Thursday 21st September 2023

(7 months, 2 weeks ago)

Lords Chamber
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Earl of Oxford and Asquith Portrait The Earl of Oxford and Asquith (CB)
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My Lords, I want to make just two points in this debate, one of a military nature and the other political. First, while I have no intention of trying to play the armchair general —and, as we all know, war plays tricks on predictions and predictors—none the less, the focus of the war in Ukraine looks to be on the point of change. The Ukrainians appear to have modified their plans and have decided to concentrate or consolidate their forces in the town of Tokmak, in the second line of Russian defences and a critical logistic hub for the Russian Army in Ukraine. If the Ukrainians can take and control Tokmak, they can establish a pivotal position of blockade over the land bridge from Russia to Crimea, which implies a longer term waiting game for Ukraine and should give the Russian general staff some pause for thought.

In that event, it is conceivable that a stalemate of some kind could ensue after another four to six months of this war and, sooner than we think, some kind of halt could be called to the fighting—or at least some conclusion to widespread fighting would perhaps be a more accurate description. There is no evidence that either side would be ready to call this an armistice. Indeed, the Ukrainians have a long tradition of insurgency, and I doubt very much that hostilities would entirely cease, but a persistent war of attrition it may not be.

What would remain static would be a kind of Korean solution, leaving Russia in possession of 15% to 20% of occupied Ukrainian territory. That would be an unhappy, unsatisfactory solution for Ukraine but, without air cover, it is doubtful that the Ukrainians can continue offensively much further. Without air cover, the speculative scenario that I have just outlined is more plausible than a tangible or convincing Ukrainian victory. If we truly advocate victory, Ukraine must have the means.

At the same time, there is now an increasing debate among Ukraine’s allies on the importance of rehabilitating or “reincorporating” Ukrainian army recruits into civilian life, with a target of spring 2024 now stated by the United States. That might indicate the current direction of thought among the allies. Clearly no one wants 200,000 armed soldiers on the loose in Ukraine and, while there is no doubting the bravery and inventive skills of the Ukrainian armed forces during this conflict, it is an open secret that there is deep disaffection between the military and the country’s political leadership. Who knows? Maybe the present Administration will seize what they can in the time left to them, or maybe some will be caught up in the same cloud of chicanery that attended the end of Karzai’s regime in Afghanistan.

My second point is that we must prepare for the possibility of considerable turmoil within Ukraine when and if hostilities cease. Naturally, we must abide by our commitments to assist the reconstruction of the country and the security of the people as a whole, but we have connived at and allowed certain practices to go on for too long and certain political illusions to prevail among ourselves. There will come a reckoning within Ukraine that will not be pretty, and one which, at the moment, our own electorates are not prepared for.