Baroness Verma
Main Page: Baroness Verma (Conservative - Life peer)
Baroness Maddock
My Lords, I support my noble friends in trying to highlight the importance of demand reduction and the fact that this Bill came rather late to it, as has been said by others. I was somewhat confused by some of the earlier comments from those who said that they were in favour of energy efficiency but were not sure about demand reduction. If you increase energy efficiency, you reduce demand. That is fairly logical. I find some of the comments a little curious.
I emphasise the fact that if the Government are having only one pilot that will be only around the capacity market, that will not be good enough, which is why we have tabled these amendments. As regards the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Roper, if the Government were to take something like that forward, we could have a demonstration about which scheme or schemes are the most effective in delivering permanent demand reduction. In a sense, that ties in with the amendment of my noble friend Lord Teverson. There was a lot of criticism of my noble friend and talk about the difference between demand management and demand reduction. They are two different things. We have had some strange logic in today’s debate.
Unless we have several pilots, there will be no meaningful comparison and we will not be able to decide which are the most cost-effective and the most effective in reducing demand. I support my noble friends in their efforts to make demand reduction more of a priority in this Bill.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Energy and Climate Change (Baroness Verma)
My Lords, I thank my noble friends for enabling me to lay out further a response to the amendment of my noble friend Lord Teverson, which aims to make energy efficiency a general consideration when carrying out key functions of electricity market reform. I also welcome the cross-party support expressed in this House for electricity demand reduction measures and energy efficiency generally.
While I support the sentiment behind the amendment, we consider energy efficiency to be more than just about the efficient use of electricity, on which the amendment appears to focus. Therefore, the danger of this amendment is that, in focusing on efficiency of electricity use, it risks diverting attention from the wider importance of energy efficiency, on which we are already committed to progressing. When exercising capacity market functions, proposed new paragraph (f) would require the Secretary of State to give priority to demand side management and demand reduction measures over increased electricity generating capacity wherever this was economically appropriate.
The capacity market is being designed to allow demand-side response and permanent electricity demand reduction measures to participate in the capacity market. This is a proven way of delivering electricity demand reduction and is already working successfully in the United States. The auction process is a fundamental pillar of the capacity market and all resources that can contribute to security of supply. Demand-side response, permanent demand reduction and generation are able to compete against each other for support in the long term. This will ensure that demand-side measures that deliver the same level of security of supply benefits as generation at a lower cost will always be rewarded at the expense of generation. Accordingly, I hope that my noble friend will see that proposed new paragraph (f) will not add to the practical effort of what is already envisaged for the capacity market.
Proposed new paragraph (g) of Amendment 51N would require the Government to measure the energy intensity of the UK economy per unit of GDP and to improve this progressively. Again, while I recognise the intention behind this amendment, it would duplicate the existing domestic and European policies, to which my noble friend referred, in the recently adopted EU energy efficiency directive, which is aimed at driving improvements in energy efficiency across the EU and contains, among other measures, two key targets for member states, to which my noble friend also referred. The first is a non-binding national energy efficiency target for 2020, which is equivalent to reducing primary energy consumption by 20% by 2020. The second is a binding target to save 1.5% of additional energy per year, to be achieved between 2014 and 2020, through the deployment of an energy supplier obligation and/or equivalent policy measures.
The UK recently submitted its target to the European Commission under Article 3 of the directive. Under the target, the UK is projected to reduce final energy intensity by 26% between 2007 and 2020, maintaining our position as one of the least energy-intensive economies in Europe. In terms of domestic action, this Government have shown their commitment to supporting every opportunity for energy-efficiency measures. The policies that we have put in place, such as the Green Deal, will help households and businesses reduce demand by installing energy-efficiency improvements, with some or all of the cost paid for from the savings on their energy bills. In addition, the energy efficiency strategy sets out our plans for realising the significant untapped potential that remains in this key sector. Between the measures that we have put in place domestically and the new targets established through the directive, there is already considerable momentum that is contributing to making the UK economy more energy efficient.
Amendment 55ZA in the name of my noble friend Lord Roper, which aims to make an electricity demand reduction pilot compulsory, raises an issue that has come up a number of times at Second Reading: namely, that multiple pilots are necessary in order to test a variety of approaches. While I support my noble friend’s aim of ensuring that we test variations of the key elements associated with demand reduction projects, the Secretary of State already has the ability to design and run a pilot, or pilots, to test different approaches.
Clause 37 is simply a spending power to authorise the spending of money for such a purpose. I appreciate the concern that this amendment demonstrates about ensuring that sufficient funds are available for a demand reduction pilot. However, since it depends on the arrangements for the capacity agreements made in Clauses 22 and 24, funding the pilot in this way would have to wait until the affirmative regulations implementing the capacity market are in place. We considered this option but discounted it because the process would delay considerably the start of a pilot, and, as I have said, the Government are committed to taking forward a pilot with funds that are already available to it.
Before I ask my noble friend to withdraw his amendment, I will refer back to a few points raised during the debate. First, the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, referred to smart meters. I agree with him that increasing developments in new technologies—and the smart meter is one example—will ensure that consumers will have more control over how energy is being used. It is one of a number of measures that we are taking. He also asked why we are not getting on with a pilot. At the moment, there are a number of uncertainties. We are working out how a pilot would lead to a better understanding of the potential benefits of a financial incentive and of the market appetite for such an approach. We are considering detailed elements of how the design of that pilot, its monitoring and its location would work. The noble Lord also mentioned that Germany has 33% of its grid powered by solar. I respond to that by saying that Germany also has much higher energy costs than the UK, of both gas and electricity. We are delivering a low-carbon energy mix, at least cost to the consumer: this is at the heart of what we are trying to achieve through the Bill.
My noble friend Lord Roper asked why DSR and EDR were not in the draft delivery plan. Proposals on demand-side response were detailed in the capacity market framework publication of 27 June. On electricity demand, we are committed to a piloting approach, as I have said already. This commitment—to the pilot—was included on page 15 of the draft delivery plan.
Lord Crickhowell
My Lords, I had not intended to intervene but, while listening to this debate and agreeing with what has been said, particularly during the recent speeches, I was also glancing at the Explanatory Notes to the Bill. It is rather interesting that under Chapter 6 the Government have an essay on access to markets. The notes refer to wholesale market liquidity as,
“an important feature of a competitive market. It provides market participants with a route to market, risk management opportunities and investment and operational signals”.
It goes on to talk about the importance of liquidity and, further down, it says:
“Independent developers have played an important role in delivering new capacity in the renewable and gas generation sectors and could play a key role in meeting the Government’s goals and deliver essential investment in the future, provided market conditions are right”.
Having said all that, surely it is entirely appropriate that, when we get on to electricity market reform and the duties placed on the Secretary of State, the points made by my noble friend in this amendment should indeed be there. If these are the matters that the Government consider important in their introduction to Chapter 6, it must surely be right that this should be one of the factors that the Secretary of State has to take account of. It should therefore be listed in the Bill.
Baroness Verma
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Jenkin and the noble Baroness, Lady Worthington, for their amendments and for the opportunity to debate some of the important issues that they have raised. In relation to Amendment 52, Clause 5 sets out the matters to which the Secretary of State will have regard when carrying out specific EMR functions to meet the objectives of EMR. Effective competition is fundamental to delivering the Government’s energy policy objectives of having energy security, keeping consumers’ bills affordable and decarbonising our energy sector. EMR will deliver the greener energy and reliable supplies that the country needs at the lowest possible cost, which is good news for the consumer, by reducing exposure to volatile and rising fossil fuel prices and securing electricity supply.
Increasing competition in the electricity market drives down prices and promotes innovation—hence competition will be considered in the context of the requirement at Clause 5(2)(d) to consider the likely cost to the consumer. For example, we are designing the capacity market in a way that promotes competition —in particular, between incumbents and the new entrants that my noble friend Lord Jenkin is anxious to see. By providing a steady revenue stream in place of dependence on volatile scarcity prices, the capacity market will help to ensure that we can enable broad participation. Furthermore, we are incentivising new investment in plants by offering longer-term contracts to new plants, which will enable the costs of capital to be spread over longer periods. This will be important in ensuring that new independent entrants can compete with incumbents, as they would be likely to find it difficult to access finance with a short-term contract.
However, it is important to note that independent generators are a broad mix. They are not just medium or small-scale firms. Some are large European or international utilities, such as GDF Suez, which do not currently have a major presence in the UK wholesale or retail market. To ensure that we capture the interests of this broad group, we have been working, and will continue to work, with the independent generators’ group on the design of the capacity market.
The Government are also addressing problems affecting competition within the market. This includes poor liquidity in the wholesale electricity market and tariff complexity in the retail energy market. We are working with Ofgem to tackle these now, and have taken back-stop powers in relation to both areas in this Bill to ensure that reforms can still be driven forward if Ofgem’s proposals are either frustrated or delayed.
We recognise that it is important to help independent generators to secure access to the market. We are aware of their concerns that it is becoming more difficult to secure a power purchase agreement and that terms have declined. We have been working to gain a better understanding of the complex PPA market and the investment issues for independents. Since last year’s call for evidence on access to markets, we have undertaken analysis of the issues and the potential options for addressing them. I hope to provide further information to the Committee on this very shortly.
The ultimate aim of electricity market reform is to allow all forms of electricity generation to compete fairly, and therefore to enable the least-cost mix of generation and demand-side measures necessary to meet our decarbonisation targets, ensure security of electricity supply and keep costs to consumers as low as possible. I hope that noble Lords will be reassured that competition is therefore at the heart of the design of all EMR functions. Consequently, it is the Government’s view that my noble friend’s amendment to Clause 5 is unnecessary.
Turning to Amendment 52A, throughout the development of EMR we have been clear on the objectives of these reforms. They have been set out in our published documents, from the EMR White Paper of July 2011 onwards, and the objectives set out in Clause 5 reflect these. The amendment would add the duties set out in Sections 3A to 3D of the Electricity Act 1989 to these objectives in Clause 5. However, the Electricity Act 1989 relates to the operation and regulation of the market, which is a different purpose from the new mechanisms that we are introducing through EMR. Contracts for difference and the capacity market are designed to complement the existing market structure and have been developed with the specific objective of moving to a secure, low-carbon energy mix at least cost to the consumer.
Furthermore, the amendment would risk causing duplication. For example, Section 3A(2)(a) of the Electricity Act 1989 relates to ensuring that electricity demands are met, and this would duplicate Clause 5(2)(c) of the Bill. We have made clear the importance of considering the cost to consumers at Clause 5(2)(d).
I turn now to Amendments 54 and 55, linking the principal objectives and duties in Clause 33 to the Secretary of State in relation to the capacity market. The purpose of this clause is to align the principal objective and general duties of the authority, in carrying out functions in the capacity market, with its principal objective and duties in the current electricity market. The reason this clause does not apply to the Secretary of State is that Clause 5(2) in Chapter 1 sets out what the Secretary of State must have regard to in relation to making capacity market regulations, as well as other EMR functions.
As I have already indicated, encouraging competition will be central to the way that the Secretary of State makes capacity market regulations. Promoting competition will be an effective way of achieving the aims of having regard to ensuring security of supply to electricity consumers and having regard to the likely cost to electricity consumers. We feel that it is impractical to require the Secretary of State to have regard to two separate lists of matters: those in Clause 5 as well as the principal objective and general duties in the Electricity Act 1989.
I hope that I have been able to reassure my noble friend and the noble Baroness, Lady Worthington, with my explanations and that my noble friend will feel content to withdraw his amendment.
Baroness Worthington
My Lords, perhaps I may ask for clarification before the noble Baroness sits down. I accept her comments about the potential duplication involved in having two lists. However, subsection (2)(d), on the likely cost to consumers of electricity, does not include future consumers of electricity. People involved in the discussion about Ofgem’s duties will know that that innocuous-sounding difference is actually a big difference. Perhaps she will reassure us that she might consider changes to subsection (2)(d) to better reflect the duties in the Electricity Act.
Baroness Verma
I have been informed that it does take into consideration the points that the noble Baroness has just raised.
Baroness Maddock
My Lords, I support the noble Lord, Lord Whitty. As I have declared before, I am vice-president of National Energy Action, which has been working with Ofgem on this because there is the potential to reduce prices for vulnerable customers in fuel poverty. As the noble Lord said, it is rather surprising that the distribution network operators have not been specifically mentioned with regard to electricity demand reduction because they have the ability to reduce the cost of network reinforcements, which would reduce prices.
We are always talking about what is going to add to the cost of fuel but this amendment would reduce prices. If we are moving to more people having domestic electric heating, it is particularly important to find ways of reducing the cost. There is quite a lot of work going on here. Indeed, NEA has been working with Ofgem on some of these proposals. I give my strong support to this and I hope that the Minister can indicate that the Government recognise that this is an important part of what we are all trying to achieve.
Baroness Verma
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, and the noble Baroness, Lady Worthington, for tabling these amendments, which highlight the important role that the distribution network operators play in our electricity system, including in supporting electricity demand reduction. Amendment 52B seeks to ensure that distribution network operators take account of government policy as set out in Clause 5. Amendment 55ZZC would insert a requirement in Clause 37 for the Secretary of State to take account of the role of distribution network operators in a pilot scheme to permanently reduce electricity use.
Ofgem regulates through a licensing system and electricity distribution network operators need to obtain licences from Ofgem to participate in the energy market. An important aspect of this system is Ofgem’s power to set regulatory price controls, and its price control framework. This, as the noble Lord pointed out, is known as RIIO, and is well aligned with the Government’s energy policy, including the requirement for network companies to invest efficiently to ensure continued safe and reliable services, to innovate to reduce network costs for current and future consumers, and to play a full role in delivering a low-carbon economy and wider environmental objectives.
As we have previously debated, the Government are providing even greater clarity, as Clauses 119 to 126 will enable the Secretary of State to introduce a new strategy and policy statement for Ofgem to help improve alignment with government policies. In addition, my department works closely with DNOs and the wider industry, through groups such as the Smart Grid Forum, to satisfy ourselves that strategic investment decisions are being made.
On the specific issue of efficiency and reducing demand, DNOs have a licence condition on them to reduce losses, and they have been required to set out in their business plans how they will reduce losses, and to publish annual reports on what loss reductions they planned and what they actually achieved. A discretionary reward of up to £32 million will be made available by Ofgem, over the price control period, for efficient and innovative loss reduction initiatives.
In future price control reviews, when more reliable data may be available through smart meters and smart grid technology on the networks, Ofgem expects to introduce further incentives. Furthermore, Ofgem has recently extended the scope of its Low Carbon Network Fund to enable DNOs to carry out electricity demand reduction projects, which will complement the Government’s larger-scale pilot.
To reiterate the points made in our earlier debate on the electricity demand reduction pilot, while I support the noble Lord’s aim of ensuring that we test variations of the key elements associated with demand reduction projects, the Secretary of State already has the ability to design and run a pilot—or pilots—to test different approaches.
Clause 37, as I said earlier, is simply a spending power; it authorises the spending of money for EDR pilots. Our intention is design the pilot in a way that encourages projects to be delivered by a variety of organisations, including DNOs, provided the projects meet the criteria that we develop.
The noble Lord, Lord Whitty, asked why we cannot deliver eight year-old DNO plans without details under EMR. We have set out clear policy intentions—for instance in the renewables road map published last year, and in our various announcements on EMR—to move to a low-carbon energy mix. This informs the development of the DNO plans.
The noble Lord also asked why we had moved to an eight-year period. This was to encourage DNOs to work more strategically and to invest over a longer term, instead of making short-term investment decisions.
I hope the noble Lord is reassured that I recognise the important role that DNOs are already able to play in helping to realise reductions in electricity use. I hope that on that basis he feels able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Whitty
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister and also to the noble Baroness, Lady Maddock, for her support.
It is certainly true that there have been general indications of the Government’s direction. No doubt they are taking into account the DNOs in drawing up their plans. It still strikes me as very odd that we have here a piece of legislation, the capacity mechanism bit of which we are discussing now but the detail of which is not yet known, and it will require considerably more explanation before we finish this Bill and some serious delegated legislation thereafter. If it applies to DNOs—as the Minister rightly says in a sense it will—it must have implications for how DNOs operate. The outcome of the demand reduction must have implications. The way in which the capacity mechanism brings other people into play in the grid, and ultimately down the distribution system, must have implications. Therefore, I still find it very odd, even if they have read all the signals right—and my brief reading of the 700 pages of the Western Power document suggests that they may have missed one or two.
I am not necessarily objecting to the eight-year period, but that period has to relate to something that is operating under the wider electricity market reform. Instead, we are going to have the approval of the DNO strategic plans within the next two or three months before we know how the capacity mechanism is working, before we know how the demand reduction mechanisms are working and before we know a lot of other detail that will emerge from this Bill, which will eventually be encapsulated in the new strategy and policy statement from the Secretary of State. That will be the context in which Ofgem and the industry will have to work.
I am not trying to be awkward with the Government. I just do not think that they have the pieces in the right order or in the right place. Before we complete the consideration of this Bill, we need to be a bit clearer on how the distribution structure will operate in the new system. We should not have Ofgem definitively endorsing the plans, which it will have before it in a couple of weeks. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Verma
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, for his amendment. Amendment 53 is aimed at the abolition of the vertically integrated business model in the energy industry. I have listened carefully to noble Lords and I have some comments to make after I have gone through my speaking notes, which I hope will address some of the issues the noble Lord has raised. I reassure him that the coalition is committed to driving competition and choice in the energy market.
In considering the merits of this amendment, we must be guided by what will most benefit consumers, deliver competition, affordable energy and better customer service, and secure the investment we need for the future. We must acknowledge that the vertically integrated business model delivers a range of benefits for consumers through lower capital costs, efficient risk management and economies of scale. Simple prohibition of certain business models could lead to higher prices for consumers and trigger lower investment in the market.
The Government believe that consumers will get the best deals when suppliers face much tougher competition. Wider competition and more diversity are key to a competitive market and securing investment. We must ensure that the market is open to all business models to provide them with the ability to compete on a fair basis. That is what the Government and the regulator are working to achieve. It is why we have made concessions on the threshold for the small-scale feed-in tariffs and the route to market for independent renewables generators. These will help to open the market to community energy projects and smaller independent renewables developers.
Liquidity in the wholesale market remains a key barrier to entry for independent players and Ofgem has recently announced a package of reforms to address the low levels of liquidity in the wholesale electricity markets. This is a positive step forward and the Government welcome Ofgem’s announcement. We want to see swift and effective implementation of its reform package. However, we are seeking back-stop powers in Clause 43 to address low liquidity should Ofgem’s reforms be delayed or frustrated.
The Government are also looking at other barriers, including independent generators’ ability to secure bankable long-term contracts that will allow them to finance their projects. The Government are taking back-stop powers in Clause 44 to enable them to act quickly to address this issue if necessary. I know that this will be of particular interest to the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley.
Finally, Clauses 127 to 131 will give statutory backing to Ofgem’s retail market review proposals. This will ensure that energy companies place consumers on the cheapest tariff that meets their preferences, thus simplifying the market and enabling consumers to shop around for the best deals. Bringing greater transparency to the retail market will also make it easier for innovative small suppliers to compete with larger established players in the market.
We share the desire of the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, to ensure that consumers get the best deal in a fair, affordable and competitive energy market. However, requiring the energy companies to divest and reorganise is not the most effective way of delivering the outcomes that I know we both desire. It is likely to create unnecessary disruption at a time when we need significant investment in our energy infrastructure, and we are making real progress in introducing greater competition in the energy markets.
I query also whether this would improve liquidity in wholesale markets, at least to the degree suggested. Poor liquidity relates to a lack of availability of products or buyers for products, and poor transparency of prices. Removing vertical integration will not necessarily address these issues fully, whereas Ofgem’s reforms to the wholesale electricity market are focused on making more power available to buyers while ensuring that generators can sell their electricity, and on increasing price transparency. We therefore believe that reforms by government and Ofgem offer the quickest, most effective and most reliable way to increase competition and boost consumer confidence in the energy markets.
We have a real opportunity through the reforms we are making in the Bill to see the way opened for greater competition, greater transparency and harsher penalties if generators and suppliers do not provide the choice and value for money we all want to see for customers. Decades of missed opportunities cannot be allowed to continue.
Perhaps I may pick up on a couple of the points that the noble Lord, Lord O’Neill, made about the flaws in the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley. I refer back to what the noble Lord and the noble Baroness, Lady Worthington, said about Ofgem. When he was Energy Secretary, Ed Miliband said that Ofgem was a regulator fit for purpose. Through supporting Ofgem and strengthening its powers, we are trying to deal with the fears that the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, and the noble Baroness, Lady Worthington, have. It is not about creating another new body but about ensuring that the body we have has the powers to be able to deliver what a regulator is supposed to be delivering; that is, to be quite tough on energy suppliers. We have seen examples of that. Between April 2011 and March 2012, Ofgem set fines of more than £19 million for licence breaches and anti-competitive behaviour. It imposed fines of more than £500,000 and £4.5 million in redress.
It is not about change but about ensuring that we empower a body. It would be really interesting to know what sort of body the noble Baroness, Lady Worthington, would put into place and what it would do that Ofgem is not doing. It is not clear to me that banning vertical integration would in fact improve liquidity in the wholesale markets, at least not to the degree suggested. A lack of available products and poor transparency is what needs to be addressed and on that basis, I hope that the noble Lord will see that what the Government are doing in the Bill is right, and withdraw his amendment.
Baroness Worthington
In response to the Minister’s direct question, we would have a regulator which, when it is asked, “Why can’t you split vertical integration?” answers, “That is a good idea and we will look at it in more detail”, instead of “Because the industry doesn’t like it”. Quite frankly, as I said earlier, when it did a review into liquidity and competition in the market, eight recommendations were made but I think six of them were dropped and the two that were moved forward were watered down. As soon as Ofgem goes and consults its friends in the industry, it gets told, “That’s too difficult—we couldn’t do that”, so things get watered down. That is what we have to break.
For example, the noble Baroness quoted the suggestions that Ofgem has come up with for solving this problem. The market-maker proposals are frankly ludicrous. They are so complex and so against a normal, natural market that I really cannot believe that that is our solution to this issue—actually, I can believe it since it is Ofgem—when the real solution is staring us in the face: no more vertical integration. However, I will sit down.
Lord Whitty
My Lords, I briefly signal the support of our Front Bench for the amendments. Although I am familiar with—and may even have been one of the Ministers who rebutted the noble Earl, Lord Caithness, in—long arguments about “may” and “must”, it is slightly different here because it is not so much about parliamentary counsel’s sensibilities on these matters. “Must” is here a statement of fact. The clauses on the capacity mechanism are wide and vague—understandably, at this stage. The Minister and everyone else have accepted that we will have to translate them into secondary legislation. If we do not do so, we will not have a capacity mechanism. In that sense, there is a stronger argument than there is sometimes for substituting “may” with “must”, because otherwise the whole point of this section of the Bill disappears.
On the second point, although the noble Earl is correct to say that there have been repeated references to the interests of households and small businesses, that is in the context of the demand reduction provisions within the capacity mechanism. It is not obvious from first principles that mechanisms will be involved which benefit the small users of energy, whether they are households or small businesses. I therefore think that it helps to insert that at this point. It will help to guide the drafting of statutory instruments, when we come to that. I hope that the Government will show some sympathy to the amendments.
Baroness Verma
My Lords, I start by thanking the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Stamford, for his amendments. Like my noble friend Lady Maddock, I say from the start that we are putting consumers and fairness to new entrants at the heart of the Bill. It is important to note that the Government confirmed on 27 June our intention to initiate the capacity market, with the first auction taking place in 2014 for delivery from 2018, which would provide an insurance policy against any future blackouts. I reassure the noble Lord that it is the Government’s clear intention to implement the capacity market through regulations as laid out in this chapter. That can be delivered without a statutory requirement in the Bill, so the may/must argument does not need to be fought at the moment.
On Amendment 53ZZB, although the noble Lord’s intention behind the amendment is laudable, we believe that the Bill already makes sufficient provision for driving energy efficiency. The Bill lays out how the capacity market is intended to involve permanent electricity demand reduction in Clauses 29 and 37. The inclusion of electricity demand reduction in the capacity market is of course complex and, as such, its impact needs further examination and assessment. Because of that, we intend that an electricity demand reduction pilot will be carried out to assess the viability of incentivising demand reduction in the capacity market.
Secondly, the Government are already doing a large amount of work to encourage increased electricity efficiency of homes and small businesses—for example, through the Green Deal energy company obligation and smart meters. I urge the noble Lord to consider those measures available to low-income and vulnerable families. I also remind him of how the number of tariffs rose under his Government. When they were in power, it rose to 4,000 tariffs. Fuel poverty nearly doubled during the last five years when they were in power. We are addressing a long-term, deeply embedded problem. Passing the amendment without the result of the pilot being known would risk duplicating existing policies for the promotion of energy efficiency and could lead to contradictory or inefficient regulations.
Although I have been rather brief, I think my explanation should reassure the noble Lord that the Government are doing everything possible through the Bill to answer his concerns, and I hope that he will withdraw his amendment.
Lord Roper
My Lords, with reference to the regulations being referred to here and elsewhere, will my noble friend give the Grand Committee some indication as to how likely we are to have details of them before we come to Report?
Baroness Verma
My Lords, I will not be able to give my noble friend an answer now but, if he will allow it, I will write to him and to the Committee.
Lord Davies of Stamford
My Lords, I am grateful for the contributions to this short debate. On the issue of “may” versus “must”, nothing has been said to persuade me that I was wrong. On the contrary, everybody who has spoken has persuaded me that I am right to make a point about this. If a nonsense is systemic, that is no reason for not combating it and trying to get it right. I shall now feel even more emboldened when the word “may” comes up. I shall feel very sceptical about it; I shall look at it and may very well—not just in this Bill, but in others—put forward amendments of the kind I have today. I hope colleagues who also think that the present system is pretty nonsensical will be emboldened to do the same.
In a free society permissive legislation is otiose. Anything in a free society which is not specifically prohibited is allowed. Therefore, there is no purpose in passing a Bill with a clause saying somebody “may” do something. The issue is whether they must or must not do it. Those are the only things worth including in a legal obligation.
Turning to the more substantive issue, I reiterate that I was in no way suggesting that people had not been talking about the requirements of small businesses or of families and households. I am well aware that the Government have addressed, as the previous Government did, the issue of fuel poverty. We are all conscious of the importance of that, given that energy prices are bound to rise in real terms as a result of our very necessary policies. However, it is extremely important to draw the attention of everyone in this debate to the need to make sure that these new smart methods of monitoring the price of energy through the day, from minute to minute, are available not just to big sophisticated companies and energy users, but to households and small businesses. Only in that way will we get the full benefit of these new technologies, reduce energy demand in the way we need to do, and address the fairness problem and the lack of a distinction between smaller and larger businesses which are substantial consumers of energy.
On the relationship between the capacity market and demand reduction, all I say to the Government is that they had better get on with it. They have got the timing the wrong way around: I repeat, they cannot know what additional capacity they need to meet peak demand, plus a safety margin, until they know how successful the demand reduction efforts are likely to be. The two things are related all the way along: they are reciprocals, as I have said from the beginning. They need to get started with these energy demand methods and pilots very rapidly; they have taken far too long to do it. That is my main message to the Government.
Lord Davies of Stamford
I think that we are all very much agreed. I am grateful to everybody who has contributed. I am grateful to the noble Lord and I am delighted I gave him the opportunity to make that intervention. A very similar message going out from both sides of this Committee about the urgency and importance of these matters is exactly what I wanted.
Baroness Verma
Before the noble Lord withdraws, which I am hoping he will do, I have just been given a note referring to his question about demand and capacity, and when we would publish details of the proposed reliability standard he asked about. It is in the draft delivery plan which was issued yesterday, if the noble Lord would like to refer to it.
I have also been given a note relating to my noble friend Lord Roper’s question about the publishing of the secondary legislation. Detailed proposals will be published from October, along with draft secondary legislation to illustrate our policy intentions. I hope that information is helpful to the Committee.
Lord Davies of Stamford
I am grateful to the noble Baroness. I had not noticed that announcement yesterday, I am afraid, but I am delighted that it has been made. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Roper, will be equally pleased with the answer she has given. It is the job of this Committee to keep the pressure on the Government on these matters and I am glad that some measures are now coming through. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Baroness Worthington
My Lords, I shall speak briefly to the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, on the future capacity question, because it is the first to address that. This may be a good opportunity for the Minister to provide us with some detail about the capacity mechanism and how it will operate, and to address the important issue raised by the noble Lord of the need to have a long-term view.
Perhaps this is the time to say that this part of the Bill seems to be lacking an awful lot of detail. We have tabled some amendments later which respond to the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee’s comments, which were quite damning on this aspect of the Bill. It is lacking a huge amount of detail; a lot of questions still need to be answered.
I will not ask all of them here, but this discussion may be an opportunity for the noble Baroness to talk about how long the review of the capacity market is. The implementation plan is pretty useless when it comes to providing detail on this part, but if anyone is interested, I have discovered that it is all in the June document, Electricity Market Reform: Capacity Market—Design and Implementation Update. If noble Lords want even more detail, I suggest that they read the memorandum submitted to the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, because that has even more detail. Why that is not in the implementation plan I do not know, but we are where we are, we have to gather all this information and try to make the best of it.
It would be helpful if the Minister described the length of time for which the Government consider that the capacity market needs to operate and precisely how it will enable new investment. One of the key challenges is that the capacity market means everything to everyone. If you are an owner of an existing power station, you see it as your opportunity to keep that station open. If you own a mothballed gas plant, it will be the opportunity to get that back on the system. If you want to build new CCGTs, it is your opportunity to get those built. If you are a demand-side response producer, it is your opportunity to get that done. It is not clear how this broad set of measures will manage that conflict between existing owners, owners of mothballed plant, new owners and demand reducers. We as a Committee, representing the wider two Houses, deserve more information. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Baroness Verma
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Jenkin for his amendment. Amendment 53ZA proposes that providing capacity should take account of projected growth over a 10-year period. I understand that he has proposed it because of concerns about the long-term capacity of electricity networks and the ability of distributive network operators to make strategic, long-term investment decisions. I should make it clear from the outset that the capacity market is not intended to drive investment in network capacity. Rather, it is designed to ensure that there is sufficient longer-term investment in electricity capacity, including generation and other forms of capacity, such as demand-side response.
In March, Ofgem published its strategy decision for electricity distribution network price control. That explained that price control had been designed to encourage distribution network operators to provide a high level of service for connections while maintaining a reliable network and delivering value for money for existing and future customers. The decision also explained that flexibility has been provided for DNOs to submit a case for strategic investment in their business plans on a project-by-project basis. Similarly, the Electricity Act 1989 already provides some flexibility for early investment—for example, the distribution network operator and its customer can make an agreement that allows an upfront user commitment agreement between the DNO and a customer who wants strategic investment. I understand that, in the case of UK Power Networks and its customers in the City of London, this is already happening.
It is vital that investment in our networks continues at a pace that supports our future energy needs. None the less, we must be mindful that there will be a balance to be struck to ensure that consumers do not pick up the costs of unused or underused assets. For this reason, it is right that Ofgem and the network companies continue to consider carefully where investment ahead of need is proposed.
My noble friend also makes an important point about ensuring that decisions on capacity of electricity supply are made with due regard to the long-term outlook. As such, for the capacity market, the Government have committed to publishing a delivery plan every five years and producing annual updates to that plan. These plans will include long-term forecasts of electricity demand and supply, and will inform the amount of capacity contracted through the capacity market.
I hope that my noble friend finds my explanation reassuring. Before I ask him to withdraw his amendment, I shall respond to the noble Baroness, Lady Worthington, on her questions about how the capacity market works and how it is envisaged. A forecast of future peak demand will be made for four and a half years ahead of the delivery year in which it must be available. The amount of capacity needed to ensure security of electricity supply will be acquired through a competitive central auction four years ahead of the delivery year. Generation and non-generation approaches such as demand-side response will be able to participate in the capacity auction. All generation plant, including existing plant, will be eligible to participate in this auction, with some exceptions such as low-carbon plant receiving CFDs.
Providers of capacity successful in the auction will enter into capacity agreements committing to providing electricity when given notice in the delivery year in return for steady capacity payments or will face financial penalties. The costs of the capacity payments will be shared between electricity suppliers in the delivery year. That is a brief outlook of how it will work but I hope that the noble Baroness is reassured that there is plenty of detail. She also referred to the Delegated Powers Committee. As she is aware, we have submitted extra information to the committee and it is now looking at that. We will then look at its recommendations but until that point it would not be right for me to comment on them. With that, I hope that my noble friend will withdraw his amendment.
Lord Jenkin of Roding
I am very grateful to my noble friend for her careful reply to the amendment. It is clear that she understands the nature of the problem but somehow there has to be a greater understanding between those who represent the interests of developers and other business people in the City and elsewhere, and those who are concerned, as she said very properly, not to add additional costs on consumers unnecessarily. I hope the discussions will continue because it seems to me that my noble friend has spelt out the problem very clearly as the Government see it. As I have said, we have had the consultation with my noble friend Lord Deighton. It is also clear from what my noble friend Lord Deben said that this is a wider problem than just the City and the commercial districts. There is something here which needs to be looked at. Those who have been advising me on this will certainly read very carefully, as I will myself, what the noble Baroness has said.
On the wider question asked by the noble Baroness, Lady Worthington, I have had an invitation, as I suspect have others, to a briefing to discuss the document published yesterday, the Consultation on the Draft Electricity Market Reform Delivery Plan. I think this will be on Monday and I am very much looking forward to it. In the mean time, I mentioned that I had not had the full printed copy and, mirabile dictu—sorry, one is not allowed to use Latin—or, amazing to say, it turned up on my desk. I am extremely grateful to the official who made that possible, so I will have some interesting reading over the weekend. Having said that, I am very pleased to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Teverson
My Lords, I welcome any amendment that emphasises the demand side of this issue. I particularly like the fact that we have started to bring in the factor of energy storage. Whenever you talk about energy storage, the technologies are always just about going to be there but they never get down to the commercial level by quite a way. But I hope that that will not be the case in the long term. This is an important point that needs to be taken into consideration.
The really important point is around capacity auctions and the ability of the demand side to compete equally with that. I would be interested to hear from the Minister whether she is confident that the demand side will be able to compete or bring forward sensible bids at the early four-year period. While I understand entirely that there is a fallback to the previous year, a lot of the market has already gone. Clearly, the best solution, the nirvana solution, is that all capacity payment is filled with demand-side reduction. That is the best outcome that there could be. I am sure that that will never be the case but it is how we make sure that we do not restrict it. I am interested in the Minister’s views on how the Government feel that the demand side can effectively come forward four years in advance. It would be very useful to understand the Government’s thinking on that.
Baroness Verma
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, for his detailed explanation of his amendments. The Government have already made it clear that the demand-side response and electricity storage will be eligible to participate in the capacity market. We have announced that these technologies will be supported by transitional arrangements to help develop their capability and enable them to compete on a level playing field against generation. However, while we agree that these are two important aspects of providing capacity, the subsection already allows Secretary of State to make further provision for the meaning of “providing capacity”.
The definition in this subsection is not intended to be exhaustive, nor would it be if these amendments were accepted. There are other existing technologies, such as interconnectors, which may, at some point, play a part in the capacity market, along with other new technologies in the future. This clause seeks to maintain the flexibility to include this full range of technologies, including demand-side reduction and storage in the capacity market, while leaving it open to incorporate novel technologies, should they emerge in the future.
Amendment 53B is intended to ensure that demand-reduction providers are given priority over other providers in the awarding of capacity agreements through capacity auctions. There are a number of reasons why the Government do not see this approach as desirable. First, the capacity market seeks to encourage genuine competition by placing all forms of capacity provision on a level playing field. This is the best way to ensure value for money for consumers, and the reason why no capacity quantity will be ring-fenced for any particular technology type.
None the less, we recognise that certain technologies, such as demand-side response and storage, have different characteristics from generation. That is why we have announced the transitional arrangements. In addition, we have designed the enduring capacity market to ensure that demand reduction and storage can participate effectively by running capacity auctions both four years ahead and one year ahead of when capacity is expected to be required.
As we have already debated, the Government are also proposing an electricity demand-reduction pilot to inform the future entry of EDR into the capacity market. Holding an auction four years out ensures that there is sufficient time to build and commission new generation plants as necessary. However, demand-reduction providers have told us that opting into capacity agreements so far in advance of the delivery year would not be possible for most of their projects. This is why we are giving demand-side response and storage the option of participating either in the auction held four years out or in a further auction held one year ahead of delivery.
It is currently risky for demand-side response providers to predict the amount of demand reduction they will be able to provide four years ahead of a delivery year. This risk is significantly reduced in a one-year auction and we would expect them to be awarded capacity agreements at this stage. This is because we envisage them being able to provide cheaper capacity than generating plants.
In summary, this amendment would not be compatible with a technology-neutral approach. Furthermore, it risks either forcing demand-side response providers into taking on unacceptably large risks to align with the timescales required for building new generating plants or negating the possibility of new plants participating in the capacity market, risking a significant shortfall in electricity supply and the very real possibility of regular blackouts.
Amendment 53C would require the Secretary of State to modify the Electricity Act 1989, adding an additional licence condition authorising a person to store electricity. Storage of electricity is not presently an activity that requires a separate licence, although some storage providers may be generation licence holders. I therefore reassure the noble Lord that electricity storage would be able to participate in the capacity market without this amendment. The Government have already confirmed its eligibility and this is irrespective of its licence status. This is because Clause 22 does not restrict participation in the capacity market only to licence holders. It also allows the Secretary of State to define further who may be a capacity provider in regulations.
The noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, also mentioned electricity storage. We agree that storage technologies are still developing and further innovation is needed to bring down costs and find ways of scaling up. We are supporting two innovation competitions, the first winners of which were announced in May. In the large-scale storage competition, 12 winning projects were given £17 million of funding for the first feasibility phase. Decisions on which projects will proceed to the demonstration phase are expected in September. The component research and feasibility study competition has four projects so far.
The noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, asked about a separate set of rules for DSR within the capacity market. We do not envisage a separate set of rules. We envisage that the rules and regulations will cover all technologies eligible to participate in the capacity market, although the transitional arrangements for DSR will be incorporated. He also asked about baselining for on-site capacity. This will be covered in the detailed capacity market regulations and will be the responsibility of the national system operator.
The noble Lord asked what I visualised as success, given his previous question on the Green Deal. I view success in the long term as a programme that will last many decades. In reference to the Green Deal, I am already witnessing success. We had more than 44,000 assessments up to the end of June and 115,720 installations under ECO. That is what I would call successful.
Turning to Amendment 53AA, tabled by the noble Viscount, Lord Hanworth, which proposes a definition of demand-side response to be added to Clause 21, the Government have already made it clear that demand-side response and electricity storage will be eligible to participate in the capacity market. As I made clear in response to the questions of the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, we have announced that those technologies will be supported by transitional arrangements to help them to develop their capability and enable them to compete on a level playing field against generation.
I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, and the noble Viscount, Lord Hanworth, have found my explanations reassuring, and I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.