affidavit I executed in July 2011. The facts surrounding that affidavit demonstrate that it was coerced and based on a promise that was never kept. I provided documents, emails, recordings and data to Mr Garcia showing the following facts:
In early June 2011, a senior official of the Qatari bid contacted me, urging me to recant information I had provided anonymously to the British media in late 2010 and early 2011. Initially, I refused to recant, as I knew what I had witnessed. I was then informed that a legal injunction had been issued against me in the State of Qatar in the amount of one million dollars for breach of my non-disclosure agreement. The Qatari official threatened to enforce the judgment against me internationally. I finally agreed to sign a recanting affidavit upon the Qatari official’s promise that I would receive in exchange a legal letter that they would not sue me. Their agreement to this deal is confirmed in numerous documents and recordings.
In early July 2011, a lawyer from a London law firm representing Qatar’s Supreme Committee for Delivery & Legacy came to Washington DC and presented an affidavit to me. I resisted signing it because it alleged that I had lied about what I had witnessed and altered documents, which I had not done. Finally, under threat of being sued and upon a promise that I would receive the legal letter, I agreed and signed the affidavit. I then requested my letter, but the Qatari officials changed the deal saying that, before I would receive it, I had to give media interviews about my affidavit, contrary to their promise of anonymity. After objecting, I gave those interviews, as the Qataris and their lawyer kept assuring me that I would receive the legal letter. Those assurances are recorded.
In September 2011, as I was continuing to demand my legal letter, three FBI agents came to my house unannounced. I had not contacted them. I told them all I knew about the Qatari bid, the threats against me, the affidavit and the Qatari refusal to give me the legal letter. At their request, I agreed to co-operate with them. In October 2011, at the FBI’s request, I spoke to a Qatari official who confirmed that there was a deal to give me the legal letter in exchange for the affidavit. The FBI agents recorded that conversation on their equipment. I continued to demand my letter from the Qataris and their lawyers. Finally, in October 2011, instead of sending the promised legal letter, the London lawyers for the Qataris sent me a letter accusing me of harassing them and threatening to sue me if I continued contacting them. I discontinued demanding my legal letter under that new threat of being sued by the Qataris’ lawyers.”
Ms Almajid does not name the London law firm in her statement, but I have been told that it was Olswang.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving way; I sought his permission beforehand to intervene on him, and I apologise for not being here at the beginning of his speech. He has outlined clearly the position that the whistleblower took in outlining what had been happening. Does he believe that it is now time for our Government to call on FIFA to give protection to whistleblowers, wherever they might be within that organisation, to ensure that they keep their jobs, despite what they have said, and that they are protected from prosecution?
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. He makes a serious point. That is at the heart of my reason for raising this matter in the House tonight and for contacting the Serious Fraud Office about it.
What Phaedra Almajid’s story tells us is that she co-operated fully with Michael Garcia’s inquiry and feels that her evidence has not been treated seriously and that, if anything, FIFA sought to discredit her for coming forward and co-operating with its inquiry. It also demonstrates that the FIFA process offers no guarantees to whistleblowers—people coming forward with information—whereas if they approach the proper authorities in this country, such as the SFO, or the FBI in America, they could discuss in confidence serious matters of concern to them. That is why a proper investigation and inquiry led by international agencies, including the SFO, will be the only way to get to the truth, and to encourage whistleblowers and protect them in coming forward to share their information with us. I believe some of these whistleblowers have genuine grounds to be fearful of the consequences of coming forward.
Other individuals supported the network that Phaedra Almajid describes and supported Mr Mohamed bin Hammam in his work, and little has been understood or acknowledged about them, and certainly not fully investigated. They include Najeeb Chirakal, who was suspended from football by FIFA in 2012 for failing to co-operate with its investigation into bin Hammam; Amadou Diallo, who worked for FIFA’s Goal Bureau for six years and was later alleged to be involved in bribing African football officials on behalf of the Qatar bid; Mohamed al-Mehshadi, a former FIFA Goal Bureau chairman and an insider who accompanied bin Hammam to key meetings in 2010 in Cairo and Moscow connected with the World cup bids; and Rahif Alameh, who resigned in 2012, having been for more than 50 years the general secretary of the Lebanese football association, following years of allegations of bribery and corruption.
There is a huge list in press reports and documents of names of people and allegations of the roles they played in seeking to secure votes for money in the bidding process for the World cup, and I think we see a system that was corrupt. People have been asking whether it was the fault of individual nations bidding, but we see a total system that had been corrupted and by an organisation that people have no confidence in. In 2010, when the 22 members of the FIFA executive committee cast their votes, they were determining which countries should host the next two World cups. That was unprecedented, and people have their own ideas about the reasons for it. Since that time 18 of those 22 members have faced allegations of some sort or current investigations into their conduct and whether they were involved in some sort of scandal involving the way they cast their votes. Just less than a third of the 22—seven of them—have been forced out of football because of their actions and activities. They have been banned by FIFA and forced to stand down because of their involvement in practices that were not considered suitable for a member of the FIFA ethics committee. That includes people such as Jack Warner, Chuck Blazer and Mohamed bin Hammam.
When we consider that 18 of the 22 face some sort of questioning of their role, that seven out of the 22 have resigned and that Russia and Qatar, coincidentally, both won the right to host the World cup by winning margins of six votes, we see why many people would say that the weight of allegations is so great and the stink of corruption that has stayed around this process for more than three years now is so strong that we can have no confidence in that process and therefore no confidence in the decision to award the World cup to those host countries. Those host countries deserve to have these allegations brought out and the world of football deserves to know what happened. If the SFO or the FBI were able to investigate these matters and bring criminal charges against people involved in that process, it would be impossible to see how it could continue. My concern and the reason for raising this tonight, is that without the involvement of organisations such as the SFO and the FBI, which is already involved, it seems impossible that we will ever get to that truth. It is only external pressure that will lead FIFA to change, and we need to act together to save football from FIFA.