Equality (Titles) Bill [HL]
Debate between Earl of Caithness and Lord Richard(10 years, 5 months ago)
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The Earl of Caithness
If “living heir” is accepted, does the noble Lord, Lord Richard, accept that it would be irrelevant whether that child was legitimate or illegitimate?
Lord Richard
Of course I accept that the definition of an heir may be different in England and Scotland. It is a matter of Scottish law. All I am saying is that if it applies to a Scottish title, then Scottish law will apply to the definition of an heir. Whatever the definition of an heir is, that heir in future, according to this proposal, will be either male or female depending upon which is the eldest. That is the Scottish position. So be it. The English position may be different. I do not see the difficulty that the noble Earl, Lord Caithness, sees in this. The proposal talks about an “heir”. What is an heir? It is one thing in England and one thing in Scotland. You cannot marry the two together in a Bill; of course not. The noble Earl’s amendment is frankly irrelevant and unnecessary, because Scottish law will apply to Scottish peerages and English law will apply to English peerages. I do not see the difficulty.
House of Lords (Amendment) Bill [HL]
Debate between Earl of Caithness and Lord Richard
The Earl of Caithness
My Lords, I have told my noble friend that I am concerned about this matter, although not about the principle of the amendment. However, it was brought to my attention today—I should perhaps have notified my noble friend of this—that we had a big debate on this matter in the 2008-09 Session. The Committee for Privileges looked at the question of expulsion under the present regime. There was at that time a substantial difference of opinion between the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland of Asthal, and my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern as to exactly what the powers of the House are in this regard. I am concerned that the amendment would allow the House to expel Members through the use of Standing Orders. To expel a Member of the House would exclude that person from receiving from the Crown a Writ of Summons and the Letters Patent to attend, sit and vote in Parliament. That is a substantial change. I repeat that I am not against the amendment in principle, but given that this is such a big issue, I wonder whether this is the right way forward.
I had a quick talk to my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern earlier this afternoon. He looked at this measure and said that the House can override the Writ of Summons, if it wants to. He noted that the proposed new subsection (2) of the amendment contains a right of appeal, but asked to whom the right of appeal could be made. There needs to be much more detail. I wonder whether that detail should be left to Standing Orders or whether my noble friend will consider withdrawing the amendment so that we can discuss the matter when the Bill that the noble Lord, Lord Richard—I am glad to see him in his place—and his committee are looking at comes forward in the next Session, so that we can get the wording right.
Lord Richard
My Lords, I rise briefly to support what the noble Earl, Lord Caithness, said. It is a difficult question. First, we have had some very complicated debates over the past few years as to power of the House to expel or suspend. I am not sure whether it is right to, in effect, give this House the power to expel a Member by a provision inserted at Third Reading of a Private Member’s Bill. Perhaps that is not the way we ought to do it. The principle that the House should have the power to expel may be right. It may even be right that the way to do it is by standing order. I am not sure about that.
Secondly, I strongly support what the noble Earl, Lord Caithness, had to say about the right of appeal. I should have thought that the one thing we would wish to do in a situation in which the House decided to expel someone was to keep the courts out of the decision. A situation in which there is an appeal to the courts or in which the courts can be appealed to, even if there is not a formal right of appea, would be dangerous. These are essentially parliamentary matters; they should be treated as such and the division of responsibility is in our constitution. It leaves the courts looking after judicial matters and Parliament looking after parliamentary matters. I do not want those two to be mixed.