Groceries Code Adjudicator Bill [HL]
Debate between Baroness Wilcox and Lord Browne of Ladyton
Lord Browne of Ladyton
My Lords, I was not present at this weekend’s negotiations, so I rely upon the reporting in farming publications and on the BBC for what took place. My understanding is that, as a result of those negotiations, it was agreed that an order was necessary to cover the issues that had arisen in the pricing of milk provided by suppliers to processors. We understand that the Government intend to assist in the negotiation of an order similar to the groceries code order which is at the basis of this legislation. I also understand—it was covered liberally in the media—that the farming Minister, Jim Paice, told all and sundry that he would consider whether that order required an adjudicator. We are legislating for an adjudicator in this area and setting out the framework for the adjudicator to operate. As the Competition Commission will now have to amend the order at the basis of this Bill, could it be persuaded, once an order is negotiated, to incorporate this agreed order into the new order that it promulgates? By that simple stroke, we would get an order that covered this area and the adjudicator that the Minister apparently wants. Is that possible?
Baroness Wilcox
My Lords, the relationship between this Bill and the groceries supply order is evidently an important one. The noble Lord, Lord Knight, has proposed a technical amendment to ensure that references to the groceries supply order will refer to the order as varied, if that order is subsequently varied. There is no general rule of construction as to whether references to an instrument include references to any future variations of that instrument. This depends on the details of the context and the drafting in each case. In this case, the Government are confident that the current drafting of the Bill would already have the intended effect, which is that references in the Bill to the order include any future variations made under Section 161 of the Enterprise Act. It would not make sense for the adjudicator to exercise his or her enforcement and compliance functions by reference to a version of the order which was different from the version binding the retailers at the relevant time.
As further evidence of this position, perhaps I might also direct the noble Lord towards Clauses 16(4) and 21(5), which contemplate amendments to the groceries supply order. This makes it clear that the references to the groceries supply order are also meant to include any future variations in this case.
I will now turn briefly to the other issue which the noble Lord has raised and on which I am happy to give him the reassurance he wants. The Government share the natural concerns of noble Lords about the situation of dairy farmers. In light of the obvious interest in this matter, my noble friend Lord Taylor will be making a Written Statement tomorrow. However, I would like to give some reassurance on this issue, although I emphasise that these discussions are not within the remit of the amendment. I have not spoken to Jim Paice over the last few days, but I am sure we will have such discussions in the future. The remit of the groceries code adjudicator is clearly defined and will remain so. The proposed code for dairy is voluntary and any adjudicator for that code would be a separate person.
Our adjudicator will, of course, be able to intervene to address any instances of supermarkets breaching the groceries code in their dealings with their dairy suppliers. Dairy farmers who are indirect suppliers will also be able to bring issues to the attention of the adjudicator, for instance if they believe that an intermediary processor who is being treated unfairly under the code might in turn pass pressure on to them. Colleagues in the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs are deeply concerned about the situation of dairy farmers and are considering a range of ways to help them. We will of course continue to listen carefully to any concerns raised by farmers themselves or by colleagues in government or Parliament. I cannot comment further on the specific points raised by the Minister of State for Agriculture and Food, as these statements were made only recently and he has not yet made any suggestions to me or my department.
Groceries Code Adjudicator Bill [HL]
Debate between Baroness Wilcox and Lord Browne of Ladyton
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (Baroness Wilcox)
My Lords, the issue of plain English was raised at Second Reading. It was revisited at some length in Committee. The Government have considered this further. Noble Lords will recall that we discussed the possibility of saying, “There will be an adjudicator” or “There shall be an adjudicator”. I am glad to say that the proposal in the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Browne, is consistent with previous Bills and, I hope, clearer for those reading the Bill. In the spirit of this, and having heard the positions of several noble Lords in Committee, I would be happy to accept the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Browne.
As to an update on my conversations with the noble Lord, Lord True, I have a fulsome response for him later in the proceedings. Perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Knight of Weymouth, will kindly leave it until then for me to respond.
Lord Browne of Ladyton
My Lords, I hope I do not spoil the achievement of having the Government accept this amendment, but I cannot resist the temptation to express how delighted I am that I have managed to effect change to legislation in your Lordships’ House. I am absolutely sure that as we devote a substantial part of the immediate future to discussing the immediate future of your Lordships’ House, this will be cited as a historic moment in which the revising powers of the Chamber were exercised to the benefit of the ordinary people of the country.
Baroness Wilcox
My Lords, on the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Browne, I appreciate that the Competition and Markets Authority, when established, is likely to take on the functions of the OFT and the Competition Commission that are relevant to the adjudicator. The Bill will eventually need to be amended to reflect this. We were very grateful for the noble Lord’s understanding attitude in Committee and suggested that these amendments should be considered at a later stage of the Bill.
Last week, the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill passed through Committee in the House of Commons but is still some way from enactment. For this reason, the Government believe that these amendments are still somewhat premature. Furthermore, I ask noble Lords to note that Clause 58 of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill includes a power to make consequential amendments to enactments, including enactments made in the same Session as that Bill. Even if this Bill were not amended during its passage to refer to the Competition and Markets Authority in place of the OFT and the Competition Commission, that power could later be used to bring it into line following enactment. Today the noble Lord has asked why the same approach is not taken on every Bill. The answer is that each Bill is different and the Government will consider what approach to take on a case-by-case basis. In this case, where it is relatively easy to amend either Bill at a later stage, the Government have decided to amend it at that later stage and I therefore ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Browne of Ladyton
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for responding to my amendments in what I suspect is the only way that she could. I am reminded of an experience that I had when I was a young solicitor with a client who had a dreadful drink problem. On one occasion I met him in the cells of the local sheriff’s court, and he had a summons for being drunk and incapable and a summons for breach of the peace. I asked him how he was pleading and he said not guilty. I said, “What’s the defence?”, and he said, “As far as breach of the peace is concerned, I was so drunk that I couldn’t speak, so I could not have been shouting and swearing. I am an alcoholic”. I said, “What about the drunk and incapable?”. He said, “I’m teetotal. I don’t drink”. I said, “These defences would appear to be inconsistent”. He said, “But you’re a young man at the beginning of his legal career. You will learn that two separate cases have two separate defences”. I am struck that to some degree my life has come full circle.
I do not intend to press this to the vote at this stage, but I hope that at some point the amendment, along with the position that the Minister has been put into in trying to defend these contradictory positions, may encourage those who draft legislation to be a wee bit more consistent. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Browne of Ladyton
My Lords, before the Minister speaks I should perhaps indicate—for the purpose of the record—that I also support the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Howard of Rising. I think it is entirely consistent with what is fair in relation to the conduct of this process.
Baroness Wilcox
My Lords, as I said in Committee, the reports that the adjudicator must publish at the end of each investigation are a vital part of his or her accountability, and an important way of keeping retailers, suppliers and consumers informed of his or her work. While I can understand the intention behind the amendment of my noble friend Lord Howard of Rising, I am not sure that it is necessary. If a retailer wishes to make a public comment on the report, it will be free to do so by issuing a press release or publishing a statement on its website. For this to be included as an annexe to the report itself would appear somewhat unusual, particularly as there would—due to confidentiality—be less possibility of a similar statement from any suppliers.
Furthermore, we think it important that the report is clearly the adjudicator’s report and the adjudicator’s alone. The report should be fair and impartial and should not be coloured by commentary from a retailer with which the adjudicator may or may not agree. As I say, the retailer will be free to make its own statement, and similarly the adjudicator will have no right to have his or her comments on that statement included in it. I therefore ask the noble Lord not to press that amendment.
To move on to the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Browne, I said two weeks ago that this was interesting and reasonable—he repeated my words exactly—and upon further consideration I am happy to say that my opinion has not changed. It is eminently sensible to require the adjudicator’s investigation reports to contain the reasons for the decisions made, and I am therefore happy to accept that amendment.
Lord Browne of Ladyton
My Lords, I am overwhelmed by the scale of my success this afternoon. I suspect I may retire from the lists now. This will be a day that I will never repeat. I thank the noble Baroness for her consistent approach in this case. I thank her and her Bill team once again for their co-operation and engagement with me in an attempt to try and make this amendment work better, and it does. I think that we have, between us, improved the Bill.
Baroness Wilcox
My Lords, the adjudicator’s obligation to maintain strict standards of confidentiality is integral to the Bill. I therefore thank the noble Lord, Lord Browne, for his careful consideration of how we can make these standards exacting.
As I said in Committee, the Government are confident that the deputy adjudicator and people acting on behalf of the adjudicator would be bound by the duty of confidentiality as set out in the Bill. The deputy and the individuals acting for the adjudicator have no functions which are independent of the adjudicator and can only carry out the adjudicator’s functions. In doing so, they will be subject to the same restrictions as the adjudicator. If a person acting on behalf of the adjudicator breaches Clause 18, normal agency principles will make that a breach of Clause 18 by the adjudicator. Additionally, we are convinced that the words “may not” and “must not” have the same force and meaning here.
The noble Lord has raised the issue of plain English with regard to the amendments. We are confident that the Bill has the correct legal sense as it stands. Although it would not be wrong to use “must not”, we believe that “may not” is slightly better here. The words “may not” in their context here are clearly intended to be prohibitive. If they were permissive, it would mean that the adjudicator was allowed not to make unauthorised disclosures, which would not make sense. If further clarification were needed, the words “prohibitions contained in this section” are used in Clause 18(5).
The noble Lord has also suggested that the creation of a criminal offence is needed to discourage breaches of confidentiality. This seems unnecessary, as the adjudicator will be a public authority and be expected to take his or her statutory duties very seriously.
Perhaps I might also remind noble Lords that Schedule 1 provides for the Secretary of State to,
“dismiss the person if satisfied that the person is unable, unwilling or unfit to perform his or her functions”.
Serious breaches of confidentiality, either personally or from those working for him, have the potential to satisfy these requirements. We therefore believe that the threat of dismissal will be a sufficient deterrent, if indeed a deterrent is needed.
There are therefore ample reasons for the adjudicator and those working for the adjudicator to take care over confidentiality. I agree that strict confidentiality requirements will be essential if the adjudicator is truly to eradicate the climate of fear that we are aiming to address in the Bill. The Government are confident that the Bill provides for these requirements as it stands. I therefore ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Browne of Ladyton
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for the care that she has again taken to address these issues having previously thought that she had seen me off in Grand Committee. I am pleased that we now have further clarity about the basis for her confidence in relation to the extension of the obligation to the deputy adjudicator and his staff—that is helpful. I maintain the position that, if “must not” and “may not” mean the same thing, “must not” is preferable, particularly when you are trying to build confidence among people who are in a weakened position—if they were not in a weakened position, we would not be doing this. I am disappointed, however, in the Minister’s failure to appreciate that there needs to a sanction for a breach of confidentiality which does not imply the dismissal of the adjudicator himself, because that, too, is about building confidence. If people see that a criminal offence will have been committed if their confidentiality is breached, their confidence in the legislation will be increased. I hope that the Minister’s confidence that there will be no leaks is well placed. I will regret it, as much as she will, if she is wrong. I just think that, in this internet age that we live in, it is fanciful to imagine that we are capable of creating an organisation that is leak-proof. However, I have been seen off on this occasion and I shall not come back. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Groceries Code Adjudicator Bill [HL]
Debate between Baroness Wilcox and Lord Browne of Ladyton
Baroness Wilcox
My Lords, much of the debate about sanctions today has focused on financial penalties. However, I value the opportunity to discuss the rationale behind the other enforcement powers available to the adjudicator. The noble Lord, Lord Howard of Rising, has brought forward two amendments which would together extend the right to a full merits appeal so that it applied to all the enforcement methods and would be to the Competition Appeal Tribunal. The Bill already provides for a full merits appeal to the court against financial penalties, if these are introduced. In the case of recommendations or the requirement to publish information, the Government believe that judicial review is more appropriate.
In the case of recommendations, it must be emphasised that these are non-binding on retailers. There is no consequence which follows if the retailer does not comply, other than the possibility of a further investigation, which could lead to the imposition of a further sanction only if a further breach of the code were found. We therefore believe that, in this case, a full merits appeal would be clearly inappropriate.
The Government acknowledge that for the requirement to publish information the arguments are more finely balanced. However, having considered this in depth, we believe that judicial review remains the most appropriate form of appeal. The reasons for this were set out in the Government’s response to the BIS Select Committee’s report. They include the independence and impartiality of the adjudicator and the breadth of matters that an investigation is likely to consider. The critical difference between the requirement to publish and a financial penalty is that in the latter case there is a very direct and immediate consequence for the retailer, whereas a publication of information is rather different. It should be remembered here that this information will not in itself determine that a retailer has any obligation to a particular supplier. The supplier would still need to bring his case to arbitration to seek damages or any other remedy.
Finally, we have also taken into account the implications that a full right of appeal against a mere requirement to publish could have for the effectiveness of the adjudicator. A full right of appeal, requiring the repetition of a detailed fact-finding exercise, could seriously delay the requirement to publish and so substantially diminish its impact. Taking these matters into account, the Government consider that a full right of appeal is needed only against financial penalties and that otherwise the possibility of judicial review by the court will be sufficient.
In addition, the noble Lord seeks to replace the principle of appeal to, or review by, the High Court or Court of Session with appeal to, or review by, the Competition Appeal Tribunal. While the adjudicator is being introduced on competition grounds, the details of the practices addressed by the groceries code are not the same as anti-trust cases or the other issues dealt with by the Competition Appeal Tribunal. The High Court or Court of Session in Scotland is therefore an appropriate place for such appeals to be heard.
However, I have listened to your Lordships today who support what the noble Lord, Lord Howard, has said or want to question this issue further. Therefore, I am willing to consider this point and will invite the noble Lord, Lord Howard, to a meeting, as well as any other noble Lords who spoke, including the noble Lords, Lord Borrie and Lord Browne, the noble Baroness, Lady Byford, and the noble Viscount, Lord Eccles.
I turn to the amendment proposed by the noble Viscount, Lord Eccles. The Bill contains clear requirements for the adjudicator as to what they must specify to the retailer if they require a retailer to publish information. The noble Lord has suggested that these be removed. I believe that it is important that if a retailer is being asked to publish information, it should be told what information it must publish, how the information should be published and the time by which it must be published. Otherwise, the instruction will be unclear or it could leave too much discretion to the retailer concerned. Given that this is a means of enforcement to be used following a breach of the code, I also believe that it is reasonable for the adjudicator to be able to specify what information is to be published, as well as when and where it is to be published.
Accepting this amendment would make the Bill less clear and would weaken one of the adjudicator’s means of enforcement. In asking the noble Lord, Lord Howard, to withdraw his amendment, I repeat my offer to him to meet me and my officials.
Lord Browne of Ladyton
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way; I have no desire to prolong proceedings this afternoon. In anticipating that the noble Lord, Lord Howard of Rising, might accept the invitation to discuss these matters further, I would welcome being a party to those discussions.
Will the Minister ask those advising her to take into account the interaction of Clause 8(3) with the expectation that review will be conducted by way of judicial review? That has the potential to create a multiplicity of actions that are entirely unnecessary. She indicated that there was effectively no enforcement mechanism in relation to naming and shaming. But there is such a mechanism, by way of injunction or specific performance, in Scotland. I can see a judge in the Court of Session in Scotland or in the High Court in England having an application before them and saying, “I cannot go into the merits of this case. They are for another forum”. A judicial review will be raised at the same time and the interaction between the two will have to be worked out by judges in the same courts involving enormous expense all because there is no appeal. That is inevitable.
Baroness Wilcox
I think that I may have an answer for the noble Lord now, but as we will be discussing this further we will come back to it. The requirement to publish needs an enforcement mechanism. We should not oust the rights to judicial review and therefore we need both. That is the answer that I am giving now. We shall take it into consideration with everything else. I want at least to be sure that I am giving an explanation that is clear. In the mean time, I ask my noble friend to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Wilcox
That cannot be the case, because we have made an arrangement that fines can be imposed, though it will be the Secretary of State who allows that. Yes, if there is a continuing breach—not just a failure to follow a recommendation—obviously that would be the response.
Lord Browne of Ladyton
My Lords, I am extremely grateful to the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Wakefield, my noble friend Lord Borrie, and the noble Baroness, Lady Byford, for their support. The noble Lord, Lord Borrie, is a very wise and knowledgeable man. At least, today he has displayed that; I am not sure if he was so consistent the other day. I am very grateful for his support, and I must at least be fairly near the right answer on this occasion.
The Minister’s response disappoints but does not surprise me, because there has been a consistent recommendation that the adjudicator should have the power to escalate right throughout all of the consultation process on the Bill. Indeed, the Business, Innovation and Skills Select Committee, at the end of its deliberations, supported escalation. I know that the Government’s position was not to support it.
Let me respond to the Minister in this way, as I am sure we will debate this again: in the first instance, if there is a recommendation, that means the retailer has—in the view of the adjudicator—broken the groceries code. We are starting from the point that the adjudicator is dealing with someone in breach of the code. The powers of enforcement following investigations cannot be imposed unless the adjudicator is satisfied that a large retailer has broken the groceries code.
Of course, failure to follow a recommendation is not evidence that a large retailer is continuing to break the groceries code. There may be any number of reasons why a large retailer may refuse to accept, carry out or respond to, a recommendation. I agree with the Minister in that regard. However, in her argument she said that the Government have granted the adjudicator the power, in those circumstances, to consider as part of the follow-up a yet further investigation, because a refusal to accept a recommendation will in some circumstances imply a continued breach of the code. Those are the only circumstances that I can see in the Bill where the adjudicator can initiate an investigation where he has no reasonable grounds to believe. It is the failure to follow a recommendation that gives him the power to institute the new investigation.
Baroness Wilcox
Before the noble Lord withdraws his amendment, to which he will no doubt return on Report, it might be useful for me to comment. It is possible for a retailer to have breached the code and the adjudicator to decide that a recommendation is enough. The adjudicator will not know for sure whether a failure to follow a recommendation is also a breach of the code. That will need to be further investigated to be fair to the retailer.
Lord Browne of Ladyton
I am very grateful to the noble Baroness who is utterly generous in responding to every point that is made in these debates. It is very helpful in understanding how this complicated system will work. Essentially, this is a plea to make this legislation less complicated. If it is occupying so much of our time in trying to work out what it all means, perhaps it is just too complicated and we are trying to be too clever. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Browne of Ladyton
I am grateful to the noble Lord and I think he has got my point. It seems to me that we ought to front-load the assessment of vexatiousness and not leave this bit at the end, as if somehow it balances everything and makes it appear much better than it is. We should give the adjudicator the power to say to people who bring complaints that are vexatious or without merit—and that will be revealed very quickly—“I am not taking these any further and that’s it”. People have to have confidence in this. The decisions that we want the adjudicator to make in relation to this issue will be decisions of moment and will have to be serious and important points. We do not want an adjudicator running around doing lots of small investigations. We want one or two key investigations that go to the heart of the inequities in this market, which people want the Government and Parliament to address. The previous Government started to do that. I am uncomfortable with this particular clause for a number of reasons but am grateful to it because it exposes the false logic of a lot of the rest of the provisions of this Bill.
Baroness Wilcox
My Lords, I understand my noble friend Lord Eccles’s reluctance to see individual retailers or complainants having to pay the costs of investigations. However, I think this is justified in both cases and take this opportunity to explain why this clause should stand part of the Bill.
In the case of retailers, they can be required to pay the costs of investigations only if the adjudicator is satisfied that they have broken the code. In this situation, the need for investigation and enforcement follows from their actions. It would seem unfair on retailers who have not breached the code to incur additional costs through a general levy when there is a party who clearly bears responsibility for the costs being incurred. I know from our debate at Second Reading that many noble Lords feel strongly that the costs should fall on those who breach the code rather than those who do not, wherever possible.
This is not a financial penalty or a blank cheque; it simply ensures that if a retailer breaches the code, the cost of the investigation can be borne by them, not by the other nine retailers. In the case of costs being borne by complainants, the Bill is clear that they can be expected to pay the costs of an investigation only if the adjudicator is satisfied that their complaint was vexatious or wholly without merit. That is a strong test directed at clearly irresponsible complainants rather than simply erroneous or weak ones. Without such a power, individuals might be motivated to make complaints that they know to be false or completely unjustified, wasting the adjudicator’s resources and placing unfair burdens on the retailers it investigates. Of course, the adjudicator should not pursue a case that he or she knows to be vexatious, but that may not be clear at the outset. That is simply a safeguard in case an investigation turns out to have been based on vexatious complaints.
Finally, I note that in each case, the clause says that the adjudicator may require a party to pay the costs of investigation. That is strictly discretionary. For instance, if a breach was found in a retailer but it was understood to be a matter of simple error, the adjudicator might decide that it would be disproportionate to require it to pay all of the costs. I hope that helps the noble Lord, and I support the Question that the clause stand part of the Bill.
Baroness Wilcox
My Lords, providing advice and guidance will be important in the adjudicator’s role of promoting compliance with the groceries code. I understand, therefore, why my noble friend Lord Howard of Rising wishes to see a requirement on the adjudicator to provide advice and why the noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton, wishes such advice to be available to the public as well as to retailers and suppliers. I agree with the noble Lord, so it is important that the adjudicator clarifies certain issues around how he or she will work and indeed, how the public as well as suppliers and retailers will have an interest in this.
However, under Clause 12 the adjudicator has a duty to provide guidance on how he or she will investigate and has powers to provide further guidance on any issue related to the code. This guidance will be published and available to all. It is therefore the most suitable format for any obligatory communication by the adjudicator and is the best way for the adjudicator to deal with the public. Conversely, advice is more likely to be given on an individual basis to clarify specific issues with retailers and suppliers. It is likely to be given where the adjudicator notices that certain retailers or suppliers do not have a clear understanding of the code. It is also likely to be given to retailers or suppliers who are not sure whether a specific practice that is relevant to them is within the code. Advice is therefore suited to individual, potentially technical discussions of the code with those to whom the code is more directly relevant—suppliers and retailers. Any statements of general principles can be made through the power in Clause 12 to provide guidance, and those statements will be available to the public.
On whether the provision of advice should be mandatory, the adjudicator would normally be expected to provide advice when it is requested. However, the adjudicator will have a limited budget and will need to prioritise their work accordingly. It is therefore appropriate that they should have the freedom to choose whether in a particular instance giving advice is the best way of encouraging retailers to comply with the code. There could also be circumstances when giving advice would be inappropriate; for example, due to a conflict of interest. I ask noble Lords not to press their amendments.
Lord Browne of Ladyton
Perhaps I may ask the Minister a relatively simple question. If a member of the public thinks that he or she is in possession of knowledge that should support a complaint to the adjudicator, are they entitled to phone the adjudicator’s office and ask for advice as to whether that is appropriate? If not, is it common sense?
Baroness Wilcox
I do not imagine that the adjudicator will put up a barrier to people telephoning and asking questions. I imagine that they will have with them a group of people who will be able to assist anyone who comes. Looking at the adjudicator’s incidental powers, they may do anything that is calculated to facilitate the carrying-out of their functions, or is conducive or incidental to it. It is not for Ministers to interfere at this stage with how the adjudicator decides to work. I think that that covers the noble Lord’s question.
Lord Browne of Ladyton
It does indeed, and I am very grateful to the Minister for her immediate response, but she may want to compare that response with the one that she gave to my attempt to add the public to those who can get advice. It seems that the answer now is not that there are two types of communication, one appropriate to retailers or suppliers and another, which we are supposed to find in Clause 12, appropriate to the public. The answer is actually that the way in which the Bill has been drafted allows the adjudicator to give advice to the public if he or she wishes to do so. It would therefore appear that my amendment is unnecessary and that all the other responses I have just received, suggesting that it was inappropriate, are not correct.
Lord Browne of Ladyton
My Lords, I do not think I shall detain the Committee for very long. I am hopeful that the Minister will have a simple answer to this particular problem.
The amendments are designed to do two things: they would extend the obligation of confidentiality beyond the adjudicator to his or her deputy and staff, and would provide a criminal sanction for a breach of the obligation of confidentiality. The arguments are comparatively simple. Clause 18, on a straightforward reading, limits the obligation of confidentiality to the adjudicator. If that reading is correct then this is far too narrow. The persons connected to the adjudicator should also be covered by the statutory provision, and these include, at the very least, the deputy adjudicator and the adjudicator’s staff.
The obligation of confidentiality in Clause 18, with the wording that has been adopted, can be argued to be discretionary rather than mandatory, and the amendment deleting the word “may” and inserting the word “must” clarifies that the obligation is mandatory. Amendments 102 and 103 are consequential amendments on those two provisions.
The obligation provided by Clause 18 must be enforceable, and in my view the provision of a statutory offence will ensure that the obligation is respected. I beg to move.
Baroness Wilcox
My Lords, the duty of the adjudicator to keep complainants’ identities confidential is central to this Bill. The initial market investigation, consultation and pre-legislative scrutiny all indicated that suppliers would be reluctant to complain if they thought that they would be identified, and noble Lords have made the same point in the House. The protection of the identity of parties to arbitration is likewise important. The proposed amendments on confidentiality therefore need careful consideration.
The noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton, proposed a number of amendments with the clear aim of making the requirement on the adjudicator to maintain confidentiality as tough as possible. I agree that this needs to be a strong requirement. However, I believe that the Bill already achieves this.
Two of the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton, specify that the adjudicator “must not” rather than “may not” make unauthorised disclosures of information that might break confidentiality. I am confident that “may not” and “must not” have the same force here. The words “may not” are intended to be prohibitive: the adjudicator is in either instance required to refrain from making unauthorised disclosures.
Another two amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Browne, specify that the duty to maintain confidentiality also applies to the deputy adjudicator and any staff. I agree completely with this as a matter of principle. However, the Government are confident that the deputy adjudicator and staff seconded to the adjudicator would already be bound by the duty of confidentiality as set out in the Bill and that therefore the amendment is unnecessary.
The noble Lord’s final amendment on this clause makes any knowing breach of confidentiality by the adjudicator or his or her staff an offence and introduces fines for anyone found guilty of such an offence. I do not believe that the threat of fines is necessary to make the adjudicator act responsibly. The adjudicator will be a public authority and will be bound to take the responsibilities under Clause 18 very seriously, as well as being bound to respect the human rights to privacy of the relevant parties. It is true that there is no sanction for breach expressed in Clause 18 but a breach would be a breach of statutory duty by the adjudicator and would in principle enable a person who suffered from a breach to claim damages from the adjudicator or to seek an injunction to prevent the disclosure if the person knew in advance.
I do not think that my noble friend Lord Eccles will be speaking to his amendments.
Baroness Wilcox
I therefore would ask the noble Lord, Lord Browne, to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Browne of Ladyton
My Lords, I am reassured by the noble Baroness’s comprehensive response, and now that her words are on the record, it will be very clear that the requirement of confidentiality applies not just to the adjudicator, as the Bill states, but to the deputy adjudicator and the staff. In making a plea for plain English, which is where we started our debate, I wonder why we do not just say what we mean in legislation, in order that we do not have to read Hansard to find out that it applies to other people. A few words here would not cost us that much. If “may not” can have as strong a construction as “must not” and the Government prefer “may not” when they mean “must not”, I am content with that as well. However, I still think that it would be better if we said what we meant rather than left it to what lawyers understand of these things.
I am impressed by the Minister’s confidence that in future this confidentiality will be respected. I have had the privilege to hold some quite significant offices in government and I have discovered, sometimes to my frustration, that where one expects confidentiality most is where one least gets it. We have a media industry that substantially operates on the basis of leaks. These stories will be of interest to many people. They will sustain the front pages of newspapers that are competing with an internet that is utterly uncontrollable. I would not be surprised if very quickly we find that trying to stem leaks out of these investigations is a problem, and I believe that we will regret that we did not put down a criminal offence to discourage that. In the current circumstances, though, and at this time of day, I do not intend to insist on this any further. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Groceries Code Adjudicator Bill [HL]
Debate between Baroness Wilcox and Lord Browne of Ladyton(12 years, 4 months ago)
Grand CommitteeRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Baroness Wilcox
It might. I wonder if the noble Lord, Lord Browne, would be kind enough to let me take this away and return. I ask him to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Browne of Ladyton
My Lords, I will be more than content to withdraw my amendment, and to go away and reflect on the response of the noble Baroness to my rather small point. I am surprised, I have to say, at the nature of the response, given that I know that at least one piece of legislation has been passed by this House which includes the phrase “there shall be” in its first sentence. I suspect that there are many others, but I shall have to go and do some research now. If it was a prediction that the legislation fulfilled, perhaps that is the proper construction; I am not entirely sure. However, we should not detain the Committee with this point, given that we all need to go away and reflect on it. I am happy to withdraw my amendment, but I give the noble Baroness notice that I am not entirely persuaded by the response she deployed. This is not the most important issue that the Committee will consider this afternoon, but it is important that there should be consistency in legislation. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Wilcox
My Lords, these amendments concern the independence of the adjudicator and, in particular, how this may be safeguarded through the appointment and dismissal processes. I fully agree that the independence of the adjudicator is critically important to the successful operation of the role.
I have just been passed a note for the noble Lords, Lord Browne and Lord Borrie, on the name “adjudicator”, which I thought might be helpful. The term has been chosen because an ombudsman must deal with consumers rather than businesses. That is the answer to that one.
Before addressing the amendments, I first reassure noble Lords that the Bill provides the adjudicator with full operational independence. There is no question of the Secretary of State telling the adjudicator what to do, who to investigate or what the sanctions should be. It is, however, normal practice that public appointments should be made by Ministers, in accordance with the standard rules and procedures on public appointments. In addressing these amendments I intend to draw parallels with other public bodies in the field of competition.
On the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton, the adjudicator will not be a judge and it is therefore not necessary to involve the Judicial Appointments Commission. Similarly, the panel members of the Competition Commission, who might also be considered to have a similar quasi-judicial role in their rulings on appeals from sectoral regulators, are not appointed or recommended by the Judicial Appointments Commission. It is similarly appropriate that the Secretary of State should appoint both the adjudicator and, if there is one, deputy adjudicator, as both are public appointments. In a similar way, the Secretary of State currently appoints both the chair and the chief executive of the Office of Fair Trading. The Office of Fair Trading can, of course, also impose financial penalties.
On dismissal, the Secretary of State may dismiss the adjudicator only if they are satisfied that he or she is unable, unwilling or unfit to perform his or her functions. This is not a judgment that would be made lightly and could be subject to judicial review if made incorrectly. Given these safeguards, I do not consider it necessary to require the Lord Chief Justice’s approval, nor to make specific provision for the circumstances of criminal conviction, which the Secretary of State could, in any case, take into account when judging whether the person was appropriate for the role.
Finally, on the amendment tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Knight of Weymouth and Lord Grantchester, I make two points. First, while the Government support the principle of suitable parliamentary oversight of public servants, they believe that pre-appointment hearings by Select Committees are only for those roles where it is vital that the post’s independence from government or its importance to the public is of the highest importance. It does not seem clear that the adjudicator, though very important to the groceries sector, would fall within this category.
Secondly, even were the post of adjudicator such a post, it is also not general practice for Select Committee oversight to be set out in primary legislation, but rather for it to be decided by the Secretary of State responsible. I hope that that is helpful and, therefore, ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Browne of Ladyton
I am grateful to the Minister for dealing so comprehensively with the constituent elements of my argument. I am not entirely persuaded by all her arguments. I read that the distinction between an ombudsman and an adjudicator is that an ombudsman deals with only consumers and therefore cannot regulate a set of circumstances in which consumers are not involved. I am not entirely sure whether that argument is sustainable but it has been deployed in earlier debates on this legislation for justifying the move from the recommendation for an ombudsman in relation to this role. When I read it in the past I was not convinced and, with respect to the noble Baroness, I am not convinced now. However, I realise that that is the Government’s position, which I respect.
I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Borrie for his intervention and I am enormously respectful of his vast experience in the area of consumer protection and competition. I thought that he got almost to the point where he agreed with me but could not break through the cigarette paper that was between us—which I have to say he put there. I am also grateful to him that he thought that there was something in my argument.
There is nothing implicit in any of these arguments that is in any sense critical of the way in which I expect the Secretary of State to behave. I expect the Secretary of State of whatever party is in government in this country to behave in an entirely appropriate way and not to make capricious decisions. I accept also that it may be possible to find other examples—as there were in the noble Baroness’s brief—of similar types of appointment that have not been considered to be judicial appointments or have required the intervention of the Judicial Appointments Commission in the past. However—I will research this as I cannot be certain about it—I suspect that none of those roles was created by statute since the creation of the Judicial Appointments Commission in 2005. In view of the roles held in the OFT in the post-2005 constitutionally changed environment, I would argue that it would be inappropriate to appoint someone with those sorts of powers without the element of independence that we imposed on the nature of these appointments by passing that legislation.
I am concerned that perhaps we treat constitutional change now as being of the moment and that we revert to type thereafter. But the 2005 Act was a significant step in creating an element of independence in the role of people who exercise these types of functions. We extended it well beyond what people would normally think of as judges, for instance into tribunals that cover a significant area of public life. I do not believe that competition should be immune from that restraint as regards the constitution. However, despite the fact that I believe quite strongly in this argument, at this stage I am content to withdraw the amendment—before I do so I will give way to my noble friend.
Baroness Wilcox
My Lords, I fully recognise the interests of the devolved Administrations in this Bill: of the noble Duke, the Duke of Montrose, for Scotland and the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, for Wales.
The Government have kept in close contact with the devolved Administrations through the development of both the policy and the legislation, and we are grateful for the strong support that they have given to this Bill. Officials in my department have discussed this with representatives of all the devolved Administrations on multiple occasions, and continue to do so. We would of course expect the adjudicator to informally interact with the devolved Administrations in the same way.
However, formally speaking, the groceries code is a non-devolved issue, as it is a matter of competition law. The adjudicator therefore has no formal responsibilities to the devolved Administrations. Given this fact, a statutory duty to report to such bodies would therefore be inappropriate, and could make the adjudicator’s role less clear. Additionally, it might suggest that the devolved Administrations had responsibility for oversight of the adjudicator, when in fact they do not have powers to control either the code or the adjudicator. However, as I have said, we have worked and will continue to work very closely with the devolved Administrations. It is in all our interests that we do so.
If I may, I will discuss the issue regarding the Competition and Markets Authority when we discuss the seventh group of amendments. I therefore ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Browne of Ladyton
My Lords, I confess to being disappointed. It would appear that we have resorted to type in relation to the legalities of these issues. I am utterly schooled in making the arguments for them. However, with respect to the noble Baroness, she reassures me to a significant degree when she recounts the degree of interaction and co-operation that there has been between the devolved Administrations and the UK Government. I am reassured by that and would expect nothing less. She suggested that informally the adjudicator will be encouraged to continue that level of co-operation. To that degree she reassured me.
However, the noble Baroness disappoints me because it would appear that in the structures of Whitehall we have not got beyond the strict legalities of these arguments and cannot see how damaging this strict approach is to relations across the union. We need to be much more mature in the way in which we approach these issues, and we need to be much more political in not creating opportunities for grievance or for discussions that are perceived to be beyond power but which create an argument for more power. For example, if the Welsh Assembly sensibly had a debate about the importance of a supermarket ombudsman, in Scotland that would lead almost inevitably to an argument that the Scottish Parliament should have had the power to appoint one because the UK Government were taking a long time to do it. We would then get into a confrontation about the constitution that would be utterly unnecessary if we had an officer who was instructed by the legislation that we passed to set up his office to report to those institutions.
I confidently predict that if the adjudicator role beds in, at some stage a committee of the Scottish Parliament, Welsh Assembly or Northern Ireland Assembly will say, “We are conducting an inquiry into the economic opportunities that relate to a particular part of our society or economy. This officer has a role to play in that. We would like him to come and give evidence to our committee”. I also confidently predict that the occupier of this role will go, that the constitution will not melt down and that no great affront will be done to the divisions between devolved and reserved powers. I hope that at some stage we can come off these platforms where we tell the people of the United Kingdom that we are better together and that we respect each other and the settlement that we have, and drive that attitude down through Whitehall so that departments do not define themselves by whether they have reserved or devolved powers.
This is a disappointing response to the issue. I understand why legally it is being done. I am sure that the noble Baroness is aware of the possibility that while she is still in her office, somebody will come to her and say, “This does not go far enough. There is insufficient power for Scotland and it is disrespectful to the Scottish people”. I hope that those who provided her with the argument to defeat my simple amendment can provide her with the argument to deal with that when she has to go to Edinburgh to make the argument. However, I accept the inevitable. We are where we are. In these circumstances, there is nothing else I can do but beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Wilcox
Perhaps if I go back and continue for two paragraphs, we might find something a bit more helpful. I will go back again to say that the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee examined the Bill. It carefully considered whether the procedures provided by the Bill were appropriate, and explicitly considered whether some measures should be delegated at all. The committee concluded that the procedures were appropriate and did not recommend the replacement of the affirmative procedure with the super-affirmative procedure at any point.
On the abolition of the adjudicator, the committee stated:
“We considered whether this goes far enough and whether the policy and repeal of the Act in these circumstances should be effected by another Bill. But we are satisfied that the affirmative procedure is appropriate given the overall purpose of the Bill”.
On transfer of functions, the committee said:
“An order under clause 16(1) can transfer all or some of the Adjudicator’s functions to another public body (undefined). The power is balanced by the affirmative procedure; and the Adjudicator’s functions are specific under the Bill. We are satisfied with this approach”.
Abolition and transfer of functions are major steps that should be subject to the super-affirmative procedure. The Secretary of State can abolish the adjudicator only for being ineffective or unnecessary, under the clauses referred to by noble Lords, following one of the triennial reviews. These reviews require full consultation. Transfer of functions can be done only after consideration of whether it will increase efficiency, effectiveness and economy, while ensuring appropriate accountability to Ministers.
This Committee’s job is to carefully scrutinise delegated powers and to ensure that the appropriate procedures are chosen. If the committee had recommended changes to the Bill, we would have considered them extremely carefully, but it said that the procedures were satisfactory.
As I said at the beginning, one must ensure that the degree of scrutiny is proportionate to the powers involved. That is why it would be absolutely wrong, for example, for the negative procedure to be used in these cases. Equally, the super-affirmative procedure is a step too far. With that explanation, I invite the noble Lord to meet me after today and talk this through further. I would be delighted to do so, rather than taking up any more of the Committee’s time at this stage. Therefore I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Browne of Ladyton
My Lords, I look forward to the Government’s amendments at a later stage of the Bill and, although I was slightly premature, the opportunity to claim credit for them. I have to say to the noble Baroness that I would trade that for better consideration of the earlier amendment on the devolved Administrations. If I may crave the indulgence of your Lordships, I realise that when I was responding to that debate I failed to recognise and pay due regard to the contributions of the noble Duke, the Duke of Montrose, and the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, who graciously supported my amendments and made arguments that created a cross-party consensus on this issue, which the Government were unfortunately immune to. I am grateful to noble Lords for their support and contributions to the debate. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Wilcox
The noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton, has raised an important question that it is well worth us examining closely. It is correct that the adjudicator will have two separate main roles. One will involve arbitration, as set out in Clauses 2 and 3 of the Bill. The other will involve investigations and is set out primarily in Clauses 4 to 10 of the Bill. Both roles will be carried out fairly and impartially. The two functions will be distinct from each other and it is important, as the noble Lord, Lord Browne said, that they remain so in order to prevent any conflict of interest.
The noble Lord, Lord Browne, asked whether the adjudicator would always be conflicted. Not necessarily. If arbitration is sought on a subject where the adjudicator has not carried out an investigation or given advice, it is likely that there would be no conflict of interest. We do not consider it inherent in the functions of the adjudicator that he or she will be conflicted in carrying out arbitrations.
It is important to remember that the adjudicator will carry out all their functions fairly and impartially. It is not the role of the adjudicator to act as an advocate for suppliers in carrying out investigations, but it is possible that conflicts will arise in particular cases, and the Bill provides the flexibility to deal with each situation as it arises. The Government consider that Clause 2(1)(b) in particular will help ensure that the distinction between the adjudicator’s arbitration and investigation functions is maintained and that any conflicts of interest are prevented. This clause allows the adjudicator to appoint another person to arbitrate a dispute. The Government envisage that this will be used in cases where a conflict of interest may exist, for example where the adjudicator has previously advised on, or investigated, an issue which is relevant to the dispute. To assist the noble Lord, Lord Browne, the powers to arbitrate are applied at the request of the supplier or retailer. No previous investigation is actually needed.
The adjudicator will be required to act responsibly and will refer any cases where a conflict may arise. However, in cases where there is no conflict of interest, the Government believe that it is sensible to allow the adjudicator to arbitrate. This was envisaged by the Competition Commission in its drafting of the groceries supply order. The adjudicator will, after all, probably be the single most experienced person in the workings of the code.
On the proposed procedure for appointing an arbitrator, I do not consider it necessary to set this out in the Bill. As the Explanatory Notes explain, in England and Wales and Northern Ireland, Section 94 of the Arbitration Act 1996 will broadly apply the provisions of Part 1 of that Act to any arbitrations carried out under the groceries supply order and this Bill. In Scotland, Section 16 of the Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010 will broadly have a similar effect in applying the Scottish arbitration rules.
The arbitration legislation which will apply to arbitrations by the adjudicator or a person appointed by the adjudicator includes protections on fairness and impartiality, including an ability for parties to apply to the court to remove an arbitrator on those grounds. The adjudicator can of course be expected to satisfy himself or herself either that they can carry out an arbitration themselves fairly and impartially, or that the person they appoint will do so, but there is a safeguard in the arbitration legislation if, for some reason, that does not happen properly.
I wanted to respond to my noble friend Lord Eccles, and have now found the speaking note for that. The groceries supply order has already established a dispute resolution scheme for disputes arising between a particular retailer and a particular direct supplier under the groceries code. The order anticipates that the adjudicator, referred to there as the “ombudsman”, will arbitrate these disputes. This will both ensure that the disputes are arbitrated by an individual with a high level of expertise in the sector and will allow the adjudicator to gain a greater understanding of how the code is operating that will be helpful when carrying out his or her functions, such as providing advice or preparing the annual report. I hope that that is helpful.
I hope that these rather long but, we felt, necessary explanations have proved satisfactory to noble Lords. While I would of course be happy to speak further to the noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton, about this matter, I ask him to withdraw his amendment at this stage.
Lord Browne of Ladyton
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Viscount, Lord Eccles, for expanding into a potentially fruitful area my further deliberations on this. I had not thought to look at the terms of the code itself, but his drawing my attention to the detail of the provisions on arbitration points to an area at least worthy of consideration: the interaction between existing provisions and those that would be enacted by the Bill, which are less descriptive. It interests me that the Government have chosen to legislate in way that is less clear than the simple provisions in the code, which the noble Viscount read out, composed by the Competition Commission. I will take some time to deliberate on that, but it is an area worth exploring, perhaps at a later date.
I am grateful to the noble Baroness for giving these amendments such careful consideration, and for her words suggesting that they raise an important issue. It is an important issue and I remain to be convinced that it would be appropriate for the adjudicator to embark on arbitration without doing some prior investigation. I suppose that it depends on what one means by “prior investigation”. Given that it is expected that the adjudicator will arbitrate in a very small number of cases over the course of a year, I would expect that he or she would pay great attention to whether it was appropriate to deploy scarce resources on such a request, even if it came from a big retailer.
Lord Browne of Ladyton
My Lords, I shall not detain the Committee long with my amendments in this group. They are designed to protect legal professional privilege and confidentiality of communications in Scotland.
I am certain that the noble Baroness will say that legal professional privilege is recognised by common law and is therefore protected by it; that it is not therefore necessary to make legislation to protect it; and that the same applies in Scotland. My question to her, although she may not be able to answer it, is: why do we protect legal professional privilege in some legislation but not in other legislation? For example, in the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, at paragraph 12 in Part 3 of Schedule 7, we enacted exactly the provision I have sought to include in the Bill. That is only one example and I can find others. I apologise to the noble Baroness for bowling her a bit of googly, even if I am a Scotsman—and we normally cannot play cricket at all, unless we captain the English team. Why on some occasions do we legislate to protect legal professional privilege and on others we do not? If she can answer that at some stage, I will be pleased. I do not intend to press this matter to a Division. I beg to move.
Baroness Wilcox
This is an important issue. It is clearly important that documents subject to legal professional privilege should not be subject to the information-gathering powers that are granted here. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Browne, for raising this point and reassure him that the Bill already gives protection to documents that are subject to legal professional privilege, on the basis of the general rule about legal professional privilege in civil proceedings. Because the enforcement mechanism in Schedule 2 and Clause 3 is via civil proceedings, the outcome is that legal professional privilege cannot be overridden.
I can say that confidently because legal professional privilege can be overridden only by express words or necessary implication. That is precisely what the House of Lords decided in the case of R (Morgan Grenfell & Co Ltd) v Special Tax Commissioner 2003. There are no express words of override here, nor is there anything that can be thought of as giving rise to unnecessary implication. In the mean time, I have been given an answer to the question put to me by the noble Lord. It is difficult to talk about other legislation, but we are clear that the intent is to protect legal professional privilege here.
As a result of the precedent to which I have just referred, the Bill has the effect desired by the noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton, and I would therefore ask him to withdraw his amendment.
Baroness Wilcox
I thank all noble Lords. We are considering three amendments in this group—two intended to make it easier for the adjudicator to begin investigations and one to make it harder.
I assure noble Lords that the Government are in complete sympathy with the aims of the amendments tabled by my noble friends Lord Razzall and Lord Teverson, and by the noble Lord, Lord Browne. We firmly believe that the adjudicator should be able to consider information from any source when deciding whether to start an investigation, whether or not this is provided by way of complaint. However, it is unnecessary to make explicit provision for the breadth of information that can be considered. I assure noble Lords that in this respect Clause 4 is written broadly and places no limits on who can complain to the adjudicator or what evidence the adjudicator can consider as reasonable grounds for suspicion. My officials have discussed this clause with trade associations and representatives of suppliers, including the National Farmers’ Union and the Food and Drink Federation, and they have raised no concerns over the wording of Clause 4.
The amendment of my noble friend Lord Howard of Rising would return the Bill to the draft that was originally published for pre-legislative scrutiny last year by restricting the sources of information that the adjudicator could consider to information from suppliers and information in the public domain. I remind noble Lords that this issue was considered carefully by the BIS and EFRA Select Committees, both of which explicitly rejected the version of the clause that is now being proposed. They concluded that third parties, including trade associations and whistleblowers, could have a valuable role to play. After discussion with both suppliers and retailers, the Government decided that that was right. Trade associations, for example, may have a better overall picture of practices in a sector, which could reveal systematic breaches of the code. The Government therefore consider that it is right that the adjudicator should be able to consider any relevant information when making decisions to investigate. However, I reassure my noble friend Lord Howard of Rising that we have also introduced Clause 15(10) to enable the Secretary of State to restrict the possible sources, if it turns out that third parties do act irresponsibly.
I say to my noble friends Lady Byford, Lady Randerson and Lord Howard that there is protection in the Bill against malicious complaints, in that costs can be awarded against a complainant who makes a vexatious complaint or one that is wholly without merit. If those answers are seen as good and fair, I will ask the noble Lord, Lord Browne, to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Browne of Ladyton
My Lords, at Second Reading the Minister said that there would be no restrictions on who could complain to the adjudicator and she has confirmed that that is the position, which I am satisfied with. I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate for their support of that position, which was overwhelming, with one notable exception.
The noble Lords, Lord Teverson and Lord Borrie, raised the issue of my reference to the phrase “with an interest” as perhaps restricting those who can complain. I may, in including it, have been guilty of what I have been trying to avoid and want the Government to avoid: attaching legalese when it is unnecessary. The concept of “with an interest” is well recognised by lawyers. It was intended not to restrict but to indicate that there ought to be a bar against frivolous or vexatious complaints. The idea of title and interest is a concept with which I am entirely comfortable, but I understand that many other people may not be and may think that it would be restrictive. It would not prevent any of those identified groups that noble Lords want to be able to complain to the adjudicator from doing just that. In any event, I would think that the adjudicator would be experienced and able enough to indentify frivolous or vexatious complaints and see them off rather than have to wait until the end to deal with them by the imposition of expenses, as it were.
I cannot conclude without expressing a degree of regret at the tone of the preamble to the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Howard of Rising, to which I listened with interest. I have some sympathy with it, which he will have gathered from my contribution. I am not interested in creating some monster which runs away in terms of regulation.
Baroness Wilcox
Before the noble Lord sits down, I realise that I omitted a response to my noble friend Lord Howard on a question that he asked. It was central to what he was saying, so I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Browne, does not mind if I intrude. My noble friend Lord Howard asked whether it was right that the adjudicator will have no power to require information before an investigation is started. The answer is yes. The adjudicator will have no such power; this is in paragraph 35 of the Explanatory Notes. The only exception to that is the monitoring of recommendations. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Browne.
Lord Browne of Ladyton
I will finish what I had to say. I was pleased that the nature of our debate in Committee this afternoon was devoid of partisanship. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Howard, was perhaps just tweaking our tail a little and was not making too serious a point, However, I represented a group of farmers in my constituency, which was both urban and rural, for 13 years. I established a good relationship with them, and some of them became my very good friends, although I did not know them before I became a Member of Parliament. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Howard, that before he categorises people as manifestations of irony, perhaps he should make some inquiries. I am confident that, were he to interrogate members of the National Farmers’ Union in Scotland whom I represented for 13 years about whether they thought it ironic that I should be party to a process that is designed to protect their livelihoods and those of others, he would be surprised. Clearly he would be surprised, because he has a preconception about where I am coming from. The same could be said of my noble friends on the Front Bench. I understand that one of them farms, and so is well qualified to speak for farmers. Therefore, it might be better if we avoided such implications for the rest of our deliberations. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Browne of Ladyton
Despite the lateness of the hour, I am significantly perked up by the noble Baroness’s response. I have no doubt that what tipped the balance in my favour was the support that I received from the noble Viscount, Lord Eccles, but more importantly that I managed at last to persuade my noble friend Lord Borrie that there was some merit in one of my amendments. I am extremely grateful to him. He has almost rehabilitated his relationship with me with that intervention. I am delighted that the noble Baroness is willing to take this away. I would of course say this but, with respect, it enhances this part of the Bill. It will have the consequence of reducing the amount of contention that follows decisions if it is clear that people can expect that there will be reasons given for them.
I listened carefully to the amendment by the noble Viscount, Lord Eccles, and I have some sympathy. Coupled with the contribution of the noble Baroness, Lady Byford, there is an issue here that requires further exploration. I think that—with respect—there was a cross-purposes discussion that took place between the proposal of the noble Baroness for comments to be published, and the response from the Minister that that would in some way impede the process of investigation. I understood the noble Baroness to be saying that the comments and response deserve to be published. As these will be published in any event, it would be a much more coherent and comprehensive process that would command the support of parties if they thought that, even when there was a finding against them, the response would be published by the process rather than independently of it.
I hope that I have done credit to the amendment from the noble Baroness. In any case, conversations are about to take place and I hope that, when we all come back to this, there will be even bigger smiles on their faces, metaphorically, than I have at the moment, having managed to achieve even this minor victory. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.