Civil Aviation (Consumer Protection and Regulatory Reform) Bill [HL] Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Grayling
Main Page: Lord Grayling (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Grayling's debates with the Department for Transport
(1 month, 2 weeks ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, it is a pleasure to start the second day in Committee on this Bill. I open this group on airspace modernisation, consultation and charging and move Amendment 60 in the name of my noble friend Lady Grender, as she is unfortunately unable to be here today.
The amendment is straightforward and seeks simply to insert a new subsection requiring that, before the Secretary of State makes any directions under Clause 4, three things must happen: a consultation with persons and communities likely to be affected; an environmental impact assessment; and a noise impact assessment. On these Benches, we feel that these additions are a basic requirement of legitimate decision-making where the power may have serious local consequences. The Clause 4 directions on airspace redesign are not merely a technical tidying-up exercise and can be used to alter flight concentrations, runway throughput, and the intensity and timing of overflight experienced on the ground. A ministerial direction made under this clause is capable, in substance, of facilitating additional capacity without ever being labelled as such.
As was said at Second Reading, the Bill is a blueprint; it is not the final product. It provides a framework that leaves the substance to future regulation. In that sense, as we have described, it is paving legislation. The Committee is entitled to ask what safeguards are built into that paving before being asked to drive on it. The Minister has given us reassurances that the Bill will not be used as a vehicle for airport expansion; we note and welcome those, and we accept them in the good faith in which they have been given. However, personal reassurances, however well-meaning, are not a legal safeguard. Ministers change, Prime Ministers change, Governments change, and interpretations can also change. The whole point of us seeking to put this duty into the Bill is to ensure that Parliament and the public can distinguish between a necessary operational change and one that, in effect, delivers additional capacity through the back door of airspace decision-making. Without mandatory consultation and impact assessment, the distinction cannot be realistically made. Even if it could be made, it would happen only after the fact.
Airport change proposals are already assessed through environmental methodologies, noise matrices and statutory directions. This should therefore be aligned with that pre-existing reality. For our communities, these matters are really important. Many, as we know, are already impacted by the noise and environmental impacts of existing airports, and future communities could be impacted by proposals under this legislation. These are real impacts on our communities, from noise late at night to environmental pollution. They should not have to rely on good will, however well-meaningly it is given. If the Secretary of State is to have this power, the Bill should state clearly what the procedural safeguards must be before it is used. That is exactly the point of Amendment 60. We are simply seeking to put a safeguard and some handrails in place around these powers. This is a crucial issue for us in our scrutiny of this Bill.
I turn briefly—I am sorry for speaking to these before others have managed to—to the other amendments in this group. In general, they all seek to do fairly similar things to Amendment 60. Amendment 61, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Grayling, would require a minimum 28-day targeted consultation with local communities, local authorities and airport operators before any direction on airspace redesign is issued. We have considerable sympathy for this amendment, for exactly the same reasons that I outlined on our Amendment 60. The 28-day objective is not onerous; it is fundamentally achievable. We hope that the Minister sees fit to put our Amendment 60, this Amendment 61 or some combination of them into the Bill.
Amendment 62, from the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, would add the British Airline Pilots Association to the consultation list. We are broadly supportive of this amendment and recognise the central role that our pilots play, particularly in matters of safety. Their judgment and professionalism are essential in any plans to modernise our airspace and capacity. However, our concern is that the amendment, by its nature, names one organisation and does not, for example, name air traffic controllers. We would prefer it if the amendment was reworded to talk about consultation with representatives of the industry, as opposed to naming only one organisation.
Amendment 63, from the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, would require the CAA to establish a blockchain-based audit trail for every airspace change program. We recognise that the underlying objective and purpose of this is to create a tamper-proof, long-term record of what has been decided, by whom and when. That is an entirely legitimate concern. In the past, too many of these decisions have been opaque; it has been extremely difficult for anybody to know what has been happening and what has been done by whom.
The requirements in this amendment, particularly those in proposed new subsection (3) for cryptographic security, 15-year retention and tamper-proof records, are all laudable aims, but we wonder whether naming one specific technology would make this a hostage to fortune in the future. We suggest alternative wording that asks for a secure, auditable and publicly accessible record, without prescribing the exact technology to be used. We feel that that would be a better way forward. It might be that the technology that the noble Lord suggests is the one that is chosen, but alternative wording would at least leave more scope for examination in the round.
Amendment 64, from the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, probes with characteristic precision the rationale for allowing changes to be imposed under Clause 6 on persons who neither use nor benefit from the air traffic services in question. This is a serious point: the Bill should have open scrutiny of who bears the costs for these matters. I hope that the Minister can provide some clarity on those points.
The final amendment in this group is Amendment 65, from the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope. It would require the Secretary of State and the CAA to have regard to the growth and sustainability of general aviation when setting charges and to ensure that charges on general aviation users are proportionate to the use that they make of air traffic services. General aviation is too often forgotten, and this seems a proportional requirement and a modest and reasonable ask. We look forward to the Minister’s response to it.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Earl, Lord Russell, for his comments on my Amendment 61. I will speak to it only briefly, because it is pretty self-explanatory.
The legislation rightly gives some power to the Government to intervene and, in effect, act as arbiter when it comes to airspace redesign. Airspace redesign has taken much too long. It started when I was Secretary of State and now, nearly eight years later, we are still not close to bringing it to fruition, yet it is fundamental to the future of the aviation sector in this country. It will unlock extra capacity and use next-generation technology to enable us to provide more respite to communities that are affected by aircraft noise, even though the level of aircraft noise, in the world in which we live, has dropped enormously over the past generation.
The Government rightly believe that they need some degree of arbiter powers in this, but I do not think that they should have those powers just to say, “Right, that’s the decision”. There is an obligation there—nothing at great length, because we know that government consultations can last for ever, take months to be responded to and all the rest, but with a simple process saying, “Look, that’s what we’re going to do. Is there anything we haven’t thought of? Is there something we’re not quite getting right here?” I say to the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, that the wording of the amendment is what it is, but I would expect pilots’ organisations, air traffic organisations and all the rest to be able to input a view on this point.
I would see this as being not an isolated consultation but a standard government consultation—a short, snappy one—simply so that the organisations and communities that have a vested interest can come forward and say, “There’s something you haven’t thought of. This is going to have an adverse effect that you haven’t thought about. You really shouldn’t be taking this decision”. It would be improper for that process not to exist where the Government have what is, in effect, a pretty absolute power of direction under the legislation as it is at the moment. I very much hope that the Minister will take that on board and perhaps look to include something of this kind on Report.
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 60 to 62; I express a specific concern in my Amendment 62. I thought that I knew about the technology in this debate until I decided to brush up on it yesterday; I have spent most of my working hours since then getting up to date, to some extent.
The essence of the technology, which would allow a much more holistic review of airspace use, is that it is dependent not on aids on the ground but on global positioning systems. That gives great benefits, in terms of what it does for aviation, but I put it to the Committee that it also gives great benefits to those who are concerned about the environmental impact. If your route does not fit with that bit of society and there is a route that can fit with that bit of society, then, with the overarching technology, it can be changed. Up to this point, changing where aeroplanes go close to the ground has been totally dominated by the ground-based aids that they use to land.
The essence of my amendment—as an ex-BALPA shop steward, I thought that I had better represent my old team—is to get pilots involved in this consultation. They are going to face dramatic differences. One of the first things that I would say relates to the point that the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, made the other day, which is that the planes can fly themselves. Normally, you have to drag the plane into the air then tell it to fly itself, and, when you get to the end, you actually have to make a few decisions. It is a very good theory; hopefully, when you press “flight nav” or something like that, that will happen.
The problem facing the modern pilot is that one of their most important tasks is to cope when there are system failures. There will be system failures. There are no big computer systems in the world that do not have system failures, as we all know to our cost. The problem is that the level of knowledge needed by the operative to cope with a system failure is very large but it is not often practised. It will, I am sure, follow the pilot’s standard of continuous checking. I have never flown an airplane with its engine on fire, but, when I was an airline pilot, I flew a plane with its engine on fire many times in a simulator. It was dramatic and great fun, but the whole essence here is that the systems delivering this will intrinsically and inevitably have failure modes early on. The crew are there to look after that, among all the other safety issues that they have to care about.
All the literature on the impact on pilots of a very different system says that it will require if not an almost completely new licence then certainly a substantial licence endorsement to equip pilots to look after these systems. How can their views and their wisdom be taken into account? They are the only people who can envisage the situation, together with a very dramatic change in standards.
May I just ask a specific question? If we countenance the situation where, for example, a plan coming from Heathrow to amend the routes into that airport clash with the routes into Farnborough and it has been through extensive process and, effectively, there is a logjam where one says one thing and the other says another, my understanding is that the Government, using their direction power, can say, “Right, we vote for Farnborough, not Heathrow”, or vice versa. In that situation, where the Government say they are voting for Farnborough, is there still a duty to consult on that decision before it is implemented?
I will take some advice and respond further. But I note in response to the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Grayling, that both proposals will have been consulted on and agreed, so it is not the case that consultation would not have applied to either of them. I will write to him with the precise answer to his very reasonable question and copy it to other noble Lords.
Amendment 63 is from the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, and he is right that information about airspace changes should be secure and transparent. I take the noble Lord’s point about the choice of technology. The Civil Aviation Authority’s CAP1616 airspace change process is designed to ensure transparency throughout. There is already a legal requirement for directions related to airspace change to be published, as well as any steps the CAA takes to enforce them. In addition, both the sponsor of an airspace change and the CAA are required to publish relevant documentation throughout the process, which is held on the CAA’s airspace change portal—a secure platform which acts as a single source of truth. When an approved design is implemented, it is published in the UK Aeronautical Information Publication, as required by international law.
This is not an area where there is a lack of trust or accountability requiring a more complex or novel audit mechanism. The CAA operates within a well-established statutory framework with clear oversight and requirements for publication and traceability. Introducing a requirement to store this information in a prescriptive or novel format risks adding complexity without corresponding benefit, given that the core objectives of transparency, accessibility, and auditability are already being met. It would also apply irrespective of any identified gap, creating additional cost and rigidity on how information is managed, so I respectfully ask the noble Lord not to press his amendment.
Amendment 64 from the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, relates to a technical change arising from the proposed expansion of who can pay charges for air traffic services, which will ensure that the “user pays” principle can continue to be fairly applied in future. Air traffic services are provided for all users within a block of airspace. Even when an airspace user does not use a service directly, they may still benefit from it. For example, if two aircraft avoid a collision because one is directed away from the other, both benefit even though one did not directly receive the service.
It is right that the charging framework reflects this. The Bill does not say that charges may be imposed on persons who cannot use or benefit from them. We reassure noble Lords that charges are not set without safeguards and that the Bill maintains them. The Civil Aviation Authority accounts for factors such as efficiency and proportionality and follows an established process, including extensive engagement, statutory consultation and rights of appeal.
A requirement to prove the precise level of use or benefit for every airspace user would be disproportionate and unworkable, particularly as an increasing number of emerging uses, especially drones and other unmanned aircraft systems, are integrated into shared airspace and require air traffic services in future. That issue is what the existing provision is designed to avoid and what the changes in the Bill seek to maintain. For that reason, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, we now move on to the slots regime. My two amendments in this group, Amendments 66 and 68, are designed to press the Government to understand what they are trying to achieve and where the limits to that are.
I had always expected that, when we left the European Union, we would be able to have a less regulated slots regime, particularly once we and the European Union had taken the view that we would not stay part of the EASA. Fundamentally, we are talking about a private sector market, with privately owned airports or airports owned by third-party bodies—such as the local authorities in Manchester—and independent airlines. So the question is this: what do the Government actually need to do? What is the role of the Government in this space? Should the Government be determining how many airlines fly to an airport, how many slots are available to it and the circumstances in which slots can transfer between one organisation and another?
It seems to me that there are three things that the Government should be doing. I see the role of the Government in this as referee rather than regulator. I am concerned that the content of the clauses that relate to the slots regime give the Government extraordinarily sweeping powers. If I have a slight regret, it is that I did not provide for the removal of new subsection (4), which says:
“The regulations may make different provision for different purposes”.
What on earth does that mean? The Government are taking on to their own shoulders blanket powers to manage the whole of the slots regime between a commercially run airport, a commercially owned airport and a commercially owned airline. To me, that feels like many steps too far.
What I have sought to do with these two amendments is, first, on the principal amendment, focus on the things that the Government need. The first is all about acting as arbiter and referee, where there is genuinely a problem. We are talking about our key airports here. Where there is genuinely a problem—a dispute that cannot be resolved—I understand that the Government may, for strategic reasons for the benefit of the United Kingdom, need to have put in place some form of arbitration mechanism. Proposed new paragraphs (a) and (b) are designed to achieve that. It is topical because of the Iran war, as we have seen. We had the debate last week over the change to the slot regime resulting from that conflict and the need to take away from airlines the requirement to use a slot at a particular time. There may be circumstances in which, in a period of international crisis, the Government need to have a role in the slot regime.
I should also say that, on reflection—I look at the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Empey—I agree that there is an element, although we might not agree about the scale of it, of a need to make sure there is connectivity within the United Kingdom. In part, the market delivers that anyway. If you are a major international airline flying from Heathrow to another part of the world, you need the feeder flights to fill your planes. If you do not have flights from Belfast, Glasgow, Edinburgh and Manchester, you are losing a whole chunk of your market—probably losing a whole chunk of it to Schiphol. It is not, therefore, necessary for the Government to take an absolute view about this. But in much the same way that the Government provide and subsidise key strategic routes within the United Kingdom that may not be economically viable but are socially necessary, I understand that there may be a case, in some circumstances, for making sure that a particular route and slot is available to the airline. Therefore, I am not sure I agree with the full detail of the noble Lord’s amendment, but I have some sympathy with what he is trying to achieve.
What we do not need to do—this is my fear about elements of the Bill—is try to micromanage the market that is the independent aviation sector. This part of the Bill feels like it is treading into that territory. I am looking for the Minister to provide some clear justifications for the steps being taken here. Particularly, Clause 68 is designed to address, effectively, a criminal provision within the slots regime. I do not quite understand that. Why on earth does there need to be a criminal context to the management of the slots regime? I understand that there can, on occasions, be a need for regulatory enforcement or enforcement in the civil courts—but the criminal courts? My amendment would take out that provision. Frankly, I would take some persuading by the Minister before we come to Report that we need a criminal provision in the management of slots at our key airports. That feels like a bridge that goes much too far.
I need to hear from the Minister an explanation for why all this is necessary: why the slots regime needs to be as all-encompassing as it is, and why the Bill comes up with extraordinary provisions of interference. I refer again to proposed new subsection (4). The Bill does much more than is necessary to provide a sensible framework simply for protecting the strategic interests of the United Kingdom. It amounts to interference, not strategy, and should take a step back from where it is.
My Lords, I instinctively agree with a lot of what the noble Lord, Lord Grayling, has said but there are situations in extremis that could arise regarding access to hub airports, which is a critical—not only socially but economically—necessity. It has nothing to do with subsidy. There are some modest PSOs in operation. We had them when we were in the European Union. Cornwall was involved at one stage and had a subsidised air route. But that is not what I am getting at here. It is nothing to do with subsidy because all the main regional airports going to hub airports, primarily Heathrow, are perfectly economically viable. It is not a question of subsidy.
My Lords, as we have heard, this group concerns the airport slots regime. I am grateful to noble Lords for their amendments. I will address each one in turn but first note two common points that apply across this group.
The UK slots regime depends on independent, fair, transparent and non-discriminatory allocation by the slot co-ordinator. It also operates within international frameworks, such as the Worldwide Airport Slot Guidelines, the global standard for managing airport capacity at congested level 3 and capacity-constrained level 2 airports. The regime already recognises commercial expectations that require clarity, consistency and timely decision-making. Where I refer to independence, proportionality, flexibility or international alignment, these are the common justifications I have in mind. I also say to the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, that the processes in this Bill do not in themselves allow airport expansion; they are about the efficient allocation of capacity created by expansion, which is a different issue.
I begin with Amendment 66, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Grayling. I understand the concern that the Government should not interfere in a liberalised and well-functioning sector, and our policy intent is not to interfere in this. These provisions, however, largely replicate provisions previously available through EU legislation. All the Government are doing is replicating the powers we think we appropriately need to continue. I refer the noble Lord to paragraphs 20 to 24 of the Explanatory Notes to the Bill.
Neither the Government nor airlines have a role in the day-to-day allocation of slots. As noble Lords have noted, that is undertaken by an independent slot co-ordinator who must allocate slots openly, fairly, transparently and without discrimination. The amendment would therefore not have the intended effect and would create uncertainty. The temporary reallocation or suspension of unused slots during an international crisis is already addressed by Clause 7. In our view, Amendment 66 is therefore unnecessary and duplicative.
I turn to Amendment 67, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Empey, which would require sufficient slots at hub airports such as Heathrow to be allocated to flights from UK regional airports. The Government recognise the importance of strong regional connectivity and effective access to hub airports for people and businesses across the United Kingdom.
However, I cannot support the amendment because requiring hub airports to prioritise domestic regional services over international routes could conflict with non-discrimination and fair competition obligations in the UK’s bilateral air services agreements. It could also require the reallocation of slots from incumbent operators that have historic rights where usage requirements are met, raising legal and practical issues. I therefore ask the noble Lord not to press his amendment.
The next amendment, from the noble Lord, Lord Grayling, seeks to remove the ability to create regulations on enforcement of the slots regime through criminal and civil sanctions. Existing assimilated law already contains criminal and civil enforcement provisions, which the Government believe are necessary. Removing this power would freeze the current enforcement regime, meaning that even proportionate updates could be made only through further primary legislation. I do not believe that that is the noble Lord’s intention.
Can the Minister illustrate to me the kind of circumstance in which a criminal sanction is required?
I will respond to the noble Lord after today.
Clause 7 already reduces the severity of sanctions by removing the possibility of imprisonment for breaches of slots regulations. Any exercise of the power to amend enforcement provisions would be subject to the affirmative procedure, ensuring scrutiny and debate in both Houses. For those reasons, I ask the noble Lord not to press his amendment.
I turn to Amendment 70, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, which would place a statutory duty on the Secretary of State to consult airlines, airport operators and others before making any slots regulations under Clause 7. The Government recognise the importance of proper engagement and, where new policy is developed under this power, will carry out appropriate consultation, including with industry and, where relevant, communities. However, an inflexible statutory consultation duty would not be appropriate. The power may need to be used urgently in response to significant disruption, as was necessary during the pandemic. In those circumstances, government must be able to act swiftly and proportionately. I therefore ask the noble Lord not to press Amendment 70.
I will take Amendments 71 and 72, also tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, together. They would require all regulations relating to slots to be subject to the affirmative procedure. I recognise the desire for parliamentary scrutiny, but the Bill already draws a proportionate distinction. The negative procedure is available only where there is a significant threat to public health, or another substantial reason, and only for temporary changes to slot-usage requirements. Requiring the affirmative procedure in every case could delay necessary action during disruption, where speed may be essential. I therefore ask the noble Lord not to press Amendments 71 and 72.
Amendment 73, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Harper, would—
If I may, I shall respond to the noble Lord by saying that, if I have not understood his point clearly, I shall indeed go away and have a further discussion with him.
My Lords, we have had an interesting debate. Again, some important issues were raised. The noble Lord, Lord Empey, makes an important point. In fact, when reflecting on my own amendment at the start, I thought that what he was saying might be an element missing from mine. I have a lot of sympathy with what he has said.
I want to be frank with the Minister. He knows that I have the highest regard for him; he knows that I regard him as knowing more about much of the transport system than anyone I know, so I do not direct this comment at him, but at the Government. I am really quite unimpressed by the Government’s inability to explain what are relatively simple things, or should be relatively simple, if they had thought this through properly, in the measures that they are taking in this Bill and those in the debate that we had last week over the slot regime. If the Government want to take powers or continue powers to enforce criminal sanctions, they should at least be able to say what kind of issues those criminal sanctions are designed to address, because I do not think that this is simply a replication of existing EU law—and were it so, I would be asking what we can we do less of, rather than more of, outside the European Union.
However, if the Government’s intention is purely to replicate what is there already, they do not need new Section 34A(4), which says:
“The regulations may make different provision for different purposes”.
What does that mean? What it does is create a blank cheque for the Government to expand their remit in the slots regime beyond where it is at the moment. They are also seeking, as I say, to continue with criminal sanctions. That does not feel to me like a Government who are trying to maintain a light touch in what the Minister rightly says is a commercial marketplace with established processes that are part of international agreements that go beyond the European Union. So some of this should not be necessary, and it should not be necessary to continue some of it on from what we had before. Where it is continuing, there needs to be a good explanation for it. I am sorry, but I do not think that the Minister has been able to give that good explanation. The Government need to do a better job on what should be pretty basic questions about what they are proposing.
I will of course seek to withdraw this amendment today, but I give notice to the Minister that these questions need to be answered properly before we get to Report, because I can see no justification for having what are clear Henry VIII powers in the slots regime. There is not even a provision for the affirmative resolution so, frankly, in six or 12 months’ time, another Minister—I am sure that it would not be this Minister—could simply come back and take a much more interventionist approach to the slots regime, which would be absolutely out of kilter with anything that we have done either inside or outside the European Union. For now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment, but I will not leave this issue untouched when we come back on Report.