Covid 19 Inquiry: Judicial Review
Debate between Baroness Laing of Elderslie and Jeremy Quin(1 year, 6 months ago)
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The Minister for the Cabinet Office and Paymaster General (Jeremy Quin)
I am grateful for permission to make a statement on the Government’s decision to seek a judicial review on a specific point of law relating to the public inquiry on the covid pandemic. The whole House will recognise that, as you so eloquently said, Madam Deputy Speaker, on any issue that is before the courts, a Minister needs to act and speak with extreme sensitivity. We fully respect the difficult role that judges need to perform, and I appreciate that the conventions of this place are designed to ensure that we do not make their role—the sober and detailed consideration of facts of law by those qualified to do that—any harder. I am sure that the House will respect the fact that, for those reasons, it would be inappropriate for me to debate the fine details of this case.
Notwithstanding that, we felt that there was very real public interest in the broader issue of why the Government would take the unusual step of asking for a judicial review on a point of technical difference between the Government and an inquiry that the Government have established. That being the case, we felt, as ever, that the matter should be raised in this House.
The Government fully support the vital work of the inquiry, which seeks to establish the facts, and the lessons to be learned from the response to the pandemic. It is right that the inquiry on covid-19 be comprehensive and rigorous. It is being chaired by Baroness Hallett, an eminent former Court of Appeal judge. In this dispute, the guidance of the courts is sought on a narrow and technical point of law. It does not touch on the Government’s confidence in the inquiry. Nor does it in any way affect the Government’s intention to continue full co-operation with the inquiry. To date, the Cabinet Office alone has submitted 55,000 documents to the inquiry. We will continue to provide any and all covid-related materials requested.
We are grateful for the work being undertaken by the inquiry chair and her team. The pandemic was one of the most difficult times for our country in living memory —so many people lost so much. The inquiry’s task is challenging. It must have the support of us all in conducting its work, and in bringing forward its conclusions in a timely way. The core point of principle that is raised is whether there are limits to the power of the inquiry to compel information and documents to be produced.
Specifically, the question raised by the compulsory notice under the Inquiries Act 2005 that was served on the Cabinet Office is whether the inquiry has the power to compel production of documents and messages that are unambiguously irrelevant to the inquiry’s work, including personal communications and matters unconnected to the Government’s handling of covid. The notice received is bound to include a range of material of that nature. It covered a two-year period and a range of documents, including WhatsApp messages relating to my right hon. Friend the Member for Uxbridge and South Ruislip (Boris Johnson) and a former special adviser.
I reiterate that all material that is relevant to the inquiry’s work has been and will be provided to the inquiry; likewise, material about which there might be real questions about its relevance to that work. There is no question but that all internal discussions on covid, in any form, requested by the inquiry will be made transparently available to it. What has been redacted, and so not provided in response to the notice, is material that the Cabinet Office considers to be clearly and unambiguously irrelevant to that work. That material includes, for example, communications about purely personal matters and about other aspects of the Government’s policy and work which have nothing to do with covid. It is that material, and that material alone, that is subject to judicial review. Hon. Members wanting to see more detail of our concerns may be interested in our letter to the inquiry, sent last Thursday, which is available on the Government’s website and a copy of which I will deposit in the House of Commons Library.
As in any such dispute, there are two sides to this debate. Baroness Hallett, as I have said, is a highly respected senior judge and inquiry chair in whom the Government have great confidence. The inquiry has made relevant statements regarding the Government’s position on its website, to which I draw the House’s intention. The inquiry will no doubt be making further statements. Above all, as I understand it, the inquiry believes that it should be for the inquiry alone to judge the relevance of the material requested. We respect that position and, as I have indicated, the Cabinet Office has provided material about which there might be a dispute.
Where we differ with the inquiry is only in relation to material that is considered to be clearly and unambiguously irrelevant, and that is considered to be so after careful checking. This is a genuine and sincere difference of opinion on which we are seeking the guidance of the courts. I do, however, want to assure the House that the Government have explored with the inquiry ways to bridge the gap between those sincerely held but differing views, and we will continue to do so. We appreciate the patience and goodwill shown by the inquiry as we have sought to identify a mutually acceptable solution.
We have also sought to assure the inquiry on the nature of the redactions of non-relevant material from the information requested in the section 21 notice and how those would operate. The process deployed to ascertain and redact unambiguously irrelevant material from that information is as follows. Witnesses are required to identify any material that may contain potentially irrelevant information to the inquiry, with guidance from the counsel team supporting them. That is then reviewed by the counsel team, who identify any material that is unambiguously irrelevant. The counsel team discusses it with the witness in case there is any context or detail of which they may not be aware. The review by the counsel team includes the assessment of a King’s Counsel instructed by the Cabinet Office. No decision to redact material as unambiguously irrelevant has been or will be taken by a witness acting alone.
These redactions will all be kept under review such that if the scope of the chair’s inquiry changes, she will be able to receive the material that becomes potentially relevant. I would like to reiterate that this is a matter of legal principle that will have an impact on this Government and all future Governments. This is absolutely not related to one individual’s personal information.
In conclusion, I would like to again issue my thanks to the inquiry chair and her team for the important work they are undertaking. The Government have only embarked on this course after serious consideration. It is with regret that we felt the judicial review had to be brought forward. We are very aware that it is sometimes in the nature of government that difficult decisions have to be taken, knowing that in the short term they may of course be criticised or misinterpreted, but which we believe are important for the country in the longer term. Whereas it is entirely right that any material in any way related to covid is available to the inquiry, we believe there is value to challenge and debate inside Government being unclouded by the knowledge that other discussions could be disclosed regardless of their relevance to any future inquiry. As such, we believe this request for guidance is necessary.
Finally, I would like to make it absolutely clear to all those directly affected and bereaved by covid that the Government will do absolutely nothing that we believe impedes the vital work of the inquiry, to give them the answers they deserve and that the country needs to ensure that we learn the lessons of covid. I commend the statement to the House.
Fleur Anderson (Putney) (Lab)
I thank the Minister for an advance copy of his statement. This weekend I walked the length of the covid memorial wall on the banks of the Thames just opposite this building. Every heart on that wall symbolises a life lost to covid. Every heart represents a family who lost a loved one—a mother, father, sibling, friend or colleague—to that terrible disease. That is what the covid inquiry is about: preventing a repeat of that same tragedy, which cost so many lives and still affects so many of us; and answering the questions that so many families still have.
This week, we all watched with embarrassment—I am sure that Government Members on the Benches behind the Minister feel the same privately—as the Cabinet Office, the Department responsible for upholding transparency in government, briefed journalists that taxpayers would be picking up yet another legal bill to pay for the Prime Minister’s ploy to obstruct the covid inquiry. We need more information: public inquiries are a core ministerial responsibility in the Cabinet Office; and vital lessons are learned through inquiries, which save lives in the future. By undermining and challenging the inquiry, the Government could undermine not only trust but public safety. Then, there is the cost: hundreds of thousands of pounds of taxpayers’ money on legal fees.
May I ask the Minister a few straightforward questions? How much has his Department projected the judicial review to cost? Does he agree with his Minister’s assessment that the review will “probably” fail? Does he think that time would be better spent on complying with the inquiry, handing over the information and learning lessons to prevent another pandemic, rather than this infighting?
Can the Minister confirm media reports that his Department’s lawyers have threatened to pull the plug on the taxpayer-subsidised legal defence fund for the right hon. Member for Uxbridge and South Ruislip (Boris Johnson)? Does he agree that Ministers must be held to the highest standards of transparency and openness? In that spirit, what guidance has he given to other Cabinet Ministers about handing over WhatsApp messages to the inquiry? Will we be back here again?
How many inquiry-imposed deadlines for evidence submissions have been missed to date? Can the Minister confirm whether the Prime Minister has already handed over his WhatsApp messages to the inquiry in full? Can he confirm how many devices have been handed over by the former Prime Minister?
The Minister claims that the Government have handed over 55,000 documents to the covid inquiry. I commend civil servants for working through the night to look at them, but his Department previously admitted that well over 20 million documents could be relevant. What criteria have been used to determine whether evidence will be suppressed?
It comes down to trust. We need to be able to trust the process and the determination of what is relevant and what is not. People’s trust in this Government is severely weakened, and the judicial review is undermining it further.
Jeremy Quin
The hon. Lady started where I ended, and she is right that the focus of the inquiry must be the people who have been affected and bereaved and the lessons that this country needs to learn. I commend her for her walk over the weekend. It is harrowing to see that memorial and to remember what it represents.
Government is tough. It is easier, in many ways, to be in Opposition. They do it very well on the Opposition Benches, and I am sure that they will get even more practice over a long period of time, but in government we have to take very difficult decisions. It does not take a genius to realise that the decision we felt we had to make regarding a judicial review may be misinterpreted and criticised, but we have to look at the long-term consequences for this and future Governments. There are important—albeit technical—matters of law, and we need guidance to ascertain how this and future inquiries should operate.
The hon. Lady asked a series of questions, one of which was on cost. I cannot give her an exact number, but I am delighted that, from what we have heard from the courts, the judicial review looks to be heard very soon and in a timely fashion, which I would welcome for a number of reasons. I will certainly not get into our view of the case. That would be pertinent; it is before the courts, which must look into that and take their own view.
I will go through all the points the hon. Lady made. There is a long tradition, under all Administrations, that Ministers should be provided with support for their legal fees and for their work to support and help the inquiries that are established—that is the right thing to do.
The hon. Lady is right that we have already passed over some 55,000 items. To counsel a note of caution about the hon. Lady’s reference to 2 million documents, those undertaking the inquiry have made it clear that they do not want to be flooded with information that is not relevant to the inquiry, and therefore we go through the process of trying to ensure that they get all the information that they require that is covid related. The point of issue is only material that is unambiguously not relevant to the inquiry. We go through a process, which I have set out to the hon. Lady and to the House.
I reiterate that we have a great deal of confidence in the inquiry. We know that those undertaking the inquiry are absolutely assiduous in their work, but we feel that there is a technical point of law on which we need to have guidance from the courts, and that is what we are pursuing.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)
I call the Chairman of the Select Committee on Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs.
Mr William Wragg (Hazel Grove) (Con)
The problem is that if Government business is conducted by means of WhatsApp, public inquiries will express an interest in reading what was transacted. My right hon. Friend is well aware of what a statutory public inquiry is and how that is established under the Inquiries Act 2005. Indeed, he referenced section 21 of that Act, which makes it clear that it is for the inquiry chair to decide what is required. When he says that the question is about material that might be “unambiguously” irrelevant, surely it is for the chair to determine that. It was spurious nonsense to hear some Ministers witter on about personal information about their children being disclosed—that is not the case. Nor is it my understanding that any of this material will be subject to a freedom of information request. May I ask my right hon. Friend why, sadly, the Government have chosen this course of action?
Jeremy Quin
I thank my hon. Friend, but in my recollection the Act refers to related material. However, we will not dwell on that as it is a matter for the courts.
I have some sympathy with my hon. Friend regarding WhatsApp messages. Such messages should not be used for taking policy decisions; those decisions should be taken formally and through the proper course. Any WhatsApp information presented will cover all manner of things between individuals and may well include illness, family or other personal issues. That is simply a statement of fact.
I think it is absolutely vital that we have guidance on this technical point. When other inquiries reported, we were perhaps in an era before a whole range of means of communication, including WhatsApp. I would point out to my hon. Friend that while WhatsApp has got the attention, the technical point of law applies to all manner of communications, not simply WhatsApp, about what is unambiguously irrelevant or what is relevant, and the process will determine that.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)
I call the spokesperson for the Scottish National party.
Infected Blood Inquiry
Debate between Baroness Laing of Elderslie and Jeremy Quin(2 years ago)
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The Minister for the Cabinet Office and Paymaster General (Jeremy Quin)
With permission, Madam Deputy Speaker, I will make a statement to update the House on our preparations for the infected blood inquiry, which is expected to conclude next year.
I took over as the Minister sponsoring the inquiry on 25 October. While I have been aware of this issue for many years, as have so many of us who have been contacted by affected constituents, undertaking this role has further impressed on me its scale and gravity—not only the direct, dreadful consequences for victims, but the stigma and trauma experienced by many of those infected, by their families, and by those who care for them. I recognise that, tragically, we continue to see victims of infected blood die prematurely, and I also recognise that time is of the essence.
I commend the work of the all-party parliamentary group on haemophilia and contaminated blood. I am pleased to have met the co-chairs, the right hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Dame Diana Johnson) and the Father of the House, my hon. Friend the Member for Worthing West (Sir Peter Bottomley), and I am grateful for their insight.
In July 2017 my right hon. Friend the Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May) established the infected blood inquiry, chaired by Sir Brian Langstaff. My predecessor as Paymaster General, the current Leader of the House, went further by commissioning a study from Sir Robert Francis KC, which is entitled “Compensation and redress for the victims of infected blood: recommendations for a framework”. The purpose of the study was clear, namely to ensure that the Government were in a position to fully consider and act on the recommendations. Sir Robert delivered it in March this year.
The Government had intended to publish a response alongside the study itself, ahead of Sir Robert’s evidence to Sir Brian Langstaff’s inquiry. However, as the then Paymaster General explained, the sheer complexity and wide range of factors revealed in Sir Robert’s excellent work meant that when the study was published by the Government on 7 June, it was not possible to publish a comprehensive response. The Government remained absolutely committed to using the study to prepare for the outcome of the Langstaff inquiry, and that is still the case.
On 29 July, in response to Sir Robert’s recommendations, Sir Brian Langstaff published an interim report on interim compensation. It called for an interim payment of £100,000 to be paid to all those infected and all bereaved partners currently registered on UK infected blood support schemes, and to those who registered between 29 July and the inception of any future scheme. The Government accepted that recommendation in full on 17 August. Quite rightly, a huge amount of work was undertaken across Government during the ensuing weeks to ensure that the interim payments could be exempt from tax and disregarded for the purpose of benefits, and that an appropriate delivery mechanism existed. This involved work across many Departments, and with the devolved Governments in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Interim compensation is just one part of our overall response, but it was important that we got it right.
I fully recognise that interim compensation was but one of the recommendations in Sir Robert’s study. I want to stress to the House and to the many people who have a direct and personal interest in the inquiry that those interim payments were only the start of the process, and work is ongoing in consideration of Sir Robert’s other recommendations. I am pleased that all the interim payments were made by the end of October. Sir Robert recognised in his study that the Government could not give in advance a commitment on the exact shape that redress will take. Our comprehensive response must await the final report of the infected blood inquiry. However, I want to assure those affected that this Government, which delivered a statutory inquiry and interim compensation, remain absolutely committed to our intentions in commissioning the compensation framework study. Accordingly, and recognising the need to continue to build trust with the affected community, I want to share with the House the progress we are making.
A cross-Government working group, co-ordinated by the Cabinet Office, is taking forward work strands informed by Sir Robert’s recommendations. A cross-departmental group at permanent secretary level has been convened, chaired by the Cabinet Office second permanent secretary, Sue Gray, to oversee that work. I am pleased to be able to say that Sir Robert has agreed to provide independent transparent advice to the group as work progresses. I am grateful to him for his continued input into our thinking. It is my intention over the coming months to update the House on progress and, where it is possible, to provide greater clarity on the Government’s response to Sir Robert’s recommendations prior to Sir Brian’s report being published.
In the meantime, I wish to make clear one critical answer to a recommendation posed by Sir Robert. In the first recommendation of his study, Sir Robert sets out that there is in his view a moral case for compensation to be paid. The Government accept that recommendation. There is a moral case for the payment of compensation. We have made that clear in our actions with the payment of interim compensation. I now want to make it equally clear on the Floor of the House. The Government recognise that the scheme utilised must be collaborative and sympathetic, and as user-friendly, supportive and free of stress as possible, while being consistent with the Government’s approach to protect against fraud. The Government will ensure those principles are adopted.
We have significant work to do to ensure we are ready for Sir Brian’s report. For example, Sir Robert makes detailed findings and recommendations about the delivery of the scheme, which must be worked through in discussion with the devolved Administrations. Work will need to be undertaken to ensure, in line with his recommendation, that final compensation can be made free of tax and disregarded for benefits purposes.
We know, too, that the inquiry will make recommendations in relation to bereaved parents and children. In his interim report, Sir Brian made clear his view that the moral case for their compensation is beyond doubt. Sir Brian recognised that the approach to compensating this group of people is complex and the Government must be ready to quickly address recommendations relating to them. The work in consideration of the study will ensure that the Government are prepared to act swiftly in response to Sir Brian Langstaff’s final recommendations relating to compensation.
Those infected and affected have suffered enough. Having commissioned both the inquiry and the report, the Government have further shown their commitment in our actions by the payment of interim compensation. Sir Brian and Sir Robert have both ensured that the voices of those infected and affected are front and centre of their work, and I, too, hope to be able to meet and hear from people directly affected as our work progresses. We have much to do, but I wish to assure the House—this is why I wished to be here today—that this is a priority for the Government and we will continue to progress it. I commend this statement to the House.
Jeremy Quin
I thank the hon. Lady for her remarks. She spoke movingly of the impact on those infected and affected. I concur that time is of the essence. I appreciate that, for family reasons, she knows how difficult it must be for the people who saw these things happening to their relatives, and how awful that process has been. I also appreciate that it is incredibly important, given all that has happened to this community, that trust is built and retained. I certainly commit that we will update the House regularly.
I cannot commit to a timetable. The reason is that I do not want to say anything in this House that we cannot meet. There is a complex series of steps to be taken and work to be done across Government and with the devolved Administrations. But I assure hon. Members that it is my intention to update the House as we make progress. We must do so in order to ensure that those infected and affected are fully apprised of the progress we are making.
I am grateful to Sir Robert and Sir Brian for how they have incorporated the views of those infected and affected in their work. My impression is that those infected and affected have appreciated the engagement they have had through the work undertaken. I hope that means that Sir Brian’s work is fully reflective of the thoughts of the community. I have said that I wish to meet members of the community. I want to ensure that our work is timely and ready to fully consider and respond to the work that Sir Brian produces during the course of next year.
Public Order Bill
Debate between Baroness Laing of Elderslie and Jeremy QuinTuesday 18th October 2022
(2 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Public Order Act 2023 View all Public Order Act 2023 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Consideration of Bill Amendments as at 18 October 2022 - large print - (18 Oct 2022)
The Minister for Crime, Policing and Fire (Jeremy Quin)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government new clause 8—Injunctions in Secretary of State proceedings: power of arrest and remand.
New clause 1—Guidance on locking on—
“The Secretary of State must by regulations issue guidance to police forces about the protest technique of locking on, which includes—
(a) examples of best practice, and
(b) detailed guidance on addressing new and developing forms of locking on.”
New clause 2—Consolidated protest guidance—
“(1) Within three months of Royal Assent to this Act, the Secretary of State must by regulations issue guidance which consolidates into a single source—
(a) the College of Policing’s authorised professional practice for public order guidance,
(b) the National Police Chiefs’ Council’s operational advice for protest policing, and
(c) the National Police Chiefs’ Council’s protest aide memoire.
(2) The Secretary of State must regularly review the guidance and, if appropriate, must by regulations issue revised consolidated guidance.
(3) The consolidated guidance must include specific updated guidance about the protest technique of locking on.”
New clause 3—National monitoring tool—
“(1) The Secretary of State must develop a consistent national monitoring tool, accessible by all police forces, to monitor the use of or requests for specialist protest officers across England and Wales.
(2) Data collected under this section may be used to evaluate capacity and demand for specialist protest officers across England and Wales.
(3) The monitoring tool must be accessible on a national, regional and local basis.
(4) The monitoring tool must include—
(a) examples of best practice from policing protests across the United Kingdom, and
(b) data on how many trained officers have been required for any protests during the period in which monitoring took place.”
New clause 4—Injunction to prevent serious disruption to effective movement of essential goods or services—
“(1) Upon an application by a person under subsection (4), an injunction may be ordered by a Judge of the High Court against ‘persons unknown’ in order to prevent a serious disruption to the effective movement of any essential goods or any essential services occasioned by a public procession or public assembly.
(2) The “persons unknown” may be—
(a) anonymous persons taking part in a public process or public assembly who are identifiable at the time of the proceedings; and/or
(b) persons not presently taking part in a public procession or public assembly protest but who will in future join such a public procession or public assembly.
(3) The conditions under which such an injunction may be granted are as follows—
(a) there must be a real and imminent risk of a tort being committed which would result in a serious disruption to the effective movement of any essential goods or any essential services;
(b) a method of service must be set out in the order which may reasonably be expected to bring the proceedings to the attention of the “persons unknown”;
(c) the “persons unknown” must be defined in the order by reference to their conduct which is alleged to be unlawful;
(d) the acts prohibited by the order must correspond with the threatened tort;
(e) the order may only prohibit lawful conduct if there is no other proportionate means of protecting the effective movement of essential goods or essential services;
(f) the terms of the order must set out what act(s) the persons potentially affected by the order must not do;
(g) the terms of the order must set out a defined geographical area to which the order relates; and
(h) the terms of the order must set out a temporal period to which the order relates, following which the order will lapse unless a further order is made upon a further application by the applicant.
(4) An applicant for an injunction to prevent serious disruption to effective movement of essential goods or services may be—
(a) a local authority with responsibility for all or part of the geographical area to which the proposed order relates;
(b) a chief constable with responsibility for all or part of the geographical area to which the proposed order relates; or
(c) a person resident in, or carrying on a business within, the geographical area to which the proposed order relates.
(5) A “serious disruption to effective movement of essential goods or services” includes a prolonged disruption to—
(a) the effective movement of the supply of money, food, water, energy or fuel;
(b) a system of communication;
(c) access to a place of worship;
(d) access to a transport facility;
(e) access to an educational institution; and
(f) access to a service relating to health.”
New clause 5—Definition of “serious disruption”—
“(1) For the purposes of this Act, ‘serious disruption’ means—
(a) significant delay to the delivery of a time-sensitive product to consumers
of that product, or
(b) prolonged disruption of access to any essential goods or any essential service, including, in particular, access to—
(i) the supply of money, food, water, energy or fuel,
(ii) a system of communication,
(iii) a place of worship,
(iv) a place of worship,
(v) an educational institution, or
(vi) a service relating to health.
(2) In subsection (1)(a) a ‘time-sensitive product’ means a product whose value or use to its consumers may be significantly reduced by a delay in the supply of the product to them.”
New clause 6—Offences impeding emergency workers—
“(1) This section applies where—
(a) the court is considering for the purposes of sentencing the seriousness of an offence under sections 1 (Offence of locking on) or 3 (Obstruction etc of major transport works) of this Act, and
(b) the commission of the offence had the effect of impeding an emergency worker in exercising their functions, subject to the exception in subsection (2).
(2) The exception is that the emergency worker was exercising their functions in connection with the offence for which the person is being sentenced or in connection with any action which the court considers to be related to that offence.
(3) The court—
(a) must treat the fact mentioned in subsection (1)(b) as an aggravating factor (that is to say, a factor that increases the seriousness of the offence), and
(b) must state in open court that the offence is so aggravated.
(4) In this section, ‘emergency worker’ means—
(a) a constable;
(b) a person (other than a constable) who has the powers of a constable or is otherwise employed for police purposes or is engaged to provide services for police purposes;
(c) a National Crime Agency officer;
(d) a prison officer;
(e) a person (other than a prison officer) employed or engaged to carry out functions in a custodial institution of a corresponding kind to those carried out by a prison officer;
(f) a prisoner custody officer, so far as relating to the exercise of escort functions;
(g) a custody officer, so far as relating to the exercise of escort functions;
(h) a person employed for the purposes of providing, or engaged to provide, fire services or fire and rescue services;
(i) a person employed for the purposes of providing, or engaged to provide, search services or rescue services (or both);
(j) a person employed for the purposes of providing, or engaged to provide—
(i) NHS health services, or
(ii) services in the support of the provision of NHS health services, and whose general activities in doing so involve face to face interaction with individuals receiving the services or with other members of the public.
(5) It is immaterial for the purposes of subsection (4) whether the employment or engagement is paid or unpaid.
(6) In this section—
‘custodial institution’ means any of the following—
(a) a prison;
(b) a young offender institution, secure training centre, secure college or remand centre;
(c) services custody premises, as defined by section 300(7) of the Armed Forces Act 2006; “custody officer” has the meaning given by section 12(3) of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994;
‘escort functions’—
(a) in the case of a prisoner custody officer, means the functions specified in section 80(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1991;
(b) in the case of a custody officer, means the functions specified in paragraph 1 of Schedule 1 to the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994;
‘NHS health services’ means any kind of health services provided as part of the health service continued under section 1(1) of the National Health Service Act 2006 and under section 1(1) of the National Health Service (Wales) Act 2006;
‘prisoner custody officer’ has the meaning given by section 89(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1991.”
New clause 9—Publication of data about use of stop and search powers—
“(1) The Secretary of State must publish data about the use of the stop and search powers under sections 9 and 10 within three years of—
(a) if sections 9 and 10 come into force on the same date, the date on which they come into force, or
(b) if sections 9 and 10 come into force on different dates, the later of those two dates.
(2) The data published under this section must include—
(a) the total number of uses of stop and search powers by each police force in England and Wales, including whether the powers were used on suspicion or without suspicion,
(b) disaggregated data by age, disability, ethnicity/race, sex/gender and sexual orientation of the people who have been stopped and searched, and
(c) data relating to the outcomes of the use of stop and search powers.”
New clause 10—Review of the use of stop and search powers—
“(1) The Secretary of State must appoint an independent reviewer to assess and report annually on the use of the stop and search powers under sections 9 and 10.
(2) In carrying out their review, the person appointed under subsection (1) must—
(a) consider the impact of the use of stop and search powers on groups with protected characteristics under the Equality Act 2010, and
(b) consult such civil society organisations as appear to the person appointed under subsection (1) to be relevant.
(3) The person appointed under subsection (1) must ensure that a report on the outcome of the review is sent to the Secretary of State as soon as reasonably practicable after the completion of the review.
(4) On receiving a report under this section, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament—
(a) a copy of the report, and
(b) the Government’s response to the findings.
(5) The first report under this section must be completed no later than one year after the date provided for under section [publication of data about use of stop and search powers](1).”
New clause 11—Offence of interference with access to or provision of abortion services—
“(1) A person who is within a buffer zone and who interferes with any person’s decision to access, provide, or facilitate the provision of abortion services in that buffer zone is guilty of an offence.
(2) A “buffer zone” means an area which is within a boundary which is 150 metres from any part of an abortion clinic or any access point to any building or site that contains an abortion clinic and is—
(a) on or adjacent to a public highway or public right of way,
(b) in an open space to which the public has access,
(c) within the curtilage of an abortion clinic, or
(d) in any location that is visible from a public highway, public right of way, open space to which the public have access, or the curtilage of an abortion clinic.
(3) For the purposes of subsection (1), ‘interferes with’ means—
(a) seeks to influence,
(b) persistently, continuously or repeatedly occupies,
(c) impedes or threatens,
(d) intimidates or harasses,
(e) advises or persuades, attempts to advise or persuade, or otherwise expresses opinion,
(f) informs or attempts to inform about abortion services by any means, including, without limitation, graphic, physical, verbal or written means, or
(g) sketches, photographs, records, stores, broadcasts, or transmits images, audio, likenesses or personal data of any person without express consent.
(4) A person guilty of an offence under subsection (1) is liable—
(a) in the first instance—
(i) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months,
(ii) to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale, or
(iii) to both; and
(b) on further instances—
(i) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years, or to a fine, or to both, or
(ii) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months, or to a fine, or to both.
(5) Nothing in this section applies to—
(a) anything done in the course of providing, or facilitating the provision of, abortion services in an abortion clinic,
(b) anything done in the course of providing medical care within a GP practice, hospital or other healthcare facility,
(c) the operation of a camera if its coverage of persons accessing or attempting to access an abortion clinic is incidental and the camera or footage is not used for any of the purposes listed in subsection (3), and
(d) a police officer acting properly in the course of their duties.”
New clause 12—Justice impact assessments for Wales—
“(1) Within six months of the passage of this Act, the Secretary of State must issue a justice impact assessment for any provision of this Act, or any regulations which have been made under this Act, which impact on matters which are devolved to Senedd Cymru.
(2) Within one month of the date on which they are made, the Secretary of State must issue a justice impact assessment for any regulations made under this Act which are not included in the assessment required under subsection (1) which impact on matters which are devolved to Senedd Cymru.
(3) The Secretary of State and the Welsh Ministers must jointly prepare and publish guidance on the implementation of the provisions on which justice impact assessments have been issued under subsections (1) and (2).”
New clause 13—Intentional harassment, alarm or distress on account of sex—
“(1) A person (P) commits an offence under this section if—
(a) P commits an offence under section 4A of the Public Order Act 1986 (intentional harassment, alarm or distress), and
(b) P carried out the conduct referred to in section 4A(1) of that Act because of the relevant person’s sex In this subsection ‘the relevant person’ means the person to whom P intended to cause, harassment, alarm or distress.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b) it does not matter whether or not P carried out the conduct referred to in section 4A(1) of the Public Order Act 1986 for the purposes of sexual gratification.
(3) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b) it does not matter whether or not P also carried out the conduct referred to in section 4A(1) of the Public Order Act 1986 because of any other factor not mentioned in subsection (1)(b).
(4) A person who commits an offence under subsection (1) is liable–
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court, to a fine or to both;
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years, to a fine, or to both.
(5) If, on the trial on indictment of a person charged with an offence under subsection (1), the jury find the person not guilty of the offence charged, they may find the person guilty of the basic offence mentioned in that provision.
(6) References in this section to P carrying out conduct because of another person’s (B’s) sex include references to P doing so because of B’s presumed sex.”
New clause 14—Harassment, alarm or distress on account of sex—
“(1) A person (P) commits an offence under this section if—
(a) P commits an offence under section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986 (harassment, alarm or distress), and
(b) P carried out the conduct referred to in section 5(1) of that Act because of the relevant person’s sex.
In this subsection ‘the relevant person’ means the person to whom P intended to cause, or caused, harassment, alarm or distress.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) it does not matter whether or not P carried out the conduct referred to in section 5(1) of the Public Order Act 1986 for the purposes of sexual gratification.
(3) For the purposes of subsection (1) it does not matter whether or not P also carried out the conduct referred to in section 5(1) of the Public Order Act 1986 because of any other factor not mentioned in subsection (1).
(4) A person who commits an offence under subsection (1) is liable—
(a) on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale;
(b) on conviction on indictment to imprisonment to a term not exceeding 6 months, or to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale, or to both.
(5) If, on the trial on indictment of a person charged with an offence under subsection (1), the jury find the person not guilty of the offence charged, they may find the person guilty of the basic offence mentioned in that provision.
(6) References in this section to P carrying out conduct because of another person’s (B’s) sex include references to P doing so because of B’s presumed sex.
(7) It is not a defence under this section for P to claim that they could not reasonably have foreseen that their behaviour may constitute an offence.”
New clause 15—Public inquiry into the impact of policing of public order on Black, Asian and minority ethnic people—
“Within six months of the date of Royal Assent to this Act, the Secretary of State must set up an inquiry under the Inquiries Act 2005 into the impact of the policing of public order on Black, Asian and minority ethnic people.”
New clause 16—Equality Impact Analyses of provisions of this Act—
“(1) The Secretary of State must review the equality impact of the provisions of this Act.
(2) A report of the review under this section must be laid before Parliament within 12 months of the date of Royal Assent to this Act.
(3) A review under this section must consider the impact of the provisions of this Act on—
(a) households at different levels of income,
(b) people with protected characteristics (within the meaning of the Equality Act 2010),
(c) the Government’s compliance with the public sector equality duty under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010, and
(d) equality in the different nations of the United Kingdom and different regions of England.
(4) A review under this section must include a separate analysis of each section of the Act, and must also consider the cumulative impact of the Act as a whole.”
New clause 17—Public inquiry into the policing of protests—
“Within six months of the date of Royal Assent to this Act, the Secretary of State must set up an inquiry under the Inquiries Act 2005 into the policing of public order and protests, including investigation of the use of—
(a) force,
(b) kettling,
(c) police horses,
(d) policing powers contained in the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, and policing powers contained in this Act.”
Amendment 3, page 1, line 4, leave out clause 1.
Amendment 28, clause 1, page 1, line 6, after “they” insert
“, without reasonable excuse, and using a device or substance that impedes detachment”.
This amendment, together with Amendment 30, would give effect to a recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights by taking the burden of proving “reasonable excuse” away from the Defendant and make it an element of the offence. It would also narrow the meaning of “attach” to focus on the use of devices or substances that make removing the protester difficult.
Amendment 29, clause 1, page 1, line 10, leave out paragraph (1)(b) and insert
“that act causes, or is likely to cause, serious disruption to the life of the community, and”.
This amendment would give effect to a recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights by replacing the current threshold of serious disruption with a higher threshold based on serious disruption to the life of the community (defined in Amendment 32).
Amendment 30, clause 1, page 1, line 16, leave out subsection (2).
Amendment 31, clause 1, page 1, line 20, leave out
“the maximum term for summary offences”
and insert “three months”.
This amendment would give effect to a recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights by reducing the maximum penalty for the offence of locking on.
Amendment 32, clause 1, page 2, line 1, leave out subsections (4) and (5) and insert—
“(4) For the purposes of subsection (1)(a), in determining whether a person has a reasonable excuse, particular regard must be had to the importance of the right of peaceful protest in a democracy by virtue of Article 10 and Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
(5) For the purposes of subsection 1(b), “serious disruption to the life of the community” means a prolonged disruption of access to any essential goods or any essential service, including, in particular, access to—
(i) the supply of money, food, water, energy or fuel,
(ii) a system of communication,
(iii) a place of worship,
(iv) a transport facility,
(v) an educational institution, or
(vi) a service relating to health.”
This amendment would give effect to a recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights by inserting an express requirement to have particular regard to the right to peaceful protest when considering whether an individual has a “reasonable excuse” for their actions when locking on. It also provides detail on the meaning of serious disruption to the life of the community.
Amendment 4, page 2, line 11, leave out clause 2.
Amendment 33, clause 2, page 2, line 13, leave out
“may be used in the course of or in connection with”
and insert “will be used in”.
This amendment would give effect to a recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights by narrowing the scope of this offence.
Amendment 5, page 2, line 20, leave out clause 3.
Amendment 6, page 3, line 23, leave out clause 4.
Amendment 7, page 4, line 19, leave out clause 5.
Amendment 8, page 4, line 35, leave out clause 6.
Amendment 34, clause 6, page 4, line 36, leave out subsection (1) and insert—
“(1) A person commits an offence if—
(a) the person obstructs the undertaker or a person acting under the authority of the undertaker—
(i) in setting out the lines of any major transport works,
(ii) in constructing or maintaining any major transport works, or
(iii) in taking any steps that are reasonably necessary for the purposes of facilitating the construction or maintenance of any major transport works, or
(b) the person interferes with, moves or removes any apparatus which—
(i) relates to the construction or maintenance of any major transport works, and
(ii) belongs to a person within subsection (5), and
(c) that act causes, or is likely to cause, significant disruption to setting out the lines of, the construction of or the maintenance of the major transport works affected, and
(d) the person intends their act—
(i) to obstruct the undertaker or person acting under the authority of the undertaker as mentioned in paragraph (a) or to interfere with or remove the apparatus as mentioned in paragraph (b), and
(ii) to have a consequence mentioned in paragraph (c) or are reckless as to whether it will have such a consequence.”
This amendment would give effect to a recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights by narrowing the scope of this offence to ensure it criminalises only conduct that would cause or be likely to cause serious disruption to major transport works. It would also introduce a requirement of intention or recklessness.
Amendment 35, page 5, line 9, leave out
“It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (1) to prove that”
and insert
“A person does not commit an offence under subsection (1) if”.
This amendment would give effect to a recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights by taking the burden of proving “reasonable excuse” or that the act was part of a trade dispute away from the Defendant and making it an element of the offence.
Amendment 36, page 5, line 14, at end insert—
“(2A) For the purposes of subsection (2)(a), in determining whether a person has a reasonable excuse, particular regard must be had to the importance of the right of peaceful protest by virtue of Article 10 and Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights.”
This amendment would give effect to a recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights by inserting an explicit requirement to have particular regard to the right to peaceful protest when considering whether an individual has a “reasonable excuse” for their actions.
Amendment 9, page 6, line 42, leave out clause 7.
Amendment 37, clause 7, page 7, line 5, leave out
“It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (1) to prove that”
and insert
“A person does not commit an offence under subsection (1) if”.
This amendment would give effect to a recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights by taking the burden of proving “reasonable excuse” or that the act was part of a trade dispute away from the Defendant and making it an element of the offence.
Amendment 38, page 7, line 10, at end insert—
“(2A) For the purposes of subsection (2)(a), in determining whether a person has a reasonable excuse, particular regard must be had to the importance of the right of peaceful protest by virtue of Article 10 and Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights.”
This amendment would give effect to a recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights by inserting an explicit requirement to have particular regard to the right to peaceful protest when considering whether an individual has a “reasonable excuse” for their actions.
Amendment 39, page 7, line 18, leave out “to any extent” and insert “to a significant extent”.This amendment would give effect to a recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights by narrowing the scope of the offence to prevent it sweeping up minor interference.
Amendment 40, page 7, line 22, after “means” insert “an essential element of”.This amendment would give effect to a recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights by narrowing the meaning of “key national infrastructure” to exclude inessential elements of infrastructure.
Amendment 51, page 7, line 31, at end insert—
“(j) farms and food production infrastructure.”
Amendment 10, page 8, line 17, leave out clause 8.
Amendment 41, clause 8, page 8, line 24, leave out “or B”.
Amendment 42, page 8, line 27, after “Act)” insert
“, but excludes infrastructure that is not essential for the purposes of transporting goods or passengers by railway”.
This amendment would give effect to a recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights to narrow the scope of the offence by narrowing the meaning of “rail infrastructure” so as to ensure the offence does not extend to interference with inessential elements.
Amendment 43, page 8, line 39, after “Act)” insert—
“(c) but excludes infrastructure that is not essential for the purposes of transporting goods or passengers by air”.
This amendment would give effect to a recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights to narrow the scope of the offence by narrowing the meaning of “air transport infrastructure” so as to ensure the offence does not extend to interference with inessential elements.
Amendment 44, page 8, line 41, leave out “or in connection with”.
This amendment, together with Amendments 45 to 48, would give effect to a recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights to narrow the scope of the offence, and reduce uncertainty, by narrowing what amounts to key national infrastructure.
Amendment 45, page 9, line 5, leave out “or in connection with”.See the explanatory statement for Amendment 44.
Amendment 46, page 9, line 20, leave out “or in connection with”.
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 44.
Amendment 47, page 9, line 35, leave out “or in connection with”.
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 44.
Amendment 48, page 10, line 1, , leave out “or in connection with”.
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 44.
Amendment 49, page 10, line 18, leave out
“‘newspaper’ includes a periodical or magazine.”
This amendment would give effect to a recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights to narrow the scope of the offence by narrowing the meaning of “newspaper” so as to prevent it extending to any periodical or magazine.
Amendment 52, page 10, line 18, at end insert–—
“(16) “Farms and food production infrastructure” means—
(a) any infrastructure, used for the commercial growing of crops and horticultural produce or rearing of livestock for human consumption or as an ingredient in items for human consumption; or
(b) any premises on which items for human consumption are processed, produced, or manufactured for commercial purposes; or
(c) any abattoir.”
Amendment 11, page 10, line 20, leave out clause 9.
Amendment 12, page 11, line 1, leave out clause 10.
Amendment 13, page 12, line 29, leave out clause 11.
Amendment 14, page 13, line 9, leave out clause 12.
Amendment 15, page 13, line 33, leave out clause 13.
Amendment 16, page 14, line 6, leave out clause 14.
Amendment 17, page 14, line 15, leave out clause 15.
Amendment 1, page 18, line 7, leave out clause 16.
Amendment 2, page 20, line 15, leave out clause 17.
Amendment 20, page 22, line 11, leave out clause 18.
Amendment 21, page 23, line 12, leave out clause 19.
Amendment 22, page 24, line 12, leave out clause 20.
Amendment 23, page 25, line 20, leave out clause 21.
Amendment 24, page 26, line 9, leave out clause 22.
Amendment 25, page 27, line 1, leave out clause 23.
Amendment 26, page 27, line 8, leave out clause 24.
Amendment 27, page 27, line 26, leave out clause 25.
Amendment 53, page 29, line 33, leave out clause 26.
Amendment 54, page 30, line 28, leave out clause 27.
Amendment 55, page 31, line 8, leave out clause 28.
Amendment 56, page 31, line 23, leave out clause 29.
Amendment 57, page 31, line 30, leave out clause 30.
Amendment 58, page 32, line 10, leave out clause 31.
Government new schedule 1—Injunctions in Secretary of State proceedings: powers to remand.
Government amendment 50.
Jeremy Quin
I thank hon. Members who have joined us for this important debate today and I look forward to the lively discussion that we are bound to have over the course of the afternoon. Although there will inevitably be differences of opinion, which I will come on to, I hope we can all agree on the fundamental point that should be underpinning this discussion—namely, that it is completely unacceptable for a selfish minority to wreak havoc on the lives of people going about their daily business. I would like to open the debate by speaking to the amendments in the Government’s name, and I will respond to other amendments in my closing remarks.
I will also touch on new clause 11, which covers abortion clinic buffer zones. We totally endorse the sentiment behind the new clause, but I look forward to setting out in my summing up why measures in existing legislation combined with the growing use of public space protection orders—PSPOs—can be used and are effective.