Grenfell Tower Inquiry

Debate between Clive Betts and Kevin Hollinrake

Monday 2nd December 2024 Commons Chamber

[Kevin Hollinrake (Thirsk and Malton) (Con)]

The Grenfell Tower fire was an unthinkable tragedy that claimed 72 lives. It is one of the few moments in life when we all remember exactly where we were when it happened. Our thoughts are with those who lost loved ones, the survivors who endured unimaginable trauma, and all those who were affected by that devastating night. The state failed them in its duty to protect, and we must ensure that such failures are never repeated. We will work collaboratively with the Secretary of State and the wider Government in the interests of everyone directly and indirectly affected by this tragedy, and I very much welcome today’s announcement about the acceleration of remediation.

Following the tragedy, the Conservative Government took decisive action to uncover the truth, initiating a public inquiry to learn lessons and implement changes to prevent such a tragedy from ever happening again. The right hon. Lady may remember that we served briefly together on the Housing, Communities and Local Government Committee which, under the extremely capable leadership of the hon. Member for Sheffield South East (Mr Betts), led much of the thinking and debate following the tragedy. We successfully campaigned for a banning of combustible materials on the outside of new buildings over 18 metres, and for a Government remediation fund for existing buildings. I pay tribute to my right hon. Friend the Member for Richmond and Northallerton (Rishi Sunak) who was the first to properly grasp that nettle as Chief Secretary to the Treasury, Chancellor, and Prime Minister. More than £5.1 billion has since been allocated for building remediation, and we have acted to strengthen regulations and implement recommendations from the inquiry’s phase 1 report.

I also pay tribute to the right hon. Lady’s predecessor, the former Member for Surrey Heath, for his work in this area, not least the establishment of the building safety levy, which is the source from which much of the funds will flow. However, publication of the phase 2 report in September 2024 revealed the scale of failures that occurred over decades and across multiple sectors, making clear that much more remains to be done, as the right hon. Lady set out. Even those of us who have followed the inquiry closely find the report truly shocking to read. The phase 2 report, chaired by Sir Martin Moore-Bick and supported by panel members Ali Akbor OBE and Thouria Istephan, makes 58 recommendations to improve fire safety and address systemic issues within the construction industry. Crucially, the report concluded that the Grenfell Tower fire was the result of decades of failures by Government, regulatory bodies and the construction industry to act on the known dangers of using combustible materials in high-rise buildings.

One of the most alarming findings was the role of systemic dishonesty in the construction industry. Companies engaged in deliberate and sustained strategies to manipulate safety testing processes, misrepresent test data and mislead the market. For instance, the insulation product Celotex RS5000, used on Grenfell Tower, was found to have been sold using manipulated test results—incredibly, with the Building Research Establishment complicit in those practices.

[Mr Betts]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his comments about the work of the Select Committee. On product safety and product testing, what the Hackitt report, as well as the Select Committee, found was the extent to which product manufacturers were going from one testing place to another until they found one that agreed that their product was safe. Products often failed the tests, but those failures were never in the public domain. Does he think that there ought to be a change of process, so that when a product fails in one testing place, that failure is made known publicly?

[Kevin Hollinrake]

I agree with the hon. Gentleman, as I did during much of our work on the Select Committee. One of Martin Moore-Bick’s recommendations was exactly that: that all test results should be published, not just the ones that support the safety of the product. That would go a long way towards ensuring that the true safety of the products is established.

The BRE findings highlight a shocking betrayal of trust, and a callous disregard for public safety, driven by financial gain. The report also identified severe leadership and management failings within the London Fire Brigade. It described a chronic lack of effective management, an undue focus on processes, and a complacency among senior officers regarding the brigade’s operational efficiency. Those weaknesses hindered the brigade’s ability to respond effectively to the crisis, and underscored the need for systemic reform and improved leadership in fire services.

To address those failings, the phase 2 report made far-reaching recommendations, including the establishment of a single construction regulator; centralising fire safety responsibilities under one Secretary of State, to end fragmentation across Departments; regular updates to approved document B, to keep fire safety regulations current; and the creation of a chief construction adviser and a college of fire and rescue to ensure high standards in fire safety training and practices. We fully support those recommendations and urge the Government to implement them swiftly and effectively. We will scrutinise their progress to ensure that the necessary reforms are delivered without delay.

Some have questioned the pace of the remediation efforts. I think the Secretary of State was right to do so. I emphasise that the remediation efforts prioritised the highest-risk buildings, and by July 2024, 98% of high-rise buildings with the most dangerous, Grenfell-style ACM cladding had either completed or started work. On the remaining buildings, enforcement action is being taken against non-compliant owners. The complexity of the buildings and legal disputes over responsibility have caused delays. Nevertheless, all building owners must step up, take responsibility, and act swiftly to address the issues, or face the consequences of their inaction. It is important to note that the building regulations regime was established under the Building Act 1984, and fire safety reforms were introduced by other Governments in previous decades, as the Secretary of State acknowledged.

From 2010, the coalition Government sought to remove unnecessary bureaucracy, but fire safety and building safety were explicitly excluded from those reviews. The inquiry acknowledged that key safety regulations, including the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 were excluded from deregulation initiatives. Under our leadership, safety was never treated as red tape. Nevertheless, as the report confirms, mistakes were made by Ministers and officials on our watch. The frequency of changes under Governments of different political stripes, and the frequency of changes in housing Ministers and Secretaries of State, would not have helped. I hope that Parliament may learn that lesson for the future. Since 2017, the Conservatives in Government led comprehensive reforms of building compliance and fire safety. Measures introduced include the Fire Safety Act 2021 and the Building Safety Act 2022, which created the Building Safety Regulator to oversee stricter compliance with standards.