Bee Population

Baroness Thomas of Winchester Excerpts

Thursday 10th January 2013 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Thomas of Winchester]

My Lords, the House is extremely grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, for such a well informed and expert speech. A honey bee beekeeper is prized indeed in this kind of debate. My interest in bees goes back to the long, hot summer of 1976, when the Liberal candidate for Winchester told me that his bees had collected four times more nectar than usual in May, as if they knew what was coming. Honey from the wild flowers of the Hampshire chalk downland is second to none, and I hoped there would be a limitless supply. However, we now know that things are very different today in the bee world, with fewer flower-rich meadows, unpredictable weather, the stranglehold of the varroa mite, and the possible weakening effects of even small amounts of the widely used systemic insecticides known as neonicotinoids.

As we have just heard, the importance of bees is not just because of the honey they produce, but because of their vital role as pollinators. They are the most efficient pollinators in the insect kingdom and the crisis in the bee world, if it is not halted, could have devastating effects on crops worldwide. In this country, it is estimated that 39 commercial crops rely on insect pollination, although there are wildly different estimates of how much this is worth. The figure seems to vary between £400 million and £500 million per annum. Perhaps the Minister could give us the latest estimate.

Although pests and diseases, as we have heard, are still thought to be the main threat to honey bees, it is significant that the UK has lost a staggering 97% of its wildflower meadows since the 1930s. The evidence is mounting about the possible harmful effects of systemic insecticides. The many research findings now in existence simply cannot be ignored, particularly those that are field-realistic rather than just laboratory findings.

Last month I tabled a Written Question asking the Government what assessment they had made of the impact of these insecticides on bee colonies, at the request of another beekeeper I know in Hampshire. Reading between the lines of the Answer from my noble friend, I got the impression that although Defra is very cautious in its approach, it nevertheless is taking seriously some new studies published last year which suggest that even low doses of neonicotinoids could have sub-lethal effects on bees: that is to say, they do not kill the bee, but alter its physiology or behaviour. In particular, research from the University of Stirling concluded that there was a clear need to re-evaluate the safety of these chemicals. Professor Dave Goulson, who supervised the work, said:

“Our work suggests that trace exposure of our wild bees to insecticides is having a major impact on their populations. Only queen bumblebees survive the winter to build new nests in the spring, so reducing the number produced by 85% means far fewer nests the following year. Repeated year on year, the long-term cumulative effects are likely to be profound”.

As we know, this is not just a British phenomenon. Last month, the European Environment Agency and MEPs issued a policy document, in which the first of the key findings was:

“Although bee declines can be attributed to multifarious causes, the use of neonicotinoids is increasingly held responsible for recent honeybee losses”.

The European Food Safety Authority, on behalf of the European Commission, is carrying out a review on bee health and insecticides which should provide new insights into the issue and may recommend a reassessment of EU regulatory guidelines. Some countries, most notably France and Italy, have taken action to mitigate the use of some of these insecticides, but I do not think any country has yet banned them altogether. However, some research carried out in France is, perhaps, significant. This is research by a team led by Professor Mickael Henry at INRA Research Centre in Avignon which analysed the effect on honey bees of a new generation of systemic insecticides called—I hope I have the pronunciation right—thiamethoxam. They fitted tiny electronic tags to over 650 bees and monitored their activity around the hive. Those exposed to commonly encountered levels of this insecticide suffered high mortality, with up to one-third of the bees failing to return. Professor Henry said:

“They disappeared in much higher numbers than expected...Under the effects we saw from the pesticides, the population size would decline disastrously and make them even more sensitive to parasites or lack of food”.

Therefore, what are we to make of the conflicting evidence of the chief causes of the decline in bee health? Is it the widespread use of these systemic insecticides, or is the picture more complicated than that? On the one hand, many beekeepers and concerned members of the public find some independent studies on the sub-lethal effects of these insecticides on bees very worrying. On the other hand, many farmers quite understandably say that if there were to be a ban on, for example, the planting of oilseed-rape-treated seeds, far less oilseed rape would be planted, which could mean that many bees would starve. Of course, fields planted with ordinary oilseed rape seeds would then have to be sprayed. What are we to make of the evidence from Australia where, apparently, these systemic insecticides are widely used but where there is no varroa mite to weaken the bees’ immune system? Australian bees are thought to be the healthiest on the planet.

We have to look for help to independent scientists whose job it is to carry out trials and publish the results in peer-reviewed scientific journals. The scientists at the Rothamsted Research station in Hertfordshire are old hands in this field. Yes, a small proportion of its work is funded by agrichemical companies—it is quite open about that—but most of it is publicly funded. It has always been committed to sustainable agriculture by improving and developing novel methods of pest and disease control while ensuring minimal harm to wildlife, including pollinators. It says that the management of pesticide use is not as simple as “use it” or “don’t use it”. If the concentrations used and the methods of application were strictly adhered to, the risk to insect pollinators would be minimal, which has to be balanced against the risk of not protecting farmers’ crops. It also acknowledges some of the evidence linking neonicotinoid use with sub-lethal effects on pollinators.

Therefore, the scientists, the public and beekeepers, including, I think, the British Beekeepers’ Association, want this research to be done as speedily and effectively as possible, otherwise the calls for neonicotinoids to be banned altogether will grow louder and louder. Perhaps my noble friend could help me with whether any of these pesticides are licensed for use domestically or by local authorities for use perhaps on roadside verges.

Turning to the role of Defra, I hope that it will continue to work closely with the farming community to encourage more bee-friendly measures, such as the planting of flower-rich field margins and wildflower meadows, particularly through agri-environment schemes. I believe that the funding of those schemes is due to end in a few months’ time. Will the Minister tell us what will happen then?

Perhaps the Government will also consider encouraging all those who have gardens, however small, to plant nectar-rich flowers, shrubs and even trees, to help bees obtain the nectar that they need for survival. This is especially true in big cities such as London, which is home to many beekeepers and whose bees need as much help as they can get from ordinary garden owners. We hear that bees in urban settings are often flourishing better than their rural neighbours, possibly because they are not so exposed to pesticides. However, before the expansion of beekeeping in big cities, we have to make sure that there are enough nectar-rich sources. I applaud the mayor of Runnymede who I have just heard is encouraging primary schools in the area to plant nectar-rich flowers.

Defra is to be congratulated on spending more money on research into insect pollinators in recent years, but I hope that it will continue to act vigorously in trying to get to the bottom of the very alarming decline in the health of honey bees, and will be fearless in pursuing the goal of a healthy and sustainable bee population.

Public Bodies Bill [HL]

Baroness Thomas of Winchester Excerpts

Monday 4th April 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

My Lords, we come to a very important group of amendments that is concerned with the procedure-making processes in Parliament when it comes to an order. As we have already debated, it is very important, when a Minister seeks to make an order, that it enjoys stringent parliamentary scrutiny. We welcomed the Minister’s amendments to introduce greater scrutiny than was envisaged when the Bill was first drafted. There is no doubt that what he describes as extensive parliamentary scrutiny is an advance. However, I want to encourage him to go a little further.

The Minister will, of course, be aware of the advice that your Lordships’ House has received from the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which reported to the House on four occasions. I refer noble Lords to the committee’s report of 7 March that reminded the House of the key differences between the noble Lord’s amendment that has been made to the Bill and my amendment. The report said that there are two key differences between the Government’s enhanced procedure and the provision in the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006 that introduced the super-affirmative procedure on which my amendment is based.

The committee said that under the 2006 Act,

“if a committee of either House recommends that no further proceedings be taken on a draft order, then any further proceedings are automatically stopped unless and until the recommendation is rejected by that House itself”.

The committee also reminded us in March that under the 2006 Act,

“a Minister wishing to proceed with an order unaltered after having been required to have regard to representations must lay a statement before Parliament giving details of any representations received”.

The committee pointed out that this matter would also enjoy enhanced scrutiny.

When we discussed this matter in Committee, at col. 1723, the noble Lord, Lord Taylor, essentially said that because Schedule 7 had been removed, the scope of the Bill had been significantly narrowed and a more restrictive scrutiny procedure was therefore required than that in the regulatory reform Act. I understand where the Minister is coming from, but I do not agree with his conclusions. Even with the safeguards that the Minister has introduced and the removal of Schedule 7, the Bill still gives considerable powers to Ministers. When one looks through the Bill, the powers to abolish, to make changes to the financial arrangements, and to change the governance arrangements are considerable. The use of the super-affirmative procedure is, therefore, entirely appropriate.

I know that the noble Lord’s department has said that it believes that the super-affirmative procedure that I propose would risk derailing the Government’s reform programme, but I want to make it absolutely clear that I support the regular review of these public bodies. I have never had any difficulty whatever with the principle of the Bill. No public body should believe that it is entitled to exist for all time. It is right that public bodies should be reviewed. I have no problem at all with that principle in the Bill. However, we come back to the point of ministerial powers. I remember being reminded, when I was sitting or standing where the noble Lord is sitting at the moment, that ministerial powers need to be fettered. Under the Bill, many organisations doing public work can be affected by the use of ministerial power. Parliament needs and deserves the most stringent scrutiny powers possible. The super-affirmative procedure is not new. It is used within the confines of the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act.

The noble Lord says that if we were to pass such an amendment, it would have an impact on the other place and its procedures. My argument is: let us see. Let this House pass the amendment, agree to the super-affirmative order and see how the other place responds. We are not at the last point of this Bill’s journey through Parliament and it would not be unreasonable for noble Lords to express the view that orders under the Bill should be considered under the super-affirmative procedure. I beg to move.

[Baroness Thomas of Winchester]

My Lords, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, will forgive me if I do not go down the path of discussing his amendment in detail, as I am the chair of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. However, I will say that this group of amendments gives us the chance to discuss the wider issue of parliamentary scrutiny arrangements of orders made under the Bill.

The House should not try to pin down the Minister today on exactly how scrutiny under the Bill should be conducted, particularly as the other place has yet to consider the Bill. However, it is important to set out a few questions that should be asked at this stage. Under the Bill, every draft order has a 40-day period during which a committee of either House looks at it. This committee must report on the order within 30 days. Under the revised Bill, the committee can require an order to undergo a full, enhanced scrutiny procedure. At present, the Lords committee charged with looking at all orders coming before the House is the Merits of Statutory Instruments Committee, which has been spoken about a lot this afternoon. It may draw orders to the attention of the House either because they may be of interest or because they may imperfectly achieve the policy objective. The committee is already busy and meets nearly every week. The first question might be whether this is the right committee to look at orders made under the Bill, whether under the enhanced scrutiny procedure or not.

In the Delegated Powers Committee’s fifth, sixth and 11th reports, the enhanced scrutiny procedure on orders under the Bill was compared, as the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, said, to the super-affirmative procedure in the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006. As this is the nearest procedure to the one we are discussing, it may be worth restating that legislative reform orders come before the Delegated Powers Committee, but are significantly different in character from orders under the Bill. The two main differences are that the LRO procedure is not used for highly controversial matters, and that if a committee of either House recommends that no further proceedings are taken on a draft order, then proceedings are automatically stopped unless the House decides otherwise. The committee has looked at only 12 LROs since the 2006 Act.

However, the Bill is likely to generate a lot of work—and, at some point, an entirely new procedure. Therefore, it must be decided quite soon which committee should undertake the enhanced affirmative procedure if it is required. Although this will, of course, be a matter for the Procedure Committee and ultimately for the House, I believe it is worth thinking about now.

There are some fundamental questions to be asked about how a committee should carry out its work before either House decides on a suitable committee structure. Should it simply review the evidence taken during the consultation? Should it take evidence itself? That could be an expensive process. The only purpose in the Bill is, as we heard this afternoon, to improve the exercise of public functions, although it must have regard to the objectives of achieving increased efficiency, effectiveness and economy—the Minister’s triplet—and securing appropriate accountability to Ministers. Suppose the committee decides that the broad purpose of improving the exercise of public functions is not met, will the Minister think again? After all, he only has to have regard to a committee’s recommendations. Obviously the order will have to be passed by both Houses and there is always the possibility of it being voted down. That this House is reluctant to do this should not be taken for granted.

Turning very briefly to the procedure in the other place, the two Houses have different ways of looking at statutory instruments and different committee structures from each other. The only joint committee in this area is the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments, which just looks at the vires of an instrument with the parent Act. Although a superficially attractive idea, a joint committee is very difficult to establish. I understand that this is too early for any hard-and-fast decisions on how orders made under this Bill are to be scrutinised by Parliament, but it is not too early for Parliament to be thinking hard about the implications of the proper scrutiny of the delegated powers in this Bill.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

My Lords, my Amendment 69AA is the second amendment in this group. I think that there has been some inadvertent misgrouping in this complicated Bill and I suspect that this amendment would have appeared more happily in the first group of amendments, alongside government Amendment 69A. However, with your Lordships’ indulgence, and since I have no intention of putting this to the vote, I will proceed to seek to persuade the House that this small amendment would serve a large purpose.

In the first group of amendments, the Minister laid great stress on the fact that no order can be made unless there is an Explanatory Memorandum produced so that Parliament can judge what is going on with regard to the order. Earlier today, the Government got through this House with approbation Amendment 60A, which changes Clause 8 and introduces various specific qualities that must be met by any order before it can be enacted: effectiveness, efficiency, economy and securing appropriate accountability to Ministers. Those are quite expressly, by the provisions of Clause 11, to be included in the Explanatory Memorandum. Not included in the Explanatory Memorandum, but a fundamentally important aspect of the protections in this Bill, are the provisions of Clause 16(3). I will read it because it is quite short. It simply says:

“Provision made by an order under the preceding provisions of this Act must be proportionate to the reasons for the order”.

I do not think that anybody sitting here tonight will need convincing that proportionality is one of the most important pillars on which good legislation is built, but there is no reference to proportionality in the provisions of the Bill dealing with the Explanatory Memorandum.

That is still the case after the amendments have been read into Clause 11. Clause 11 as amended requires the explanatory document to introduce and give reasons for the order. The first of those in the earlier government amendment is that,

“the order serves the purpose in section 8(1)”.

There is no reference to Clause 16(3). In simple terms—I do not think that this is contentious; indeed, it seems to me to be an improvement in the Bill, whichever way one looks at it—I want a requirement that the Explanatory Memorandum must also include the Minister’s justifications in terms of proportionality for introducing the order, so that that can be considered along with efficiency, effectiveness, economy and accountability. Whichever way that plays out in the Bill as it will emerge tonight, I hope that my noble friend will accept the amendment in principle so that it can be brought back at Third Reading in the proper place.

Public Bodies Bill [HL]

Baroness Thomas of Winchester Excerpts

Wednesday 9th March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Thomas of Winchester]

My Lords, I speak at this point wearing my hat as chair of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. As the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, has said, Clause 5 contains perhaps the widest power in the Bill now that we no longer have Clause 11 and Schedule 7. Schedule 5 includes bodies exercising a very wide range of statutory functions. The abolition or transfer of some of those functions could completely alter the character of the primary legislation that set up the bodies in the first place—added to which, any Minister in future could add new functions or alter existing ones considerably. Nothing in any amendments that the Government have so far proposed changes that fact.

That is why the committee of which I am chair has reiterated, in each of its three reports on the Bill so far, the inescapable fact that the powers in Clauses 1 to 5 and 13 are inappropriate delegations of powers. What we are looking for—and I hope that it may still not be too late—is that the Minister should consider amending the Bill to say briefly how these delegated powers should be exercised in relation to each body. The detail could then safely be left to delegated legislation.

[Baroness Andrews]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the chair of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, and I reinforce what she said. I declare an interest as the chair of English Heritage and as a member of that committee.

I will address the stand part debate regarding Clause 5, but it is difficult to do that without referring to Clause 11, Schedule 7 and indeed to Clause 8, which we will come on to later. I think that I am the first Member of this House—in this debate anyway—to congratulate the noble Lord on his success in getting rid of Clause 11 and Schedule 7. I know that as we proceed through the Bill today, he will be inundated with congratulations on what he has achieved regarding those clauses; it will be like his birthday. My thanks are very much a foretaste of joy to come.

I have always seen this Bill as more the product of William McGonagall than of Machiavelli in terms of how it had been put together and what it represented. Even for a Government who are fast establishing a reputation for recklessness, the Bill was a step too far. As I recall, the kindest thing that was said in our earlier debates about Schedule 7 was that it was “Kafkaesque”; it certainly created a feeling of victimisation without any sense of the crime that had been committed or indeed the sentence and the punishment that might follow.

I could end there, with unqualified praise, but I must pick up on the points that the noble Baroness, Lady Thomas, made. We are not yet done with this Bill—there are more changes that we have to press the Government to deliver. The problem that was widely recognised in this House, certainly at Second Reading and earlier in Committee, is that the whole Bill, frankly, is misconceived. It is an object lesson in making policy by prejudice. It demonstrates a failure to understand the nature, the role and the effectiveness of public bodies. It is an object lesson in how not to make legislation that will provide the substance of many a PhD thesis in future.

In recent days, the Committee has done its work very well by taking individual bodies and holding the implications of the Bill up to the light, defending their future and fate. The stand part debate allows us to say again to the Minister that it is not too late to recognise the fundamental problem that has been established in Clauses 1 to 5: that the powers in these clauses are far too wide. I echo what the noble Baroness, Lady Thomas, has said: Clause 5 is the widest power of all. We know where we are with Clauses 1 to 4; we know what “abolition” and “merger” mean. However, we do not know what Clause 5 implies and those bodies listed in the schedule certainly do not. It is very different in scope. It modifies or transfers functions, purposes and objectives, and could change the rationale for an entire organisation at a stroke—all by ministerial edict. Given the importance of the bodies that are listed in Schedule 5, this is a very serious predicament in which to put them.

It is no wonder, therefore, that the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee reiterated in its 11th report on Monday that our original concerns were unmet. In our original report we were concerned about the inappropriate delegation of powers in Clauses 1 to 5. “Inappropriate” is a word that we have returned to time and again on this Bill. We are still concerned about those powers, which are still inappropriate. We said that the delegation of powers in Clauses 1 to 5 was “inappropriately broad in scope” and that there should be appropriate parliamentary scrutiny. That is still the view of the committee. We suggested in our earlier report that if Clause 11 were to be removed, it might make it easier for the powers in Clauses 1 to 5 to be better calibrated to matters that are appropriately left to delegated powers.

Clause 11 will, I am pleased to say, be removed. However, the powers in Clauses 1 to 5 are as yet unchanged. I say “as yet” because the Minister has said that he is considering these concerns. I certainly welcome that. I hope he will be as successful in dealing with that as he was in dealing with Clause 11 and Schedule 7. A crucial concern that we want him to consider before Report stage is spelling out more specifically the purposes for which the powers may be exercised. In Clause 8, the existing references are to matters to which the Minister may simply have regard. That is not strong enough. They do not deal with the fundamental problem of the Bill’s silence on the general purposes for which Parliament expects the powers to be used. They need to be so specified. It is extremely important that the Minister should address that point, at the end of either this debate or the debate on Clause 8.