Procedure of the House (Proposal 5)

Countess of Mar Excerpts

Tuesday 8th November 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Butler of Brockwell]

My Lords, the proposal refers to exceptional circumstances and I should like to remind the House of one. I remember a public expenditure Statement lasting an hour and a quarter being made in the House of Commons and then being repeated in full in this House on the following day, when everybody had had the opportunity not only to read the Statement but to read everything about it in the newspapers. I suggest that that is the sort of circumstance in which the time of the House should not be taken in repeating a whole Statement.

[The Countess of Mar]

My Lords, the Leader of the House made clear what happens at Question Time as to which blocs there were. My understanding is that, at Statements, Liberal Democrats are a separate bloc from the Tories, the Labour Party and everybody else. Can he make the position clear?

[Lord Strathclyde]

My Lords, I think that the Leader’s Group is trying to be helpful, in part because of the example that the noble Lord, Lord Butler, laid out. The proposal is not for the generality of Statements; it is for the most exceptional circumstances; there is the safeguard of the usual channels. The example that the noble Lord gave, of last year’s Autumn Statement, when it was taken on the second day, is precisely the one that we all had in mind. To spend an hour and a half on the Minister reading out the Statement was, I think, a bit much for all of us. The proposal is not designed to deal with most Statements.

On some of what the noble Countess said about blocs during Statements, I am not entirely sure what the situation is. Perhaps I could discuss it with the Chief Whip and the opposition Chief Whip. I think that there is a slightly different system at Statements, with the Liberal Democrats, Conservatives, Labour, Cross Benches and anybody else taken more in rotation than at Question Time.

Postal Services Bill

Countess of Mar Excerpts

Tuesday 24th May 2011 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Drake]

My Lords, government Amendment 3 to Clause 24 is in itself desirable. If the Royal Mail pension plan is to be divided into two or more pension schemes, as distinct from sections, it is better that all trustees co-operate with efficient administration and have the power so to do. What is most interesting about the amendment, however, is that it reveals for the first time during the Bill’s progress that the Government's intention may be to split the Royal Mail pension plan into two or more separate schemes, as distinct from sections.

It would be possible not to split the scheme and run the Royal Mail pension plan as a segregated scheme similar to the railway pension scheme. From the perspective of scheme members, that may well be a preferable outcome, because the governance structures would remain in place, but one can anticipate that that may not be the Government's preferred outcome. As the amendment now introduces separate schemes into the Bill, as distinct from separate sections, it raises questions that I put to the noble Baroness.

Is it now the Government’s decided intention to split the Royal Mail pension plan into separate schemes post-privatisation? If the Royal Mail pension plan is to be so divided, is the Post Office scheme to be hived off, leaving the reduced Royal Mail pension plan with the privatised Royal Mail, or vice versa? What is the Government's intention on consulting the trustees on such separation?

A fourth point that I know will be of concern to scheme members attracted some attention in the debate in the House of Commons. There is no power to wind up in the rules of the Royal Mail pension plan. That is a very important safeguard for the current members, which ought to be replicated.

During the House of Commons Committee debate on 30 November 2010 the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Mr Edward Davey, commented to the effect that inserting a winding-up provision would be prevented by the then Clause 19 of the Bill, which is now Clause 20, dealing with the “no worsening of benefits” provision. He said—

[The Countess of Mar]

I am sorry to interrupt the noble Baroness. Might I ask the two people speaking behind the Woolsack to retreat into the Prince’s Chamber, as is suggested in the Companion?

[Baroness Drake]

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary said:

“Any amendment to the RMPP rules that would allow the scheme to be more easily wound up would fall foul of the protection provided for members under clause 19(2), as any such amendment would have a material effect on members’ ‘relevant pension provision’ … and given that our intention is to take on the historic deficits for the Royal Mail together with a more manageable scheme, it would not be appropriate for the Secretary of State to make any amendment to the RMPP that would allow the scheme to be wound up”.—[Official Report, Commons, Postal Services Bill Committee, 30/11/10; col. 445.]

In view of that debate, and in view of the fact that this amendment now introduces an intention to separate the plan into separate schemes rather than separate sections, is it the Government’s position that there will be no change to the winding-up provisions in any separate scheme if and when a section of the RMPP is constituted as a separate pension scheme?

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Countess of Mar Excerpts

Monday 6th December 2010 Lords Chamber

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (The Countess of Mar)]

Before I call Amendment 16, I have to say that, if Amendment 16 is agreed to, I cannot call Amendments 18 to 30 inclusive, because of pre-emption.

Amendment 16

Moved by

Business of the House

Countess of Mar Excerpts

Monday 29th November 2010 Lords Chamber

[The Countess of Mar]

My question has a bearing on what the noble Lord, Lord Richard, has just said. Does the Speaker in another place make a decision entirely on his own or with legal advice from the Clerks in the House of Commons?

[Lord Elystan-Morgan]

My question is very much along the same lines. It goes to the root of the question raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hollis. Is she right when she says that the mere fact of a Bill involving public expenditure makes it possible for it to be certified as a money Bill? If that is so, then it is extremely serious and of massive constitutional relevance.

Is it then the case—I do not have the wording of the 1911 Act before me—that since 1911 it has been a matter of restraint not to certify possibly thousands of Bills that might have been money Bills but for good reason have not been so regarded? Am I right in thinking that although the 1911 Act very considerably curtails the effect of any amendment made by this House, there is not one word in it that suggests that we should not discuss a money Bill?