Offensive Weapons Bill

Debate between Earl of Erroll and Baroness Hamwee

Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 4th March 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, is not really possible to substitute for the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, but I was happy to introduce some of his amendments, as my noble friend did, on our first day on Report. We have Amendments 82 and 86 in this group. Amendment 86 also requests guidance on articles that are not bladed products for the purposes of the Bill—in other words, a negative approach. Amendment 82 would provide that the term does not,

“include a product intended for domestic use which incorporates a blade if the product does not function without the blade”.

I could go off down a separate avenue about the range of experiences that we draw on in this Chamber: I could not have begun to talk about sheep shearing; the noble Duke, the Duke of Montrose, might want to talk about food processors—I do not know. Clause 20 defines “bladed product” for the purpose of the clauses dealing with delivery to residential premises. Of course, I am not taking issue with the overall approach of my noble friend, but, as the Government have been resisting, this is to look at the detail.

The definition excludes all sorts of things, some of which I have never heard of: flick-knives, gravity knives, knuckle-dusters, death stars and other weapons whose sale and importation is already prohibited, as well as items excluded from the prohibition on the sale of bladed articles to those under 18. I think it is appropriate to pause here, while thanking the Government for providing Keeling schedules, to say that it is really not immediately obvious what is within Clause 18—in other words, what products it will be an offence to deliver to residential premises. There was a degree of confusion when this was debated in the Public Bill Committee in the Commons. We have just heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, about the distinction between a pointed article and an article with a cutting edge, but it seems to me that that must depend on how the items are used. Surely, with something that is pointed, if you pull it down against somebody’s skin it is likely to cut the skin.

In our view, it ought to be clear which items make delivery to residential premises an offence. Apart from its substance, the clause’s complexity and its dependence on orders made under other legislation—more accurately, the exclusion of items that are the subject of such orders—is not in the tradition of well-written Acts of Parliament. One cannot employ the defence of reasonable precautions and all due diligence when there is an issue with the definition.

I have occasionally bought art materials online for delivery at home. Go on to any art materials website and you will find a range of palette knives and craft knives, some of which would fall foul of the definition. Not everyone paints, does craft work or shears sheep—but everybody eats, which is why I picked domestic kitchen items. They are relevant to many people’s lives, as they buy them either for themselves or for others, for instance from a wedding gift list.

Other noble Lords may have received a letter from John Lewis representatives—whom the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, and I met a couple of weeks ago—who expressed concern that the definition would prohibit them selling and delivering to a residential address a wide range of everyday kitchen products containing blades, such as food processors and scissors. They described to us the careful age-verification steps they take in respect of sales in store, but said:

“Online sales at John Lewis and partners are a key part of our business strategy and account for over 40% of our total sales … Around 50% of these online sales are delivered direct to customers’ homes. Any restriction on our ability to continue to sell and deliver products, such as food processors, online would negatively … impact our business. We do not believe this is the intention of the Government”—


nor do I—

“and nor do we believe that this would do anything to help address the issue of knife crime”.

We agree. This amendment is not intended as a plug for John Lewis; rather, it seeks clarity and a common-sense outcome in which businesses do not regard more items than is necessary as outlawed from home delivery.

The British Retail Consortium supports the three amendments in this group. In Committee and earlier on Report, we sought to address the issue through the amendments to which my noble friend referred. I appreciate that Amendment 82 only scrapes the surface of the issue, but I wanted to highlight the point.

As we know, under government amendment 106, the Secretary of State “may”—that is the term used—issue guidance. The amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, says “must”; Amendment 86, in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Paddick, says “shall”. No doubt we will be told that “may” means “will”, or other close synonyms, but guidance cannot override legislation, so it is essential to get that right. Of course, guidance will be produced by the Executive without parliamentary approval and it can be changed without approval. So at least we should hear from the Dispatch Box—I look forward to the Minister’s explanation—what consultation on the guidance the Government intend to undertake. Clearly, it should be thorough. I suspect that the Government have also had a bit of difficulty in pinning down a definition—otherwise we would have one. That simply demonstrates how important this issue is.

[The Earl of Erroll]

My Lords, we having been discussing this issue in the Digital Policy Alliance’s age verification and internet safety working group. Being clear on definitions is absolutely essential.

The Minister said in the previous debate about pointed items that it will be up to the courts to decide. Who can afford that? How can people afford to go that far? That is the trouble. The natural reaction of business will be to be overly cautious. That will close down entire avenues of business and inhibit normal people’s ability to carry on with their normal lives. A lack of clarity will cause so much trouble and you will get an awful lot of flak in the papers. I suggest that this group of amendments be taken together so that we can sort something out and produce absolutely clear guidance. We are trying to legislate for only a few outrageous incidents. The trouble is that regulations never prevent what they seek to prohibit. You cannot stop all of this by regulation. Let us make reasonable regulations, which allow normal people to continue with their normal lives. Given that, clarity in the definitions is absolutely essential.

Offensive Weapons Bill

Debate between Earl of Erroll and Baroness Hamwee

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 28th January 2019 Grand Committee

[The Earl of Erroll]

Can I add something on that subject? I was not suggesting that the Secretary of State should specify specific company schemes, or whatever. However, I agree entirely that there should be a certification process so that people know whether they are okay or not. If there is not, there will be a massive test case in the courts, which will be very expensive for someone, to test what is adequate. The Secretary of State could avoid this by giving some direction on the regulations which reflects where you can change them, with changing technology, and which would satisfactorily protect the seller from vexatious things and awkward situations. The Government should look at this again.

[Baroness Hamwee]

I mentioned that, not long before coming into this debate, I—and no doubt other noble Lords—had a note from the British Retail Consortium. It also makes the point about how helpful it would be to have guidance—“possibly through guidance”, it says. Different situations may be different, but we are all concerned about not just protecting the seller but making sure that purchasers are able to purchase when it is reasonable to do so. I think it was my noble friend who mentioned John Lewis’s current policy on sending cutlery through the post.

Data Protection Bill [HL]

Debate between Earl of Erroll and Baroness Hamwee

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 30th October 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I say to my noble friend Lord McNally that it is even worse having people say to you, “You’re a lawyer, you must understand this”, when too often you do not.

I have a question for the Minister. Am I right in thinking that the Charter of Fundamental Rights will apply to all member states after Brexit? Is it not the objective that we are on all fours with them as other users of data and, therefore, if there is no provision such as the ones that we have been debating contained in the Bill, how will that affect the adequacy arrangements?

[The Earl of Erroll (CB)]

My Lords, I want to say a couple of words about privacy. A very important basic point has been raised here. I am not going to argue with lawyers about whether this is the right way in which to do it, but the right to privacy is something about which people feel very strongly—and you will also find that the Open Rights Group and other people will be very vociferous and worry about it, as should all of us here. When we go out and do things on the internet, people can form some interesting conclusions just by what we chance to browse on out of interest, if they can record that and find it out. I became very aware of this, because I have been chairing a steering group that has been producing, along with the British Standards Institution, a publicly available specification, PAS 1296, on age verification. It is designed to help business and regulators to comply with Section 3 of the Digital Economy Act, which we passed just the other day, which is about protecting children online. The point is to put age verification at the front of every website that could be a problem. We want it to be anonymous, because it is not illegal for an adult to visit sites like that; if it was recorded for certain people in certain jobs, it could destroy their careers, so it must be anonymous. So a question arises about trying to put in the specification a right to privacy.

One thing that we have to be very careful about is not to interpret laws or regulations or tread on the toes of other standards. Therefore, when this Bill and the GDPR are passed, we must make sure that people processing any of that material ensure that any data is kept completely secure, or anonymised, or is anonymous in the first place. Websites, first of all, should not know the identity of a temporary visitor when they get verified—there are ways of doing that—so that there are rights to privacy. The thing about the right to privacy is that it is a right that you, the individual, should have. The GDPR and this Bill are about how you process data; in other words, it is about what you do with the data when you have it. The legislation builds in lots of safeguards, but there is nothing that says, when you decide what data to keep or whatever it is, that people should have a right to know that it will not be revealed to the general world.

The question is where we should put it in. People used to think that Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights covered them, but I realised just now that it covers only your relationship with Governments. What about your relationship with other corporates, other individuals or ordinary websites? It should cover everybody. So there is an issue here that we should think about. How do we protect ourselves as individuals, and is this the right place to do it? I think that this is probably the only place where we can put something in—but I leave that to the very bright lawyers such as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, to think about.