Health and Social Care Bill

Debate between Baroness Thornton and Baroness Murphy

Thursday 15th December 2011 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Murphy]

My Lords, I echo many of the words of the noble Lord, Lord Warner, although I wish to put a slightly different slant on the issue. It is crucial that we press on with the project to get all trusts to foundation status. There is no doubt in my mind that having this two-tier system, which we have allowed to continue for too long, has led to difficulties in foundation trust hospitals becoming more self-reliant, more seriously entrepreneurial in the way that they think about their services, and more responsive to the local agenda, and so on. They have not had to bother because they have always had Big Brother watching. The de-authorisation process, which threatens to drag them back to the Department of Health, has acted as a sort of brake on their thinking. That has been quite difficult. I seriously think that we should move trusts to foundation status. The noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, is looking puzzled, but I think that it has been a really serious problem.

[Baroness Thornton]

I was looking puzzled only because I wondered what evidence there was for some kind of break in the system.

Health and Social Care Bill

Debate between Baroness Thornton and Baroness Murphy

Tuesday 13th December 2011 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Thornton]

My Lords, I promise that this will be a very much shorter speech. We now turn to the second group, which concerns Monitor’s function as a licensing provider—a part of the suite of amendments that we have put down about reconfiguring Monitor.

The Bill extends the concept of financial regulation to non-financial trusts, and we can see the logic in this. For consistency, however, we argue that all providers of services to the NHS—not just foundation trusts—should have to meet requirements around their financial position and have this subject to oversight, as well as the obvious fit and proper test that they would have to go through.

We can see the argument for a robust evaluation, for example, of capital structures, which certainly would have been helpful in the case of Southern Cross. The regulator should be allowed to make authorisation subject to this kind of probity test—something like a fit and proper persons test. For us, the key aspects of the licensing regime should be determined by the Secretary of State, not by the regulator. The job of the regulator in our view is to operate the system, not to define it. I would invite the Minister to say whether he agrees with that analysis.

With foundation trusts we set out that Monitor shall use the licence to ensure that information flows to the regulator to enable it to have effective oversight and to intervene if necessary. The licence has to extend this to other sorts of providers which may be reluctant to supply information or submit to the idea of intervention. They may claim commercial confidentiality. The Bill resolves this problem, as far as we can see, by simply having no oversight—in other words, the “nothing to do with us, guv” approach to regulation. We believe that the public would not accept this. The Mid Staffs example, where Monitor came into much criticism, or the Southern Cross example might be instructive here.

[Baroness Murphy]

I am sorry to interrupt. The situation at Mid Staffs arose following the approval of the Department of Health and the Healthcare Commission. It was passed to Monitor as a fit and proper hospital. The scandal emerged only three weeks after it was approved by Monitor.

Health and Social Care Bill

Debate between Baroness Thornton and Baroness Murphy

Wednesday 9th November 2011 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Thornton]

I am sorry to interrupt the noble Baroness. I am listening carefully to her because she has great experience. Is she not talking about transferring the setting of targets, projects or whatever from the responsibility of Andrew Lansley as Secretary of State to Sir David Nicholson as head of the NHS Commissioning Board? If the problem, as she sees it, is the setting of too many targets and projects—although I do not know what that has to do with Clause 4— I am not sure what safeguards there are to stop that from happening anyway.

[Baroness Murphy]

Perhaps I may respond. It is a direct result of that chain of command that goes from the Secretary of State, to Ministers, to Sir David Nicholson and to everyone inside the Department of Health. It is a direct result of the impact on the management system.

[Baroness Thornton]

My point to the noble Baroness is that I do not believe that it will change.

[Baroness Murphy]

I am sorry but I think it is the direct result of Clause 4. I shall continue my theme, if I may.

It is vital that we do not get lost in the impact of what the setting of targets does to the management structure. If the Government set goals and we have key performance targets, at the moment hospitals, services and local commissioners have no responsibility for their strategic direction or goals. I talk as someone who has been a strategic health authority chairman and I know exactly what micromanagement of health authorities and trusts means. I will come on to foundation trusts and why it has not worked entirely with them.

The targets are passed down through commissioning organisations without any understanding of the capacity to deliver. No sooner has one directive been issued than another set of politically interesting goals arrives as an additional directive—without removing the first. All this has no connection to how healthcare is delivered at the front line to patients and it creates a sort of parallel universe of management that never really touches operational patient care.

In mental health services, the care programme approach was an absolutely classic example of something that was implemented without any thought being given to how the service was really delivered and it therefore took 10 years to put in place. In successful businesses, managers focus their time and attention on operational realities—on how to help staff solve problems and improve day-to-day operational performance. This is the front-line machine that implements management decisions. However, in the NHS, managers are not interested in the front line. At every level, they focus upwards to the next level and, as a health authority chairman, I was pretty horrified to find that at least 25 per cent to 30 per cent of my CEO’s time was taken up at meetings and other activities, to which we referred as “feeding the beast” of the Department of Health or of Ministers. I understand that in many trusts some 50 per cent of this time is taken up with managing the centre.

The preoccupation with satisfying the centre leaves front-line staff—unsupported and often demoralised—to cope with broken systems, unless they have a substitute in a charismatic clinician who leads them instead. That is why high-flying specialist units work exceptionally well and why everyday bog-standard services are often a disgrace. That is why meeting targets is often a game. Data are manipulated and money is diverted from one front line to another to achieve a target temporarily until the Minister’s attention is diverted to the next enthusiasm.

The four-hour waiting time target at A&E is a very good example. This was an admirable target—some would say it was not tough enough—but it was achieved only with horrendous diversion of funds from other front-line areas and a reordering of clinical priorities, but with no real change in hospital behaviours or any understanding by staff as to why they were doing it. Metrics for the purpose of compliance are almost always different from those that one would wish to collect to understand and improve patient care pathways. A&E services targets were achieved at the cost of diverting increasing numbers of patients into medical assessment units and we have ended up with an 11.8 per cent increase in emergency admissions and vast numbers of patents being admitted from A&E who would not previously have been admitted—all in the interests of reducing a particular target, but without any fundamental change in the way that hospitals are run.

That is what this autonomy clause is meant to assist—we seem to me to be forgetting that. We must have organisations within the health service which set their own objectives, manage them properly and start concentrating on the front line of patient care. There is ample accountability in the Bill to ensure this along with the proper regulatory system. I know that autonomy can lead to machismo behaviour and that it can go wrong. We do need tough regulation, but we need tough light-touch regulation, with a mandate that has been agreed beforehand. With that, we will see that this autonomy clause is utterly vital to the way that we should be developing the health service.