House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Bill Debate
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(1 week ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the purpose of this group of amendments is, within a reformed House, not to diminish but instead to preserve and improve the high standard of function of the present House. This is our successful ability of legislative scrutiny and holding the Government of the day properly to account.
It is proposed that the House is capped at 620, with 600 temporal Peers and 20 Lords spiritual. As indicated in subsection (a) of the new clause in Amendment 74, a Lords appointments commission would recommend 200 temporal Peers, or one-third of the total of 600, as non-political Cross-Benchers; subsection (b) of the new clause also confers a duty on the commissioners to consult on an ongoing basis with the Leader of the House and the shadow Leader of the House, with the leader of the third-largest party-political group in the House and the Convenor of the Cross Benches.
An electoral college, representative of all parts of the UK, indirectly elects 400 temporal Peers, or two-thirds of the 600, as political Members, the government and opposition parties having exactly the same number at 150 each, or 37.5% each out of 400, as stated in subsection (3) of the new clause in Amendment 75, while the other political parties, chiefly comprising the Liberal Democrats, have 100, or 25% of 400. This means that, at 200, the non-political Cross-Benchers have 50 more members than the Government or the opposition parties, at 150 each. That in turn ensures a far better standard of legislative scrutiny than otherwise obtaining if, within a reformed House, either the government or opposition political parties had a majority instead.
For two reasons, indirect elections of 400 political Members are much preferable to direct elections of 400 political Members. First, direct elections would lead to conflict with the House of Commons, whereas indirect elections avoid that. As a result, and secondly, arising from direct elections, such competition with another place would also distract and undermine the democratic value and quality function of a reformed House as an effective revising Chamber.
Regarding the procedures and ratios of indirect elections, subsection (1)(b) of the new clause in Amendment 75 puts a duty on the Secretary of State to ensure that the indirect elections are conducted with integrity, fairness and transparency. Out of 400 places for political Members, and given that 2023 statistics indicate a total UK population of 68,265,000, England—which represents 84.5% of that figure—would be allocated 338 places; Scotland, which represents 8%, would be allocated 32 places; Wales, at 4.5%, would be allocated 18 places; and Northen Ireland, at 3%, would be allocated 12 places.
As detailed by subsection (2) of the new clause in Amendment 75, the electoral college comprises selected participants who become the electors. These would include: some Westminster House of Commons parliamentarians; some from each of the three regional Parliaments in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland; and, as electors of English Members to a reformed House, some English local government representatives.
My Lords, I admire the ingenuity and ambition of the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, in tabling these amendments, in addition to the careful consideration he has given in presenting a package of reforms. He poses a range of questions about the future composition of your Lordships’ House. However, the noble Earl will understand that we cannot accept them, as we are currently engaging in wider discussions with noble Lords from across the House about the way forward.
The noble Earl will be aware of the Government’s long-term ambition for more fundamental reform by establishing an alternative second Chamber that is more representative of the regions and nations of the UK. The Government’s manifesto makes a commitment to consult on proposals to provide an opportunity for the public to contribute their views on how to ensure that this alternative Chamber best serves them. As an aside, I note that the noble Earl’s Amendment 79 does not include the public in the list of people whom the Secretary of State would be obliged to consult.
The Government are open to differing views on what an alternative second Chamber could look like. Nothing on this matter is settled and it is right that we continue the debate, including with the public at large.
With the greatest respect to the noble Earl, his amendments would put the cart before the horse and bring forward a comprehensive package of reform, not only before the public have had the chance to have their say but with a pre-empted outcome. I therefore respectfully request that the noble Earl withdraws his amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful for the kind remarks from both Front Benches. I very much take on board the comment of the noble Baroness, Lady Anderson, about how the public should be consulted. On Report, perhaps one of the first things that it might be constructive to do is to bring back a revised amendment that incorporates that consideration.
If we agree that what should come first and foremost is the quality of legislative scrutiny and other high-standards benefits of this House, to which membership composition is secondary and subservient, then in the light of that prescription and within this grouping, your Lordships may agree that three aspects should perhaps be brought back on Report: first, the proportions and numbers indicated for different Benches in a reformed House; secondly, the role of the Appointments Commission; thirdly, that of the electoral college.
Fortunately, in the present House, the quality of legislative scrutiny is able to be as good as it is in spite of the political patronage system that appoints numbers here indiscriminately.
However, that system of indiscriminate appointments of numbers would, surely, undermine a reformed House, within which good-quality results are likely to be sustained all the same, provided that respective numbers are established in the first place, such as the proposed 200 non-political Cross-Benchers, having 50 more Members than the two main political parties, with 150 each. Having said that, I appreciate the comments of my noble friend Lord True, who takes the view that that might not work, while my view is that it could probably be made to work.
Although HOLAC or a statutory appointments commission is the way to increase as necessary the numbers of non-political Members in a reformed House, nevertheless, on Report a further amendment is needed to safeguard the reputation of the commission and its usual procedures of appointments against judicial challenge.
Equally, for the reasons already outlined, although an electoral college indirectly electing 400 political Members protects United Kingdom democracy better than direct elections of 400 political Members would, Amendments 75 and 79 should still both be revisited on Report, in connection with further evidence supporting, in comparison with direct elections for a reformed House of 600 temporal Members, the greater usefulness, authenticity and public benefit of the formula proposed, which consists of indirect elections for 400 political Members combined with commission appointments for 200 non-political Members.
Meanwhile, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 74 and will not press my other amendments in this group.