(6 years ago)
Lords ChamberMuch of this Bill is about the appropriate balance between liberty and security in the present climate, where acts of terrorism are a reality rather than a distant or remote possibility. The differences of view over some parts of this Bill are in effect over where that appropriate balance between liberty and security should lie, since I presume that we are all in agreement with the principle that there has to be such a balance. Amendment 53A is also about where that balance should lie.
Clause 18 and Schedule 2 amend existing powers to retain fingerprints and DNA samples for counterterrorism purposes. The amendment would enable a person whose fingerprints and DNA profiles are retained under a power amended by Schedule 2 to apply to the Biometrics Commissioner for the data to be deleted.
The amendment highlights and addresses two scenarios. The first is where there has been a mistake, such as over identity, place or any material fact or in the intelligence. The second scenario is where a person has been arrested but not charged for the offence. Under the terms of the amendment, an application can be made to the commissioner for the destruction of data where one of those two scenarios has been met as well as the requirement that the retention of the data has not been previously authorised by the commissioner or a court of law.
On receiving an appeal from the person whose biometric data has been retained, the commissioner would then be required to seek representations from the relevant chief officer of police as to whether the data should be destroyed, with the commissioner having to determine the appeal within three months.
If people’s data are retained in circumstances where a mistake might have been made or where they have not ultimately been charged with an offence, they should be able to appeal to have it destroyed. That right of appeal is surely quite important. At present, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act states that biometric data must be deleted by the police if it was taken where,
“the arrest was unlawful or based on mistaken identity”.
As far as I can see, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act does not provide for a personal right to appeal, which is what this amendment would give. This is surely an important principle. This amendment does not overturn the principle that there should be a period of automatic retention following a lawful and correct arrest on suspicion of terrorism. Indeed, it does not remove anything from Schedule 2.
Under Schedule 2, the time period for national security determination is amended. An NSD allows a chief police officer to determine that it is necessary and proportionate to extend the retention period for biometric data for the purposes of national security for an extra two years to five years, where it would otherwise be destroyed. An increased period of five years is a long time to retain the data of persons who have never been charged with a crime, particularly in the absence of a right of appeal. The amendment seeks to provide such an appeal through the Biometric Commissioner, who would make a decision on retention of data or otherwise based on whether it was necessary and proportionate to do so.
I hope that the Government will feel able to accept that, in the changed circumstances provided for in the Bill, the right of appeal being sought in this amendment should be taken up. I beg to move.
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has explained, this amendment would provide for a person whose fingerprints and DNA profile are retained under a power amended by Schedule 2 to apply to the Biometrics Commissioner for the data to be deleted if the commissioner or a court have not previously authorised its retention.
One of the circumstances in which this new process would apply is where an individual had been arrested or charged as a result of a mistake, such as mistaken identity. I am pleased to be able to tell the noble Lord that existing legislation already addresses such cases of mistaken identity, providing a stronger safeguard, in fact, than the one he is proposing. Section 63D(2) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, or PACE, provides that biometric data must be deleted by the police, without the individual needing to appeal, if it was taken as a result of an unlawful arrest, or an arrest based on mistaken identity. Given this existing provision, I believe that this aspect of the amendment is not necessary.
The second limb of the amendment covers cases where a person has been arrested but not charged with an offence. Of course, we touched on this ground in debating Amendment 47, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. As I indicated in response to that earlier debate, the Government’s view is that where someone has been lawfully arrested for a terrorism offence but not charged with that offence, it is none the less appropriate, necessary and proportionate that their fingerprints and DNA profile are retained by the police for three years. That approach has been firmly established for some years, through the Terrorism Act 2000, and we are now extending it to cover persons arrested for exactly the same terrorism offences under PACE. Consequently, I am not persuaded that we should now introduce a right of appeal to the Biometric Commissioner in such cases.
I stress that the Bill does not depart from the principle established by the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 that the biometric data of a person who is arrested but not charged should not normally be retained indefinitely, as had previously been the case. In passing this legislation in 2012, Parliament recognised, rightly in my view, that in certain circumstances it is appropriate and in the public interest for biometric data to be retained for limited periods in the absence of a conviction. This includes when an individual is arrested under the Terrorism Act 2000 on suspicion of being a terrorist but is not subsequently charged. The law provides for a three-year automatic retention period in this situation. However, the retention of biometric data for any longer than this would require a national security determination to be made by a chief officer of police and approved by the independent Biometrics Commissioner.
As we have already debated, Schedule 2 makes an equivalent provision for a case where the same person may be arrested on suspicion of the same terrorist activity but under the general power of arrest in PACE. The flexibility to arrest an individual under the Terrorism Act or PACE is a decision to be taken by the police, one which will be based on operational considerations. It is a gap in legislation that the same biometric retention rules do not follow the two powers of arrest in terrorism cases, despite the fact that there may otherwise be no material difference between two such cases. Schedule 2 closes that gap. While I support the principle that biometrics taken following a mistaken or unlawful arrest should be deleted—that is the position at law already—I am afraid I cannot agree that we should remove the equally well-established principle that there should be a limited period of automatic retention following a lawful and correct arrest on suspicion of terrorism.
(6 years ago)
Lords ChamberI shall be very brief. I await the Government’s response to the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, with interest.
I would like to pursue another point he raised in his contribution. Bearing in mind that this amendment, which adds offences, is coming in at a very late stage in proceedings, is this a result of a perceived oversight on the Government’s part or does it represent a significant rethink of policy?
My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords who have responded to this proposed amendment. We are very conscious that it is less than ideal to bring in an amendment of this kind at this stage of the Bill’s passage. If we had been able to do so at an earlier stage, it would have been much better.
Having said that, we felt that it was, on balance, right to introduce this change rather than not introduce it. I recognise the reservation expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, on that score. He also expressed the reservation that we heard on the previous group of amendments about applying extraterritorial jurisdiction to those who are not UK citizens or UK residents. I have already said that as a general rule I respect that point of principle. However, I put it to the noble Lord and the noble Baroness that what we are seeking to do here is not any different in concept from what we sought to do at the beginning of the Bill.
This amendment, moved by the noble Lady Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and to which my name and that of my noble friend Lord Kennedy of Southwark are also attached, is another which reflects a recommendation from the Joint Committee on Human Rights. One of the key aspects of the Bill is the proposed increase in maximum sentences for a number of terrorist offences. This was one—but only one—of our reasons for raising concerns about the prospect of innocent parties falling foul of some offences.
The JCHR said that the increases in sentences do not appear to be supported by evidence to suggest that they are justified or proportionate. The committee was particularly concerned that a sentence of 15 years could be imposed for an offence of viewing terrorist material online—even more so in the light of amendments on Report in the Commons that might make a single viewing sufficient for such an offence to be deemed to have been committed. As has already been said, the committee asked the Home Office for the evidence on which it based its decision that the current maximum sentences were insufficient and why it considered the proposed higher maximum sentences to be necessary and proportionate.
The reply from the Home Office, as set out in the JCHR report, stated, among other things:
“The division between preliminary terrorist activity and attack planning is increasingly blurred”.
It did not, according to the committee, explain why existing sentencing powers were inadequate. I hope, like others, that the Government will address this point on existing sentencing powers in their response, as well as the specific terms of the amendment, reflecting the view of the JCHR, which deletes the increase in the maximum sentence from 10 years to 15 years for the “collection of information” offence provided for in Section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000.
My Lords, Clause 7 increases the maximum sentences for a number of terrorism offences to ensure that the available punishment properly reflects the seriousness of the crime. That is the point that I urge noble Lords to focus on in this debate. A key aspect of the review of our terrorism laws announced by the Prime Minister following last year’s attacks, of which the Bill is the product, was looking again at the courts’ sentencing powers to ensure that they are sufficient to respond to the threat and keep the public safe. The clear conclusion was that sentencing needs to be updated and strengthened, and the Bill contains a package of measures to deliver that, including Clause 7. However, I recognise that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, have queried whether these changes need to be made and have suggested that such changes are unnecessary and disproportionate. However, I sincerely hope that in responding to such concerns I can explain why the Government believe that Clause 7 as drafted is a necessary, proportionate and timely response to the contemporary terrorist threat.
Since the offences in question were first introduced, in some cases 12 years ago and in others 18 years ago, the terrorist threat has evolved significantly. Its source has shifted and diversified, its methods have developed and it has been quick to exploit modern online technology. Both its extent and its severity have maintained an upwards trajectory, and the intelligence services consider that in recent years there has been an enduring shift in the nature of the threat, rather than just a spike. We can be under no illusion: the scale of the threat we face today is unprecedented and, sadly, more attacks are likely.
In particular, we have seen increases in the scale of radicalisation and changes in its methodology and patterns. The growth of the internet has brought new and powerful ways for people to connect with each other, and to share ideas and information, which have brought great benefits to the vast majority of the public. But they have also brought new opportunities to those who would do us harm, increasing the ability of terrorists both to access and to disseminate unlawful terrorist information and training material, propaganda, and incitement to hatred and violence—and to do so, potentially, to a wide audience. Indeed, those who seek to recruit and to inspire or direct individuals to carry out attacks have never found it easier to identify and connect with would-be terrorists, often across international borders, and those who are embarking on the path of radicalisation have never found it easier to access material, to communicate with terrorist individuals and organisations, and to receive encouragement or direction which will move them further and more quickly along that path.
My Lords, the Sentencing Council’s new guidelines for terrorism offences came into force, as the noble Lord rightly says, on 27 April. In its consultation on the draft guidelines, the council was able to anticipate the proposed increases. Consequently, we believe it will not be a difficult task for the council to modify the guidelines once the Bill is enacted, and the Government will of course work with the council on those increases. Any changes to sentencing will only be made following parliamentary debate and approval.
Unless I am getting confused, which is quite possible, as I understand it the Security Minister, when the Bill was in the Commons, said,
“we have kept the Sentencing Council apprised of the provisions in the Bill, and the chairman has indicated that the council plans to revisit the guidelines once the Bill has completed its parliamentary passage”.—[Official Report, Commons, Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill Committee, 3/7/18; col. 105.]
Is that still the Government’s position?
That is exactly the position. I sense no resistance from the Sentencing Council to that approach and I think it is eminently practicable. To answer the question from the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, about the review, it was announced by my right honourable friend the Prime Minister in June 2017. It is an internal government review and as such was not published, but I have informed the Committee today of some of the conclusions that it reached.
(8 years ago)
Lords ChamberI congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, on pressing this issue over a lengthy period with such determination and vigour. I ought to set out our position. There is inevitably a strong feeling that the Government are seeking a means to go back on the cross-party agreement, the undertakings given to victims and their commitment to implement Section 40 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013. In the Commons yesterday, the Solicitor-General rather gave the game away when he said that the consultation will ask whether Section 40 should be fully commenced, repealed or kept under review. Many fear that the consultation will prove to be a sham. Governments do not suddenly decide to hold a consultation on repealing recent legislation that has not yet been implemented unless that is something they would be happy to do. I suggest that the Minister knows that only too well. I suspect he may well choose to deny that, but the proof of the pudding will be in the outcome of this hastily organised consultation.
The question today is about the stance to take on the Government’s Motion. The noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, has indicated her position—at least, the Minister has done it for her—and it is one with which we agree. Two matters in particular need to be considered. One is the impact on the progress of the Bill. In our most recent discussion of this issue, the Government sought to argue that carrying the amendments concerned could place national security at risk, because it would delay the implementation of the Bill when there is a deadline, in a few weeks’ time, by which it needs to be passed. However, the Government destroyed their argument about a risk to national security by taking longer than they needed over scheduling consideration of our amendments in the Commons. If the Government seriously thought that national security was being put at risk, they would have had the Lords’ amendments considered by the Commons much sooner than they did. However, we are now that much closer to the deadline. Since we support the Bill we do not wish to start raising credible doubts over whether it will become an Act within the required timescale.
The second matter concerns the role of this House. This is usually described as inviting the Commons, the elected House, where deemed appropriate, to think again about aspects of or gaps in proposed legislation. We have done that twice in respect of the issue we are considering again today, and the Commons has twice declined to accept our view. This House has carried out its role and its responsibility.
In view of that, while we will continue to pursue this matter and the Government’s actions, like the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, we do not believe that we should continue to do so through the medium of insisting on the amendments to the Bill that have previously been carried.
My Lords, I am grateful for the contributions made from all quarters of the House. I will comment briefly on the consultation.
The consultation is a serious effort to canvas opinion. This is a difficult issue. There is no consensus around Section 40 implementation. We want to find a model for self-regulation that has broad support and works in practice. As well as having a responsibility to the victims, the Government have a responsibility to make sure that we have, as the noble Lord, Lord Myners, has correctly put it, a vibrant and sustainable press, particularly at the local level. We want to gather the evidence through a proper process, better to understand the potential impacts and explore options for next steps.
I and the Government believe that a consultation period of 10 weeks is appropriate and right. This is enough time to enable those who want to comment to do so, and we look forward to that process commencing.
(8 years ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, has already reminded us of the cross-party agreement that committed the Government to implementing the recommendations of the Leveson inquiry. Unfortunately, the Government have not seen fit to commence Section 40 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013, even though, crucially, alongside the royal charter, Section 40 was designed to incentivise newspapers to join a recognised self-regulator. Yesterday the Government announced a public consultation on Section 40, despite the clear terms of the cross-party agreement.
There will of course be those who are suspicious of the Government’s reasons behind this consultation. Some may even feel that it is designed to give a cloak of respectability to a later decision to go back on the undertakings given and the cross-party agreement reached on Section 40. I do not intend to pursue that line. It is simply very odd for the Government now to commence consultation on whether in effect they should implement their own recent legislation, which was the subject of cross-party agreement, was passed by Parliament, and which still represents the will of Parliament. Is this to be a precedent and to become a feature, with the Government holding regular public consultations on whether they should implement legislation passed by Parliament? Where will it all end?
By the way, I do not share the view that there is not still time to resolve this matter and still ensure the very necessary and vital passage of the Bill within the required time limit. My party, with others, has played a major role in improving it considerably during its passage through Parliament. We will support the amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, if it is put to a vote. There is no reason not to honour undertakings given and cross-party agreements reached on Section 40.
My Lords, I first say to those who have supported the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness that I acknowledge the strength of feeling in the House on this emotive issue. As I said in my opening remarks, the Government know how important these matters are to everybody. We need a robust and workable system for media self-regulation, and resolving that is in everybody’s interest. However, I am afraid that I remain of the opinion that the Bill is not the means to achieve that. Of course I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that the noble Baroness’s amendments are procedurally in order; that has never been in question. However, first, the scope of the Bill means it cannot do this subject justice. The amendments we are considering today concern only interception of communications and would not necessarily sit well with whatever broader solution is to follow. Secondly, and more importantly, the public consultation which the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport announced yesterday provides a means for a reasoned, informed and considered public debate—
(8 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will speak to Amendment 132 and the others in the group. The government amendments in this group address the fact that the Northern Ireland Assembly has not provided legislative consent for this Bill. Only a small number of provisions in the Bill engage devolved responsibilities in Northern Ireland. These relate to oversight and to the proposal that the role of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner for Northern Ireland, who is responsible for overseeing the exercise of devolved powers, should be subsumed into the Investigatory Powers Commissioner that we are creating under the Bill.
In the absence of legislative consent, the existing office of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner for Northern Ireland will not be abolished. Consequently, the Bill need no longer provide for the First Minister and Deputy First Minister to be consulted on the appointment of the IPC. Similarly, the Prime Minister will no longer be under a statutory duty to send them a copy of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s annual report.
Additionally, appeals arising from the Investigatory Powers Tribunal under Clause 220 will no longer be heard by the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland. It will be for the Investigatory Powers Tribunal to decide whether the Court of Appeal in England and Wales or the Court of Session in Scotland should hear the appeal instead. Although this is obviously not the most desirable appeal route for individuals from Northern Ireland, our hands are tied by lack of legislative consent from the Northern Ireland Executive.
Included in this group of government amendments are regulation-making powers allowing the Secretary of State, with the consent of the Northern Ireland Assembly, to reverse these amendments. Therefore, if legislative consent were given at some point in the future, the IPC could reasonably quickly take on the functions of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner for Northern Ireland and appeals could be allowed to go to the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland. It is our hope that both these powers can be used in the near future. Accordingly, I hope noble Lords will support these amendments. I beg to move.
My Lords, I want to make reference to the amendment that we have in this group. Clause 205 provides for the appointment of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and judicial commissioners.
As currently drafted, Clause 205(5) requires the Prime Minister to consult Scottish Ministers and the First Minister and Deputy First Minister in Northern Ireland about the appointment of these commissioners. However, there appears to be currently no duty to consult Welsh Ministers about these appointments, with the result that Wales does not feel that it is being treated equally with the other devolved Administrations in this respect.
Under the Wales Bill before the House, Welsh devolution will take a constitutional form that is much closer to that for Scotland and Northern Ireland. The First Minister of Wales considers that the mutual respect between Administrations means that drawing unnecessary distinctions in legislation between devolved Administrations should be avoided unless strictly necessary. He regards the provision in this Bill—the Investigatory Powers Bill—as at the very least constitutionally discourteous to Wales. In speaking to this amendment, I invite the Government to take the necessary steps in relation to consultation under Clause 205 to address the concern raised by the First Minister on which I have just sought to reflect.
My Lords, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner will be taking on the responsibilities of the three existing statutory commissioners in this area. I contend that Amendment 132A is unnecessary and indeed inappropriate because it would create an inconsistency across the Bill.
The appointment of commissioners to one of those existing bodies—the Office of Surveillance Commissioners —is currently a matter for the Prime Minister, following consultation with Scottish Ministers. Scottish Ministers also have the power to appoint surveillance commissioners for the purpose of overseeing the exercise of powers under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Scotland) Act 2000, or RIPSA.
Under the Bill, the IPC will take on responsibility for overseeing the exercise of powers under RIPSA. As a consequence, the Bill will remove the power of Scottish Ministers to appoint surveillance commissioners. To be consistent with the current position, the Bill therefore requires that Scottish Ministers must be consulted by the Prime Minister prior to the appointment of the IPC or a judicial commissioner. Similarly, the Bill currently requires the Prime Minister to consult the First Minister and Deputy First Minister of Northern Ireland on the appointment of a commissioner. This again reflects the fact that Northern Irish Ministers currently have a role in the appointment of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner for Northern Ireland, which the Bill had originally proposed to subsume into the office of the IPC.
In the event, as I have just said, the Bill has not received legislative consent from the Northern Ireland Assembly. Consequently, the amendments that I have already spoken to in this group would remove the requirement for consultation with Northern Irish Ministers. The noble Lord, Lord Murphy, said that that was a retrograde step, but without legislative consent for the Bill from the Northern Ireland Assembly, the Government have no alternative. In contrast, Welsh Ministers currently have no statutory role in the appointment of the existing commissioners. As the Bill will not affect the competence of Welsh Ministers, I do not consider it necessary to introduce a new right of consultation. Indeed, doing so would create an inconsistency between the treatment of Welsh Ministers and their counterparts in Northern Ireland.
The appointment of judicial commissioners is an important matter, which is why the Government have strengthened the Bill by requiring that appointments must be on the recommendation of the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, and that of his devolved counterparts. So Welsh interests will undoubtedly be represented by the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales. Indeed, I note that the current Lord Chief Justice was in fact born in Wales. I do not consider that further changes to this process are necessary, particularly when they would serve to create inconsistencies within the Bill, as I have explained. On that basis, I hope that the noble Lord will agree not to press his amendment.
I thank the Minister for his response. The spirit of the amendment, frankly, is that in the light of the thrust of the Wales Bill the Government ought to be prepared to consider making the change sought in the amendment, which after all is about consultation. However, I note the response that has been received, which clearly indicates that the Government are not prepared to go down that road. I am sure that the First Minister will read the Government’s response carefully even though it will probably be without any enthusiasm.
(8 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I listened carefully to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and I am grateful for the case she has put. However, I cannot agree with it, and I will explain why that is.
As the noble Baroness explained, this amendment seeks to provide that certain communications data authorisations can be approved only where there is a reasonable suspicion that a serious criminal offence has been, or is likely to be, committed. In short, the amendment would undermine the ability of law enforcement and other public authorities to catch criminals and to keep the public safe. I will now set out why I believe that is so.
I shall start with the requirement for reasonable suspicion. As we discussed and agreed in this House last week, the necessity and proportionality test is established and well understood. It is difficult, therefore, to see what benefit would be derived from inserting a different test. Indeed, in order to approve an authorisation for communications data for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime, a sufficiently compelling case will always be required—a speculative authorisation would never be approved. Therefore, I suggest that the amendment responds to a concern that is fundamentally misplaced.
Turning to the serious crime threshold that this amendment would insert, assuming that the noble Baroness intends the threshold to be equal to that currently used to authorise the interception of communications, I believe once again that the amendment is inappropriate and damaging. Taking effective action against serious criminals often requires the investigation of, if I may use the phrase, lower-level individuals for activities that are not considered serious crimes in order to build a case against higher-ranked criminals. It may also include the investigation of minor offences where stopping an offender at this point may prevent an escalation of their criminal activities, such as in stalking and grooming cases.
It might be helpful if I expand on that. Placing this additional restriction on the acquisition of communications data would disrupt police investigations of online grooming and linked crimes, such as the sending of sexual communications to a child. This is because where such activity does not meet the high threshold proposed, which will often be the case if the child is over the age of 13, it may be impossible to identify perpetrators who may go on to be involved in child sexual exploitation. As such activities increasingly take place online, law enforcement agencies will rely heavily on communications data and the new power in relation to internet connection records in order to investigate this.
The amendment would also reduce the ability to investigate online fraud, which affects everyday internet users who shop or bank online, but which could, depending on the value of the fraud, fall below the serious crime threshold proposed here. Equally, the Department for Work and Pensions, for instance, investigates false tax credit claims which can result in the collective overpayment of millions of pounds of taxpayers’ money, but these false claims may not individually reach the threshold of serious crime. Communications data are currently used to investigate such activity.
I also believe that these amendments are unnecessary given the strict safeguards that already apply to the use of communications data. Data can be accessed only on a case-by-case basis and only where judged necessary and proportionate by a senior officer of a rank specified by Parliament and who is independent of the investigation. Strong judicial oversight will also be provided by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner.
I was grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for qualifying his party’s position on this part of the Bill. We maintain that our existing regime and the proposals in the Investigatory Powers Bill are compliant with EU law, but whatever the final judgment, given the importance of communications data to preventing and detecting crime and safeguarding national security, we will ensure that plans are in place so that the police and others can continue to acquire such data in a way that is consistent with our obligation. I hope that that is helpful.
The Minister appears to be saying that the Government’s position is the same as ours, and that you cannot express a view on whether the law as it stands, as reflected in the Bill, meets the judgment of the European Court of Justice until we have seen and read what that judgment is.
(8 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberI will be brief, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, and other noble Lords, including my noble friend Lord Prescott, have set out the case for and reasoning behind the wording of the amendment in very clear terms. Section 40 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 was part of the cross-party agreement, which included the royal charter, which was signed by the then leaders of the Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat parties. As a result, amendments were withdrawn both in the Commons and in this House. Ministers subsequently continued to make explicit commitments in both Houses to bring in Section 40. They have, however, failed to honour that commitment, and have thus not implemented this part of the 2013 Act, in accordance with the wishes of both Houses and indeed, the previously declared intention of the Government. We will support the amendment if the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, having heard the Government’s response, decides that she still needs to test the opinion of the House.
My Lords, we discussed this issue in Committee when the noble Baroness tabled an amendment seeking to introduce a cause of action which would allow victims of unlawful interception to bring a civil claim. As she is aware, the Investigatory Powers Bill already contains a criminal offence where a person intercepts, without lawful authority, a communication in the course of its transmission via a public or private telecommunications system or a public postal system.
The cause of action, or tort, provided for in Clause 8, is intended to replicate the safeguard which existed in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. This focuses on circumstances where an individual’s communications are intercepted on a private telecommunications system by a person who has the right to control the operation or use of that private telecommunications system. This was a necessary safeguard to protect individuals in very limited circumstances where their employer may unfairly be intercepting communications on a company’s internal computer system, which is not within the scope of the offence of unlawful interception.
This provision was not intended to provide a route for anyone who believed their communications had been unlawfully intercepted to bring a civil case. As we have seen in recent times with the phone hacking cases brought by a number of individuals against media organisations, the appropriate civil routes of redress already exist, for example, for misuse of private information.
I fully understand that many noble Lords here, particularly those who have been victims of press abuse themselves, are frustrated as to what they see as a lack of progress towards implementing the recommendations of the Leveson inquiry report. I want to reassure noble Lords that that is not the case. The Government, as has been said, have implemented the vast majority of Leveson’s recommendations for reforming press regulation. Importantly, they have set up and are funding the Press Recognition Panel, which is currently considering an application for recognition from the self-regulator IMPRESS.
The exemplary damages provisions have been commenced in line with the date set out in the 2013 Act. However, it is important to make clear to the House that no specific date was set for the commencement of the Section 40 costs provisions. Notwithstanding that, the Government continue to look at this issue closely. Indeed, to better understand the issue, my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport and the Minister for Digital and Culture met Hacked Off and victims of press abuse as their first priority. DCMS officials met Hacked Off at official level again only last week. So this is something that the Government are actively considering. I suggest to the House that it is not unreasonable for Ministers who are new in post to take time to understand the issues at play. The position is that, for the time being, Section 40 remains under consideration.
We should also bear in mind that no recognised regulator is yet in place, although I realise that that could change on 25 October when the Press Regulation Panel rule on IMPRESS’s application. Regardless of the panel’s decision, it is true to say that the press landscape has undergone a huge amount of change over the last four years and the Government need to be sensitive to that. A crucial part of Section 40, for example, is around ensuring both sides have access to low-cost arbitration as an alternative to expensive litigation. The arbitration scheme run by IMPRESS is relatively new, while IPSO is currently trialling an arbitration scheme to better understand how it could work effectively. Given the importance of arbitration to making Section 40 operate effectively, it would also be useful to see how both IMPRESS’s arbitration scheme and IPSO’s arbitration pilot work in practice.
I return to the specifics of the amendments which the noble Baroness has tabled.
My Lords, I am grateful to both the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for the way they introduced this amendment. Of course, its context, as the House will be aware, is the position of this country vis-à-vis the United States. I welcome the opportunity to respond to the amendment because it provides me with a chance to update the House on the progress of the proposed bilateral agreement between the United Kingdom and the United States on the issue of access to data across jurisdictions.
The UK and United States Governments have been considering a framework under which communications service providers based in one country could disclose data directly to the other for serious criminal and counterterrorism investigations when required to by a valid warrant or order, without facing a conflict of law. We need to address the situation—highlighted by Sir Nigel Sheinwald, David Anderson, and indeed some US-based companies themselves—where the content of communications between UK nationals, in the UK or in third countries, who are planning or committing crime in the UK, or others who pose a direct threat to the UK both here and abroad, can be beyond the reach of UK law enforcement simply because the data that relate to their communications happens to be stored in the United States.
I am pleased to say that in July 2016 the US Government sent a legislative proposal to Congress that, if passed, would pave the way for a bilateral agreement between the UK and US Governments. The legislation and agreement would help ensure that US-based communications service providers were able to respond to lawful orders from the UK by removing any perceived conflict of law that may previously have prevented co-operation. It would include strong safeguards and so maintain rigorous privacy protections while providing a means for UK agencies to make targeted requests for data relating to serious criminality. This type of agreement would be good for business, which requires greater certainty in the face of any conflict of laws; good for the public, because it would increase levels of transparency and oversight, while also ensuring that they are protected from key threats; and good for the internet, because it would avoid the challenges posed by data localisation and the balkanisation of the web.
We hope that such an agreement can be in place as soon as possible. However, any timetable will of course depend on the changes required to the relevant US legislation. We hope that these can be agreed quickly. Clearly, it would not be right to specify something that does not yet exist as a primary route in the Bill. However, I can reassure the House that, in practice, of course the intention is that such an agreement between the United Kingdom and the United States would be the primary route through which UK agencies access data from US-based communications service providers where it is within the scope of the agreement.
We have always sought to work with companies so that they are able to meet their obligations under UK law. This agreement will help to facilitate exactly that co-operation—so the amendment is not necessary. It is worth repeating what the Prime Minister said in March when she was Home Secretary: any company co-operating with its obligations through an international agreement will of course not be subject to enforcement action through the courts. I hope that these remarks are helpful, and for the reasons given I invite the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.
I thank the Minister for his reply and for the update on the discussions that are taking place towards an agreement that I hope will resolve some of the current difficulties. I am quite sure that the Minister’s words and the information he has given will be read with interest, not only within this House but outside it. I thank him for his reply and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(8 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberAlmost anyone has access to bulk personal datasets. Many of us have a telephone directory. A very wide range of public bodies and commercial organisations have access to bulk personal datasets, because that expression describes a wide range. I cannot be specific to the noble Lord, but if I am able, on advice, I will write to him to elucidate further.
Before I wind up—and I shall, of course, withdraw the amendment—does the noble Earl anticipate that the Government will come forward with an amendment on Report on the recommendation in the report on the technology panel, or not?
I thank the Minister for his detailed response and thank all noble Lords who have participated in this debate, as well as thanking the Committee for its indulgence in allowing us to have a general debate on the Anderson report, even though my amendment related only to one specific part of it. It is very useful to have had the debate that we have had. I am sure that other noble Lords will do so, but I shall certainly want to read again in Hansard the full details of the Minister’s response and the replies that he has given to the questions that have been raised. Once again, I thank him for his detailed response and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(8 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberAs has been said, government Amendment 193 places a statutory duty on the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to inform the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament of his or her decision as to whether to carry out an investigation, inspection or audit in cases where the Intelligence and Security Committee has referred a matter to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner with a view to the commissioner carrying out such an investigation, inspection or audit. Amendment 194, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Janvrin, is very similar to the government amendment, except it also requires the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to provide the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament with the outcome of any investigation, inspection or audit carried out under the terms of the government amendment. I do not know whether the Government are going to accept Amendment 194—we shall find out shortly—or, alternatively, give reasons why it is not acceptable. They may simply say that this will happen anyway and that the amendment is therefore unnecessary.
However, I have one other, I think very minor, point to raise. I accept before I start that it may display a degree of confusion about another part of the Bill. Clause 206(1) enables the Prime Minister to give direction to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, provided that it,
“does not apply in relation to anything which is required to be kept under review by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner under section 205”.
Clause 206(3) states that:
“The Prime Minister may give a direction under this section at the request of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner or the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament”.
Where the direction under subsection (3) has been given by the Prime Minister to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner at the request of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, will the terms of government Amendment 193 and Amendment 194, if accepted, apply in respect of the commissioner informing the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament of his or her decision and the outcome of any investigation, inspection or audit? If not, why not?
My Lords, let me start my response to the noble Lord, Lord Janvrin, by endorsing the point ably made by the noble Lord, Lord Murphy, and paying tribute to the work that the ISC does. Its members have proven themselves adept at holding the security and intelligence agencies to account and they are more than capable, I believe, of investigating any issue that falls within their remit.
It is conceivable, however, that the ISC may uncover an issue that merits further investigation but which is outside its remit to investigate. In those instances, it is right that the committee can refer the issue to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, who can then decide whether to investigate further. It is also right that, having referred the issue, the ISC is then informed about the commissioner’s decision on whether to take further action. That is what the Government’s amendment seeks to achieve and I am glad that it has found favour with the committee.
The amendment put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Janvrin, would go further than that and mean that the commissioner must then report to the ISC the result of the investigation. I find that difficult to accept for two reasons. First, the IPC should report solely to the Prime Minister, who is ultimately responsible for our national security and therefore best placed to take any national security decisions that arise as a result of the reports. Secondly, if an issue has been referred to the IPC because it is outside the remit of the ISC, it does not necessarily follow that the ISC should see the result of that investigation.
It is worth focusing for a second on how things work in the real world. I am sure that, in practice, the IPC and the ISC will strike up a sensible and solid working relationship and keep each other informed of their work. But we do not have to provide for that in statute. On that basis, and in the light of the government amendment, which achieves almost all of what is intended by the ISC, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Janvrin, will feel able not to press the amendment.
Let me address the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, which is not a trivial point. Prime ministerial direction would come into play in a scenario in which, upon request of the ISC, the IPC declined to investigate further in the area suggested. In that situation, the ISC could progress the matter by asking the Prime Minister to direct the commissioner to undertake an investigation. That is provided for by Clause 206(3).
I do not think it is appropriate for this Bill to provide a mechanism whereby the IPC has to report in a certain fashion. We have to be a little careful here to ensure that the IPC is not seen as an arm of the Intelligence and Security Committee—it is not. However, there is a memorandum of understanding between the Intelligence and Security Committee and the Prime Minister. I understand that that memorandum of understanding will come up for review in the reasonably near future. I suggest that, at that time, if it is thought appropriate, the MoU could provide a vehicle to offer some further reassurance in the area that the noble Lord, Lord Janvrin, is seeking.
I recognise the issue that has been raised by the noble Lord, Lord Janvrin. As I said, I think that in the real world it will be a non-issue. However, if there is concern in this area, perhaps I can send a signal to those involved that, when the MoU is further considered, this issue will also be factored in.
(8 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberWill the noble Earl respond in writing on the point on the part of the report by the Select Committee on the Constitution which states:
“The House may wish to consider whether it would be appropriate for an independent court to be prevented from disclosing information if it considers it necessary in the interests of justice”?
Is that the issue on which the Government are going to respond?
There is one more point. In response to Amendment 194BA on funding, the noble Earl said that Clause 210 already requires the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to make an annual report to the Prime Minister. The Select Committee on the Constitution was of course aware of that at the time when it made its report, since it comments:
“The Prime Minister is required to publish the report but has a power to order redactions”.
I wonder why the Government do not therefore feel able to go down the road of the Select Committee recommendation over the Investigatory Powers Commissioner having the right to make written representations to Parliament, because they argue it on the grounds of the requirements of judicial independence and the need for public trust and confidence in the system. They say, in suggesting that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner might have the right to make written representations to Parliament, that that is,
“akin to the right conferred on the Lord Chief Justice by section 5 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005”.
I am not sure why the Government are in effect rejecting the suggestion from the Select Committee on the Constitution, which knew at the time when it made that suggestion that Clause 210 required the commissioner to make that annual report but commented that although the Prime Minister is required to publish it, he has a power to order redactions. That is therefore slightly different from the Investigatory Powers Commissioner having the right to make written representations to Parliament directly, and it is a right that is akin only to that already conferred on the Lord Chief Justice under the Constitutional Reform Act 2005.
I understand the point made by the noble Lord, but I think it would be unimaginable that Parliament would not protest if there were a redaction in the report around the commissioner’s funding. Redactions, in any case, are made only on national security grounds, not on matters of this nature. Nevertheless, I will consider carefully over the summer period what the noble Lord has said, and no doubt we can return to these matters at a later stage.
(8 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe intention behind this amendment to Clause 83 is to replicate the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act in its original form. In so doing, it would restrict the scope of Clause 83 and equate it to existing data retention provisions in DRIPA, with the only addition being the inclusion of internet connection records.
Under the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act, the term “relevant communications data”, as I understand it, covers internet access services, internet email and internet telephony. Those categories replicate the 2009 data retention regulations, which implemented the then EU data retention directive. The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 extended DRIPA to include what was called IP address resolution data.
Clause 83 currently empowers the Home Secretary to issue retention notices covering some six categories of data under the definition of “relevant communications data”. One of these categories is internet connection records. That therefore leaves five other categories, which on the face of it would appear to go wider than the existing data retention categories under the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 as amended by the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015.
As the Bill is currently drafted, the term “relevant communications data” could be interpreted as some sort of catch-all definition of relevant communications data that would cover the collection of virtually any type of communication on a network, including communications where the sender or recipient was not a human being. If that is an accurate assessment, the definition of “relevant communications data” in Clause 83 would cover not only background interactions that smartphone apps make automatically with their supplier servers but presumably also the entire internet of things.
I therefore seek an explanation from the Government as to why the scope of “relevant communications data” in the Bill is not consistent with that in current recent legislation, the reasons and justification for the apparent broadening of the scope, and the difficulties that presumably the Government believe would be caused if the scope of Clause 83 were restricted in line with the amendment and instead equated to existing data retention provisions in DRIPA, apart from the addition of the inclusion of internet connection records. I beg to move.
My Lords, the amendment seeks to amend the definition of “relevant communications data”—that is, the communications data that the Secretary of State will be able to require communications service providers to retain.
In looking at how the amendment is couched, I would like to bring the Committee’s attention to a statement made by David Anderson QC in his report on investigatory powers. He said that,
“any new law … must be couched in technology-neutral language”.
The Government agree. However, the amendment would go against that advice. It would seek to revert to the technical language from the data retention regulations 2009. This, in turn, as the noble Lord mentioned, was drawn from the EU data retention directive 2006, which was struck down in 2014.
I suggest to the noble Lord that it would be inappropriate to base today’s law on specific tele- communications definitions from a decade ago. For example, the amendment would ensure that we retained a reference to dial-up internet access in our legislation. That surely cannot be appropriate where broadband and mobile internet access are now the norm. The approach we have taken is to keep our definitions technologically neutral, as David Anderson recommended and as, indeed, is sensible in the drafting of any law that needs to apply across a range of technologies over time.
I hope that the noble Lord will recognise that it is not appropriate to tie our data retention regime to specific, and outdated, technological language. Those are the reasons why the Government cannot support the amendment.
Perhaps I may ask a question on that point. Not unfairly, the noble Earl made reference to regulations of some years ago, but presumably it is also accurate to say, and perhaps he could comment on this, that very recent legislation—namely, DRIPA 2014, as amended by the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015—has also used the wording referred to in the amendment. Therefore, it also relates to legislation that is not particularly old and indeed is pretty recent. As I see it, we are making a change in wording from legislation that was passed only a year or two ago.
The noble Lord makes what is, on the face of it, a fair point. We have language, as I have explained, that is out of date. But even where the language is not out of date in the kinds of instances that he refers to—for example, legislation refers to the “international mobile equipment identity” of devices—the rate at which telecommunications change means that that kind of language could become out of date very quickly. We try to read across the data descriptions that originated in the 2006 directive to the communications technologies of today, and do so in technology-neutral language. That is why we have departed from the approach that the noble Lord is advocating.
As the noble Lord will remember, DRIPA was emergency legislation. We simply replicated the existing language in that Bill. We now have an opportunity in the Bill before us to do rather better and try to future-proof the terms that the Bill contains.
I thank the Minister for that explanation. In the light of what he has said on behalf of the Government, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Since the issue of the Wilson doctrine has been raised, perhaps I could refer to the recent report from the Select Committee on the Constitution. It referred to the Wilson doctrine and made particular reference to a case decided last year, where,
“the Investigatory Powers Tribunal held that the Wilson Doctrine provided fewer safeguards for parliamentarians’ communications than had commonly been supposed”.
The Select Committee ended that section of its report by saying:
“We note that the surveillance of parliamentarians is a significant constitutional issue and would welcome clarification from the Government of its current understanding of the Wilson Doctrine”.
Do the Government intend to give an indication of their current understanding of the Wilson doctrine, in line with the views expressed in that recent report from the Select Committee on the Constitution?
My Lords, Amendment 169AA would remove the role of the Secretary of State and law enforcement chiefs from the warrant authorisation process, in circumstances where an equipment interference warrant is sought for the purposes of acquiring the communications or private information of a Member of a relevant legislature. This proposal reflects an earlier amendment discussed by this Committee in the context of interception. As I understood her, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, is concerned that the safeguards contained in the Bill politicise the process of authorising a warrant. I do not share that perspective at all.
As my noble and learned friend Lord Keen said when we first discussed this matter, this amendment would in fact reduce the safeguards for parliamentarians. In line with the commitment given by the previous Prime Minister last November, the Bill provides a triple lock where warrants concern a parliamentarian’s communications or private information: they must be issued by the Secretary of State; approved by the Prime Minister; and authorised by a judicial commissioner. The Bill goes even further in the context of equipment interference warrants issued to law enforcement agencies, which are issued by a law enforcement chief and must be approved by the Secretary of State, the Prime Minister and an independent judicial commissioner.
I will not rehearse the arguments for the double lock at this point, but it is important to remember, as the noble Lord, Lord Murphy, reminded us, that it was endorsed by the Joint Committee of Parliament that scrutinised the draft Bill and, following amendments made in the other place, enjoyed cross-party support. The additional safeguards provided for parliamentarians add an extra layer of checks to the process. I do not share the perception of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, that the process introduces the risk of political bias. In fact, I find it difficult to see what possible benefit would accrue from removing one of the checks that we now propose—that regarding the Secretary of State or law enforcement chief. In view of that, I respectfully invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
I will move on briefly to the amendment tabled by the Government. Amendment 173 is—this answers the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee—a small, technical amendment that simply corrects the omission of a definition from Clause 114. The amendment adds the appropriate definition of a “designated senior official” to the clause, informing the reader of the persons to whom the provision applies. We do not think that there is any need to revisit the relative definitions in other parts of the Bill, and the amendment does not change how the equipment interference regime operates in any way.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked about the Government’s view of the Wilson doctrine. As he will be aware, in its judgment of 14 October the IPT comprehensively rejected the claim brought by a number of parliamentarians that their communications were improperly intercepted and found that all activity was within the law. The IPT also found that MPs’ communications with their constituents and others are protected by RIPA, the statutory legal regime, and that the regime governing the interception of MPs’ communications is compliant with the European Convention on Human Rights.
In February 2015, the Government published an updated draft code of practice on the interception of communications, which explicitly recognised the importance of communications between constituents and their elected representatives. In consequence, the Bill now provides for this in statute by setting out a role for the Prime Minister in authorising warrants which target a parliamentarian. I hope that that is helpful.
(8 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberUnless the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has driven a coach and horses through these amendments—I shall have to consider carefully what he said—I would like to thank the Government for bringing them forward. As has been said, they incorporate in all the relevant parts of the Bill the change that was made in relation to trade union activity in providing protection for it when the matter was debated in the Commons. We welcome the amendments and the Government honouring the commitment that they gave in the other place.
(8 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank the Minister for repeating the Answer to an Urgent Question asked in the Commons earlier today. We appreciate and welcome the steps that the Government are taking. In the Commons yesterday, the Government confirmed that they were accepting the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Dubs which was passed in this House. They also said that they would urgently consult others prior to bringing forward more detailed proposals and that a meeting of the Local Government Association was scheduled for later this week.
It appears that 10 Downing Street has now told the Daily Telegraph that the first children will be arriving by the end of the year, which is a totally different tenor of response to that given in the Commons, which was all about urgency and getting on with it as quickly as possible. Will the Government tell us the estimated timetable for implementing my noble friend’s amendment, which the Government have accepted? Will the Minister also say whether it will be an objective to take in at least the first 300 children before the start of the school year in September, since it will not assist the position of such children if they have to join a school well into the start of the school year?
Finally, 157 children have been identified by Citizens UK as being in Calais and having family connections here. I appreciate that earlier a Minister said he could not comment on the figure of 157, but will the Government give an assurance that they will take prompt action to ensure that those children in Calais with a valid legal claim for reunification are reunited as a matter of urgency with their families here under the Dublin arrangements?
My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, who asked a number of questions. The Daily Telegraph picked up the No. 10 statement and misconstrued it. No. 10 said that we would proceed with this programme as quickly as possible and that by the end of the year we will have seen children arriving in this country. That does not mean to say that it will be 31 December before any child arrives.
It is difficult for me to define the estimated timetable because of the need, as specified by the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, to consult local authorities before we are in a position to say how many children can be accommodated. I can only assure the noble Lord that we need to take necessary but not undue time to do that, that we are already engaged with the French authorities to ensure that the vulnerable children who I know the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, wants us to prioritise are identified as quickly as possible, and that we will do the same in Greece and Italy.
I cannot, as the noble Lord will therefore surmise, be specific about whether we will admit 300 children before the start of the school year. The very nature of this announcement means that we must take the necessary time to consult others before bringing forward final proposals on how to implement. All I can say is that we will not only implement the letter of this amendment but its spirit, and we will do so enthusiastically and as speedily as we can. Naturally, as I have already emphasised, those children in Calais are likely to be the first candidates.
(8 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe amendment your Lordships sent to the Commons on allowing asylum seekers the right to work after six months, like the other amendments carried in this House against the Government’s wishes, did not find favour with the Government or indeed receive any indication of movement by them on the issue.
As has been said, at present in most cases asylum seekers are not allowed to work in the UK unless they have waited over 12 months for an initial or subsequent decision, and are not considered responsible for any delay. Those who do qualify for the right to work under these restrictions are then able to apply only for jobs on the shortage occupation list. However, we are currently reviewing this issue as part of a wider policy review and consequently we will not be supporting the Motion sending the matter back again to the Commons—albeit now saying nine months rather than six months.
My Lords, Amendment 59B, proposed in lieu of Amendment 59, while slightly less radical than the earlier amendment, would still mean fundamental changes to the government policy of restricting permission to work to those who have been awaiting a decision, through no fault of their own, for 12 months. As the noble Lord reminded us, those allowed to work are restricted to jobs on the shortage occupation list introduced in the last Parliament. As I indicated earlier, the Government believe that this is a fair and reasonable policy, and we believe that because of the need to ensure that access to jobs is prioritised for British citizens and those with leave to remain here—including, importantly, refugees.
The new amendment would not only allow asylum seekers to work after only nine months; it would also remove the important caveat that any delay must not be of the asylum seeker’s own making. This would benefit those who are responsible for delaying a decision on their claim and purposely frustrate the asylum process simply to gain permission to work or to avoid removal. It would also benefit individuals whose cases were complex for perfectly good reasons, such as those accused of serious criminal acts, including war crimes, where there is an inescapable imperative to investigate the facts before reaching a decision. It would also allow unrestricted access to the labour market—that is to say, not just to jobs on the shortage occupation list—regardless of the interests of British jobseekers. It is a recipe for a free pass into the UK employment pool and that really is not fair to British people competing for the same jobs. In making policy in this area, we have a duty to consider how such policy impacts on society as a whole, not just on asylum seekers.
The noble Lord, Lord Alton, rather dismissed the arguments rehearsed by my noble friends Lord Ashton and Lord Bates in earlier stages of the Bill. But there is a danger that the noble Lord’s amendment would serve to encourage unfounded claims from those who do not need protection at all but are simply seeking employment opportunities, knowing that if they play their cards right they can achieve that objective within nine months. These are opportunities for which they would not otherwise be eligible. That cannot be right or acceptable. The shorter the period allowed for in this context, the more we encourage spurious asylum claims of this kind.
Currently, the Immigration Rules allow non-EEA nationals to work here if there is no suitable resident worker available. This gives priority to those filling roles on the shortage occupation list and is subject to numerical limits. If non-EEA nationals could bypass these restrictions by lodging an unfounded asylum claim, this approach would be completely undermined. It could encourage illegal migrants to come here and make an unfounded asylum claim, which would prejudice the position of British people and recognised refugees in our labour market. I say that because if we were to experience an increase in unfounded claims, the knock-on effect would be to delay claims from genuine refugees and undermine our progress towards a fair and efficient asylum system.
There has been much debate about delays in decision-making in the Home Office, but this is no longer an issue. Delays have been brought under control and, in the great majority of cases, asylum seekers receive a decision within six months. Many of those who do not are the complex cases that I referred to earlier. The noble Lord’s amendment carries an increased risk that we will be obliged to give a free pass to people with a criminal record—or, shall I say, with a criminal past. The majority of refugees are granted asylum within six months and once that happens, they have unrestricted access to the labour market.
The noble Lord, Lord Alton, suggested that his amendment was a route out of poverty but this suggests that asylum seekers are penniless. While awaiting a decision, they receive free accommodation and a cash allowance to cover essential living needs if they would otherwise be destitute. While their claim is outstanding they can undertake volunteering activities that can benefit a community, giving them a sense of purpose, and we are exploring ways to support this.
The amendment proposed is unnecessary and I really do not think that the noble Lord has made his case. Asylum seekers do not need to work and what he proposes carries the risk of serious abuse. I firmly believe that the current policy strikes the right balance. As I said earlier, it is fair and reasonable towards genuine asylum seekers; it is consistent with our international obligations; and it takes into account the rights and needs of our society as a whole. On that basis, I ask noble Lords to resist Amendment 59B in lieu.
I will be brief, since the arguments for this amendment have already been powerfully made. I also endorse the comments made by my noble friend Lord Dubs and other noble Lords about the measures that the Government have already taken. But while on the one hand the Government say, rightly, that we need to play a role at the heart of Europe, on the other they decline to assist over taking in unaccompanied refugee children in Europe who have fled from war, conflict and persecution and are already alone and at risk, simply because they are already in Europe.
Europol estimates that 10,000 unaccompanied refugee children went missing in Europe last year and we know that children are being exploited. The Government maintain that taking in any unaccompanied refugee children from among those already in Europe would increase the so-called pull factor—an argument for which there is no firm, hard evidence one way or the other. But at the heart of the unproven pull factor claim is a policy stance that we should leave all unaccompanied refugee children already in Europe to their fate. That is an unacceptable stance and if my noble friend decides to put his amendment to a vote, we will support him in the Division Lobby.
My Lords, I am very sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, appeared to be so dismissive of the many measures that I set out in my opening remarks. I emphasise that those measures include both children in conflict zones and those who have reached the shores of Europe. We want to ensure that those children already in Europe are able to access the help and protection that they need; we simply disagree on the method outlined in the amendment in lieu.
I will emphasise something that I should have highlighted earlier: our position is firmly based on the evidence and advice of the expert organisation in this field, namely the UNHCR. Our approach focuses on family reunification and the wider risk categories of children at risk, rather than just unaccompanied children. The UNHCR has commended this approach, and I ask noble Lords not to dismiss that point. As the world expert in this field, it has cautioned against creating additional routes and benefits that target unaccompanied children, because of the risk of encouraging families to send children ahead alone—in other words, causing children to become unaccompanied, with all the risks that go with it. That would be a terrible thing to do or to encourage. We surely must do nothing that puts more children’s lives at risk. Our new children at risk scheme, which I referred to earlier, is designed specifically to avoid creating perverse incentives like that.
We agree that we have a duty to help vulnerable children across the globe, whether in conflict regions, in European member states or in the UK, to access the help and protection they need. But it is our belief that simply physically transporting some unaccompanied children from one part of the EU to another is not the best or most effective way to fulfil our duty. That is why we are providing the significant support I have already outlined to build capacity in European asylum systems and ensure children are able to access that support.
We also believe it is best to support family reunification —bringing families together—rather than creating perverse incentives for children to be separated from their family, which I fear is what the noble Lord’s amendment would do. We already have several routes for families to be reunited safely. Our refugee family reunion policy allows immediate family members of a person in the UK with refugee leave or humanitarian protection—that is to say, a spouse or partner and children under the age of 18, who formed part of the family unit before the sponsor fled their country of origin—to reunite with them in the UK.
That is the answer to my Commons colleague Stephen Phillips: under that policy, we have reunited many refugees with their immediate family and continue to do so. We have granted more than 21,000 family reunion visas over the past five years. Even where an application fails under the Immigration Rules, our policy requires us to consider exceptional or compassionate reasons for granting a visa outside the rules.
(8 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberI, too, have received a briefing on the issue that has been raised, and I certainly do not wish to reiterate the points that have been so ably put. There seems to be a strong argument for at least clarifying the situation—I think that that is what is being asked for—and ensuring that we do not end up with people being made homeless as a result. I very much hope that in his response the Minister will be able to provide that clarification—and an acceptable clarification as well.
My Lords, Amendment 1, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, would, as she explained, provide that a person disqualified by virtue of their immigration status may apply to the Secretary of State for written confirmation that permission to rent has been or will be granted to them. The amendment would amend the Immigration Act 2014, which introduced the right-to-rent scheme. It would work in conjunction with the existing provision, which states that a person who is otherwise disqualified from renting premises as a result of their immigration status is to be treated as having a right to rent where the Secretary of State has granted them permission to occupy premises under a residential tenancy agreement.
I hope that I can persuade the noble Baroness that the amendment is unnecessary and potentially even a step backwards. The Secretary of State is already able to grant permission to rent to people who are otherwise disqualified from renting. This may include migrants without leave who have sought asylum, families with minor children who are in the family returns process or those who face a genuine obstacle to leaving the UK. A migrant may obtain confirmation that they will be afforded such permission by contacting the Home Office, and all a landlord need do then is to contact the Home Office landlords’ checking service with the migrant’s Home Office reference number to confirm that they may rent to that migrant. Following that process will give the landlord a statutory excuse from any civil penalty under the right-to-rent scheme.
Very importantly, this system allows for a swift process, without the need to require a migrant to make a formal application or for them to await written confirmation through the post that they may rent. Our experience since the right-to-rent scheme was introduced on 1 December 2014 is that this process works well. For those reasons, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
Incidentally, there is no inconsistency between the FoI response and the letter from my noble friend Lord Bates. As I explained, a migrant may already contact the Home Office in order to establish whether they will be granted permission to rent. Existing arrangements are straightforward and work well. I should also mention that the Home Office is in the process of revising its published guidance in response to concerns raised during previous debates. I have no doubt that it will factor in the points made in this debate as well. Once that is done, the guidance will set out even more clearly how a migrant may contact the Home Office. But I suggest that requiring that they make a formal application and then have to await written confirmation may lead to unnecessary delays and in fact would serve no useful purpose.
My Lords, with the leave of the House I will briefly answer the noble Lord’s questions. First, as he is aware, we regularly consult external partners and experts including the Red Cross and Save the Children. We will continue to do that. Secondly, we are revising our guidance on family reunion, which provides specific guidance for those already in the UK on how to apply for family reunion and instructions for caseworkers on how to consider such applications. We intend to publish this in April and we will communicate it to all relevant officials. Details of how to apply are already available on GOV.UK and refugees granted international protection are advised about their entitlement to family reunion when they receive their asylum decision.
I take this opportunity—I believe I am doing it at the right place—to express our thanks to all those who have participated in the debates on the Bill, which I believe is now a better Bill than the one that was sent to us from the House of Commons. We are grateful for the amount of information provided by Ministers and the Bill team, for the numerous meetings that have taken place and for the willingness of Ministers to listen to concerns about the Bill and, in some instances, the willingness of the Government themselves to bring forward amendments or place statements on the record to address those concerns. I particularly express appreciation of the work undertaken during the passage of the Bill by the noble Lord, Lord Bates, whose approach, as with that of his Front-Bench colleagues, has I think been appreciated on all sides of the House.
(9 years, 2 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, the purpose of the order that we are considering today is to continue in force legislation governing the Armed Forces—the Armed Forces Act 2006—for a further period of one year, until November 2016. This reflects the constitutional requirement under the Bill of Rights that the Armed Forces may not be maintained without the consent of Parliament.
The legislation which makes the provision necessary for the Armed Forces to exist as disciplined forces is renewed every year. There is five-yearly renewal by Act of Parliament. That is the primary purpose of Armed Forces Acts. Between Acts, there must be an annual Order in Council. That is the purpose of the draft order that we are considering today.
If the Order in Council is not made by the end of 2 November 2015, the Armed Forces Act 2006 will automatically expire. The effect of this would be to end the powers and provisions necessary to maintain the Armed Forces as disciplined bodies.
The order will continue in force the 2006 Act until the end of 2 November 2016, when a new Act of Parliament will be required to provide for the legislation to continue for the next five years. We expect the next Armed Forces Bill to be introduced into Parliament soon, and I look forward to our debates on the Bill and on matters of great importance to our Armed Forces during its passage in your Lordships’ House. Indeed, before then, I look forward to enjoying a full and interesting debate next week on the role and capabilities of the UK Armed Forces in the light of global and domestic threats to stability and security.
Turning back to the business in hand today, I should say something about why we need to keep the 2006 Act in force. The Armed Forces Act 2006 applies to all service personnel wherever in the world they are operating. It provides nearly all the provisions for the existence of a system of command, discipline and justice for the Armed Forces, covering such matters as offences, the powers of the service police and the jurisdiction and powers of commanding officers and of service courts, in particular the courts martial. It is the basis of the service justice system that underpins the maintenance of discipline through the chain of command which is so fundamental to the operational effectiveness of our Armed Forces.
The 2006 Act also provides for a number of other important matters for the Armed Forces, such as for their enlistment, pay and redress of complaints. Members of the Armed Forces have no contracts of employment and so no duties as employees. Although members of the Armed Forces owe a duty of allegiance to Her Majesty, their obligation is essentially a duty to obey lawful orders, but without the 2006 Act, commanding officers and the courts martial would have no powers of punishment for either disciplinary or criminal misconduct. That is why the Armed Forces Act 2006 is so important and why we need to continue it in force. I beg to move.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his explanation of the purpose and need for the order. We have this debate on the Armed Forces continuation order each year, and I must say that I am no clearer at present than I was when I was first involved in these debates what would be the implications if the order was not carried.
I do not intend to speak at any length. We support the order and, as the Minister said, we have a separate defence debate in the Chamber next week. However, bearing in mind the wide-ranging nature of the order and the apparent consequences if it was not agreed, it has always seemed to me—if, apparently, to no one else—that consideration of the order each year could be used as the basis for an annual general defence debate in the Chamber. There is, after all, very little, if anything defence and Armed Forces-wise that it could be argued would not be relevant in a debate on an order which if not agreed calls into question the continuation of our Armed Forces as a disciplined fighting force.
As paragraph 7.1 of the Explanatory Memorandum states, the Armed Forces Act 2006, which the order extends for a further year from 2 November 2015,
“provides nearly all the provisions for the existence of a system for the armed forces of command, discipline and justice … It also contains a large number of other important provisions as to the armed forces, such as provision for enlistment, pay and redress of complaints”.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, for their comments and questions. I shall address them in turn.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, devoted his remarks to questions around the hypothesis that were this order not to be approved, the effect on the Armed Forces would be to render them, in practice, completely ineffective. I can confirm that. The practical effect of not renewing the Act would be that the Armed Forces as we know them would cease to exist because, among the many important provisions in the Act, the key provisions are perhaps the duty to obey lawful commands and the mechanism for enforcing that duty. Without these, the Armed Forces would be unable to continue as disciplined forces. They would continue to owe allegiance to Her Majesty but to deploy the Armed Forces in practice or in theatre would be rendered almost impossible because the system of obeying duties would fall away.
Perhaps I should clarify. I understand fully the point that the noble Earl has made. Is the Minister saying that it would be impractical to undertake military action because there would be no duty to obey commands, or is it also the case that if this order was not passed it would be illegal for our Armed Forces to undertake any action? Is it an issue about practicality or is it an issue about whether it is legal?
It is both, as I understand it, in that the requirement for annual renewal can be traced back, as noble Lords have pointed out, to the Bill of Rights 1688. It declared that the raising or keeping of a standing Army within the kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with the consent of Parliament, is against law. That means, essentially, that it would be illegal to have a standing Army or, indeed, a standing Royal Navy or Royal Air Force. It has not been a matter for any Government in living memory to contemplate a scenario whereby Parliament might not approve the continuation of the Armed Forces.
My Lords, I am not advocating that either but I am not entirely clear that the Explanatory Memorandum actually says that about the legality, in words of one syllable.
I shall naturally take advice from those who are expert in this field. If anything that I have said is wrong or requires expansion I will of course write to the noble Lord. I agree that this is a subject of theoretical interest. I am glad to hear that there is no proposal to take the questions to their logical conclusion, but I recognise the importance of the questions that the noble Lord poses and will be happy to clarify, perhaps at greater length in writing, what the legal position amounts to.
The noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, also referred to the Bill of Rights, but focused her remarks on the system of complaints and asked whether the changes that are being introduced are on track. They are. As she knows, the Ministry of Defence worked closely with Dr Susan Atkins, the first Service Complaints Commissioner, to make the service complaints process more efficient and to strengthen the commissioner role. That was the basis of the Armed Forces (Service Complaints and Financial Assistance) Bill that received Royal Assent on 26 March this year. As she is aware, the Act shortens the complaints process and replaces the commissioner with a new Service Complaints Ombudsman. Implementation is expected in January. The ombudsman will have significant new powers, while maintaining the right balance between the authority of the military chain of command, which must be responsible for looking after its own people, and strong independent oversight through the ombudsman.
Nicola Williams, the former ombudsman in the Cayman Islands, with whom I had a useful conversation the other day, took over as the commissioner in January and will become the first ombudsman, subject to approval by Her Majesty the Queen. Nicola Williams’s first annual report on the fairness, effectiveness and efficiency of the service complaints process was published on 24 March. The Government’s response was published on 16 July 2015.
The noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, asked me whether the Explanatory Memorandum reflects the content of Mr Morrison’s letter. I will have to get back to her on the answer to that.
As for the timetable for the Armed Forces Bill, I anticipate that it will be introduced into Parliament shortly. I cannot comment on its content before that happens, but my understanding is that the Bill should be under way in October.
(9 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am sure the noble Lord knows that I cannot separate the Gurkhas out from the SDSR. It would be as impossible to do that for the Gurkhas as for any other part of the British Army. However, I note the strength of feeling that the noble Lord has expressed, and I am sure that that will be conveyed back to those who are in the throes of preparing the initial stages of the SDSR.
My Lords, I understand that a commitment has been given by the Prime Minister that there will be no further cuts in our Regular Army. Why is there any doubt that there will be any cuts so far as the Gurkhas are concerned? Are they not covered by the pledge that was given by the Prime Minister?
(9 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, a range of other military aircraft provide search and rescue radar capability to the Armed Forces. We have the E-3D Sentry system, which admittedly is optimised for the air-to-air role, but its radar has a maritime search mode. C-130 Hercules aircraft are fitted with radar systems that, combined with visual search, provide basic maritime search capabilities. RAF Sea King helicopters, and Royal Navy Merlin and Lynx helicopters all possess short-range surface search radar for use in maritime search operations.
I welcome the Minister to his first Defence Question since his appointment. He has moved from the health of the nation to the health of our Armed Forces. He referred to the strategic defence and security review and our maritime patrol capability. Can he confirm that, in pursuit of a bipartisan approach to defence policy, Her Majesty’s loyal Opposition will also be involved in the consultations on the SDSR, which the Government told us last Thursday in this House are now taking place?