Bank of England (Appointment of Governor) Bill

Debate between Lord Brady of Altrincham and John McDonnell

Friday 6th July 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Graham Brady (Altrincham and Sale West) (Con)]

rose—

[John McDonnell]

I have allowed large numbers of interventions. If I can press on, I will see whether I can allow further interventions later.

Let me go through the other arguments that the Chancellor has made. He also argued that involving the Treasury Committee in determining the appointment of the Governor would blur the lines of accountability, saying that

“it is proper that the Government of the day chooses the Bank Governor,”

and

“is held accountable for that choice”.

However, the reality is that the Governor’s term of office rarely coincides with a Government’s term of office. Many Governments inherit the Governor appointed by the previous Government and can therefore barely be held accountable for that appointment. The involvement of Parliament in the appointment would simply mean that both the Executive and Parliament would be held accountable for it. That is perfectly proper and appropriate.

Let me turn to Executive functions. When challenged over his decision to allow the Treasury Committee a veto over an appointment to the OBR, but to refuse it one over the appointment of the Governor, the Chancellor argued that

“the Governor…is carrying out executive functions on behalf of the State,”

such as setting monetary policy and monitoring financial stability. In the evidence session on 5 July 2011, the Chair of the Treasury Committee pointed out to him the contradiction between that argument and the argument that the Committee should have a veto over the OBR appointment precisely because it would be carrying out Executive functions. The Chancellor then made a rather bizarre distinction between different Executive functions, which was beyond the Committee’s comprehension.

The other argument, which was raised in the other place, concerned market sensitivity. The argument was that the appointment of the Governor was market sensitive and that involving the Committee in the process could have a detrimental impact on the markets by creating uncertainty over the appointment. It could just as easily be argued that OBR appointments are extremely market sensitive. However, whether the appointment of the new Governor is undertaken behind the closed doors of the Treasury or openly and transparently in the Committee, there will still be speculation in the markets about which candidate will be appointed and what the impact will be. If the post is so market sensitive, it is even more important that the appointee is seen to have the approval and confidence of both the Executive and Parliament.