Political Violence and Disruption: Walney Report

Debate between Holly Lynch and Tom Tugendhat

Wednesday 22nd May 2024 Commons Chamber

[Tom Tugendhat]

I welcome my hon. Friend’s approach to this, and to many other aspects of social media and online harms. She has been an example to many of us in how campaigns can be led to include, not exclude, and she has made her voice heard extremely clearly. All of us in this House will have had that Jekyll and Hyde experience of meeting someone in person who has previously been utterly vitriolic online—like seeing a country parson walking down the lane, and then discovering from their social media that Satan himself could not have come up with more bile. It is quite remarkable.

My hon. Friend makes a very good point that we need a little bit of recognition about who we all are—not just elected Members but others who are campaigning in favour or against a political issue. By and large, people approach issues in our democracy from a position of interest in the common good and support for each other, their families, communities and neighbours, but the treatment that somehow comes out of people when they are anonymous can be simply vile.

[Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)]

Earlier this week, I met a female chief fire officer who explained to me some of the intimidation, harassment and abuse that she had experienced, alongside some of her female colleagues in senior leadership roles in our emergency services, up to and including credible death threats. As far as I can tell, that is for no other reason than that they have the audacity to be women in senior leadership roles in our emergency services. The Walney reports considers the intimidation of academics and journalists, but I urge the Minister to speak to colleagues across Government to see what other protections we might need to offer those people doing incredibly important work, who under no circumstances should be subject to that type of intimidation?

[Tom Tugendhat]

I welcome the hon. Lady’s comments; she makes some very good points. Yesterday I was talking to Festus Akinbusoye about the racism he faced as police and crime commissioner. Whether people are in a public-facing role in our emergency services—our ambulance, police or fire crews, for example—or they hold an elected position, from Prime Minister to parish councillor, the idea that they should face any hostility at all is unacceptable, but the idea that they should be targeted because of their sex, race, gender or religion is even more unacceptable.

This country is extraordinary for many reasons. One thing that I love about it is the fact that many people from many different backgrounds have found their home here and have found their voice here and made it strongly. The transformation that has made to our country for the good is remarkable. I am hugely proud of that. To see that voice silenced by people, as the hon. Lady says, because they happen to be a female fire officer, is simply unacceptable, and I will certainly talk to the Minister for Crime, Policing and Fire to see what more we can do.

National Security Bill

Debate between Holly Lynch and Tom Tugendhat

Consideration of Lords message
Monday 26th June 2023 Commons Chamber

[Tom Tugendhat]

The right hon. Gentleman, as he will understand, raises an individual about whom I will not comment. The Government will not take a position of that nature on an individual based on such comments. I will not address him specifically.

What I will say is that there have been reports of foreign donations getting into political parties—that is true. What is also true is that political parties have a responsibility to check the sources of their donations, and all British citizens have the right to donate. If a specific accusation has not been reported to the Electoral Commission and investigated, and if a person has not been found guilty, the right hon. Gentleman will understand that I cannot make any further comment.

[Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for his opening contribution as these two additions to the National Security Bill return to the Commons once again.

The Minister has made the case for Government amendment (a) in lieu of Lords amendment 122B. I have a great deal of respect for him, as he knows, but this amendment in lieu, tabled in the name of the Home Secretary, essentially says that this House and the other House have a point, that the Government want to give themselves maximum wiggle room to be able to avoid doing anything about addressing the point by tabling an amendment in lieu that is much wishier and much washier than the clarity of our Lords amendment.

Lords amendment 122B, tabled by my noble Friend Lord Coaker, would have introduced a duty to update the Intelligence and Security Committee’s memorandum of understanding, rather than a requirement to consider whether the MOU needs updating. What does that actually mean? Is there a proposed framework or a timetable for deliberations? The Lords amendment was not tabled for fun; it was tabled because the Intelligence and Security Committee performs a vital function, but its ability to perform that function is being eroded.

The Lords amendment followed a recommendation made by the ISC in its 2021-22 annual report, which looked back to the Committee’s origins, when the then Security Minister told Parliament that it was

“the intention of the Government that the ISC should have oversight of substantively all of central Government’s intelligence and security activities to be realised now and in the future.”––[Official Report, Justice and Security Public Bill Committee, 31 March 2013; c. 98.]

Security Threat to UK-Based Journalists

Debate between Holly Lynch and Tom Tugendhat

Monday 20th February 2023 Commons Chamber

[Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)]

I am grateful to the Minister for advance sight of his statement. As he has already said, press freedom is fundamental to any liberal democracy, and it is a right that we are all committed to defending across this House. We should all be appalled that Iran International has felt the need to close its office here in the UK following police advice after a series of threats made against its brave journalists.

The UK has a proud history of supporting those who speak truth to power. Since 2017, Iran International has operated successfully here in the UK. In recent weeks, it has shone a spotlight on the Iranian regime’s violent repression of those protesting the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini and of those taking to the streets calling for civil liberties to be upheld. For that, they have been targeted by the regime, and, unbelievably, deemed to be a threat to Iran’s national security, with threats that agents of the organisation would be pursued.

As the Minister knows, in November’s annual threat assessment, the director general of MI5, Ken McCallum, stated that Iran had sought to murder or kidnap individuals in the UK on at least 10 occasions. Just this week, the head of Counter Terrorism Policing in the UK stated that there had been five more plots since then, saying that they had disrupted

“15 plots since the start of 2022 to either kidnap or even kill British or UK-based individuals perceived as enemies of the regime.”

I know that across this House we are united in our outrage that any foreign Government would think that they could conduct activity in this way within the borders of another country. As a democracy, we have to send the strongest possible message that we, our policing and security services, and the British public, will not tolerate it. I have met with representatives from Iran International. As the Minister said, they have spoken highly of UK counter-terrorism policing and our security services. I want to put my thanks to them on the record for the work that they undertake every day.

However, I have asked the Government five times in this Chamber since October why we are not going further to deploy sanctions and proscription powers against those acting on behalf of Iran. In response to my question at the last Home Office questions earlier this month, the Minister spoke of his desire to see the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps proscribed, so why are they not, either through the use of existing terrorism powers or new state threats equivalent powers? He has not mentioned it at all in his statement today. That means the IRGC are still free to organise and establish support here in the UK. We have to put a stop to that.

There are people appointed to posts here in the UK who are representatives of the supreme leader himself. Why are they still here? The Minister talked of instructing his Department today to lead work. Although the threat from Iran has escalated, it has not come from out of the blue. Why have we found ourselves ill-prepared to respond to the threat? The United States proscribed the IRGC as a terrorist organisation in 2019. Activity from Iran has been a feature of the annual threat assessment for some years. There were warnings in the 2021 integrated review, as well as in the Intelligence and Security Committee report of March 2022, which said:

“There also exists a continuing threat of state-sponsored assassination, attacks and abductions of those perceived as dissidents.”

Again, in November of last year, we had the starkest warnings from the director general of MI5. The ISC’s annual report published last year said:

“In November 2021, the Committee announced that it will be undertaking an Inquiry into national security issues relating to Iran.”

I understand that the ISC still has not been able to progress that report, and so I would welcome an explanation from the Minister as to why requested information has not been forthcoming to Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee, with an assurance that it is being addressed as a priority.

The UK must always be a safe place for journalists to speak truth to power. The rest of the world is watching. We cannot ever allow authoritarian tyranny to be exported to the UK and conducted on behalf of other hostile states within our borders. I ask the Minister: when will we see the sanctions? Can he provide us with a timeline? He has talked about co-ordinated responses, but those can be slow. When will we see proscription? We have to get this done. We are looking to table amendments to the National Security Bill; will the Minister support them? We very much stand ready to work with the Government in making this happen.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I thank the hon. Lady for her comments. She is absolutely right to press me on those issues, because it is absolutely true that this has been ongoing. She is also aware that proscription is a legal instrument, and that therefore there is a natural element of discussion. We do not comment on whether we are going to proscribe; we wait until we have the actions ready to do it. She will understand that we will wait until we have full advice.

What we need to be doing is exactly what we are doing, which is sanctioning individuals. I announced eight further sanctions today. We have spoken about various different actions we have taken, and I am grateful that the hon. Member has quite rightly praised the work of the police and the intelligence services, which have done a phenomenal job in keeping us safe. I am afraid that it is not true to say that nothing has happened since the IR. Since then, MI5, Counter Terrorism Policing and many other agencies of the state have been working tirelessly to keep this country safe, and to defend our values and freedoms.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Holly Lynch and Tom Tugendhat

Monday 6th February 2023 Commons Chamber

[Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)]

The Minister has been explicit, as have others, about the threat we face in the UK from the Iranian regime. I really welcome what he has said, and we stand ready to work with him on this issue, but the truth is that we have not seen anything like the sanctions and immigration controls that have been deployed against Russia being deployed against Iran. Will the Government go further and be clear? Will they proscribe the IRGC using either existing terror laws or new state threat variations to drive out this threat and keep people safe?

[Tom Tugendhat]

The hon. Lady knows very well that the Government have already sanctioned many individuals inside the Iranian regime and have taken action on individuals who may have had access around Europe and indeed into the United Kingdom. Those people have been either controlled or not allowed permission to travel. She should also be aware that our embassy in Iran is keeping us closely informed of how the sanctions are playing out and making sure that we target appropriately individuals who are a threat to the United Kingdom.

It is completely wrong that any foreign state should be able to threaten anybody in the United Kingdom. Anybody in the UK should have the same protection and be afforded the same rights as anybody else. The action we have taken to protect some journalists in the UK, which was highlighted only recently by some of our agencies, is absolutely vital to the security of our whole society.

Draft Investigatory Powers (Communications Data) (Relevant Public Authorities and Designated Senior Officers) Regulations 2022

Debate between Holly Lynch and Tom Tugendhat

Tuesday 13th December 2022 General Committees

[Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Bardell. I thank the Minister for his opening remarks. He has outlined what the statutory instrument does, and we are very aware that these changes come as a result of the High Court ruling in June this year in the case of Liberty v. the Secretary of State for the Home Department and the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. The SI will now allow for the internal authorisation of the acquisition of communications data solely for serious crime purposes in urgent situations, as prescribed by section 61A of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016.

I understand that parts of the wider case were dismissed, however the High Court ruled in favour of Liberty on a key point, deeming it to be unlawful for the security services to obtain individuals’ communications data from telecom providers without having prior independent authorisation in certain circumstances. We welcome the weight of the ruling of the High Court and, therefore, the Government’s corrective action with this statutory instrument. In an ever-changing world, it is crucial we get the investigatory powers available to our security services right in order to deal properly with the modern threats we face, including from serious and organised crime. However, that must always be prudently balanced against civil liberties.

I see that there was a period of consultation on these changes with the agencies most affected, and while I am curious to know what their response was, I know from my work in the area that a great deal will not be able to be shared with the Committee or more widely. I welcome the fact that the consultation took place. I also welcome the letter the Minister promised to my right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds Central, and I would be grateful for a copy.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I would be delighted.

[Holly Lynch]

I will not detain the Committee any longer, and we will not divide on the regulations.

Overseas Chinese Police Stations in UK: Legal Status

Debate between Holly Lynch and Tom Tugendhat

Tuesday 1st November 2022 Commons Chamber

[Tom Tugendhat]

I again pay tribute to the work that my hon. Friend has done over recent weeks, in particular, and years in alerting this House and the country to the threats that we have faced from authoritarian regimes around the world. I pay particular tribute to her leadership of the China Research Group, on which I was honoured to work with her before.

The reports that my hon. Friend mentions are not exclusive to this country. Sadly, we have seen authoritarian states exercising repressive tendencies abroad and seeking to extradite, or indeed inveigle, citizens of their own country back to their homeland to extract punishment. That is simply unacceptable. The protections of the UK state need to apply to all those in the United Kingdom and it is absolutely essential that those protections are afforded to all. That is why I am working, and will work further, with the police and agencies to ensure that we are on top of this offence and that, should evidence be shown and proof be given, action will be taken.

I also thank my hon. Friend enormously for her comments about the British national overseas scheme. She is right that that was not only world leading but essential for protecting British nationals in the face of an authoritarian dictatorship, and that those who come here under the scheme should be afforded the same protections, rights and dignity as all British nationals everywhere.

[Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)]

I, too, welcome the Minister to the Dispatch Box. I am grateful to the hon. Member for Rutland and Melton (Alicia Kearns) for securing the urgent question. As we have heard, the Safeguard Defenders report alleges that the Chinese Communist party has set up parallel policing mechanisms around the world. The report identifies three such stations in Hendon, Glasgow and Croydon that purport to offer services for Chinese nationals abroad. There have been multiple reports, however, that those stations are cracking down on Chinese political dissidents, including Hong Kong ex-pats and Uyghur refugees.

According to the Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong Foundation, people from Hong Kong relocating to the UK are being

“followed, harassed, attacked and intimidated”

by operatives based at the Glasgow station. The recent unacceptable conduct that we witnessed outside the Chinese consulate in Manchester makes it clear that we have to act to safeguard those in the UK from increasingly belligerent measures being undertaken by those acting on behalf of the Chinese state.

With the Minister’s predecessor, the right hon. Member for Stevenage (Stephen McPartland), we discussed in the National Security Bill Committee that the harassment of dissidents was becoming an increasing concern. What assessment have the Government made of these stations and what action have they taken to disrupt these damaging activities? The foreign influence registration scheme is long overdue, as he and others have said, so can he put on record exactly when it will be introduced?

The Government previously stated that the Home Office and the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities have drawn up plans to protect those arriving from Hong Kong from surveillance and harassment. Can the Minister elaborate on what those provisions are? The rule of law and freedom of expression are fundamental principles in our democracy and we must act to make it clear to any overseas regime that only UK police forces undertake policing in this country—with absolutely no exceptions.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I thank the hon. Lady for the tone with which she has approached not just the urgent question but the National Security Bill Committee, and for the openness and frankness with which she has enabled us to work on a truly cross-party basis on what is fundamentally a national security question for our whole country. I am extremely grateful for the way she has addressed these questions.

The Safeguard Defenders report that the hon. Lady cites certainly raises some very serious concerns. Those are being looked into. Of course, it would not be the first time an authoritarian dictatorship had claimed powers that it does not have, so we are looking into the assessment and, as I say, we will come back to the House with a report when and if action needs to be taken.

On FIRS, the hon. Lady is absolutely right that this is a matter that many of us have raised on numerous occasions. As soon as the National Security Bill is through the House—as she is well aware, that will, I hope, be very soon—those powers will be able to be used to defend not just this country but Members of this House against the intimidation or influence of those who seek to lobby or influence, masking the fact that they are doing so for a foreign state.

On protections, the hon. Lady is, again, absolutely right. The reality is that there is no police force in this country that has jurisdiction except the police forces of the United Kingdom. She is absolutely right that no foreign force should have abilities to influence, detain, hold or pressurise citizens of our country, except those that are agreed to by law.

National Security Bill (Fourteenth sitting)

Debate between Holly Lynch and Tom Tugendhat

Committee stage
Tuesday 18th October 2022 Public Bill Committees

[The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)]

I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Garston and Halewood and the right hon. Member for North Durham for the tone with which they have approached the debate. I appreciate their comments and those of the shadow Minister, who has made similar points. They have made them in the spirit of openness, proper debate and trying to improve what they see, correctly, as a Bill that will keep our country safe. I am grateful to them for that.

I will go through some of the points that have been made. First, the right hon. Member for North Durham asked about the purpose. Part of the objective of registering under the scheme is to highlight and to be clear. This is not a sanction. The very fact that a scheme exists for foreign companies that trade with British companies does not in any way mean that it is a sanction. The intention is to bring transparency to relationships that might otherwise lie hidden. It is intended not as a punishment, but merely to promote openness.

The requirement to register an arrangement within 10 days is made so that the person acting on behalf of the Government, or the individual, makes that clear at that point or within a reasonable period of time. I am happy to hear arguments for a slightly longer or less long period, but I think 10 days is a reasonable period for a registration to be made. Again, that is not supposed to be a sanction or an obstacle, but it is merely supposed to be a way of achieving transparency. It is not really supposed to be stopping the entire process, but merely supposed to be enabling people to know what is going on. If there was a requirement, and if it was a sanction, that would be different and the process would have to stop immediately. That is not what this is about.

[Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)]

Will the Minister give way?

[Tom Tugendhat]

Briefly, because we have so much to get through.

[Holly Lynch]

Of course, and I am grateful. May I bring the Minister’s attention to an example that I have had a chance to look at, and which has broken today? Up to 30 former UK military pilots are thought to have gone to train members of China’s People’s Liberation Army. They have been offered lucrative packages of up to £237,000 for their expertise in training Chinese pilots. Actually, a Ministry of Defence spokesperson has said that they are attempting to disrupt that activity

“while the new National Security Bill will create additional tools to tackle contemporary security challenges—including this one.”

Just looking at that example of where presumably some of those involved in headhunting might need to register that activity—

[Holly Lynch]

There is a need to try to put a stop to some of this activity, and I just wonder what the relationship is between the visibility and the need to stop it.

[Tom Tugendhat]

As the hon. Lady will know very well, I share her deep concern at this information, which was reported just this morning. First, may I say that there are already many different clauses in the Bill that are designed to make sure that individuals should not be co-operating with those who may be trying to steal secrets or to gain from secret information. It is possible, although I have not got the details of the case, that similar sorts of cases may be covered under other clauses in order to prevent the acquisition of information. The foreign agents element—the foreign influence element—would also come to play, but it is not the only element in the Bill that would come into play. It is absolutely correct that we do need the Bill in order to prevent such actions, which at the moment are more loosely defined, and therefore possible. The foreign influence element is not the only element, but I appreciate the spirit in which the hon. Lady has entered the discussion.

If I may, I will speed up a little.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

I turn to new clauses 22 and 23, which relate to the offence of providing false information and of carrying out activities under arrangements tainted by false information.

New clause 22 would create offences for where a registrant provides false or misleading information under the primary registration requirement or the enhanced registration requirement, or in response to an information notice. These offences are important to reduce the risk that the person is able to appear as if they have complied with the obligations under the scheme through the provision of false or misleading information. The delivery of the scheme’s objectives is undermined if a registrant is able to provide false or misleading information through registration or in response to an information notice without consequence. We should expect that those who seek to obfuscate their arrangements and activities will attempt to that, and we must be able to respond.

Such offences are not new or novel—indeed, they are common to requirements that place a positive obligation on members of the public to provide information. As with other offences we have considered, those that relate to the primary registration requirement have a higher bar for the prosecution to meet: that the registrant knows or ought reasonably to know that the information is false, inaccurate or misleading in a material way. By comparison, offences of the provision of false information in relation to the enhanced measure are to be strict liability. It should not be acceptable that such information is provided in relation to activity carried out for a specified foreign power or entity.

New clause 23 creates offences for carrying out activities under a registrable arrangement where false or misleading information has been provided in connection with the arrangement. I have already explained that the requirement to register an arrangement under the primary or enhanced registration requirements falls on the person who has made an arrangement with the specified foreign power or entity, or foreign principal.

We have also discussed the possibility that the registration of an arrangement could be made with false or misleading information: for example, where a person wants to appear as if they have complied with their registration obligations but is actively trying to conceal the true nature of their arrangements or activities.

These additional offences are important because they will allow for enforcement action to be taken against those who are acting pursuant to a falsely registered arrangement and are either complicit or in a position where they ought reasonably to know that the arrangement has been registered. As I explained in relation to the offences for carrying out activity pursuant to an unregistered arrangement, this will reduce the likelihood that unregistered activity is carried out, as well as providing a means of disrupting all levels of an organisation that has been identified as engaged in a covert arrangement or activity.

I want to reassure hon. Members that where an individual could not reasonably know that the information registered relating to the arrangement is false or misleading, they will not be prosecuted. It will be up to the courts to decide on a case-by-case basis whether someone charged with an offence ought reasonably to have known about the false information. I commend the new clause to the Committee.

[Holly Lynch]

It is right that new clauses 22 and 23 set out new offences that are created as a means of promoting compliance with the registration scheme. On that basis, we are satisfied that new offences are in order.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 22 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 23

Offence of carrying out activities under arrangements tainted by false information

“(1) A person commits an offence if—

(a) the person carries out an activity in the United Kingdom pursuant to a foreign activity arrangement required to be registered under section (Requirement to register foreign activity arrangements)(1),

(b) information provided to the Secretary of State under section (Registration information) or (Information notices) in connection with the arrangement, whether by the person or by another person, is false, inaccurate or misleading in a material way, and

(c) the person knows, or ought reasonably to know, that the facts are as mentioned in paragraph (b).

(2) A person commits an offence if—

(a) the person carries out a political influence activity in the United Kingdom pursuant to a political influence arrangement required to be registered under section (Requirement to register foreign influence arrangements) (1),

(b) information provided to the Secretary of State under section (Registration information) or (Information notices) in connection with the arrangement, whether by the person or by another person, is false, inaccurate or misleading in a material way, and

(c) the person knows, or ought reasonably to know, that the facts are as mentioned in paragraph (b).

(3) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to a foreign power.

(4) Subsection (2) does not apply to—

(a) a recognised news publisher;

(b) a person within section (Requirement to register foreign influence arrangements)(6)(b).”.—(Tom Tugendhat.)

This new clause creates offences of carrying on activities under a registrable arrangement where false of misleading information has been provided in connection with the arrangement.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 24

Offences: penalties

“(1) A person who commits a foreign activity offence is liable—

(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years or to a fine (or both);

(b) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or to a fine (or both);

(c) on summary conviction in Northern Ireland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both);

(d) on summary conviction in Scotland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both).

(2) “Foreign activity offence” means—

(a) an offence under section (Requirement to register foreign activity arrangements)(10);

(b) an offence under section (Offence of carrying out activities under an unregistered foreign activity arrangement);

(c) an offence under section (Requirement to register activities of specified persons)(3);

(d) an offence under section (Registration information)(6) committed in relation to a foreign activity arrangement registered under section (Requirement to register foreign activity arrangements) or an activity registered under section (Requirement to register activities of specified persons);

(e) an offence under section (Information notices)(7) committed in relation to an information notice given under section (Information notices)(1);

(f) an offence under section (Offence of providing false information)(1) or (2);

(g) an offence under section (Offence of carrying out activities under arrangements tainted by false information)(1).

(3) A person who commits a foreign influence offence is liable—

(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years or to a fine (or both);

(b) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or to a fine (or both);

(c) on summary conviction in Northern Ireland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both);

(d) on summary conviction in Scotland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both).

(4) “Foreign influence offence” means—

(a) an offence under section (Requirement to register foreign influence arrangements)(8);

(b) an offence under section (Offence of carrying out political influence activities pursuant to unregistered foreign influence arrangement);

(c) an offence under section (Requirement to register political influence activities of foreign principals)(3);

(d) an offence under section (Registration information)(6) committed in relation to a foreign influence arrangement registered under section (Requirement to register foreign influence arrangements) or a political influence activity registered under section (Requirement to register political influence activities of foreign principals);

(e) an offence under section (Information notices)(7) committed in relation to an information notice given under section (Information notices)(2);

(f) an offence under section (Offence of providing false information)(3) or (4);

(g) an offence under section (Offence of carrying out activities under arrangements tainted by false information)(2).”.—(Tom Tugendhat.)

This new clause sets out the penalties for the offences created under the registration scheme.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

New clauses 24 and 26 deal with the penalties and supplementary provisions for the offences under the scheme. I start by reminding the Committee of one of the scheme’s aims: to deter foreign power use of covert arrangements, activities and proxies.

FIRS will play an important role in countering state threats. It is therefore important that the scheme should have penalties that reflect the seriousness of non-compliance within that context. The new clause makes provision for two separate maximum penalties for the two parts of the scheme. It is proposed that any offence committed under the primary registration requirement should be capable of attracting a custodial penalty of up to two years on indictment, or a fine; that is compared with an offence committed under the enhanced registration requirement, which we propose should be capable of attracting a custodial penalty of up to five years on indictment, or a fine.

The availability of a custodial penalty is a necessary reflection of the seriousness of seeking to hide or obfuscate influence or activity in the United Kingdom directed by foreign powers or entities. The penalty must be taken seriously by those engaged in the state threats activity that we are trying to counter; that would be unlikely if, for example, we were to impose only financial penalties. The offences under the enhanced measure would be capable of a higher maximum custodial penalty. This distinction is to reflect the seriousness of hiding or obfuscating arrangements and activities, carried out on behalf of foreign powers or entities, that the Secretary of State has identified as being necessary to specify in order to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom. I have covered the issue to some extent through my earlier explanations about the differing thresholds for offences.

I will not spend long speaking to new clause 26, given that it extends the application of clauses 28 and 29 to the offences under this part and mirrors the approach taken to exclude the public from legal proceedings in clause 31—clauses that have all been debated by the Committee already.

The new clause has several functions. First, it extends the application of clause 28 to this part so that the officers of bodies corporate and other bodies may be held liable for offences committed by those bodies. Given that a body corporate or other bodies can make either a foreign activity arrangement or foreign influence arrangement, it is crucial for the enforceability of the scheme that these bodies and their officers can be held liable should they breach the conditions set out under these provisions.

Secondly, the new clause extends the application of clause 29 to an offence under this part that is capable of being committed outside the UK. In the context of FIRS, that relates to where a foreign activity or foreign influence arrangement has been made outside the UK but has not been registered within the 10-day period. Although the activity pursuant to the arrangement must take place in the UK, the offence for failing to register can therefore be committed overseas. We have already debated the necessity of this in respect of the new clauses relating to the registration of arrangements.

Finally, this provision grants the court the power to exclude the public from proceedings for offences under this part, where necessary in the interests of national security; it is important to be clear, however, that this does not apply to the passing of a sentence. Excluding the public from proceedings might be necessary in circumstances where the Crown needs to adduce sensitive evidence as part of the prosecution—evidence that may be harmful to national security if shared more widely with the public.

For example, if a person provided false information in connection with an activity that is required to be registered in relation to a foreign influence arrangement, it might be necessary to rely on sensitive evidence to demonstrate why that information was considered to be false and what the person’s actual activities included. The provision would ensure that such sensitive evidence could be examined without the public being present. The decision to exclude the public would be made by the court, not the prosecution, and it is important to note that the power does not grant the use of closed material proceedings.

[Holly Lynch]

Government new clause 24 lays out the penalties for offences committed under the registration scheme. Subsection (1) states that a person who commits a foreign activity offence is liable on conviction or indictment to a maximum five years of imprisonment. Subsection (3) states that a person who is found to have committed a foreign influence offence is liable to a maximum two years of imprisonment. My hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood raised this point yesterday with officials: why the marked difference in sentencing between the different strands of activity?

Subsection (1) of Government new clause 26 states that officers of bodies corporate may be held liable for offences committed by those bodies in relation to the registration scheme. That is a welcome measure that will ensure that corporate officers and organisations will remain accountable to the registration scheme. Like the inclusion of body corporate offences in part 1 of the Bill, it reflects the seriousness with which UK businesses must treat the provisions.

Subsection (3) provides that the public may be excluded from proceedings for an offence under part 1. As the Minister said, we discussed at previous stages of the Bill that it is right to have that option where matters prejudicial to the UK’s national security may need to be cited for prosecution. However, we stress that it is a power that should be exercised only when necessary.

[Tom Tugendhat]

The difference between the tariffs is purely down to the different importance of a general registration and an enhanced registration.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 24 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 25

Publication and copying of information

“(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about—

(a) publication of information provided to the Secretary of State under this Part;

(b) copying of information provided to the Secretary of State under this Part.

(2) The power under subsection (1) includes in particular power to make provision about a description of information or material which is not to be published.”—(Tom Tugendhat.)

This new clause allows the Secretary of State to make regulations in relation to the publication and copying of information provided to the Secretary of State under the registration provisions.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 26

Offences: supplementary provision

“(1) Section 28 (offences by body corporate etc) applies in relation to offences under this Part as it applies in relation to offences under Part 1.

(2) Section 29(1) and (3) to (5) (offences committed outside the United Kingdom) applies in relation to offences under this Part as it applies in relation to offences under Part 1.

(3) If it is necessary in the interests of national security, a court may exclude the public from any part of proceedings for an offence under this Part, except for the passing of sentence.”—(Tom Tugendhat.)

This new clause provides that officers of bodies corporate and other bodies may be held liable for offences committed by those bodies, that offences may be committed outside the United Kingdom, and that a court may exclude the public from proceedings for offences.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 27

Annual report

“(1) The Secretary of State must, as soon as is practicable after the end of each relevant period—

(a) prepare a report in relation to that period, and

(b) lay a copy of the report before Parliament.

(2) The report must provide details of—

(a) the total number of arrangements registered with the Secretary of State under section (Requirement to register foreign activity arrangements) or (Requirement to register foreign influence arrangements),

(b) the number of arrangements registered with the Secretary of State under section (Requirement to register foreign activity arrangements) or (Requirement to register foreign influence arrangements) during the relevant period,

(c) the total number of specified persons and foreign principals who have registered activities with the Secretary of State under section (Requirement to register activities of specified persons) or (Requirement to register foreign influence activities of foreign principals),

(d) the number of specified persons and foreign principals who have registered activities with the Secretary of State under section (Requirement to register activities of specified persons) or (Requirement to register foreign influence activities of foreign principals) during the relevant period,

(e) the number of information notices issued under section (Information notices) during the relevant period,

(f) the number of persons charged with an offence under this Part during the relevant period, and

(g) the number of persons convicted of an offence under this Part during the relevant period.

(3) ‘Relevant period’ means—

(a) the period of 12 months beginning with the day on which this section comes into force, and

(b) each subsequent period of 12 months.”—(Tom Tugendhat.)

This new Clause requires the Secretary of State to provide an annual report to Parliament on matters relating to the registration scheme.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

New clause 27 requires the Secretary of State to prepare and publish an annual report to Parliament on the operation of FIRS. I have already spoken about the importance of transparency. Indeed, transparency is essential to the functioning not only of our democracy but of our entire state. The hon. Member for Halifax raised that issue on numerous occasions, and I have committed to working with her. The commitment to publish information about the scheme’s operation will help to ensure that the UK public is more informed about the scale and extent of foreign influence in our political affairs, as well as activity being undertaken for specified foreign powers or entities.

The information that the Secretary of State would be required to provide is as follows: the total number of foreign activity and foreign influence arrangements registered with the Secretary of State; the number of foreign activity and foreign influence arrangements registered with the Secretary of State over the previous year; the total number of specified persons and foreign principals who have registered activities with the Secretary of State; the number of specified persons and foreign principals who have registered activities with the Secretary of State over the previous year; the number of information notices issued over the previous year; the number of persons charged with a FIRS-related offence over the previous year; and the number of persons convicted of a FIRS-related offence over the previous year. The new clause acts as a safeguard by inviting parliamentary and public scrutiny of the operation of FIRS.

[Holly Lynch]

I thank the Minister for that explanation. We very much welcome new clause 27. My understanding is that the different elements of the scheme could come into effect at different times. Will the Minister confirm that if, for example, the requirement to register foreign influence arrangements becomes operational before the requirement to register foreign activity arrangements, or vice versa, the annual report will be due a year from the start date of the specific scheme, not a year after both parts of the scheme come into effect?

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

I take that point in the spirit in which it was made. I think that makes sense, but it should be possible to refer back through the registrations. If registrations have not been made, I take her point entirely.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 27 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 28

Interpretation

‘(1) In this Part—

“foreign activity arrangement” has the meaning given by section (Requirement to register foreign activity arrangements);

“foreign influence arrangement” has the meaning given by section (Requirement to register foreign influence arrangements);

“foreign power” has the same meaning as in Part 1 (see section 25), subject to subsection (2);

“foreign principal” has the meaning given by section (Requirement to register foreign influence arrangements);

“political influence activity” has the meaning given by section (Meaning of “political influence activity”);

“recognised news publisher” has the meaning given by section (Requirement to register foreign influence arrangements);

“registered activity” means an activity registered with the Secretary of State under section (Requirement to register activities of specified persons) or (Requirement to register political influence activities of foreign principals);

“registered arrangement” means an arrangement registered with the Secretary of State under section (Requirement to register foreign activity arrangements) or (Requirement to register foreign influence arrangements);

“specified person” has the meaning given by section (Requirement to register foreign activity arrangements).

(2) For the purposes of this Part references in section 25 to a foreign State, or a foreign country or territory, do not include the Republic of Ireland.

(3) Any provision of this Part which does not apply in relation to a person (“P”) does not apply in relation to—

(a) a person who holds office in or under, or is an employee or other member of staff of, P (acting in that capacity);

(b) a person whom the Secretary of State reasonably considers to be exercising functions on behalf of P as if they are a person who holds office in or under, or as if they are an employee or other member of staff of, P (acting in that capacity).’ —(Tom Tugendhat.)

This new clause contains definitions relevant to the registration scheme.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 4

Proceedings relating to safety or interests of the United Kingdom

“(1) This section applies where a court is considering proceedings under Part 1 of this Act, where the proceedings involve the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.

(2) In proceedings to which this section applies, the court must take account of how the interests of the Secretary of State or of the Government of the United Kingdom may differ from the interests of the United Kingdom, in order to satisfy itself that the interests of the United Kingdom have been appropriately identified and considered.”—(Holly Lynch.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Holly Lynch]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

New clause 4 is an attempt to make a clear distinction between what is in the Government’s interest and what is in the national interest, so that the two cannot be conflated. There are a number of new offences created under part 1 of the Bill, and a key condition running throughout those offences is that a person knows, or ought reasonably to know, that their conduct is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom. There are other conditions that must be met, with the foreign power condition perhaps being the most substantial.

The aim of new clause 4 is to ensure that a court considering proceedings in relation to part 1 offences must take account of how the interests of the Secretary of State, or the Government of the United Kingdom, may be slightly separate from the interests of the United Kingdom, in order to satisfy itself that the interests of the United Kingdom have been appropriately identified and considered. Members will recognise that there is already a difference between the safety of the United Kingdom and the interests of the United Kingdom, with the new offences encompassing both. I suspect there will be a great deal of consensus on safety, but to explicitly define and agree on interests I imagine would be much harder.

We worked through various examples as part of the deliberations on part 1 offences. One such example was whether, if the Government faced deliberate disruption enacting policy they deemed to be in the national interest, that would be enough to meet the threshold? If, for example, a deportation flight—the stuff of the Home Secretary’s dreams—was prevented from taking off because of protesters, would that be enough to meet the prejudicial to the national interest threshold? The Government might wish to argue that case, although it would be far from compromising national security.

We got some assurances from the Minister’s predecessor that national security laws would not transgress into conduct that may be irritating for the Government but lawful, or into prosecuting other criminal offences by treating them as unduly having national security implications. Beyond the specifics of the new offences created by the Bill, we also believe that new clause 4 would establish in principle the distinction between the Government’s political interests and the country’s national security.

I am explicit that the new clause, alongside new clause 5 and new clause 29, have at least in part been shaped by the meeting that we now have confirmation took place between the former Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Uxbridge and South Ruislip (Boris Johnson), when he was Foreign Secretary, and former KGB officer Alexander Lebedev, at the height of the Salisbury poisoning. It is worth remembering that we did not have confirmation of that meeting when the Bill Committee first started, and the right hon. Member was still the Prime Minister. I do not know if that is an indication of how quickly things move in politics or of how long this Bill Committee has been going on for. However, it is the sort of example that warrants the separating out of Government and individual Minister’s political interests and national security interests. It has become too easy to suggest that answers could not be provided on that matter and others for security reasons, when actually getting to the bottom of what had gone on was very much in the national interest. It may not have been in the Government’s political interest, but that is the distinction that is important to put on a proper statutory footing.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

I welcome the spirit with which the hon. Member for Halifax has entered into this discussion, and I appreciate her points. Making illegal those matters that irritate Ministers of the Crown would certainly make my life at home significantly quieter, as it would silence my children. Sadly, I think that trying to make case law for my family would be problematic.

It is certainly true that there is a difference between the interests of Ministers and the interests of an individual Minister, whether that be an ordinary Minister or a Prime Minister, and national security. Case law in the United Kingdom already recognises that in considering any prosecution in relation to offences to which the provisions regarding prejudice to the safety of the interests of the UK apply. The UK courts already consider the nature and risk to the safety and interests of the UK. Case law already makes clear that

“the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”

should be interpreted as the objects of state policy determined by the Crown on the advice of Ministers. That is notably different from protecting the particular interests of those in office.

Again, I appreciate the spirit with which the hon. Lady has entered into the conversation, but the provisions in part 1 to which the safety or interests test applies are measures that disrupt and respond to serious national security threats, such as those from espionage, sabotage and threats to the UK’s most sensitive sites. As I am sure hon. Members will agree, it is right that appropriate conditions—such as the test of whether conduct is carried out for, on behalf of, or with the intention to benefit a foreign power—are in place to limit the scope of the offences to the types of harmful activity we are targeting.

The combination of the conditions we apply to measures in the Bill mean that not only are the offences themselves proportionate, but an appropriately high bar has to be met to bring a prosecution. These conditions take us firmly outside the realm of merely leaking embarrassing or unauthorised disclosures, or indeed whistleblowing or domestic political opposition. The Law Commission shared that sentiment in the evidence it gave to the Committee—of course I was not present, but given her reference to the length of time in politics I am sure she will understand that.

Individuals and groups might not agree with Government policy, but it still represents the policy that the Government have been elected to carry out, so disclosing protected information from a foreign power can never be the right response to that. It would not be appropriate for the courts to second guess the merits of Government policy in this way. On the basis that the courts are well able to judge the difference between national interest and personal interest, I hope that the hon. Member will withdraw the amendment.

[Holly Lynch]

I suspect the Minister understands the points I am making and is sympathetic to what I am trying to get at. I put him on notice that, where I think there is information that could and should be in the public domain and I meet barriers relating to national security reasons preventing it from being in the public domain, I will be a thorn in his side every step of the way. With that veiled threat—

[Jess Phillips]

It wasn’t veiled.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Not very veiled, no.

[Holly Lynch]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 5

Ministerial conduct

“(1) This section applies in relation to any Minister of the Crown who engages with, or intends to engage with, or ought reasonably to know that they are about to engage with, a person who is a part of a foreign intelligence service.

(2) A Minister of the Crown may only engage with such a person if either of the following conditions are met—

(a) a senior civil servant is formally present at or party to the engagement, and a formal record of the engagement has been made by the senior civil servant; or

(b) a senior civil servant is not formally present at or party to the engagement, and a formal record of the engagement has not been made by a senior civil servant, but the written consent of the Prime Minister has been sought by the Minister of the Crown, and has been granted and formally recorded in writing.

(3) In this section ‘engagement’ includes meeting in person or via electronic means, and corresponding in writing or via electronic means.”—(Holly Lynch.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Holly Lynch]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

New clause 5 is similar to the previous new clause and would mean that a Minister of the Crown may only engage with a person who is a part of a foreign intelligence service if either a senior civil servant is formally present at or party to the engagement, and a formal record of the engagement has been made by the senior civil servant; or a senior civil servant is not formally present at or party to the engagement, and a formal record of the engagement has not been made by a senior civil servant, but the written consent of the Prime Minister has been sought by the Minister of the Crown, and has been granted and formally recorded in writing. That would apply both to meetings in person and via electronic means. It would apply to any Minister of the Crown who engages with, or intends to engage with, or ought reasonably to know that they are about to engage with, a person who is a part of a foreign intelligence service. Failure to follow these rules should be a resignation matter.

The measures proposed throughout the Bill promise an extensive overhaul in establishing what constitutes meeting with and assisting a foreign power threat, including new offences and regimes covering almost all aspects of society. It is entirely right that we also consider the role of Ministers. I am afraid that, once again, the need for such a provision was born out of the conduct of the right hon. Member for Uxbridge and South Ruislip when he was the Foreign Secretary. However, there are other examples.

The right hon. Gentleman confirmed to the Liaison Committee that he met with former KGB officer Alexander Lebedev without officials and without permission at the height of the Salisbury poisoning back in 2018. To set the scene, that was immediately after the then Foreign Secretary had attended a meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers at NATO headquarters in Brussels to discuss the collective response to Russia’s use of Novichok on UK soil. In advance of that meeting, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg outlined that Russia would be the first item on the agenda, after what he said were several years of Moscow’s “pattern of dangerous behaviour”, confirming, as the Prime Minister had already done, that:

“It is also highly likely that Russia was behind the nerve agent attack in Salisbury.”

That NATO meeting was on 27 April 2018.

The Foreign Secretary went straight from that NATO meeting to Palazzo Terranova in Italy for a weekend-long party hosted by Evgeny Lebedev, now Lord Lebedev. There he met with Evgeny Lebedev’s father, Alexander Lebedev, an ex-KGB officer. The Foreign Secretary attended the party with no security and no officials, despite his position being deemed to require round-the-clock protection from the Metropolitan police. There is a brief entry of ministerial interests on the Foreign Office website, where he declared an “overnight stay” at the party on 28 April, which is the only official record in existence.

While the Foreign Secretary was partying with Lord Lebedev and his father, the ex-KGB officer, the Novichok was still waiting to be found in a bin seven miles north of Salisbury. It was found by Charlie Rowley on 30 June, who survived his exposure to the Novichok. However, his partner, Dawn Sturgess, did not, having sprayed it directly on to her skin, believing it to be perfume.

In September 2018, the Prime Minister returned to update the House of Commons to confirm that, based on a body of intelligence, the Government had concluded that the two individuals named by the police and the Crown Prosecution Service were officers from the Russian military intelligence service, the GRU. The right hon. Member for Uxbridge and South Ruislip followed up in writing to the Liaison Committee in his letter dated 21 July 2022, saying:

“As far as I am aware, no Government business was discussed”

at that encounter with Alexander Lebedev. Needless to say, that one line presented far more questions than answers.

We have decided to keep the definition tight to someone who is a member of a foreign intelligence service. Committee members might point out that, in this particular scenario, given that Alexander Lebedev would describe himself as a former KGB officer, the right hon. Member for Uxbridge and South Ruislip would not necessarily be covered by the new clause. However, this new clause, new clause 4 and new clause 29 would work in combination to ensure that the gap in procedure exposed by the meeting I have just outlined would be closed down.

It is right to ensure that the Government and officials act with accountability and transparency. The new clause does not prevent such meetings taking place; it only formalises expectations around how any such encounter should be managed. The Government may argue that it is not necessary, as similar expectations are already provided for by the ministerial code, but the ministerial code was very much degraded in recent months, and was in effect when the meeting that I outlined took place, so there is very much a case for tighter measures.

The public have a right to expect the highest possible standards from their Government officials, in both their public and private lives. The new clause will ensure that Government officials adhere to strict clearance systems when dealing with the intelligence services of hostile foreign states. I hope the Government will welcome this opportunity to tighten standards and will support new clause 5.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I welcome the spirit in which the new clause was tabled. I understand the points made by the hon. Member for Halifax. As she knows very well, Ministers are already expected to uphold the ministerial code. I am not going to seek to defend the Administration of the right hon. Member for Uxbridge and South Ruislip; as the hon. Lady will know, we had our disagreements at that time, when I was chairing the Foreign Affairs Committee, and I put them on the record. Indeed, I attended the Liaison Committee hearing to which she referred.

It is important to look at where we are today and to recognise that the re-issuing of the ministerial code in May this year, which included proportionate sanctions, should be taken into account. It is also worth pointing out that the Bill already includes several measures to counter hostile activity, including updated espionage offences for disclosing or providing access to protected information and offences for engaging in preparatory conduct relating to espionage. That could just be a simple meeting and a cup of coffee.

In clause 3, the Bill also seeks to criminalise activity whereby a person either engages in conduct that they intend will materially assist a foreign intelligence service or knows or reasonably ought to know that conduct that they are engaged in is of a kind that it is reasonably possible may materially assist a foreign intelligence service. As the former head of GCHQ put it, this is all about making sure that others cannot construct a haystack in which to find a needle. It means that, for the first time, it will be a criminal offence to be a covert foreign agent and engage in activity that assists a foreign intelligence service.

To be clear to the Committee, the offences would capture Ministers of the Crown if they engaged in conduct that falls outside their official functions or capacity as a Minister. Moreover, ministerial conduct is principally a matter for the ministerial code and there are already transparency measures in place for Ministers of the Crown to formally record their engagements with external parties and declare any gifts and hospitality. If a Minister is with an external organisation or individual and finds themselves discussing official business without an official present—for example, at a social occasion—any significant content should be passed back to the Department as soon as possible after the event.

Although it would not be appropriate to comment on security or intelligence matters, what I can say is that Ministers are made fully aware of their responsibility to safeguard national security, including in respect of the standards of conduct expected of Ministers and how they discharge their duties in maintaining the security of Government business, as set out in the ministerial code. Although the new clause may seek to provide further accountability and propriety, it would not be appropriate to create new, separate provisions.

Overall, I consider that the existing mechanisms that are already in place to increase transparency around foreign influence in the UK political and governmental system, as well as the measures already in the Bill aimed at tackling and responding to the malign nature of seeking to assist a foreign intelligence service, are sufficient. I ask the hon. Member for Halifax to withdraw the new clause, although I recognise the pattern of actions that brought her to table it.

[Holly Lynch]

The Minister has gone through the pre-existing frameworks that should have prevented such a meeting from taking place, and suggests that those should be enough. Unfortunately, the example I gave shows that they were not enough. We still do not have all the answers we would like about what was discussed and what the nature of that engagement was, and the clarity that would satisfy us that there were no breaches of national security as part of that interaction. The Minister is right that all that should have been enough, but it was not in those circumstances, and as far as we can tell there were no real consequences in real time of that having taken place.

I have made my case strongly; however, as the Minister has put his personal views on the record and given his assurance that he understands the points I made and will continue to bear them in mind as we look at some of the protections in the round, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 6

Defences

“(1) In any proceedings for an offence under section 2 of this Act or section 5 of the Official Secrets Act 1989, it shall be a defence—

(a) that the disclosure in question was in the public interest, and

(b) the manner of the disclosure was also in the public interest.

(2) Whether a disclosure was in the public interest shall be determined having regard to—

(a) the subject matter of the disclosure,

(b) the harm caused by the disclosure, and

(c) any other relevant feature of the disclosure.

(3) Whether the manner of disclosure was in the public interest shall be determined having regard to—

(a) whether the disclosure has been made in good faith,

(b) if the disclosure relates to alleged misconduct, whether the individual reasonably believes that the information disclosed, and any allegation contained in it, are substantially true,

(c) whether the disclosure is made for the purposes of personal gain,

(d) the availability of any other effective authorised procedures for making the disclosure and whether those procedures were exercised, and

(e) whether, in all the circumstances of the case, it is reasonable for the disclosure to have been made in the relevant manner.”—(Mr Jones.)

This new clause introduces a public interest defence to the new disclosure offence created by clause 2, and the section 5 disclosure offence in the Official Secrets Act 1989. The proposed defence is modelled on the public interest defence in the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998.

Brought up, and read the First time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Holly Lynch]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

On considering the foreign influence registration scheme and its intended use, we felt that there was room to go further in relation to former employees of the intelligence services of other nations. New clause 29 will require all former employees of a security or intelligence service of a foreign power who are present in the United Kingdom for more than two months to register their presence with the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State has the discretion of making provisions by regulations about what information is required. We know that we are dealing with countries that are tasking their people to engage in a multitude of influence activities, from the loud and overt to the barely seen and covert, and everything in between.

Turning specifically to oligarchs and that culture, we have seen some individuals establish themselves almost as London celebrities. They are incredibly wealthy, and for some their status is built partly on the back of having been a former employee of an intelligence service. They make that clear as part of their persona, and it is the “former” bit that gives them a degree of cover. They have the connections and insight to be an interesting and potentially helpful ally to some of our politicians and decision makers, especially if they are incredibly wealthy, as so many oligarchs are, yet are deemed to be arm’s length enough for there to be the confidence for those relationships to grow largely unabated.

The notion of systemic opposition in Russia in particular provides for a degree of criticism of Putin and his regime as a means of occupying the space where actual opposition should be, and once again provides a degree of cover for those oligarchs overseas who engage in some criticism—enough to satisfy those they need to satisfy that they are indeed critics—before later mounting staunch defences of their former regimes when necessary. In addition to the FIRS framework set out in the Government’s new clauses, this is another intended layer of transparency, aimed precisely at those people, to put on a formal footing both those who are open about their previous work and those we may not otherwise know about.

We have discussed that those engaged in espionage are often not typical in any way. They will have received training, and will be incredibly capable and resourceful. Even those who have truly moved away from careers in the intelligence services will not lose overnight the ability to exercise those skills. I take on board that those working for security services have the right to a life after those careers; however, given that there are regimes known to pressurise, blackmail, or force co-operation from their people, even if they have truly walked away from that environment, there would be merit in the Secretary of State knowing where those vulnerabilities lie. I hope that the Minister will see the merit in this addition to the foreign influence registration scheme and adopt new clause 29.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I note the proposed new clause, and I hope that the hon. Member for Halifax will take my response in the way I intend it. Either foreign intelligence agents are already declared, in which case they are actively engaged in conversations with our intelligence services, or they are undeclared, in which case asking them to register may be something that we can hope for, but would be unlikely. I understand the intention behind the new clause, although I question whether it is proportionate, given that we are already trying to get anybody who is connected to a foreign agent to be registered. I feel that it may be more hopeful and aspirational than a realistic attempt to change other people’s actions.

[Holly Lynch]

The Minister absolutely understands the point that I was making. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Schedule 1

Disclosure orders

Part 1

England and Wales and Northern Ireland

Introductory

1 (1) This Part of this Schedule applies in England and Wales and Northern Ireland.

(2) “Relevant investigation” means an investigation into the identification of relevant property or its movement or use.

(3) “Relevant property” means—

(a) money or other property which is likely to be used for the purposes of foreign power threat activity, or

(b) proceeds of involvement in foreign power threat activity.

(4) The reference to proceeds of involvement in foreign power threat activity includes a reference to any money, other property or benefit in money’s worth, which wholly or partly, and directly or indirectly, represents the proceeds of the involvement (including payments or rewards in connection with the involvement).

(5) “Appropriate officer” means—

(a) a constable, or

(b) a National Crime Agency officer.

Disclosure orders

2 (1) An appropriate officer may apply to a judge for a disclosure order.

(2) The application must state that a person or property specified in the application is subject to a relevant investigation and the order is sought for the purposes of the investigation.

(3) The judge may grant the application if satisfied that conditions 1 to 3 are met.

(4) Condition 1 is that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the property specified in the application is relevant property.

(5) Condition 2 is that there are reasonable grounds for believing that information which may be provided in compliance with a requirement imposed under the order is likely to be of substantial value, whether by itself or with other information, to the investigation.

(6) Condition 3 is that there are reasonable grounds for believing that it is in the public interest for the information to be provided, having regard to the benefit likely to accrue to the investigation if the information is obtained.

(7) A disclosure order is an order authorising an appropriate officer to give to any person the officer considers has relevant information notice in writing requiring the person to do any or all of the following with respect to any matter relevant to the investigation—

(a) answer questions, either at a time specified in the notice or at once, at a place so specified;

(b) provide information specified in the notice, by a time and in a manner so specified;

(c) produce documents, or documents of a description, specified in the notice, either at or by a time so specified or at once, and in a manner so specified.

(8) “Relevant information” means information (whether or not contained in a document) which the appropriate officer considers to be relevant to the investigation.

(9) A person is not bound to comply with a requirement imposed by a notice given under a disclosure order unless evidence of authority to give the notice is produced.

(10) An appropriate officer may not make an application under this paragraph unless the officer is a senior officer or is authorised to do so by a senior officer.

Supplementary provision

3 (1) A disclosure order does not confer the right to require a person—

(a) to answer any question,

(b) to provide any information, or

(c) to produce any document or other material,

which the person would be entitled to refuse to answer, provide or produce on grounds of legal professional privilege in proceedings in the High Court.

(2) But a lawyer may be required to provide the name and address of a client.

(3) A disclosure order does not confer the right to require a person to produce excluded material.

(4) A disclosure order has effect despite any restriction on the disclosure of information imposed by an enactment or otherwise.

(5) An appropriate officer may take copies of any documents produced in compliance with a requirement to produce them imposed under a disclosure order.

(6) The documents may be retained for so long as it is necessary to retain them (as opposed to a copy of them) in connection with the investigation for the purposes of which the order was made.

(7) But if an appropriate officer has reasonable grounds for believing that—

(a) the documents may need to be produced for the purposes of any legal proceedings, and

(b) they might otherwise be unavailable for those purposes,

they may be retained until the proceedings are concluded.

(8) An appropriate officer may retain documents under sub-paragraph (7) only if the officer is a senior officer or is authorised to do so by a senior officer.

Applications

4 An application for a disclosure order may be made without notice to a judge in chambers.

Discharge or variation

5 (1) An application to discharge or vary a disclosure order may be made to the Crown Court by—

(a) the person who applied for the order;

(b) any person affected by the order.

(2) If the application for the disclosure order was made by a constable, an application to discharge or vary the order may be made by a different constable.

(3) If the application for the disclosure order was made by a National Crime Agency officer, an application to discharge or vary the order may be made by a different National Crime Agency officer.

(4) An appropriate officer may not make an application to discharge or vary a disclosure order unless the officer is a senior officer or is authorised to do so by a senior officer.

(5) The Crown Court may—

(a) discharge the order;

(b) vary the order.

Rules of court

6 Rules of court may make provision as to the practice and procedure to be followed in connection with proceedings relating to disclosure orders.

Offences

7 (1) A person commits an offence if without reasonable excuse the person fails to comply with a requirement imposed under a disclosure order.

(2) A person guilty of an offence under sub-paragraph (1) is liable—

(a) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the maximum term for summary offences or a fine (or both);

(b) on summary conviction in Northern Ireland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale (or both).

(3) A person commits an offence if, in purported compliance with a requirement imposed under a disclosure order, the person—

(a) makes a statement which the person knows to be false or misleading in a material particular, or

(b) recklessly makes a statement which is false or misleading in a material particular.

(4) A person guilty of an offence under sub-paragraph (3) is liable—

(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years or a fine (or both);

(b) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);

(c) on summary conviction in Northern Ireland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both).

Statements

8 (1) A statement made by a person in response to a requirement imposed under a disclosure order may not be used in evidence against that person in criminal proceedings.

(2) Sub-paragraph (1) does not apply on a prosecution for—

(a) an offence under paragraph 7(3),

(b) an offence under section 5 of the Perjury Act 1911 or Article 10 of the Perjury (Northern Ireland) Order 1979 (S.I. 1979/1714 (N.I. 19)) (false statements), or

(c) some other offence where, in giving evidence, the person makes a statement inconsistent with the statement mentioned in sub-paragraph (1).

(3) A statement may not be used against a person by virtue of sub-paragraph (2)(c) unless—

(a) evidence relating to it is adduced, or

(b) a question relating to it is asked,

by or on behalf of the person in the proceedings arising out of the prosecution.

Interpretation

9 (1) This paragraph applies for the interpretation of this Part of this Schedule.

(2) “Disclosure order” has the meaning given by paragraph 2.

(3) “Judge” means—

(a) in relation to England and Wales, a judge entitled to exercise the jurisdiction of the Crown Court;

(b) in relation to Northern Ireland, a judge of the Crown Court.

(4) “Senior officer” means—

(a) a constable of at least the rank of superintendent;

(b) the Director General of the National Crime Agency or any other National Crime Agency officer authorised by the Director General (whether generally or specifically) for this purpose.

(5) “Document” means anything in which information of any description is recorded.

(6) “Excluded material”—

(a) in relation to England and Wales, has the same meaning as in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984;

(b) in relation to Northern Ireland, has the same meaning as in the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 (S.I. 1989/1341 (N.I. 12)).

(7) The terms defined in paragraph 1 have the meanings given in that paragraph.

Part 2

Scotland

Introductory

10 (1) This Part of this Schedule applies in Scotland.

(2) In this Part of this Schedule “relevant investigation” and “relevant property” have the same meaning as in Part 1 of this Schedule.

Disclosure orders

11 (1) The Lord Advocate may apply to the High Court of Justiciary for a disclosure order.

(2) The application must state that a person or property specified in the application is subject to a relevant investigation and the order is sought for the purposes of the investigation.

(3) The court may grant the application if satisfied that conditions 1 to 3 are met.

(4) Condition 1 is that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the property specified in the application is relevant property.

(5) Condition 2 is that there are reasonable grounds for believing that information which may be provided in compliance with a requirement imposed under the order is likely to be of substantial value, whether by itself or with other information, to the investigation.

(6) Condition 3 is that there are reasonable grounds for believing that it is in the public interest for the information to be provided, having regard to the benefit likely to accrue to the investigation if the information is obtained.

(7) A disclosure order is an order authorising the Lord Advocate to give to any person the Lord Advocate considers has relevant information notice in writing requiring the person to do any or all of the following with respect to any matter relevant to the investigation—

(a) answer questions, either at a time specified in the notice or at once, at a place so specified;

(b) provide information specified in the notice, by a time and in a manner so specified;

(c) produce documents, or documents of a description, specified in the notice, either at or by a time so specified or at once, and in a manner so specified.

(8) “Relevant information” means information (whether or not contained in a document) which the Lord Advocate considers to be relevant to the investigation.

(9) A person is not bound to comply with a requirement imposed by a notice given under a disclosure order unless evidence of authority to give the notice is produced.

Supplementary provision

12 (1) A disclosure order does not confer the right to require a person—

(a) to answer any question,

(b) to provide any information, or

(c) to produce any document,

which the person would be entitled to refuse to answer, provide or produce in legal proceedings on grounds of confidentiality of communications.

(2) A disclosure order has effect despite any obligation as to secrecy or other restriction on the disclosure of information imposed by an enactment or otherwise.

(3) The Lord Advocate may take copies of any documents produced in compliance with a requirement to produce them imposed under a disclosure order.

(4) The documents may be retained for so long as it is necessary to retain them (as opposed to a copy of them) in connection with the investigation for the purposes of which the order was made.

(5) But if the Lord Advocate has reasonable grounds for believing that—

(a) the documents may need to be produced for the purposes of any legal proceedings, and

(b) they might otherwise be unavailable for those purposes,

they may be retained until the proceedings are concluded.

Applications

13 An application for a disclosure order may be made without notice to a judge of the High Court of Justiciary.

Discharge or variation

14 (1) An application to discharge or vary a disclosure order may be made to the High Court of Justiciary by—

(a) the Lord Advocate;

(b) any person affected by the order.

(2) The High Court of Justiciary may—

(a) discharge the order;

(b) vary the order.

Rules of court

15 (1) Provision may be made in rules of court as to the discharge and variation of disclosure orders.

(2) Rules of court are, without prejudice to section 305 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, to be made by act of adjournal.

Offences

16 (1) A person commits an offence if without reasonable excuse the person fails to comply with a requirement imposed under a disclosure order.

(2) A person guilty of an offence under sub-paragraph (1) is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale (or both).

(3) A person commits an offence if, in purported compliance with a requirement imposed under a disclosure order, the person—

(a) makes a statement which the person knows to be false or misleading in a material particular, or

(b) recklessly makes a statement which is false or misleading in a material particular.

(4) A person guilty of an offence under sub-paragraph (3) is liable—

(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine (or both);

(b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both).

Statements

17 (1) A statement made by a person in response to a requirement imposed under a disclosure order may not be used in evidence against that person in criminal proceedings.

(2) Sub-paragraph (1) does not apply on a prosecution for—

(a) an offence under paragraph 16(3),

(b) perjury, or

(c) some other offence where, in giving evidence, the person makes a statement inconsistent with the statement mentioned in sub-paragraph (1).

(3) A statement may not be used against a person by virtue of sub-paragraph (2)(c) unless—

(a) evidence relating to it is adduced, or

(b) a question relating to it is asked,

by or on behalf of the person in the proceedings arising out of the prosecution.

Interpretation

18 (1) This paragraph applies for the interpretation of this Part of this Schedule.

(2) “Disclosure order” has the meaning given by paragraph 11.

(3) “Document” means anything in which information of any description is recorded.”—(Tom Tugendhat.)

This new Schedule provides for disclosure orders to be made. These orders authorise constables and NCA officers (the Lord Advocate in Scotland) to require information for the purpose of relevant investigations as defined in paragraph 1 of the Schedule.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Schedule 2

Customer information orders

1 (1) An appropriate officer may apply to a judge for a customer information order.

(2) The judge may grant the application if satisfied that—

(a) the order is sought for the purposes of an investigation into foreign power threat activity, and

(b) the order will enhance the effectiveness of the investigation.

(3) “Appropriate officer” means—

(a) in relation to England and Wales or Northern Ireland, a constable or a National Crime Agency officer;

(b) in relation to Scotland, the procurator fiscal.

(4) The application must state that—

(a) a person specified in the application is subject to an investigation within sub-paragraph (2)(a) and the order is sought for the purposes of the investigation;

(b) the order is sought against the financial institution or financial institutions specified in the application.

(5) The application may specify—

(a) all financial institutions,

(b) a particular description, or particular descriptions, of financial institutions, or

(c) a particular financial institution or particular financial institutions.

(6) A customer information order is an order authorising an appropriate officer to give to a financial institution covered by the application notice in writing requiring it to provide any customer information it has relating to the person specified in the application.

(7) The financial institution must provide the information at or by the time, and in a manner, specified in the notice.

(8) A financial institution is not bound to comply with a requirement imposed by a notice given under a customer information order unless evidence of authority to give the notice is produced.

(9) An appropriate officer may not make an application under this paragraph unless the officer is a senior officer or is authorised to do so by a senior officer.

(10) Sub-paragraph (9) does not apply in relation to Scotland.

Supplementary provision

2 A customer information order has effect despite any obligation as to secrecy or other restriction on the disclosure of information imposed by an enactment or otherwise.

Applications

3 An application for a customer information order may be made without notice to a judge in chambers.

Discharge or variation

4 (1) An application to discharge or vary a customer information order may be made to the court by—

(a) the person who applied for the order;

(b) any person affected by the order.

(2) If the application for the customer information order was made by a constable, an application to discharge or vary the order may be made by a different constable.

(3) If the application for the customer information order was made by a National Crime Agency officer, an application to discharge or vary the order may be made by a different National Crime Agency officer.

(4) An appropriate officer may not make an application under this paragraph unless the officer is a senior officer or is authorised to do so by a senior officer.

(5) Sub-paragraph (4) does not apply in relation to Scotland.

(6) The court may—

(a) discharge the order;

(b) vary the order.

Rules of court

5 (1) Rules of court may make provision as to the practice and procedure to be followed in connection with proceedings relating to customer information orders.

(2) In Scotland rules of court are, without prejudice to section 305 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, to be made by act of adjournal.

Offences

6 (1) A person commits an offence if without reasonable excuse the person fails to comply with a requirement imposed under a customer information order.

(2) A person guilty of an offence under sub-paragraph (1) is liable—

(a) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the maximum term for summary offences or a fine (or both);

(b) on summary conviction in Northern Ireland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale (or both);

(c) on summary conviction in Scotland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale (or both).

Statements

7 (1) A statement made by a person in response to a requirement imposed under a customer information order may not be used in evidence against them in criminal proceedings.

(2) Sub-paragraph (1) does not apply on a prosecution for an offence where, in giving evidence, the person makes a statement inconsistent with the statement mentioned in sub-paragraph (1).

(3) A statement may not be used against a person by virtue of sub-paragraph (2) unless—

(a) evidence relating to it is adduced, or

(b) a question relating to it is asked,

by or on behalf of the person in the proceedings arising out of the prosecution.

Interpretation

8 (1) This paragraph applies for the interpretation of this Schedule.

(2) “Appropriate officer” has the meaning given by paragraph 1(3).

(3) “The court” means—

(a) in relation to England and Wales or Northern Ireland, the Crown Court;

(b) in relation to Scotland, the sheriff.

(4) “Customer information”—

(a) in relation to England and Wales or Northern Ireland, has the meaning given by section 364 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002;

(b) in relation to Scotland, has the meaning given by section 398 of that Act.

(5) “Financial institution” has the same meaning as in Schedule 6 to the Terrorism Act 2000 (see paragraph 6 of that Schedule).

(6) “Judge” means—

(a) in relation to England and Wales, a judge entitled to exercise the jurisdiction of the Crown Court;

(b) in relation to Northern Ireland, a judge of the Crown Court;

(c) in relation to Scotland, the sheriff.

(7) “Senior officer” means—

(a) a constable of at least the rank of superintendent;

(b) the Director General of the National Crime Agency or any other National Crime Agency officer authorised by the Director General (whether generally or specifically) for this purpose.”—(Tom Tugendhat.)

This new Schedule provides for customer information orders to be made. These orders authorise constables and NCA officers (the procurator fiscal in Scotland) to obtain customer information from financial institutions.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Schedule 3

Account monitoring orders

1 (1) An appropriate officer may apply to a judge for an account monitoring order.

(2) The judge may grant the application if satisfied that—

(a) the order is sought for the purposes of an investigation into foreign power threat activity, and

(b) the order will enhance the effectiveness of the investigation.

(3) “Appropriate officer” means—

(a) in relation to England and Wales or Northern Ireland, a constable or a National Crime Agency officer;

(b) in relation to Scotland, the procurator fiscal.

(4) The application must state that the order is sought against the financial institution specified in the application in relation to information which—

(a) relates to an account or accounts held at the institution by the person specified in the application (whether solely or jointly with another), and

(b) is of the description so specified.

(5) The application may specify information relating to—

(a) all accounts held by the person specified in the application at the financial institution so specified,

(b) a particular description, or particular descriptions, of accounts so held, or

(c) a particular account, or particular accounts, so held.

(6) An account monitoring order is an order that the financial institution specified in the application must—

(a) for the period specified in the order,

(b) in the manner so specified,

(c) at or by the time or times so specified, and

(d) at the place or places so specified,

provide information of the description specified in the application to an appropriate officer.

(7) The period stated in an account monitoring order must not exceed the period of 90 days beginning with the day on which the order is made.

Applications

2 An application for an account monitoring order may be made without notice to a judge in chambers.

Discharge or variation

3 (1) An application to discharge or vary an account monitoring order may be made to the court by—

(a) the person who applied for the order;

(b) any person affected by the order.

(2) If the application for the account monitoring order was made by a constable, an application to discharge or vary the order may be made by a different constable.

(3) If the application for the account monitoring order was made by a National Crime Agency officer, an application to discharge or vary the order may be made by a different National Crime Agency officer.

(4) The court may—

(a) discharge the order;

(b) vary the order.

Rules of court

4 (1) Rules of court may make provision as to the practice and procedure to be followed in connection with proceedings relating to account monitoring orders.

(2) In Scotland rules of court are, without prejudice to section 305 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, to be made by act of adjournal.

Effect of orders

5 (1) In England and Wales and Northern Ireland, an account monitoring order has effect as if it were an order of the court.

(2) An account monitoring order has effect in spite of any obligation as to secrecy or other restriction on the disclosure of information imposed by an enactment or otherwise.

Statements

6 (1) A statement made by a person in response to an account monitoring order may not be used in evidence against them in criminal proceedings.

(2) But sub-paragraph (1) does not apply—

(a) in the case of proceedings for contempt of court;

(b) on a prosecution for an offence where, in giving evidence, the person makes a statement inconsistent with the statement mentioned in sub-paragraph (1).

(3) A statement may not be used against a person by virtue of sub-paragraph (2)(b) unless—

(a) evidence relating to it is adduced, or

(b) a question relating to it is asked,

by or on behalf of the person in the proceedings arising out of the prosecution.

Interpretation

7 (1) This paragraph applies for the interpretation of this Schedule.

(2) “Appropriate officer” has the meaning given by paragraph 1(3).

(3) “The court” means—

(a) in relation to England and Wales or Northern Ireland, the Crown Court;

(b) in relation to Scotland, the sheriff.

(4) “Financial institution” has the same meaning as in Schedule 6 to the Terrorism Act 2000 (see paragraph 6 of that Schedule).

(5) “Judge” means—

(a) in relation to England and Wales, a judge entitled to exercise the jurisdiction of the Crown Court;

(b) in relation to Northern Ireland, a judge of the Crown Court;

(c) in relation to Scotland, the sheriff.”—(Tom Tugendhat.)

This new Schedule provides for account monitoring orders to be made. These orders may require financial institutions to provide specified information relating to accounts.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I beg to move amendment 66, Title, line 3, after “2007;” insert

“for the registration of certain arrangements with, and activities of, specified persons and foreign principals;”

This amendment amends the long title to add a reference to the registration scheme.

[Tom Tugendhat]

This is a simple change in the title of the Bill and I hope that everyone can support it.

Amendment 66 agreed to.

[Holly Lynch]

On a point of order, Mr Gray. If I may—

[Holly Lynch]

I am so grateful for your guidance, Mr Gray. I want to put on the record my thanks to some of those who have supported the Committee’s deliberations and made our scrutiny possible. I thank the Clerks—Bradley Albrow in particular has been utterly unflappable, often in the face of absolute chaos. He has been a massive help to me and, I am sure, to many other Members, and I thank him for his services.

I also thank Home Office officials and the UK intelligence community, who, I think all Members will agree, have been transparent and engaged in this process, ensuring that we are—given the subject matter—as informed as we can be. I have met several members of the security services over the course of the Bill Committee; funnily enough, I do not have full names for any of them. I thank MI5 director general Ken McCallum and his team for all their support. I also thank Detective Superintendent Darren Hassard and Commander Richard Smith from counter-terrorism policing for their insight on provisions relating to their work, as well as Professor Thom Brookes and senior lecturer and retired police office Owen West for their invaluable assistance. May I also thank my incredibly dedicated parliamentary assistant, Jamie Welham?

I have been very ably assisted by my fellow shadow Front-Bench colleagues as well as by Labour Back Benchers, and I am eternally grateful to them. As we reach Report, I look forward to following up with the Minister on the detail of exactly what has been promised.

[Tom Tugendhat]

May I thank the shadow Minister, the Member for Halifax—she has been of tremendous assistance to me in the very unusual position that I have found myself in—as well as Opposition Members? I also thank enormously my hon. Friends, who have been extraordinarily generous supporters at times when I have been quite literally learning on the job.

I also thank the Clerks—particularly Chris, who was my first Clerk on the Foreign Affairs Committee, which brought me right back home—Home Office officials, the intelligence community, with whom it is such a pleasure to work again, and of course all those who have contributed to the Bill, including you, Mr Gray. Thank you very much indeed.

National Security Bill (Thirteenth sitting)

Debate between Holly Lynch and Tom Tugendhat

Committee stage
Tuesday 18th October 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Tom Tugendhat]

Thank you very much for chairing this sitting, Mr Gray. It is a pleasure to be here under your chairmanship, and a great pleasure to introduce new clause 8 and new schedule 1, which introduce a suite of measures to allow law enforcement officers to apply to the courts for orders to gather information that will assist investigations into foreign power threat activity. As with the other police powers in the Bill, the Government have carefully considered relevant existing legislation, and looked to emulate it where it has proven effective in investigating other serious crimes. I will first speak more broadly about the need for the measures as a whole, before turning specifically to disclosure orders.

Most modern investigations include lines of inquiry into finances and other property, sometimes as a starting point and sometimes to enhance other leads. Financial investigations are often critical in developing evidence that is used in criminal proceedings where there is a financial element, by identifying and tracing criminal assets and uncovering the extent of criminal networks. Financial investigation has become increasingly important in criminal investigations in recent years.

In his recent letter to the Committee, the national lead for counter-terrorism policing, Matt Jukes, stated that it can be difficult for his officers to conduct effective investigations into state threats with the current powers and tools available, and that police would greatly benefit from the inclusion of financial investigative measures. The police have stated that these lines of inquiry are particularly important in state threats cases, where actors may be motivated by financial gain but also where they deploy sophisticated forms of tradecraft, meaning that their criminal conduct is even more difficult to uncover, disrupt and evidence than for other crimes. In many cases, financial and property investigations form an important part of establishing the link between the activity and the foreign power, particularly regarding investigations into obtaining material benefits from a foreign intelligence service.

Investigations into property and finances can take place in relation to any form of criminality, but Parliament has already recognised, in both terrorism legislation and the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, that there are certain circumstances where it is appropriate for investigators to have access to broader investigatory powers. The Committee has also recognised, in particular during our debates on schedules 2 and 3, that state threats investigations are an area where it is appropriate for investigators to have access to enhanced powers. The addition of these new financial and property investigation powers in relation to foreign power threat activity will ensure that law enforcement has the tools it needs to effectively conduct state threats investigations, prevent and mitigate harmful activity and bring those responsible to justice.

The Committee will note that these new powers are available to National Crime Agency officers, reflecting the Government’s intention, as set out in the integrated review of defence and security, to ensure that the NCA has the capabilities that it needs and to pursue greater integration where there is an overlap between serious organised crime, terrorism and state threats.

I want to take this opportunity to inform the Committee that as we have finalised these provisions, we have identified other areas in the Bill where the drafting needs to be tailored to ensure that it is consistent regarding the availability of the powers to the NCA. These small amendments will be addressed on Report.

Turning to disclosure orders, as we have discussed in Committee, schedule 2 provides for a number of powers that law enforcement can use to obtain information in state threats investigations. Law enforcement investigators require disclosure orders for state threats investigations in order to access non-excluded material by compelling individuals or organisations to provide information to investigators. It is important to note that disclosure orders cannot compel someone to answer any question or provide information that is legally privileged, or to produce excluded material. Excluded material is defined under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and includes personal records relating to physical or mental health obtained in the course of a trade or profession, human tissue held in confidence and taken for the purposes of diagnosis or medical treatment, and journalistic material held in confidence. If excluded material were required by investigators, a production order under schedule 2 would be required.

Much of the information that investigators seek under a disclosure order may be considered confidential in nature, such as payment details, but is not classed as excluded material. That may be required because the police have previously approached an organisation to ask for the non-excluded material to be provided, but the organisation has refused because it does not consider that it should disclose the information in the absence of a clear power of compulsion. It may be because the police are conducting a complex investigation involving several organisations that could require multiple requests for information over time. In such a scenario, which is likely to occur in state threats investigations, the police require a streamlined process whereby one order is available to cover separate requests for information from multiple organisations without creating an undue administrative burden on law enforcement, the courts or those who might receive such requests.

In the absence of a disclosure order, a schedule 2 production order, if applicable, would need to be made for every request for information, requiring a large amount of police resource as well as court time. Disclosure orders streamline this process and reduce the numbers of orders needed for requests for non-excluded material during an investigation. For example, if the police were conducting a state threats investigation into an individual and needed to access information from several airline companies regarding the suspect, the company may be willing to provide only basic customer information, such as the full name, without a formal court requirement. If the police required access to the suspect’s payment information used for a plane journey that is suspected of being related to state threat activity, the company may refuse to provide that information, even if investigators provided the company with reassurance that providing this information was in the interests of the prevention of crime. Executing a warrant on the company may be possible, but may not be an appropriate course of action by the police. In some cases, a production order under schedule 2 might be available, but that will not always be the case. Disclosure orders will provide a more proportionate and appropriate way of providing investigators with the information required.

In another example, the police may suspect that a person is purchasing a specialist piece of computer equipment to use in the commission of a state threats offence. The police suspect that the equipment has been purchased from one of a small number of possible companies. In that case, a single disclosure order could be sought, enabling the police to seek information from the companies in question, instead of the police needing to seek multiple production orders.

We recognise that these orders could enable the police to give a notice to a wide range of organisations. As such, senior authorisation is required within law enforcement before an application can be made to the courts. In addition to the requirement for senior authorisation, a disclosure can be made only in relation to an investigation into the identification of state threats property, which is defined as money or other property that could be used for the commission of foreign power threat activity, or the proceeds from such activity. This restriction to investigations into relevant property reflects the scope of the equivalent powers in terrorism and proceeds of crime legislation.

Furthermore, the judge must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing the information being sought would be of substantial value to the investigation, and for believing that it is in the public interest for the information to be provided, having regard to the benefit of the investigation. Disclosure orders provide for an effective and flexible means of obtaining information in a state threats investigation. Sitting alongside the powers of schedule 2, they would ensure that investigators have efficient and effective access to the information that they need to conduct their inquiries.

[Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)]

It is always a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Gray. I also welcome hon. Members back to the final day of the Committee. We welcome new schedules 1, 2 and 3, and hope that they will reflect the complex and evolving nature of state threats, and the significant technical and financial resources that provide the capability for sustained hostile activity.

For too long, our police and security services have had to use blunted tools in this regard, not designed to address adequately the challenges posed by modern day espionage. We are grateful to Counter Terrorism Policing for submitting written evidence to the Committee, and making its support for the new schedules 1, 2 and 3 very clear. Frankly, the Met provided far more in its written evidence on the rationale of these provisions than the explanatory notes accompanying the new schedules from the Government—a point made by my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham.

The fairly non-existent explanatory notes are a constant challenge from this part of the Bill onwards, affecting later amendments, which is disappointing for all hon. Members trying to follow the detail closely. As the Minister said, Assistant Commissioner Matt Jukes said in his written evidence to the Committee:

“We have requested financial investigation powers to support our investigations in this space. To this end we have articulated a clear requirement to emulate various investigatory powers within the Terrorism Act which centre on financial investigations as well as examination of material which can be used for investigatory purposes. We are assured that these will be introduced by way of a forthcoming amendment. If so, this will further ensure that we have the tools required to successfully investigate and disrupt state threat activity.”

We welcome the new schedules, and now that the long overdue Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill has been published, no doubt the new schedules are intended to work alongside some of the part 5 provisions in that legislation. Currently, terrorism disclosure orders can be made under schedule 5A of the Terrorism Act 2000. Counter Terrorism Policing has called for an explicit disclosure order for state threats, stating that it will help investigators benefit from a streamlined process, whereby one order is available to cover separate requests for information from multiple organisations, without the need to return to court. I want to push the Minister on oversight. I have made the case for an independent reviewer of all the new measures in the Bill. As those will be investigatory powers, will the Minister confirm that the investigatory powers commissioner will have responsibility for overseeing their use?

Turning to paragraphs 7 and 17 of new schedule 1, paragraph 7 outlines offences in relation to disclosure orders. Sub-paragraph (3) states that a person commits an offence if

“in purported compliance with a requirement imposed under a disclosure order, the person—

(a) makes a statement which the person knows to be false or misleading in a material particular, or

(b) recklessly makes a statement which is false or misleading in a material particular.”

By comparison, paragraph 17(1) states that a

“statement made by a person in response to a requirement imposed under a disclosure order may not be used in evidence against that person in criminal proceedings.”

I cannot quite square that off. I am keen to better understand why the information provided by a person under a disclosure order could not be used as evidence in criminal proceedings.

Before concluding, as I have said before, I accept that it is standard to refer to a police officer as “constable” in legislation, despite the fact that in doing so we are referring to police officers of any rank, not the rank of constable, which seems problematic. New schedule 1 is a prime example of where it gets messy. Paragraph 1(5) says that an appropriate officer for the purposes of these powers is either a constable or a National Crime Agency officer. It is not until paragraph 2(10) that the provision states that an appropriate officer must be a senior officer or authorised by a senior officer. Not until paragraph 9(4) does it confirm that “senior officer” must be a superintendent or above. Would it not be clearer to be explicit about the stipulated rank required to exercise certain powers at the earliest opportunity, instead of allowing for the ambiguity of the word “constable”? The last thing any of us want is for any ambiguity to be exploited by defence lawyers in the courts.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

New clause 9 and schedule 2 seek to insert customer information orders into the Bill as part of the suite of investigatory measures. Those who engage in state threats activity are highly trained individuals who have knowledge of tradecraft that can obfuscate their identity and real intentions.

For example, the tradecraft could be used to conceal transactions by creating secret bank accounts under false identities, or accounts registered to different addresses, in order to send or receive money for conducting activity. The operational objective of a customer information order is to enable an investigator to identify accounts and other account information in relation to state threats investigations. For example, this could be where a foreign agent is paying others to conduct state threats activity in the United Kingdom and police need to identify where the agent’s account is held, or it could be where a suspect is using a covert account under a false identity to receive funds to use for the purposes of state threats activity.

The customer information order is therefore intended for use as a tool of discovery during an investigation, often in the early stages. Once accounts have been identified through a customer information order, they could, where appropriate, be subject to further monitoring or investigation through a schedule 2 production order or an account monitoring order. Without customer information orders, accounts used by those conducting state threats activity may go unidentified, reducing investigative opportunities and, in turn, the ability for law enforcement to disrupt harmful activity and bring offenders to justice. We recognise that such orders could potentially require any financial institution to provide information about relevant customers. As such, senior authorisation is required within law enforcement before an application can be made to the courts.

We expect that, in practice, the powers will be used by police and NCA officers who have received relevant financial investigator training, and we are continuing to work with the police and NCA on creating the relevant guidance. Again, we have modelled the provisions on the terrorism equivalent and the measures used in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, and the consistency of these processes will ensure that law enforcement officers can make the most effective use of the powers. As I have set out, the customer information orders are another important investigative tool, opening new lines of inquiry and ensuring that law enforcement can run effective state threats investigations.

[Holly Lynch]

New clause 9 and new schedule 2 establish customer information orders, which authorise the police and NCA officers to obtain customer information from financial institutions. In its written submission to the Committee, for which we are all grateful, Counter Terrorism Policing has welcomed the provision, stating that it will

“enable investigators to identify accounts in relation to state threat investigations, or where an individual is using a covert account under a false identity to receive funds to use for the purposes of state threats.”

As the Minister outlined, the tool has been available to law enforcement for terrorism investigations thanks to schedule 6 to the Terrorism Act 2000, and it has been available for criminal investigations through the Proceeds of Crime Act. However, according to Counter Terrorism Policing, it has not been possible to use either Act in relation to state threats investigations, so we welcome the provision. It prompts the question of why we have not addressed this issue sooner.

Subsection (2) states that the judge may grant the order if they are satisfied that

“the order is sought for the purposes of an investigation into foreign power activity”,

and that

“the order will enhance the effectiveness of the investigation.”

We have spoken a lot about the value of an independent reviewer, and I welcome the substance of the Minister’s comments. It is worth keeping under review the threshold of a judge being satisfied that the order is sought for the purposes of investigation into foreign power activity. We cannot use these orders without good cause, but if we need them to be able to find evidence of foreign power activity, will investigators be able to satisfy a judge prior to that? It will be interesting to see how many applications are granted and rejected once we start to work with the orders. Aside from those points, I am happy with new schedule 2.

National Security Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Debate between Holly Lynch and Tom Tugendhat

Committee stage
Thursday 8th September 2022 Public Bill Committees

[The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)]

Let me briefly say that we all pray for Her Majesty; it is an extraordinary moment. God save the Queen.

Clause 53 sets out how certain part 2 notices are to be served. A part 2 notice, an extension notice, a revival notice or a notice of a variation of the measures without consent must be served in person to the individual in order to have effect, whereas other notices may be served through the individual’s solicitor.

Schedule 5 contains a supporting power for the police to enter and search premises to find an individual for the purpose of serving a notice on them. This is so that the individual is informed in person and the implications of the notice can be explained to them.

Clause 53 also provides that when a subject is served the relevant notice they must be provided with a confirmation notice that sets out the period for which that notice will remain in force. This will give the individual certainty regarding the period of time for which the measures apply to them.

[Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)]

Clause 53 states that a confirmation notice must be served on an individual who is served with a state threats prevention and investigation measure, or a revival notice or extension notice, setting out the period, including dates, for which the individual will be subject to the STPIM, unless it is quashed or revoked before its expiry.

We recognise the need for the clause, and it is right that there is a great deal of emphasis on serving the notice to an individual personally. There is, however, a distinct lack of detail in the Bill about who can serve a notice. Counter-terrorism police have again been very helpful in taking me through how such work might be undertaken operationally, but I put it to the Minister that it is not clear in the legislation that it would need to be a constable of a certain rank, or that it would need to be a constable. Other areas of the Bill do specify that.

It is not just a case of serving the notice: it is also the point at which a person is informed of the terms of the part 2 notice notice and presumably relocated and monitored to ensure their compliance with it. I wish to probe whether the provisions in clause 53 would benefit from being ever so slightly tightened up in that specific regard.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

I hope the right hon. Gentleman will forgive me, but I will have to write to him on that question. As for the question about the rank of the officer, a constable or any warranted officer is the answer.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 53 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 54

Contracts

[Holly Lynch]

I beg to move amendment 67, in clause 54, page 38, line 29, at end insert—

“(2) Within three months of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must publish a statement setting out how the Secretary of State intends to exercise the power under this section. The statement must include an list of illustrative examples of the kinds of contracts or other arrangements this power relates to.”

[Holly Lynch]

Clause 54 makes me uncomfortable and requires some thorough consideration. Amendment 67 seeks to flesh out some of the detail as to what the clause means in reality.

The explanatory notes say:

“This clause grants the Secretary of State authority to purchase services in relation to any form of monitoring in connection with measures specified in Part 2 notices. This would include, for example, electronic monitoring of compliance with the residence requirement provided for in Schedule 4.”

Frankly, the Government have a somewhat chequered history in awarding contracts, and while I will not go through the back catalogue, it is against that backdrop that we ask for more detail before we sign off on this clause. Section 29 of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 includes the same provision, so I hope that the Minister is in a position to share with us how private companies have been involved in the monitoring of those subject to TPIMs, so that we can gain a clearer understanding of how that would be replicated with STPIMs.

I am looking for reassurance on two fronts. The first is that we are not using contractors who are vulnerable to hacking or other forms of cyber-attack. There will be marked differences between the cohort of people currently subject to a form of monitoring—and even those subject to TPIMs—compared with STPIMs, which stand to present different challenges, so what tech will be used for monitoring someone subject to a part 2 notice, and how do we ensure that we, but no one else, knows where that individual is? I am assuming, based on what little we are asked to go on in the clause and explanatory notes, that we could be talking about wearable technology or monitoring hardware and software. I suspect that at least some component parts will be made overseas, if not all of them.

We sought to establish where the ankle monitors that are currently used come from. With some help from the House of Commons Library, we found that in November 2017 the Ministry of Justice awarded a contract for the supply of electronic monitoring services, which includes software and hardware, to G4S, and it appears to have been extended, but we could not establish where they were purchased from or just how robust they are. How do the Government plan to address that concern operationally and ensure that there are no holes to be exploited in the technology itself? How do we write those protections and technical specifications into contracts under clause 54?

Secondly, we are dealing with particularly capable people, potentially with the support of entire nation states. I want to know that our security services and trained police officers are undertaking this monitoring work, rather than private contractors who stand to be overwhelmed if not equipped and trained adequately. I had a look at what happens currently. The National Audit Office’s recent report published in June 2022, called “Electronic monitoring: a progress update”, states on page 22 that G4S supplies tags and home monitoring equipment as part of HM Prison and Probation Service’s tower delivery model for its tagging transformation programme.

HMPPS is an agency of the Ministry of Justice and is responsible for tagging. The report explains that the tower contracting approach has four different suppliers, each responsible for a different element of the national programme: supplying and fitting tags to offenders; running a monitoring centre; providing underlying mapping data; and providing the communications network. HMPPS acts as an integrator to co-ordinate work across the four suppliers. Can the Minister confirm that that is the same model, which has a number of private contracts and moving parts, presumably with the exchange of a lot of information between those moving parts, that we use for monitoring those subject to TPIMs, and that it is therefore the same way in which we will monitor people subject to STPIMs?

I would greatly appreciate some clarification from the Minister on that, to ensure that our national security cannot be outsourced and that we have specialist and trained people from our dedicated services undertaking this really important monitoring, using technology that can withstand the threat of outside interference. Given the situation in which we find ourselves, I urge the Minister to consider the merits of amendment 67.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Clause 54 grants the Secretary of State authority to use third parties to assist in relation to any form of monitoring in connection with the measures specified in part 2 notices. As the hon. Member for Halifax rightly identified, the electronic monitoring of compliance with the residence measure, such as by entering into a contract with a third party to provide tagging services, is exactly the form of contract that is envisioned. In practice, the Government will ensure efficiency by aligning, where possible, with existing contracts, and therefore may use ones that are already set up for comparable provisions in law, such as TPIMs.

The intention of the amendment is to seek clarity about what types of contracts the Home Secretary might enter into in relation to STPIMs and how she intends to exercise the power. Though the Government do not feel that publishing further detail on any such contract is necessary, I absolutely assure the Committee that the clause is not designed to do anything to outsource intelligence services. Instead, it is a standard approach that we have with TPIMs, where in some instances it is necessary for the Government to outsource some services. An example of such is the contract for ankle monitoring services to which the hon. Lady referred. She will be aware of my own views on outsourcing technology to various states; she can be absolutely assured of my own interest in making sure I prosecute this.

[Tom Tugendhat]

As the right hon. Member will be aware, in all such circumstances there will be a great variety, because what might be shared with somebody providing one service may not be the same as what is shared with another. It is also evident that the normal regulation on protecting privacy would apply where appropriate, and the Government would therefore abide with all due legal requirements. I cannot give a further commitment than that, for the obvious reason that the variety in which such contracting would apply is enormous. I can therefore only assure him that the existing previsions would endure.

[Holly Lynch]

I have listened carefully to what the Minister has said. He talked about the convenience of extending existing contracts; however, given the cohort of those who will be subject to STPIMs, that is the exact point that concerns me. We are talking about a volume of those who have committed more typical types of crime, but we need to think much more carefully about the types of technology, the software and the individuals involved in monitoring those subject to STPIMs.

Given the Minister’s reputation and understanding of the detail, and as he has already given me those assurances, I am willing to give him the benefit of the doubt that he will go back to officials and interrogate clause 54, so that he and I are satisfied that there are no vulnerabilities in that approach. I hope we can continue that conversation with the Minister. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 54 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 55

Legal aid in relation to Part 2 notices

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

I thank the hon. Member for Halifax; she can be assured that my commitment to protecting our security through electronic means, as through every other means, will endure.

Clause 55 will extend the scope of legal aid so that it will be available for state threats prevention and investigation measures. It will allow individuals to access legally aided advice and representation in relation to a part 2 notice, subject to means and merits tests. That replicates the position in the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011.

The measures are a civil order designed to protect and mitigate the risk to the public from individuals who pose a threat but cannot be prosecuted or, in the case of foreign nationals, deported. Legal aid will be made available in those cases due to the restrictive nature of the measures that an individual may be subject to. It is right that we balance robust investigation and prevention measures with the access to justice and judicial oversight that this House would demand.

[Holly Lynch]

As we have already heard, clause 55 inserts a new paragraph in schedule 1 to the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2021, to enable individuals subject to part 2 notices to receive civil legal services in relation to those notices.

--- Later in debate ---

[Holly Lynch]

I am grateful to the Minister for that comprehensive run-through of the different elements within this part 4 grouping. I will speak to the collection of clauses and amendments, which encompass the remaining provisions in part 4. Clauses 65 and 66 give powers to the Government to consequentially amend legislation based on the content of the Bill. We spoke to the House of Commons Library in order to assure ourselves that this was a conventional allocation of powers, and did not go beyond what was necessary. I am grateful to the Library staff for their feedback.

Government amendment 64 provides that regulations made under the specified provisions for the foreign influence registration scheme, which we have not yet got to, are to be made using the affirmative procedure. It seems an odd arrangement that we are debating the process for the regulations without having first considered in detail the substance of those provisions. However, here we are. We will come to the FIRS provisions; despite how long the scheme has been in the pipeline, it is fair to say that a great deal of the detail of those measures is still to be determined—and is yet to be determined in regulation. It is right that they are subject to the affirmative procedure and to proper scrutiny when that detail has been worked through. We hear and understand that it may take some time yet, but it is an important point.

Further to Government amendment 64, there are two more provisions for regulations on registration information and information notices, which merit the same approach for the reasons I have just outlined. Our amendment to Government amendment 64 seeks to extend it only to ensure a consistent level of scrutiny of what will be serious new measures. It would allow the measures to be considered by hon. Members in Committee and would ensure that they deliver what is needed. On that basis, I ask the Minister to adopt our small, but entirely appropriate, change to Government amendment 64.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I am grateful for the hon. Lady’s point. I want to correct a comment that I made. I said the provisions apply to the Crown and this meant that Crown servants could not commit the offences. What I meant was they can commit the offences in the Bill, and that is the whole point of the regulation and this change to allow the freedom that is required.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 65 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 11

Minor and consequential amendments

Amendments made: 39, in schedule 11, page 141, line 29, after “offence” insert “under section 15 of the National Security Act 2022 or”.

This amendment inserts a reference to offences under clause 15 (preparatory conduct) into the definition of “national security-related qualifying offence”.

Amendment 40, in schedule 11, page 141, line 30, leave out

“the National Security Act 2022”

and insert “that Act”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 39.

Amendment 41, in schedule 11, page 142, line 8, after “offence” insert

“under section 15 of the National Security Act 2022 or”.

This amendment inserts a reference to offences under clause 15 (preparatory conduct) into the definition of “qualifying offence”.

Amendment 42, in schedule 11, page 142, line 8, leave out

“the National Security Act 2022”

and insert “that Act”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 41.

Amendment 43, in schedule 11, page 142, line 15, after “offence” insert

“under section 15 of the National Security Act 2022 or”.

This amendment inserts a reference to offences under clause 15 (preparatory conduct) into the definition of “qualifying offence”.

Amendment 44, in schedule 11, page 142, line 15, leave out

“the National Security Act 2022”

and insert “that Act”.—(Tom Tugendhat.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 43.

Schedule 11, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 66 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 67

Regulations

[The Chair]

Does the hon. Member for Halifax wish to move amendment (a) to Government amendment 64?

[Holly Lynch]

I will continue to engage with the Government on that issue, but I will not move the amendment.

Amendments made: 64, in clause 67, page 48, line 25, at end insert—

“(za) regulations under section (Requirement to register foreign activity arrangements);

(zb) regulations under section (Meaning of “political influence activity”);

(zc) regulations under section (General exemptions);”

This amendment provides that regulations made under the specified provisions are to be made using the affirmative procedure.

Amendment 65, in clause 67, page 49, line 2, at end insert—

“(11) If a draft of a statutory instrument containing regulations under section (Requirement to register foreign activity arrangements) would, apart from this subsection, be treated for the purposes of the standing orders of either House of Parliament as a hybrid instrument, it is to proceed in that House as if it were not such an instrument.”—(Tom Tugendhat.)

This amendment provides that regulations under NC11 are not to be treated as hybrid instruments.

Clause 67, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 68 to 73 ordered the stand part of the Bill.

New Clause 7

Obtaining etc material benefits from a foreign intelligence service

(1) A person commits an offence if—

(a) the person—

(i) obtains, accepts or retains a material benefit which is not an excluded benefit, or

(ii) obtains or accepts the provision of such a benefit to another person,

(b) the benefit is or was provided by or on behalf of a foreign intelligence service, and

(c) the person knows, or ought reasonably to know, that the benefit is or was provided by or on behalf of a foreign intelligence service.

(2) A person commits an offence if—

(a) the person agrees to accept—

(i) a material benefit which is not an excluded benefit, or

(ii) the provision of such a benefit to another person,

(b) the benefit is to be provided by or on behalf of a foreign intelligence service, and

(c) the person knows, or ought reasonably to know, that the benefit is to be provided by or on behalf of a foreign intelligence service.

(3) Material benefits may include financial benefits, anything which has the potential to result in a financial benefit, and information.

(4) A material benefit is an excluded benefit if—

(a) it is provided as reasonable consideration for the provision of goods or services, and

(b) the provision of those goods or services does not constitute an offence.

(5) A benefit may be provided by or on behalf of a foreign intelligence service directly or indirectly (for example, it may be provided indirectly through one or more companies).

(6) Subsections (1) and (2) apply to conduct outside the United Kingdom, but apply to conduct taking place wholly outside the United Kingdom only if—

(a) the material benefit is or was, or is to be, provided in or from the United Kingdom, or

(b) in any case, the person engaging in the conduct—

(i) is a UK person, or

(ii) acts for or on behalf of, or holds office under, the Crown, or is in Crown employment (whether or not they engage in the conduct in that capacity).

(7) In proceedings for an offence under subsection (1) by virtue of retaining a benefit, it is a defence to show that the person had a reasonable excuse for retaining the benefit.

(8) In proceedings for an offence under subsection (1) or (2) it is a defence to show that the person engaged in the conduct in question—

(a) in compliance with a legal obligation under the law of the United Kingdom,

(b) in the case of a person having functions of a public nature under the law of the United Kingdom, for the purposes of those functions, or

(c) in accordance with an agreement or arrangement to which—

(i) the United Kingdom was a party, or

(ii) any person acting for or on behalf of, or holding office under, the Crown was (in that capacity) a party.

(9) A person is taken to have shown a matter mentioned in subsection (7) or (8) if—

(a) sufficient evidence of the matter is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it, and

(b) the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

(10) A person who commits an offence under subsection (1) is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years or a fine (or both).

(11) A person who commits an offence under subsection (2) is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years or a fine (or both).

(12) The following terms have the same meaning as in section 3—

“financial benefit”;

“foreign intelligence service”;

the “law of the United Kingdom”;

“UK person”.”

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The new clause contains two offences concerned with obtaining, accepting, agreeing to accept or retaining a material benefit from a foreign intelligence service. These offences add to the new toolkit for law enforcement and the intelligence agencies in responding to espionage activity.

FIS operations in the UK run contrary to our safety and interests. In order to operate successfully, a FIS needs to recruit, fund and support networks of agents to support their undeclared activity in the United Kingdom. One of the most important motivating factors that a FIS is able to deploy to recruit agents is financial inducement or the provision of benefits in kind. It is often the case—this is reflective of the tradecraft of such organisations—that only the money or other material benefits can be evidenced to a satisfactory criminal standard. The new offence will enable early intervention to prevent further harm from being caused and will further strengthen our ability to prevent FIS activity, building on clause 3.

The first offence, in subsection (1), concerns a person who obtains or accepts a material benefit for themselves or another person, or who retains a material benefit, from a FIS. That could involve obtaining or accepting legal or school fees intended for someone else’s benefit. Some benefits are excluded benefits, which I will come on to in a moment. That offence would attract a maximum penalty of 40 years.

The second offence, in subsection (2), concerns a person who agrees to accept a material benefit from a FIS for themselves or another person, which is not an excluded benefit. This offence, where no benefit is obtained, accepted or retained, would attract a maximum penalty of 10 years. For both offences, the benefit must also be provided by or on behalf of a FIS, and the person must know, or ought reasonably to know, that the benefit came from a FIS.

We must be alive to the tradecraft of foreign intelligence services and their ability to adapt and potentially overcome any narrow definitions in this area. Accordingly, we have drawn the meaning of “material benefit” wider than just financial benefit. Material benefit will include money and money’s worth, such as gifts. It will also capture wider benefits such as information, including information on a business arrangement, as well as anything that has the potential to result in a financial benefit. We have safeguards in place to ensure that legitimate activity is not brought into scope of the new clause.

Subsection (8) replicates the defences in clause 3, which means that a person does not commit an offence if they are complying with a legal obligation, conducting public functions or acting in accordance with an agreement to which the UK is a party. As with other offences in the Bill, Attorney General consent must be obtained before prosecution.

In addition to those protections, the new offences have an additional layer of protection in the form of the excluded benefit for those who have legitimate reason for receiving a material benefit—for example, because they provide services to diplomatic missions in the United Kingdom that are known to accommodate declared intelligence officers.

Under subsection (4), a benefit is an excluded benefit if it is provided as reasonable consideration for the provision of goods or services and the provision of goods and services does not constitute an offence. For example, a shopkeeper does not commit an offence by selling groceries to a person who happens to be a member of a FIS. Another example of the type of contact that is excluded through this exemption is a person who lives in Northern Ireland and works in the Republic of Ireland for the police force.

The effect of introducing the concept of an excluded benefit will mean that in cases where someone is believed to have committed an offence of obtaining a material benefit, the prosecution would need to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the benefit was not an excluded benefit.

In addition to the concept of an excluded benefit, we have made provision for a reasonable excuse defence in subsection (7), which relates only to the offence of retaining a benefit contrary to subsection (1). This has been done to allow people who, for example, may be unable to return a benefit and so are forced to retain it. It will also enable law enforcement and the intelligence agencies to target those people who do not have a legitimate reason for retaining such a benefit. Although, crucially, subsections (4), (7) and (8) allow us to take a wide range of legitimate activity out of scope, we have been careful to ensure that the offence captures all types of activity we are concerned about.

The definition of a FIS would include a police force or other body with intelligence functions, which is the same definition found in clause 3. As I said when I introduced that clause to the Committee, we have drawn it in that way because it is increasingly common for organisations and foreign Government agencies to undertake activity more traditionally associated with intelligence services.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

The right hon. Gentleman is exactly right. The point of the defence of “reasonable” is that, in order for this to be an offence, the individual needs to be aware that the benefit is supplied by a foreign intelligence source. Therefore, so long as they are unaware of it, it is not an offence. When they become aware of it, it is an offence.

The last point that I wish to make is on the delays. I know that the hon. Member for Halifax will understand that the Ukrainian situation, and a certain change of Government office holders most recently, may have interrupted the provisions. However, on that note—

[Holly Lynch]

Before the Minister closes, will he take an intervention?

[Tom Tugendhat]

Yes.

[Holly Lynch]

I am really grateful to the Minister. I appreciate that he is winding up. I think, if I have understood his response to my question about sex in exchange for information, that, for something to be a benefit, it would have to have a monetary value. Therefore, if there was an exchange of sex for information, that could not be prosecutable under this new clause.

I just wanted to say that because a case was brought to my attention. Partly because I am reluctant to gather any further information by typing the word “sex” into a search engine on the parliamentary estate—I am always incredibly reluctant to do that, for obvious reasons—I could not establish any further details about a specific case. Will the Minister undertake to have a look at that in a bit more detail, just to ensure that we have not missed anything through narrow definitions within this clause?

[Tom Tugendhat]

The hon. Lady can be absolutely assured that there is no way that I would like to leave out any form of inducement that a foreign intelligence service could use to entice somebody to commit a serious crime. Therefore, of course, I would be very happy to look into that.

The clause, as written, says:

“Material benefits may include financial benefits, anything which has the potential to result in a financial benefit, and information.”

Therefore, it is pretty broadly worded. I will talk to officials about how we could make it clearer if that is necessary, but I will certainly undertake to do that. Before I sit down, I will just say, God save the Queen.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 7 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Scott Mann.)

National Security Bill (Eleventh sitting)

Debate between Holly Lynch and Tom Tugendhat

Committee stage
Thursday 8th September 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Tom Tugendhat]

As the comparable sections in the terrorism prevention and investigation measures legislation make clear, clauses 41 to 44 are technical elements that improve the regime and make it work in practice. Clause 41 mirrors TPIMs by making provision for the measures imposed to be varied while they are in force. That will allow changes to be made to the restrictions where necessary, in response to changes in the individual’s personal or family circumstances or to the assessment of the risk they pose. Those provisions will be important in ensuring that the regime is able to respond dynamically and flexibly to changing circumstances, and that the individual is able to live as normal a life as is possible without posing a threat to the British people.

The provisions will also be important to securing the effective operational management of state threats prevention and investigation measures. Critically, the underlying requirement that the measures imposed must always be necessary and proportionate remains, and that is explicitly the case for any variation that has the effect of strengthening the measures imposed.

[Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under you as Chair once again, Ms Ali. They say a week is a long time in politics: never has that been truer than this week. I am very pleased to see the Minister in his place, but—for the second time over the course of this Committee—not quite as pleased as the hon. Member for North Cornwall that he once again has a Minister in place. I welcome the Minister to his role; as others have said, he is the fourth Minister we have had over the course of this Bill. We welcome the opportunity to continue to work together, now that we can make some vital progress on this really important piece of legislation. I also look forward to working with him on this policy area beyond just the legislation that is in front of us.

Turning to the detail of this group of clauses, clause 41 makes provision for the measures imposed under a part 2 notice to be varied in a number of different circumstances, as the Minister has outlined. Subsection (2) makes it possible for the Secretary of State to vary a relocation measure in a part 2 notice if considered necessary

“for reasons connected with the efficient and effective use of resources in relation to the individual”.

We are satisfied with those measures, and recognise the necessity of the remaining provisions in the clause.

Clause 42 provides a power for the Secretary of State to revoke a part 2 notice at any time by serving a revocation notice, whether or not in response to a request by the individual. The Secretary of State may exercise that power where they consider it is no longer necessary for the part 2 notice and the measures imposed under it to remain in force. The explanatory notes say that

“although the measures may no longer be necessary at the time that the Part 2 notice is revoked (for example because the individual has been detained in prison), they may subsequently become necessary again (when the same individual is released from prison, perhaps following an unsuccessful prosecution for a criminal offence).”

As I have said before, the assumed prosecution rate for state threats in the Home Office impact assessment is just 33%, so I am concerned that we might need that level of flexibility, depending on the circumstances.

Subsection (6)(a) of the clause also provides a power for the Secretary of State to revive for a period of a year a notice that has previously expired without being extended, without the need for evidence of new state threat activity. Surely if a person continues to be a threat, the notice should not be allowed to expire; alternatively, if the notice has been allowed to expire because the person is no longer deemed a threat, reviving a notice without any new information surely could not be justified. On that basis, I would be keen to hear any further rationale for the provisions in subsection (6)(a).

When considering the revocation of part 2 notices, it is also worth considering what Jonathan Hall QC described as the “TPIM Catch-22” in his annual report on the terrorism equivalent of these part 2 measures:

“On the one hand, in order to test whether an individual would revert to terrorism-related activity in the absence of TPIM measures, there may be no alternative but to reduce or remove measures; for example, by allowing an individual to associate or move more freely.

“On the other hand, association and movement measures have been imposed precisely to counter the risk of terrorist-related activity. In the absence of evidence of risk reduction, to do so might put members of the public at risk of harm.”

It is not easy to step down from STPIMs once they have been imposed and there is a clock ticking on the restrictions imposed on a suspect, so what efforts are we making to establish best practice on this, so that clauses 41 and 42 can be deployed as effectively as possible?

Clauses 43 and 44, also in this group, make provision for circumstances in which a part 2 notice is “quashed” or directed to be revoked as a result of court proceedings, and schedule 6 rightly provides other circumstances in which an individual who is convicted of an offence under clause 50 has a right of appeal against that conviction.

Other than the points we have raised, we are satisfied that these measures strike an appropriate balance.

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[Tom Tugendhat]

Clause 48 requires the Secretary of State to report to Parliament every quarter on the exercise of her powers under this part of the Bill. The Committee will recognise the parallel to similar measures in the TPIM Act 2011. Although details of the operation of the system and of particular cases will necessarily be sensitive and cannot be disclosed publicly, the clause acts as an additional safeguard by welcoming public scrutiny of the use of the regime and powers, and offers reassurance that crucial information about the operation of the regime will be public and kept up to date. Crucially, that information will include the extent of the Secretary of State’s use of her powers and the number of cases in which measures are imposed. It will also include details of court judgments handed down in the relevant period that relate to the use of those powers.

Clause 49 requires the Secretary of State to appoint an independent reviewer to review the operation of part 2 annually. First, the reviewer is required to undertake a review of the operation of the STPIM regime as soon as is reasonably practical at the end of each year, and a report on the outcome of the review must be sent to the Secretary of State as soon as is reasonably practical after the review has been completed. Then, the Secretary of State is obliged to lay the report before Parliament. That replicates the approach in TPIMs, for which the annual reports have been an effective way of examining the Government’s use of their powers.

The independence of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, combined with their unrestricted access to Government papers and intelligence, has led to real insight and informed reports that have aided the functioning and development of the TPIM regime. Using the same approach for STPIMs will ensure similarly robust scrutiny. Omitting the clause would undermine the level of oversight and transparency of the regime. I hope the Committee agrees that the provision is important for the effective operation of STPIMs.

New clause 2, tabled by the hon. Member for Halifax, proposes commitments to review annually the operations of parts 1, 3 and 4 of the Bill. I thank the hon. Lady for tabling the new clause and I understand the intention behind it. Appropriate oversight of national security functions—particularly the use of intrusive powers—is important. A range of oversight mechanisms are in operation and govern both the UK’s intelligence agencies and the police, which are the primary bodies that will utilise the new powers in the Bill.

As I have just mentioned in addressing clause 49, the Government have made a commitment to an independent reviewer of part 2 of the Bill. Although there may well be merit in extending oversight of the legislation beyond part 2, careful consideration must be given to how that is done. In some cases, it could create an undesired overlap of duplication of responsibility. The Committee discussed that earlier—a little bit before my time—in the context of the hon. Lady’s proposal for an independent body to monitor disinformation. There are further examples of potential duplication, such as the powers in clause 22, which are already the responsibility of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner.

The new clause also proposes that part 3 of the Bill be reviewed by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. As the Committee knows, part 3 contains measures to freeze civil damages awarded to claimants who are seen as representing a real risk of using their award to fund acts of terror, and measures to restrict access to civil legal aid for convicted terrorists. As a result, it is already in the remit of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation to review those measures. An explicit commitment to oversight of part 3 of the Bill is therefore unnecessary and would duplicate the existing discretion of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation to review and report on terrorism-related legislation.

With those points in mind, the Government cannot accept new clause 2 at this stage. Although I fully appreciate the purpose behind the new clause, I ask the hon. Lady to withdraw it for now. The Government take oversight of the Bill seriously, and we will consider the best way to approach it. I will be in touch with her about that.

[Holly Lynch]

I am grateful for the way the Minister has approached the new clause. I accept entirely the volume of work he has had to do in the past 24 to 36 hours.

We feel quite strongly about some of the proposals we are advocating for in new clause 2. There is an acceptance of the real value of the work undertaken by the independent reviewers right across the agencies that work with this type of legislation. We think we are largely doing the Government a favour in putting these proposals forward.

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[Tom Tugendhat]

I thank hon. Members for the tone of this discussion. I appreciate that scrutiny is important. This is about protecting not just the rights of individuals, but the agencies that are carrying out such important work on our behalf. Their heroism and courage on operations need to be protected, so that the agencies are not later found in legal difficulty in areas where they have acted not only with integrity but with enormous courage. I therefore appreciate the tone.

Briefly, I will touch on the question of scrutiny and laying before the House. I will make an absolute commitment to bring forward reports as soon as possible. I appreciate that there have been a few issues of late, which may have delayed things. I assure the hon. Member for Halifax that I will do my best to ensure that those timelines are reduced and are as sharp as possible. I absolutely appreciate her point. The issue of being laid before both Houses is made absolutely clear in the publication.

To touch on the question of who the commissioner might be, that has not been resolved as yet. I appreciate the hon. Lady’s point and there is merit on both sides of the argument, but either way, there is huge merit in ensuring that whoever is doing TPIMs has a very close connection with whomever is doing STPIMs. Whether that is a newly appointed individual or the extension of a role, I am happy to ensure that they work closely together.

[Holly Lynch]

We have been probing that during the passage of the Bill. Because that role is so crucial to the oversight that needs to follow the rest of the provisions in the legislation, can the Minister, as an absolute minimum, confirm that that person will be in post and that that issue will have been resolved by the time the Bill is enacted, so that that is not an ongoing question that starts to run into the legislation being enacted?

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[Tom Tugendhat]

The clause provides for a criminal offence of breaching a measure specified in a part 2 notice without reasonable excuse. This echoes, as do many of the provisions, a similar provision in the TPIM regime, and includes cases in which a person has permission from the Secretary of State to contravene a measure and does not adhere to the terms or conditions of that permission. For the sake of enforceability, it is vital that a part 2 notice is reinforced with effective penalties if the subject does not comply. Hence the maximum penalty on conviction is a custodial sentence not exceeding five years, unless the travel measure is breached, in which case the maximum sentence is 10 years.

[Holly Lynch]

The clause provides for an offence of contravening without reasonable excuse any measure specified in a part 2 notice. That, again, mirrors section 23 of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011. According to the Government’s most recent transparency report, in December 2020 the total number of individuals who had been served a notice since TPIMs were introduced in 2011 was 24, so compliance is relatively high. But so are the stakes when someone breaches the terms of such measures.

According to the “Statistics on the operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and subsequent legislation” quarterly report from the Home Office, the number of people who have been prosecuted and convicted under section 23 of the TPIM Act, meaning that they contravened an order, is 10. Like TPIMs, the primary function of STPIMs is to be able to control and monitor those who represent a serious threat to our national security but cannot yet be prosecuted. We have been assured that the primary function of an STPIM is to be able to manage a person while an investigation into a part 1 offence is established, rather than simply creating a situation where a prosecutable breach is highly likely.

We note the particular focus on travel in clause 50, and that under subsection (2) an individual who travels without permission loses any reasonable excuse defence. Given that we anticipate that there might be a higher number of foreign nationals and dual nationals in this cohort due to the state threat nature of the offences, it is possible that we might have higher numbers of requests to attend overseas births and deaths of family members and loved ones among the cohort. However, the risk of permitting that travel, which might mean a return to a very hostile state that we fear is sponsoring the individual’s activity, presents a massive challenge. To ensure there are robust decision-making processes around those considerations and to have good reporting and a review of those elements of the clause would be welcome additions.

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[Tom Tugendhat]

The clause gives effect to schedule 8, which provides the police with powers of search, entry, seizure and retention in a number of scenarios relating to STPIMs. For the sake of ease, I will cover the clause and the schedule together.

Before I go into the detail of the clause, I remind the Committee that STPIMs will be a tool of last resort. The Government will use every other tool at our disposal before resorting to such significant measures. Again, I remind the Committee that these measures mirror those in the TPIMs regime.

In order to effectively enforce the regime and check an individual is complying with the measures under their STPIM, the police will have the powers they need to enter premises, conduct necessary searches and seize and retain items as necessary. They will also be able to arrest the individual for a “breach of” offence if they fail to grant police access.

Schedule 8 provides powers to the police to enter and search premises without a warrant to locate an individual for the purpose of serving an STPIM notice or another specified notice on them; to search an individual or premises when serving an STPIM notice for the purpose of discovering anything that might breach any measures specified in the STPIM notice; to search premises on suspicion that an individual subject to an STPIM notice has absconded; and to search an individual subject to an STPIM notice for public safety purposes. It provides a power to police with a warrant to search an individual or premises to determine whether an individual is complying with the measures specified in the STPIM notice. There are also powers for a constable to seize and retain items found in the course of such searches.

I remind the Committee that the STPIM itself is kept under review and requires a court’s permission to impose the measure. That means that a court will have already agreed with the assessment of the Secretary of State that the individual meets the meet five conditions in clause 33, which the Committee has already agreed to. That means it is proportionate in terms of a national security determination for the police to be able to undertake the aforementioned activities without a warrant. The powers will be essential to managing and enforcing the measures imposed under STPIMs and, importantly, they provide the right balance between effective powers and safeguards for the rights of the individual.

[Holly Lynch]

I have a couple of queries on schedule 8, which provides powers of entry, search, seizure and retention in a number of scenarios relating to part 2 notices.

I have queried the use of the word “constable” in legislation before, but it seems to be standard. Paragraph 9(9) states:

“The warrant may be executed by any constable.”

Previous schedules specify certain ranks and specialisms, such as counter-terrorism officers, to undertake such duties. Are we satisfied that further stipulations on who may execute a warrant are not required?

Sub-paragraph (10) states that a warrant issued by a court to search the individual, the individual’s place of residence, or other premises specified by the warrant, expires after 28 days. That period feels a bit odd to me. We want officers to have the flexibility they need, but I cannot imagine a scenario in which they have grounds to apply for a warrant but then take more than 20 days after it is issued to execute it. I am grateful to counter-terrorism police for sharing a bit more about their operations and how these warrants are used, which has provided some reassurance on this front, but will the Minister confirm that a warrant cannot be executed more than once in the 28-day period?

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[Tom Tugendhat]

The clause will give effect to schedule 9, which makes provision for the taking and retention of biometric material from individuals subject to a part 2 notice. I will cover the clause with the schedule.

The biometric data retention provisions relating to state threats prevention and investigation measures are in line with those existing elsewhere in the statute book, including in TPIMs, which have been well established for more than 10 years. The schedule makes separate provisions for taking the fingerprints and samples of an individual subject to a specified prevention and investigation measure in England, Wales and Northern Ireland to that of Scotland. That ensures that provisions are in line with different police procedures and legislation.

constable may take biometric data, which could include physical data, from an individual subject to a part 2 notice. The individual will be informed of the reason for the fingerprints or sample being taken. Police can require an individual to attend a police station for the purpose of providing biometric data, and that material may be checked against other such material held under a variety of other powers. The schedule requires the destruction of relevant material, including fingerprints, DNA profiles or relevant physical data, unless there is a power to retain, which I shall come to.

The purpose of the provisions is to ensure the right balance between the protection of the public and individual civil liberties. Under paragraph (11), any samples taken from the individual must be destroyed as soon as a DNA profile has been derived from that sample or, if sooner, within six months of taking the sample. Paragraphs (8) and (9) contain powers to retain biometric data. Where there is no relevant previous conviction, fingerprints, DNA profiles and physical data may be retained for six months after the end of the relevant part 2 notice being in force.

Under paragraph (9), a national security determination can be made by a chief officer of police, enabling the police to retain for up to five years data relating to an individual who may pose an enduring national security threat. All national security determinations that can be reviewed must be reviewed by the biometrics commissioner, who has continued oversight of the retention and use of such data.

We recognise the importance of safeguarding individuals’ right to privacy, so paragraph (12) sets out the limitation of uses for any retained material taken from a person subject to a part 2 notice, which are in the interests of national security, for the purposes of investigation foreign power threat activity, for the purposes of a terrorism investigation, for the detection and prevention of crime, or in the interests of identification only.

[Holly Lynch]

I listened intently to the Minister. Schedule 9 makes provision for the taking and retention of fingerprints and non-intimate samples from individuals subject to a part 2 notice. Schedule 9, like schedule 3, is subject to several Government amendments. As the explanatory notes explain, fingerprints and non-intimate samples have the same meaning as that given in section 65 of PACE 1984. I would be grateful to the Minister for some clarity on that, which he may need to provide in writing. There is a lot going on in relation to biometrics in different parts of the Bill.

Paragraphs (6) to (11) make provision relating to the destruction and retention of material taken from individuals subject to a part 2 notice. The explanatory notes say that where an individual has no relevant previous convictions, fingerprints and DNA profiles may be kept for only six months after the part 2 notice ceases to be in force. Paragraph (11) goes on to state that, as provided in the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, material taken under PACE, for example, or that is subject to the Terrorism Act 2000 or the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, need not be destroyed if a chief office of police determines that it is necessary to retain that material for purposes of national security. Given that we are dealing almost exclusively with matters of national security in schedule 9, can we assume that the majority of biometric evidence taken from individuals subject to part 2 notices may be held indefinitely under this provision?

I am reliably informed that the biometric retention provisions in the Bill are designed to bring the powers into line with similar provisions in terrorism legislation. Schedule 9(8) deals with the retention of biometrics collected in the course of the service of a part 2 notice under the STPIM provisions. That provides us with a retention of six months prior to a national security determination being made, and is therefore in line with the provision under schedule 6 of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011.

A separate provision for the retention of biometrics can be found in paragraph 22 of schedule 3. It provides for a retention period of three years for those detained under schedule 4 provisions, in line with biometrics collected under section 41 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and section 41 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, which qualify terrorism offences.

Beyond the initial retention period, both provisions are capable of retention by way of a national security determination process. I have lost track—I do not know whether other Members have—of whether we are keeping biometrics for an initial six months, as schedule 9 seems to outline, or for three years, which is the case elsewhere in the Bill. I suspect the Minister is unable offer absolute clarity right now—although I have no doubt that the civil servants think it is absolutely crystal clear—but I would be grateful if he could outline, perhaps in writing, the rationale for the different provisions.

Government amendment 32 specifies that the chief constables of the Ministry of Defence police and the British Transport police, and the director general of the National Crime Agency, are added to paragraph 9(4) of schedule 9. The responsibilities of the Civil Nuclear Constabulary are different from those of other forces, but is the Minister certain that it does not need to be added to the list?