Defence
Debate between Bob Seely and Roger Gale(6 months ago)
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Bob Seely (Isle of Wight) (Con)
It is a genuine pleasure to follow my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Bracknell (James Sunderland). I want to develop some points that he and my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis) made. I will make a few points about deterrence, and about the type of warfare we are facing. I will say a little about procurement, about Ukraine, and whether we are in a pre-war era and how useful that idea is.
The point that my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East made about deterrence was profound: the fundamental problem of the past century is that we failed to deter. We fought two world wars and just about won them both, so to us they are glorious things. Actually, both were catastrophes, in terms of power and in terms of lives lost. Half of my grandparents died: my German grandmother was killed by the Soviets, and my British grandfather, a colonel, was slaughtered while leading his regiment in north Africa. Winning wars is appallingly expensive; losing them is a catastrophe, clearly. But even fighting them when we can deter instead is a huge strategic error. Fighting two world wars effectively destroyed the British empire, which I think was in many ways a force for good—but let us not go there at the moment.
My right hon. Friend made the point that even spending 10% on deterrence is potentially much cheaper than spending 50% of our GDP to fight an existential war for our future, which is what Russians are being dishonestly told that they face. Around the Solent—of course he knows this—are Palmerston’s follies, the forts to protect the fleet at Portsmouth, on the Isle of Wight and on the south side of Hampshire. They are seen as a colossal waste of money because they were never used, but I think Palmerston’s follies were wonderful because they were never used. It was about deterrence. We do not know whether they deterred anybody, but the fact remains that they were there and that fleet was not attacked, and we lived through decades of peace from the end of the Napoleonic wars through to world war one. I will come on to this in a second, but we are potentially entering a new period of great instability.
The Secretary of State talked about types of warfare, which is critical. If this £75 billion extra is simply going to buy another half dozen frigates that will survive an extra three minutes in the middle east, in the Red sea, before they are destroyed by swarm drones, there is little point having the additional kit. If there is any lesson of not only the Ukrainian war, but the Azerbaijani-Armenian war—the first war where cheap drones destroyed expensive Russian kit from above—it is that cheap mass kit is very good at destroying much more expensive kit.
As a power that seeks to use conventional force and that does not tend to think like revolutionaries, as the Russians or the Iranians do or as terrorist organisations do, I am concerned about the type of war we are planning to fight. If we are just going to buy more expensive kit that does not survive the battle, there is no point having it. We need to invest in the stuff that will not only protect destroyers and aircraft carriers, but enable us to turn the tide—to do as the Ukrainians are doing and to think like a nimble adversary facing a greater power, perhaps using mass drones ourselves to destroy larger forces in future, be they Chinese, Russian or others. It is a question of the type of warfare we are fighting.
To those of us who have read Russian doctrine, the first characteristic of modern conflict is the integration of military and non-military tools—information, spying, cyber or economic. This is the world of the 21st century, and the Secretary of State was right to point out that each century or each generation redefines war. This is a redefinition of conflict for our own era, and we are seeing it from China. The Russians are very conflict-minded, but so far the Chinese place less emphasis on physical, conventional force and more emphasis on the tools of economy, using Huawei, cyber-attacks and so on.
Even with China, however, if we are entering a pre-war phase, we see a build-up towards a potential attack on Taiwan in the next few years. How are we thinking about the type of warfare that the Taiwanese will need to fight to defend themselves? They will need not only cyber, to survive the first minutes of mass cyber-attacks, but mass drones to shoot down and destroy Chinese ships and aircraft if they attack.
That brings me to procurement. I am sure the Secretary of State was going to answer this, but did not because the Deputy Speaker cut him off when I was asking about radar on the Isle of Wight. Our procurement has to be smart. We have an absurd debate in this country: one minute we say, “Why, oh why, isn’t everything made in the UK?”, and the next minute we say, “Why, oh why, does everything cost so much more?” We have to get the balance right. We have to invest and sell stuff into export markets where we have that lead—in submarines, potentially in radar and in other really good things where we still have the cutting edge—and we have to be much smarter about what we do and how we do it.
Most airmen and most people in the armed forces would tell us that the A400 is a pretty disastrous piece of kit. Maybe they have ironed out those problems in the past few years, but most people in the armed forces would much rather have kept the Hercules and run it with, I think, the C-14 or the Galaxy—[Interruption.] The C-17, sorry. It is a beautiful plane—gorgeous. They would rather have the Herc and the C-17. We had a better build deal with the Herc in this country, but for political reasons we bought the A400, which is deeply unpopular and cannot do much of the work, especially in the more rarefied ends of the military, that the Hercules could do. It is about smart procurement—not necessarily committing to buy everything British, but committing to do as much as possible British, as long as it is also delivering value for the taxpayer. That is an important distinction.
Moving on to Ukraine, my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Bracknell is right that it is shameful that the US is doing so much of the heavy lifting; it is appalling. He is also right about how little Europe is doing. Russia is gaining ground and gaining in confidence, which is a significant problem we face. An old friend, Hamish de Bretton-Gordon, is doing great work highlighting some new tactics on the eastern front, probably the most important of which are the use of glide bombs and CS gas. As a chemical weapon, CS gas is low level, cheap and less offensive to humanity than sarin. By using it on the frontline, the Russians are forcing Ukrainian troops out of their bunkers and their positions, so they become more vulnerable to wave attacks by Russian troops and to mortar and artillery fire.
We know that the artillery ratios at the moment are something like 10:1, so for every shell the Ukrainians fire, the Russians are firing 10 back. That will soon even out to 5:1 or maybe 3:1, but the use of CS gas is still proving to be a highly significant threat. A question I would like to put to the Secretary of State is, although I know we are being generous and doing lots of great things with kit, can we supply gas masks to the Ukrainians? Can we enable British companies that produce gas masks to sell them more quickly to the Ukrainians? They need that kit. From what my friends in the Ukrainian armed forces tell me, the Soviet-era gas masks are not fit for purpose and are costing lives.
On UK supply and support to Ukraine in relation to artillery shells, I do not want to keep banging on about this point, but the more there is transparency of supply, the more the Russians will see that we are in this for the long term. The Gucci kit—the high-end kit—is important, but the stuff that is going to enable Ukraine to hold its positions and not allow a Russian breakthrough of the kind we saw in Kharkiv is going to be the supply of 155 mm artillery shells, preferably with fewer types of western kit. The Ukrainians are running 17 different types of artillery kit that use a variety of shells, which is causing massive logistical issues. It is a remarkable achievement that the Ukrainians are even doing that.
I am delighted the AS-90s have gone. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford (Mr Francois) said, that raises the question of where that kit is, but it has been put to good use. However, those barrels do not last. There are only two or three retooling plants in Europe, so why have we not opened one? The war has been going on for two years. Why do we not have a production line for artillery shells? Why are we not re-barrelling or offering to re-machine kit? If we are, can we say so? That kit is so important; it is the bread and butter of this war.
I was going to make another point, but I will not; I will wind up there because I am running out of time. Finally, on messaging, people think it is a waste of time trying to message the Russians, but I wonder if we should be trying to do that more. If we look at the number of people who are actively supporting this war in Russia, as opposed to people who simply accept Putin’s power, there are lots of people in Russia who seem to be sitting on their hands. If we can try to manipulate Russian public opinion, it would be to our benefit.
