Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Earl of Onslow Excerpts

Tuesday 29th March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Martin of Springburn]

I have heard the Minister say on earlier amendments that if they were withdrawn, he would take them back and give serious consideration to the views that had been expressed. The amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, are similar. Perhaps they can be taken back and considered seriously, considering what my noble friend Lady Boothroyd said and what I am about to say. I hope I can give some advice to this House.

This is not about Dr Jack the individual; it is about the Clerk of the House of Commons. I have experience of previous Clerks: Sir William McKay and Sir Roger Sands. They are all people of the highest calibre. I can give the House an insight into what would happen before the Clerk of the House delivered this advice. He would not just pluck these words out and put them on paper for anyone to consider; he would take soundings from constitutional experts, get someone to be devil’s advocate and put the contrary point of view, and Speaker’s Counsel would listen to the arguments. These people would give their point of view. Therefore, the words of Dr Jack would be the collective point of view of the constitutional experts we have in the House of Commons. The amendment is the property of this House, but I think it would be good idea for the Minister to take back what has been said tonight.

There is a tendency for courts to—I do not think the right word is interfere—look at matters which they would not have looked at 30 or 40 years ago. I am glad that the Court of Human Rights is there, but many Members who were disciplined in the other place said that they would like to take their case to the Court of Human Rights. Some officers of the House, while they did not encourage them or give any view, privately said that if their case went to the Court of Human Rights, with people’s civil liberties as they are at the moment, they might have won it because of the way in which our standards commissioner conducts his affairs without representation, with hearsay evidence and with people making accusations without substantiation. Although this has not been tested, some of the disciplinary measures that were taken in the other place could well have been taken to the Court of Human Rights, and who knows what would have happened?

Pressure is put on Speakers behind the scenes. I worry about the certificate. I recall a situation—forgive me, there might be some military Members in the Chamber—in which a battalion of Royal Marines was to be moved to Afghanistan in the early days of the Afghanistan problem. The Opposition tabled a Motion to put aside the business of the day to allow that matter to be debated. I felt that the Opposition had a case, and I allowed the Motion to be debated, as was the Speaker’s right. Behind the scenes, a government Whip came in—it was always a Whip who came in with the nasty news—and said, “You had no right to do that. You shouldn’t have done that”. This is the pressure that is put on Speakers. I said, “Excuse me a minute. Why shouldn’t I have done that?”. “Because those Marines weren’t going into combat”. The point I made was that if you are moving 500 highly trained members of an elite organisation into an area where they would come to no harm, they should not have been put there. They should have been back on leave in Catterick, Plymouth or wherever they were based. This was the type of abuse—complaining, if I can put it that way—that you got behind the scenes after the event. Before the event was even worse. So what is it going to be like when there is a vote of no confidence and it is down to the Speaker to decide whether a Government have to go to the country? There will be pressure from every side.

We talked about things changing with regard to the courts. Things have changed with regard to the pressure on Speakers. We have spoken about Ted Heath, his Government and how he had to go to the country. I had the honour of having Ted Heath come up as a friend to Speaker’s House to have a private chat with my wife Mary and me. I remember him telling me stories of when he was a Chief Whip. In passing, I asked him how often he came to see the Speaker, because at that time I had to see the government Chief Whip, the opposition Chief Whip and the Liberal Chief Whip on a weekly basis. He said, “I never bothered the Speaker. The Speaker was too busy to bother with the Chief Whip”. Since that time, things have changed, and terrible pressure is put on the Speaker, so I say with the best possible intentions that this is one of those amendments that get an airing in Committee and then the Minister takes the matter back and looks at it.

[The Earl of Onslow]

I was never Speaker but I am descended from three Speakers. I have never heard of a more awful choice having to be made. If the courts are allowed to interfere, that will have a catastrophic effect on the role of the Speaker. If they are not allowed to interfere, it will have a catastrophic role on the role of the Speaker. I cannot think of anything worse than that. I do not know whether to vote enthusiastically for the amendment or to vote enthusiastically against it. Whatever we do on this amendment will be nothing short of catastrophic.

[Lord Williamson of Horton]

My Lords, we have heard outstanding speeches from two former Speakers of the House of Commons. I must say that I am a little timid about getting up to say a word when I am the only non-former-Speaker on these two Benches. The speeches from my noble friends Lady Boothroyd and Lord Martin have fully covered the key elements about the defence of Parliament, which is a vital element underlying this amendment, in my view.

Let us imagine ourselves in the circumstances that would be covered by this part of the Bill: that is, that the Government have lost a vote of confidence, the 14 days have gone by and this certificate is called for. Let us also imagine the position of the British public in a situation in which they read in the papers, “Government defeated”, then, “14-day period expires: it’s an election”, and the next day, “Judicial challenge: no election”. This is a critical point from the point of view of operating confidence in the system. Therefore, the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, is good, and if it cannot be done in that way we need to strengthen the way of avoiding in this Bill any form of judicial intervention in the system.

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[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I completely understand what the noble Lord, Lord Martin of Springburn, is saying. My own view is that the courts would try to avoid getting involved, but the consequence of their not doing so is that the Speaker of the House of Commons—who, though I have never been a Member of the House of Commons, I understand should be above the party fray—would ultimately decide whether there would be a general election. Let us imagine the level of emotion that there might be in the House of Commons at that point. Is this not another illustration of the grave error in trying to prescribe in a Bill the working of a process that has previously worked by convention? I am very glad to see the noble and learned Lord, Lord Howe of Aberavon, in his place. He has always said that constitutional conventions may be better in certain circumstances. My view in relation to this part of the Bill is that the more we talk about it and the more we try to provide artificial certainty or precision—treating it as if it were a statute where you could see whether you have registered your home properly or whether certain ticks are in the boxes—the more it becomes a wholly inappropriate way to deal with the issue of whether Parliament should be dissolved and there should be a general election.

The more we debate it, the more the best solution feels like a provision that simply says that where there is a vote of no confidence there may be a general election. I do not think that my noble friend Lord Howarth would say that his amendment gives 100 per cent protection from the court; it certainly does not give the Speaker any protection from getting involved in the fray, which is so significant to their independence. I anticipate that my noble friend will say that he has put down the amendment simply in order to test the proposition. I would urge the noble and learned Lord to go back to the drawing board and see how he can construct a provision that is intended not to be a tick-box provision but instead to be a much broader constitutional provision. That will make it clear that the courts are not to be involved. Equally, it will not draw the Speaker into a political fray that could be fatal to their standing either in the House of Commons or, more damagingly, with the public at large. This is another indication that the Bill requires a lot more thought.

[The Earl of Onslow]

Has not the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, actually made a speech suggesting that we should use some of the remaining powers left to us under the Parliament Act to sling this rotten Bill right out hook, line and sinker?

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

Do not tempt us.

[The Earl of Onslow]

I may be tempted to tempt.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

The noble Earl is right to identify that the Bill is not covered by the Parliament Act. The more we debate it, the more it seems an appalling mess. If major surgery is not applied to it, a point may be reached where the House might think, very unusually, that it messed up the constitution to such an extent that it should contemplate not giving it a Third Reading. I am sure that a Minister such as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, will persuade the Government to apply major surgery to the Bill.

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[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I say again, it is not just that it is passed, it is that it is passed and that there has been no further vote of confidence in any Government. That is done for the purpose of ensuring legal certainty: that the election has legitimacy. It is quite straightforward why that is being done: that there is certainty. Otherwise, there will be a fixed-term Parliament where the law will say that the next election should be on whatever date and that to have an election not on that date, you have to be certain that the criteria laid down by law have been met. We take the view that a certificate from the Speaker makes certain beyond challenge that the criteria for having an election not on the date which would otherwise be the case have been met.

[The Earl of Onslow]

Can the noble and learned Lord give me any precedent where a specific motion of no confidence in the Government has been passed, followed two, three or four days by another motion saying, “Actually, we made a boo-boo and we do have confidence in the Government”? I cannot think of one in the 19th century, or, probably, in the 18th century; and certainly not in this century. Or am I being stupid, like my noble friend Lord Forsyth?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I would never say that my noble friend is being stupid; I take the blame myself for perhaps not explaining this clearly. It may not necessarily be the same Government. More often than not, it will be as happened in 1924, when there was a motion of no confidence, or the Government of the day lost on the Queen's speech, and a new Government came in that carried the confidence of the House. That was a circumstance where a new Government was in place with the confidence of the House. Therefore, there are circumstances in which it could happen.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Earl of Onslow Excerpts

Tuesday 15th March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Grocott]

I hope that the wider electorate reach a sensible conclusion. We shall know soon enough.

[The Earl of Onslow]

As the leader of the Labour Party has been discouraging the Deputy Prime Minister from taking any part in the AV campaign, it will be interesting to see the outcome.

[Lord Grocott]

I am interested but also worried because I care deeply about the outcome of the referendum and the damage that I believe can be done to our constitution. But we must not go back over that. It has been concluded and now it is for the people to decide.

I do not favour any of these changes, but if they are to go ahead the public need to be consulted. A referendum should be considered to determine whether there should be a four or five-year fixed term because of what I hope the Committee will agree is a powerful point: that the Bill reduces the power of the electorate. It reduces the number of occasions on which the electorate can be consulted.

If you reduce the power of the electorate, which the Bill undoubtedly does, then surely the electorate have the right to be consulted about that. It was right in 1975 for the then Labour Government to have a referendum on the Common Market, as it was then called, because it reduced the power of this Parliament. By the way, I voted no in that one. It is right that the choice should be given to the public. It is unarguable that the Bill reduces that power.

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[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I do not accept that. It might indeed be desirable to have a written constitution, but that is a matter for another day.

I accept that the Bill provides for an important constitutional reform, but it is not a fundamental change to our constitution. I say that for a number of reasons. First, in terms of whether or not a referendum is appropriate, the fixed term proposed is within the existing maximum term of a Parliament. Under the 1911 Act, Parliament can last for up to five years; under this Act a Parliament will last for five years unless either of the trigger mechanisms for an early dissolution is activated.

[The Earl of Onslow]

May I interrupt? Actually, it is a fundamental change. As the Bill is not subject to the 1911 Act, we can veto this Bill because it seeks to extend the life of Parliament. That is a fundamental constitutional change, which in my view should be resisted at all possible costs.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, the noble Earl is entirely right to say that the Bill is capable of extending a Parliament under the two-month extension proposal. That is the reason why the Parliament Act does not apply. That does indeed give this House the right to veto the legislation, but it is a non sequitur to suggest that it follows from that, and that alone, that this is a fundamental reform of the type to warrant a referendum.

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I look upon this amendment, as I am sure noble Lords who spoke to their amendments look upon those amendments, as a probing amendment, and not as an issue on which we should even begin to contemplate dividing the House today. However, I do think that it is up to the Government to try to produce what I would call a coherent pattern of constitutional reform. In recent years the worst thing about constitutional reform—I referred to it in my maiden speech a couple of weeks ago—has been what I call back-of-the-envelope constitutional reform, something of which both Governments stand guilty. They say, “We’ll get rid of the office of Lord Chancellor. Jolly good thing. Yeah, we’ll announce it”. Of course we all know what happened. Another example is the negotiations over the formation of the coalition, which I gladly support. The leader of one party says that he wants certain constitutional changes, while the Prime Minister is keen to reduce the size of the House of Commons, so they put them together. However, there is not a really thoughtful approach. There has been no opportunity for pre-legislative scrutiny. There has been no opportunity to consider and contemplate papers, green or white. Although some people quote Harold Wilson who said that royal commissions take minutes and sit for years, royal commissions do not have to sit for years. It might have been far better, and the basis for a far more coherent approach, had a royal commission on the constitution been established to look at all these issues and at the role and composition of each House of Parliament and what it should do and not do. What we are doing is having piecemeal constitutional legislation. It is back-of-the-envelope stuff. I think that there is a time to pause and reflect. I hope that between now and Report we will see some reflection and some convincing answers to some of the very important issues that have been raised today and that will doubtless be raised at subsequent stages as we debate this Bill.

[The Earl of Onslow]

My Lords, I crave your Lordships’ indulgence and apologise for not being able to speak at Second Reading. There was a slight horlicks done by our Whips’ Office, for which I apologise.

This Government, who I support extraordinarily strongly, have the opportunity to produce some of the greatest social reforms and improvements for the benefit of this country since 1911. If Iain Duncan Smith gets his welfare reforms right, that will be a major contribution to the well-being of this country. If George Osborne gets the economy right, it will be of major benefit. If education reforms and medical reforms are as good as I personally think they are going to be, these will be the successes of a very great Government. But why have they gone completely doolally over constitutional change?

The trouble with this country is that constitutional change is extraordinarily easy. Every other country has complicated locking mechanisms in it. The Bill reduces the power of the House of Commons, reduces the power of the electorate and increases the chances of chaos. In 1870 or 1871, the French Government resigned. Either the President or the Prime Minister refused a dissolution—I cannot remember which. As there was no possibility of a dissolution, they played the game of pass the parcel and wrecked French government from 1870 until 1945. That is bad constitutional form. We would do the minimum amount of harm by adopting something along the lines of what the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, says. In my 30 or so years in this House, I have regarded myself as a disloyal Conservative, and I will go on being a disloyal Conservative. If they are doing something that I believe is as fundamentally wrong as this, I will say so. That does not mean that I will come and join you over there.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I, too, support the observations of the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, as to the need for careful consideration of constitutional reform. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, accurately pointed out that the Constitution Committee, of which I am a member, did not suggest that a referendum is required in relation to the introduction of fixed-term Parliaments. As the Committee well knows, the Constitution Committee expressed grave concern in paragraph 20 of our report that this Bill owes,

“more to short-term considerations than to a mature assessment of enduring constitutional principles”.

I suggest that the Government’s position in relation to whether a referendum on constitutional reform is appropriate is precisely a matter that appears to be determined by short-term considerations—alternative vote, yes; reform of this House and fixed-term Parliaments, apparently no.

It is very difficult to deny that the Bill that we are currently considering will introduce major constitutional reform. In paragraph 40 of our report, we refer to the evidence that we heard from Professor Vernon Bogdanor in which he pointed out that the Bill, if enacted, will prevent,

“a newly chosen Prime Minister between Parliaments from going to the country”,

it will prevent,

“a Prime Minister who has a new policy for which he may seek a mandate from going to the country”,

and:

“Most importantly of all, because we could be moving into that situation with our hung Parliaments, it means that coalitions can change in the middle of a Parliament without the people being allowed to pronounce on that”.

This is a major constitutional reform. I am no fan of referendums, but I would welcome guidance from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, on behalf of the Government, as to what their policy is as to when a referendum is appropriate for constitutional reform and when it is not, and I would welcome an assurance that that issue is not determined by short-term political considerations.

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[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

He has actually put it to Parliament for it to support. Parliament will have had to vote that through, as is quite clear because we have other amendments coming down to change that date. Unless circumstances arise that would trigger the mechanisms in Clause 2, the Prime Minister of the day will not have the opportunity to seek Dissolution when it might seem opportune other than to have the election on the date set down in the Bill. He will have surrendered that power.

[The Earl of Onslow]

The Prime Minister has said, perfectly reasonably, that he thinks his Government will go on until 15 May 2015. He has made a perfectly legitimate choice to the House of Commons, but binding his successors is a different matter altogether.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, my noble friend’s point goes to the heart of whether one should have a fixed-term Parliament, bearing in mind that no Parliament can bind its successor. We debated the arguments for fixed-term Parliaments at Second Reading. I believe that they would ensure that Governments were able to plan, as indeed could Parliament, for a fixed period, and that they would not allow a Prime Minister of the day to seek an opportune moment to go to the country earlier than the full length of a Parliament for partisan reasons. This is an advance on what we have at the moment.

The point I am making is that if the Bill becomes law as it currently stands, the Prime Minister’s hands will be tied. If he saw an advantage some time in the spring of 2014, it would not be possible for him to cut and run because, if the Bill was on the statute book, he would not be allowed to do so. The fact that the Bill ensures that Parliament cannot otherwise be dissolved means, as the noble Lord, Lord Hennessy, remarked at Second Reading, that the Prime Minister has given up an important power.

We could debate whether the electorate have been denied as many chances to go to the polls as otherwise. The crude arithmetical approach—I do not mean crude in a pejorative way—adopted by the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, did not take into account that in no case since 1945 would any circumstances have arisen that would have triggered the mechanisms for early Dissolution or an early election under Clause 2; he assumes that that would never have happened. However, if one looks at history, it may well have happened in 1951 when there was a consensus between the parties that an election was needed. It may well have happened in February 1974. I know that my noble friend Lord Cormack thinks that the then Prime Minister, Mr Edward Heath, was wrong—and, indeed, as the electorate pointed out, he probably was—but there may well have been circumstances then in which it was felt that the Government of the day, and, one assumes, the Opposition, would not have stood in the way of an election, and that could have triggered Dissolution. It may well be that, as a result of that election in 1974, when there was no working majority for any party, another election may again have been agreed.

The point I am trying to make is that you cannot simply indicate that every Parliament would have gone the full five years since 1945 because there may well have been circumstances during these years that would have triggered an election. That is the whole point of the provision of trigger mechanisms, which no doubt the Committee will debate in due course. With issues such as no-confidence Motions and their wording, there is plenty of material and meat for debate.

My noble friend Lord Onslow, in his response to my noble friend Lord Marks, asked whether the Bill would extend the lifetime of this Parliament. My noble friend Lord Marks was right to say that it has the potential, if the power is used, to extend the date by two months in certain agreed circumstances, such as the foot and mouth outbreak in 2001. However, it is important to put on record that the general election last year took place on 6 May and that the first meeting of the new Parliament took place on 18 May; therefore this Parliament can continue until 18 May 2015. The latest date on which an election could be held is 11 June 2015, so stipulating the date of 7 May 2015 does not extend the life of this Parliament. The power is there to be used in exceptional circumstances and is subject to the votes of both Houses, and that is why the Parliament Act would not apply.

The amendment invites the Government to hold a referendum on whether the general election should be held in May 2014 or May 2015, although it makes no provision for the result of a referendum to be reflected in the length of a fixed-term Parliament after that general election. I think we get the spirit of what the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, is moving. My reaction is similar to that of my noble friend Lord Brooke; I am not sure what the public will make of being invited to choose the date of the next general election. I suspect that they would consider that as one trip to the polling station that they did not need to make.

The noble Lord, Lord Grocott, asked my noble friend Lord McNally which issues would be submitted to a referendum, and my noble friend replied:

“the Government believe that Parliament should judge which issues are the subject of a national referendum”.—[Official Report, 24/1/11; col. 671.]

Indeed, it will be possible for Parliament to make that judgment on any legislation.

As to the referendum on the alternative vote, let me try to put into context where we are. I do not make any bones about the fact that in the aftermath of the last general election, when quite clearly no party had an overall majority, there were coalition negotiations in which we tried to seek agreement. This has put in place a Government who are doing things of which my noble friend Lord Onslow heartily approves. I have been involved in coalitions in devolved Administrations, and there is inevitably an element of give and take and compromise in the negotiations. It is quite clear that the Conservatives did not support electoral reform in the shape of the alternative vote, and I do not shy away from the fact that some movement was required on that if there was ever going to be a coalition that would address the immediate economic crisis facing the country. There was therefore an agreement that there should be a referendum on the alternative vote, a policy that had been in the Labour Party’s manifesto. The Conservatives did not espouse a policy for fixed-term Parliaments, but they were prepared to accept it as a part of a coalition agreement because the Liberal Democrats were prepared to accept many other things. This has subsequently laid the foundations to get us out of the economic and fiscal mess bequeathed to the Government.

Both the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats had a commitment to a fixed-term Parliament in their manifestos, although neither of them said what the period would be—certainly the Liberal Democrats did not say so. We had party policy papers from the past, but we did not say four years in our manifesto. Crucially, neither party said that there would be a referendum on that commitment. Contrast that with the Conservative Party, which indicated that it wanted referendums on British membership of the European Union and ceding further powers to Brussels.

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[Lord Grocott]

I wish even more that we had had the benefit of a contribution from my noble friend and that she had been to New Zealand earlier. Perhaps we should take some advice on that front. However, her fundamental point was that, if you are going to increase the gap between general elections, you should certainly not do so without consulting the electorate.

I do not know whether the noble Earl, Lord Onslow, was supporting the proposal for a referendum but I very much agreed with him on what I think he referred to as the “constitutional madness” of the Government or a phrase of that sort. He said that they have got everything else right—which I obviously do not agree with—but they are getting constitutional reform wrong.

[The Earl of Onslow]

I said that it was doolally.

[Lord Grocott]

Doolally was the word. It is a splendid parliamentary term and I would not disagree with it.

There were many contributions to this debate but the only one with which I strongly disagreed was that of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, as he will not be surprised to hear. From his perspective, he did a good job in trying to persuade us that this is not a fundamental constitutional change, but the balance of the arguments we have heard suggested that it is. The only doubts that everyone has are in relation to there being another referendum, and I freely admit that I would not be absolutely thrilled at that prospect either. However, I hope that this short debate has established in the Government’s mind, even if it has not convinced them, that a lot of people believe that this is yet another major constitutional change. It diminishes the power of the British people by reducing the number of elections. It is surprising that the determination to proceed comes principally from the Deputy Prime Minister, who has made much of the need to reconnect Parliament with the people. How this proposal squares with that is something on which I look forward to hearing an explanation. However, in the mean time, with thanks to everyone who has taken part, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Earl of Onslow Excerpts

Tuesday 18th January 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

I congratulate my noble and learned friend on introducing the amendment with an analysis that was extremely detailed and lucid. I thought it was quite masterly. He has, more or less at one stroke, transformed the atmosphere of the debates on this subject. The last two contributions—one from the Cross Benches and the other by the noble Lord, Lord Crickhowell, from the Conservative Benches—have shown that the House is now in a mood to discuss the whole issue, pragmatically and calmly, in a spirit of genuine compromise, I hope. A willingness to try to find the right solution and occasionally to accept suggestions from other parts of the House will be a good contribution towards finding that solution. It is a wonderful relief to those of us who have been through a slightly confrontational series of debates during the course of the night.

The amendment tabled by my noble and learned friend addresses directly the issue I raised earlier. As I see it, the Boundary Commission faces in its deliberations—as it always has faced and will continue to face—an equation with three variables and a trade-off between those variables. The variables are, first, acceptability of the extent to which the local electorate is happy with the boundaries within which it is placed, which is very important; secondly, equality of numbers; and, thirdly, the number of MPs. If you fix one of those variables you will have a corresponding distortion of the others. Fixing one will, of course, because of the trade-offs, result in something less than an ideal solution in the others. You will have to pay a price in the others.

If you try to fix two you will produce an enormous distortion. If the Government were determined to maintain the 5 per cent rule at the same time as maintaining the 600 limit for MPs—or any other arbitrary limit for MPs—there will be a tremendous distortion of the important aspect of acceptability in many boundaries in the country. This point has been well made by many colleagues on both sides of the House over the past 24 hours. There would be a great many constituencies where people felt not at all identified with the constituency in which they had been artificially placed. That would be a bad day’s work and we all want to avoid that.

My noble and learned friend has suggested the compromise of not taking away the need to keep within reasonable limits of equality but to have a 10 per cent rule rather than a 5 per cent rule. The effect of that has been quantified by my noble friend Lord Lipsey. If I recall correctly, he said that if the House passes the amendment, something like 30 per cent of constituencies will need to be reviewed because they will be over the 10 per cent limit, whereas under the original draft of the Bill brought forward by the Government, something like 60-odd per cent would need to have their boundaries reviewed because they would be outside the 5 per cent criterion. It is a very substantial quantified difference. In the light of that, I hope that the Government will accept the amendment.

If they do not feel able to accept the amendment, then, in the new atmosphere— which I enormously welcome and, from the remarks of the Leader of the House, I think the Government also welcome it—at the very least the House would expect a reasoned explanation as to why they cannot accept it, together with a better suggestion for achieving what we all regard now as a common purpose. The difficulty we had in the period before the lunch break was—I emphasise to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, who is staring at me at the moment—that there is a genuine concern among many of us on this and other sides of the House that the Government had rigid plans for enormous constitutional reform; that they were not being entirely open about it; that they were unwilling to consult on or discuss the issue before they brought it forward; and that it did not involve only the subjects in the Bill. We know that because they are preparing Lords reform proposals.

There was an horrific moment this morning—I trust that it was a complete misunderstanding—when the noble Lord, Lord McNally, said something which led a number of people to think that he was threatening the House with the introduction of a timetabling system, which would be a real revolution in the House of Lords and obviously not appropriate to a revising Chamber. I trust that the noble Lord did not mean that and that his words were not intended to convey that meaning. I am sure the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, understands that those words were bound to provoke a reaction here. I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord McNally, is not in his place as I make these comments.

While I am discussing this, I should say that I thought I heard him say this morning that in the late 19th century, when the Commons introduced a timetabling system, it did so as a result of filibustering by what he described as “Fenians”. The Fenians were Irish nationalists who were prepared to use non-parliamentary and violent methods, which is a pretty horrific way to describe one’s political opponents in a democratic assembly. I am sure he did not mean “Fenian” in that sense. It is also an insult to the Irish nationalists who were conducting that remarkable filibuster—people such as Parnell, Dillon, Healy, O’Brien and so forth. They were the people who led the Irish filibusters in the 1880s and they were far from being Fenians. They had opposed in Ireland, with considerable courage, those who said that only extra-parliamentary and violent methods would work in dealing with the British. It was a remark that the noble Lord, Lord McNally, might want to withdraw, both as applied to Parnell and the Irish constitutional nationalists of that time and to those of us here.

[The Earl of Onslow]

If this is not an example of a filibuster, I do not know what is. Dillon and the people who objected to the Irish filibuster in the House of Commons have nothing to do with this amendment. The noble Lord is bringing this House into major disrepute. He is quite good at changing sides so there is nothing new in that.

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

The noble Earl should know that, although I have changed parties, I have kept very much the same political principles all my life. I intend to continue to do so. The noble Earl was possibly not here when the noble Lord, Lord McNally, made the remarks that I have just referred to. I assure him that the noble Lord, Lord McNally, made those remarks; I have not just invented that. It seemed necessary to respond to the remarks and I was taking the obvious opportunity to do so.

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[Lord Howarth of Newport]

My noble friend speaks with feeling about the area that he knows and has served so well.

I do not want to detain the House but want to complete my point on local government. That map of local government became so intolerable to tidy-minded bureaucrats in the 1960s that it was judged that it had to be reformed and redesigned. We had the Redcliffe-Maud report and the 1972 legislation that created all kinds of new entities of local government that had never corresponded to people’s sense of reality of where they lived. Many have been abolished and we have never succeeded in designing a new map of local government because you cannot impose it from on high.

[The Earl of Onslow]

The Minister has already gone quite far. He said that he will draw attention to it. Do we need what is basically a Boundary Commission argument on these little things? This is nothing other than wasting your Lordships’ time, and it is a disgrace for the Opposition to go on behaving like this.

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

I am sorry that the noble Earl thinks that. He is being a little too impatient, if I may say so. The point that I am making is that the relationship between the structures of local government and the system of parliamentary representation is very important. It needs to be intimate. Members of Parliament and elected members of local authorities need to work together. This system should be an organic whole, which is one more very important reason why the rules that the Government propose to govern the designing and drawing of the boundaries of parliamentary constituencies need to be sensitive to the realities of local government. I say no more than that, but these considerations genuinely matter.

I welcome the Minister’s tone and hope that his department will examine the practical implications of not moving beyond the 5 per cent tolerance either side of the norm, and consider whether it would produce anomalies and offensive manifestations in the way in which our constituencies are drawn that we would be very much wiser to avoid.