(6 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberClearly, the noble and learned Lord has misrepresented to an extent what I just said to the House, because I did not refer to primary legislation—those words slipped into his observation. However, I did point out that, of course, under the process that we have and will have in place, there will be parliamentary scrutiny of the steps we take to implement these provisions in respect of EU retained law after we leave.
Can the noble and learned Lord clarify the position on the provisions, which the Government will consult on imminently, concerning the “governance gap” that will open up on environmental issues after the withdrawal Bill has been enacted? At least a proportion of the powers and functions listed in subsection (2)(a) to (f) of the proposed new clause will be ascribed to a body whose nature is not yet known but is soon to be subject to consultation. It will deal with reviewing and reporting on compliance with legal requirements, monitoring and measuring, and certainly publicising information. Can the noble and learned Lord tell us what the difference is between the body that is going to fill the environmental governance gap and the same sort of governance gap that will open up with respect to other functions outside the environmental field?
(6 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I support Amendment 58. This comes down very simply to the fact that, as a result of the discussion we have heard today, the recitals and preambles either are brought across automatically—in which case, some of the statements made in the debate in the other place on this issue, which were quite lengthy and considerable, need to be re-examined, because my impression of those was that there was no guarantee of preambles and recitals being brought across—or they are not clearly brought across, in which case we need something in the Bill that does so. So I would be very grateful if the Minister would clarify, first of all, whether he believes the Government are convinced that they are already clearly brought across.
My Lords, first of all perhaps I may observe that, pursuant to Clause 3 of the Bill:
“Direct EU legislation, so far as operative immediately before exit day, forms part of domestic law on and after exit day”.
That brings over direct legislation, including recitals, as I believe a number of noble Lords have understood.
The Government’s position is that, as long as retained EU law remains as part of the UK statute book, it is essential that there is a common understanding of what the law means. Therefore, to maximise certainty, any question as to the meaning of retained EU law will be determined in the UK courts, in accordance with the CJEU’s case law as it exists immediately before the UK leaves the EU. That is set out in Clause 6(3). Any other starting point would lead to a change in the law and risk creating considerable uncertainty, if not confusion, on exit day.
However, we do not want to fossilise that case law. That is why, pursuant to Clauses 6(4) and 6(5) of the Bill, there is provision for the Supreme Court, and indeed for the High Court of Justiciary in Scotland, to depart from that situation when employing their own jurisprudence. The test would be that which they apply at the present time in departing from their domestic jurisprudence.
While it would be fair to say that the Constitution Committee has not always seen eye to eye with us on the Bill, on this particular issue it described the Government’s position as clear and sensible. Retained EU law will of course be modified after exit day by Parliament, and indeed by the devolved legislatures. It is right and sensible that it should no longer be interpreted in line with retained EU case law, following those modifications. But, in other cases, it may be appropriate that, even where there has been some modification, it should continue to be interpreted in that same way. What we have in mind is a situation in which a modification simply changes a reference, for example from an EU commission or agency to a UK public body, but leaves the substantive scheme of the retained EU law exactly as it was before. That is the purpose of Clause 6(6): to ensure that, where there is a modification that has no impact on the operation of the scheme, we should continue, pursuant to Clause 6(3), to amend in an appropriate fashion.
Amendment 57, which was moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, would remove the reference to unmodified law from Clause 6(3). But one effect of that would be to cast doubt on the operation of Clause 6(6) and the ability of modifications to retained EU law to displace the binding effect of pre-exit CJEU case law. That uncertainty, we suggest, should be avoided.
Can I come on to the issue of recitals?
(6 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberNot necessarily in the context of retained EU law, which comes over with that principle of supremacy standing behind it. I will come on to deal with that in more detail. I understand that, as the noble Lord indicated, his amendments draw on the recommendations made in the Constitution Committee report on the Bill—although I was interested to note that Amendment 33 appears to go further than the recommendations put forward by the committee, in that it extends the status of primary legislation to all retained EU law, rather than just to law being preserved by Clauses 3 and 4 of the Bill. So there is that difference between Amendment 33 and the recommendations of the Constitution Committee.
I understand entirely the concerns here and the attraction that these amendments have as a result. It is only right, however, that we should examine fully the consequences of dealing with status in a one-size-fits-all way.
Before the Minister moves on to the consequences, perhaps I might draw his attention to the status of environmental law currently drawn from the European Union. Of course, a considerable proportion of the anticipated changes that will be required are in environmental law, because so much of what we draw from Europe is environmental law. At the moment, the status of environmental law drawn from Europe has been pretty random, to be frank, and not at all reflective of the importance of the legislation. It has been random, whether it is drawn from a regulation which would be picked up by the clauses that the Minister mentioned or from a directive which would not be picked up in that way. But it did not really matter that it was rather random in its status, because the framework provided by the ECA was there, and therefore none of the legislation could be meddled with randomly by the Executive. Of course, once the safeguard provided by the ECA has gone, the status of existing environmental law becomes rather strange. It sticks out like a sore thumb, in that some of it that one would think was sufficiently important to be considered eligible, as it were, for primary legislation, has not got that current status, while other bits of law that are pretty functional and practical have a much lower status. So I urge the Minister to think about just how complicated the process would be if we did not simply adopt a single status for all that law.
First, with respect to the noble Baroness, I do not accept that the way in which environmental law has been received and enforced in our domestic legislation has been random. We differ at the outset to that extent. Of course, various propositions have been put forward, one of which is to give the status of primary legislation to all retained EU law—but that would raise difficulties that I will come on to address. The categorisation below that can be carried out: indeed, the noble Baroness tried to set out for Amendment 32A a hierarchy that could be employed in that context. But I do not consider that environmental law stands out in the way that the noble Baroness suggests.
Our concern is that, as I mentioned, a one-size-fits-all approach will not really work. Again, I quote from the Bingham Centre’s report, which stated:
“We consider that the Rule of Law objectives of legal continuity and certainty are better served by the approach taken by the Government in the Bill. The principle of supremacy is well understood and its future role is very limited, being confined to the relationship between retained EU law and pre-exit UK law. Treating all retained EU law as primary legislation enacted on exit day, on the other hand, will increase legal uncertainty because it changes the settled approach and leaves unclear whether the interpretive obligation, to interpret pre-exit UK law so as to be compatible with retained EU law, continues to apply”.
EU law that is being converted into domestic legislation under this clause covers both a vast range of different policy areas and different types of EU law, from regulations and directives applying to agriculture and farming to detailed and technical pieces of tertiary legislation, such as the list of contents for a dye or chemical. At the end of the day, treating all of that as primary legislation would present, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, indicated, a quite enormous task for Parliament if it is going to legislate to amend any of that retained EU law. How many Acts of Parliament would we have to contemplate putting through this House to wrestle with that demanding position? It really would be formidable. Because this legislation will come on to our domestic statute book in a unique way, it will not already have been scrutinised and approved by this Parliament—so we would be bringing in this enormous body of law and treating it as primary legislation when nobody in this Parliament had actually examined it.
The breadth of this body of law, in the case of EU law being converted, is unique in its nature, which is why the Government have deliberately chosen to tread rather carefully and not simply assign a single status to that retained law in domestic legislation. While assigning a single status for all purposes to all retained EU law may be theoretically possible, it would have the most difficult consequences and might lead ultimately to a situation in which we had to extend the use of Henry VIII powers beyond any reasonable limit normally contemplated in the context of provisions of this kind.
Beyond that practical consideration, there is a more fundamental concern about the constitutional appropriateness of what has been proposed. Domestic primary legislation is less vulnerable to subsequent amendment and is less vulnerable to challenge in the courts for a very good reason—because, as I said, it has undergone scrutiny by both Houses of Parliament, which means that there can be no doubt about Parliament’s intentions so far as that primary legislation is concerned. That would not apply to retained EU law.
While we are spending considerable time scrutinising this Bill, we are not able to scrutinise the law it is converting. Some of that law is itself the EU’s own subsidiary legislation, which has not been subject to comparable scrutiny anywhere. The noble Baroness observed on an earlier occasion that the European Parliament had had the opportunity to scrutinise much of this. It has had the opportunity to scrutinise some of it, but scant scrutiny—if any—of the subsidiary legislation has actually occurred in the European Parliament. By contrast, our proposed approach has been to deal with the status of converted law for certain specified purposes, such as that alluded to by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick: that is, paragraph 19 of Schedule 8 in the context of the Human Rights Act and rights arising from there.
Of course I understand the concerns put forward by the Constitution Committee and noble Lords about the consequences of the case-by-case approach that we are taking. I do not dismiss them lightly and I do not say that the Bill is a perfect solution to the issue that we have to address. As I indicated on day three of Committee, there is some scope for considering how we can take this forward. Reference has already been made to the work of Professor Paul Craig and the alternative model of categorisation that he proposed in his article of 26 February. That is something that we are looking at—albeit, as the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, anticipated, that it might involve a considerable amount of work. But if that can be an appropriate and effective categorisation, rather like that of the noble Baroness, it is something that we are willing to look at.
Again, I ask the Committee not to dismiss lightly the potential ramifications of treating all this law as having the status of primary legislation just to exclude the concept of supremacy from the operation of Clause 5. That would raise formidable problems for us and we do not see it as an effective way forward for the Bill. But, as I indicated previously, we are looking at the mechanisms employed here, and a mechanism that avoids actually applying the doctrine of supremacy may find greater traction as a way forward if we can come up with a suitable categorisation for retained EU law, rather than a blanket categorisation of primary legislation. I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
(7 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberI am most obliged to the noble Lord, because it gives me the opportunity to refine the statement that I made. Essentially, we are world leaders in the area of nuclear fusion.
I should say that I am also a member of the Science and Technology Committee, which is looking at this issue at the moment. I am also a former nuclear waste regulator. Is it true to say that this caught the Government on the hop as an unintended consequence of leaving the European Union? Will he tell us how many more of these unexploded bombs there are in there?
I am obliged to the noble Baroness. This Government are never caught on the hop.