Northern Ireland Protocol Bill

Earl of Kinnoull Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 31st October 2022 Lords Chamber

On the basis that this clause is an admitted breach of international law and the Government’s defence for the breach has fallen apart, and, further, that the Government have not presented a replacement for the provisions of the protocol they seek to exclude, and the powers are so broad and have been condemned by the committees of this House, I beg to move.

[The Earl of Kinnoull (CB)]

I was hoping that others would take on the strain. I spoke at Second Reading, and I have tried to come to this really representing the settled views of the committees of this House that have been considering these areas. I think we have heard quite a bit already in debates about the wisdom, or lack of it, of passing something that has the appearance of being an illegality. It does not matter whether or not it is; it is the appearance that is hugely damaging in terms of the rule of law point.

I will add briefly to those general views by saying only that there is a further view, and that is that we have to do an awful lot of deals with the EU over the coming years on a whole lot of things, and it is fairly unwise at this very early stage in the new relationship to have such a big black put up about us not being a reliable partner. I am deeply concerned about that, and it is a concern that has flowed through to the various reports that we have written over many years in this area. I am looking at a solid former member of the European Union Committee in my noble friend Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, who made a very good speech in the previous group, and at my noble friend Lord Pannick, who made an equally good speech and who has been strong in this area. In this group, I do not want to follow up on that, but in view of the fact that everyone seems to be going very wide here in Committee I thought I would just make that point now rather than very late tonight.

The particular point I want to raise came out of the June 2019 report of the European Union Committee, Scrutiny of International Agreements: Lessons Learned. The important thing to note here, I think, is what the man in the street had in terms of scrutiny at an elected or a parliamentary representative level in the moment before Brexit. The cherry had three bites out of it—or, really, two bites and a nibble. The first bite was that his representative in the European Parliament was going through the thing very carefully indeed, as most trade deals and many international agreements were on European matters. The second bite was that, through the action of the scrutiny reserve resolutions, the European Union Committee structure in this House and the European Scrutiny Committee structure in the House of Commons were going through things in exhaustive detail, and the interaction of those two committees and the European Parliament began at the start of any process and followed it all the way through to the end.

The third little nibble came with CRaG, a simple thing which looks at the eventual results; it is a quick yes or no procedure, where the House of Lords does not have any power at all and the House of Commons has precious little. We said in our report of June 2019 that

“the CRAG Act is poorly designed to facilitate parliamentary scrutiny.”

That is pretty clear, and it seems to me on rereading the report over the weekend that it is a pretty good report. I am coming at this in a slightly different way, but what worries me now is that these are core changes to an international agreement that could be made without any form of parliamentary scrutiny—that is true of this group but other groups as well—not even the CRaG form of scrutiny, just a Minister making an agreement. For core changes to core treaties with core partners, there must be a very good parliamentary scrutiny process.

I have not arrived with the answers to exactly what the process should be but I am saying that it must be a very serious process. I think the net effect of amendments like these would be to remove the ability of a Minister to make a decision like that but leave a mechanism whereby a Minister could come back to Parliament and—after suitable scrutiny with a suitable process—have a parliamentary agreement to back up whatever the change being discussed. I have been sitting over this for six and a half years, and I find it very difficult to discuss such changes in the abstract. I would like to discuss specific changes specifically, which is why I feel very supportive of this line of amendments and thankful that they have been tabled.

[Lord Cormack (Con)]

In effect, we have heard this evening a reiteration of Dunning’s Motion in the reign of George III:

“The influence of the Crown has increased, is increasing, and ought to be diminished.”


We are seeing in the Bill not only an abrogation of international law and our obligations, which is what primarily concerns me, but in the process, by the design of the Bill, an accretion of power to Ministers and the Executive—an unbalancing of the relationship between Parliament and the Executive.

The Executive are answerable to Parliament in our constitution. Here, great chunks are being given to the power of the Executive. We owe an enormous debt to the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, and his committee, and other committees in this House, which have pointed this out calmly—to use a word I used earlier—but very forcefully. We are embarking on a road towards executive superiority such as is incompatible with our constitution, which is moving away in the 21st century from what our forefathers fought for in the past. We cannot emphasise that too greatly.

The person who could make this speech far better than I and whose name is on the amendments spoken to eloquently by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, is the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. Time and again, in a variety of Bills and contexts, he has pointed out to your Lordships’ House how the accumulation of Henry VIII powers in the hands of Ministers, without proper accountability to the House, is the road towards executive domination such as is incompatible with our constitution, as I said a few moments ago.

In wholeheartedly supporting these amendments, I urge my noble friend, when he comes to reply from the Front Bench, to address this issue and address it directly. I have great admiration for my noble friend Lord Caine. I certainly have great admiration for his knowledge of, and concern for, Northern Ireland, to which he has dedicated a large part of his life; but is he really happy to be put in a position, or see any of his ministerial colleagues put in a position, where they can override Parliament effectively by diktat?

--- Later in debate ---

[The Earl of Kinnoull (CB)]

My Lords, I really agree with every word that has just been said. I have another suggestion for the noble Lord, Lord Lilley. The truth is that most liberal democracies in the world exist in an environment where major changes to international agreements or the making of international agreements are scrutinised by Parliament on a fairly open basis. We all know, for instance, that Mr Šefčovič has a mandate. In fact, we know an awful lot about that mandate. Mr Šefčovič regularly briefs committees in the European Parliament and has a pretty good ability to bring the European Parliament along with him, which is important—and, indeed, to bring the 27 nations along with him as well.

I am not suggesting that we should copy and paste that, but I note that the PACAC, a committee of the other place, was in Norway last week. I had a detailed discussion with a member of that committee on Friday about how Norway deals with this. In fact, Norway also brings along its Parliament in a very open way and this does not appear to interfere with the negotiating process in the way the noble Lord was worried about. These are major changes to an international agreement. The international agreements process that we have, which we need to rebuild in this Parliament, should take account of that and should apply. That is a fairly open process to the committees and Members of both Houses; I feel that strongly. I do not see any other liberal democracies doing this. We are unique in having cut Parliament out of the process. I see no other democracies having problems of the nature that the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, is worried about. I could see that he was genuinely worried, but I have to say that I am not.

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)]

My Lords, I will not rehearse what I said previously about Article 16, but I will see if I can answer the question posed by the noble Lord, Lord Lilley. If you are faced with two instruments that appear to be in conflict—which I think is what we are arguing—the first thing you do is have a detailed analysis of these instruments to see whether there is a provision in them that will enable you to reconcile the difference. The advantage of Article 16 has just been set out by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr. You are adhering to the treaty by using a term within the treaty that helps you avoid being in conflict with the other treaty. That is a possible way of doing it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

I so confirm.

[The Earl of Kinnoull (CB)]

My Lords, I ask the Minister a more technical question about the interrelationship between the trade and co-operation agreement and the withdrawal agreement. The European Affairs Committee spent a very long time writing a report, which came out last December, about trading goods. We were very careful to make sure that we did not talk about the Northern Irish situation for two reasons. First, we have our own sub-committee for dealing with that. Secondly, it was horribly complicated.

I should like some comfort on a problem that would arise should some kind of good head from Great Britain to Northern Ireland. For the purposes of the Minister’s powers, it is a Northern Ireland good. However, it is, at the same time, latently a TCA good for the purposes of moving across an EU border. An immediate set of complications arises from this. I would, therefore, be grateful for the Minister’s thoughts on what the interrelationship is between the TCA and the withdrawal agreement on goods in general. I would also be grateful for some comfort that when Ministers are thinking about exercising all the powers that this selection of clauses would give them, they will have do so in regard to all the relevant various international agreements we have. The TCA is not our only agreement with the EU.