Queen’s Speech

Baroness Taylor of Bolton Excerpts

Thursday 13th May 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Taylor of Bolton (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I congratulate my noble friend Lady Merron on her very heartfelt maiden speech. I have known her for many years, and I know she will make a significant contribution to this House. All I can say is that I am very glad she did not take her mother’s advice to stay clear of politics, and we must welcome her.

As the Constitution Committee of this House, which I have the privilege of chairing, is conducting an inquiry into the future governance of the UK, I do not intend to talk about the future of the union—tempting though that is. I want to mention a few of the issues outlined in the Queen’s Speech. I think they fall into the description of “the good, the bad and the ugly.”

Let me start with the good—or at least, the potentially good—which is the repeal of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act. We should be honest from the start and acknowledge that this was never really introduced as a constitutional measure. It was simply part of the political deal between David Cameron and Nick Clegg, and so I welcome its repeal. But as the Constitution Committee pointed out in its report, you cannot simply repeal it because you would leave a vacuum in other areas.

This morning I received a letter from the noble Lord, Lord True, giving more detail on this five-clause Bill. Some aspects will not be controversial, such as providing a maximum parliamentary term of five years. However, the noble Lord, Lord True, goes on to say that the Bill will revive the Crown’s prerogative power to dissolve Parliament and restate the long-standing position that the exercise of the prerogative power to dissolve Parliament is non-judiciable. The Minister is confident that that will be watertight. I fear that other legal opinion will not share his confidence. It is essential that, whatever is in this Bill, it is absolutely watertight in respect of the role of the monarch. The Minister also says in his letter that this will be underpinned by a set of non-legislative constitutional conventions. That is an interesting concept, and we will look forward to the detail on how this is going to be achieved. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Norton, will have a lot to say on that.

I wish the Minister well with his Bill, but I think its passage may not be as easy as he anticipates, and maybe the Commons, having been given the taste for a say in the timing of elections, will not be quite as willing as he thinks to relinquish that role. So that was the good.

The bad is simply the irrelevant proposal about free speech and universities. In opening, the Minister said that we should not be divisive, but that is exactly what that Bill is.

The ugly Bill is also divisive, and here I refer to the voter suppression Bill, because I think that is the title it deserves. I do not often agree with David Davis MP, but he described this measure as “pointless” and a “waste of time”. Photo ID for voting is just not necessary, and I speak as someone who approves of the principle of ID cards. It is not the problem that Ministers are suggesting it is. Ministers have said they want to protect our democracy; is this what they think is the main problem of our democracy at this time?

We have heard the figures: there have been two convictions and, in the trials, 819 people were denied votes. You have to think about who will be affected by this—it is very clear. We probably all know someone with no driving licence or passport; they will often be on a low income. I do not see why we should make it more difficult for people who do not enjoy our comfortable lifestyles to exercise their democratic right to vote—a right just as valuable as anyone else’s. A better use of Parliament’s time would be to drop this Bill and for the Government instead to adopt my noble friend Lord Grocott’s Bill to end by-elections for hereditary Peers.

Finally, I will mention one phrase that caught my attention, as it did that of others in this debate. The Government have written that they will

“restore the balance of power between the executive, legislature and the courts.”—[Official Report, 11/5/21; col. 3.]

These are fine words, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, pointed out. My question is: are they a promise or a threat? I fear the latter. Reversing the increasing domination of the Executive should be a theme for us all in this Session.

Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Bill [HL]

Baroness Taylor of Bolton Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 13th May 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I agree with the observations of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton. I gave my reasons earlier for thinking that Clause 2 should not stand part and I shall not repeat them. I shall add just one further point. There has been discussion this afternoon, particularly from the noble Lords, Lord Adonis and Lord Foulkes of Cumnock, about the disadvantages of Virtual Proceedings, disadvantages notwithstanding the exceptional efforts made by the clerks and the staff, for which we are all very grateful, to ensure that these Virtual Proceedings can take place. The additional disadvantage that I want to mention—additional to those who have already been identified—arises from the correct observation of the noble and learned Lord that the Minister stands alone on this subject; all other speakers have explained why Clause 2 is objectionable.

The point is that if we were on the Floor of the House, the Minister would not just hear and see those who are speaking; he would see and hear expressions of disapproval from all around the House, including from his own Benches; he would sense the degree of concern that there undoubtedly is about the constitutional implications of Clause 2. This debate has highlighted those concerns, but I hope the Minister will understand that there is a very widespread concern around the House, not just from those who have spoken today but from those who would be present in Committee were normal proceedings to apply. By their presence and their body language, other Members of the Committee would indicate their profound concern. I hope he will take all that into account before Report.

[Baroness Taylor of Bolton (Lab)]

I am in a slightly different position from many noble Lords because I joined this Committee sitting simply because of the strong feeling on the Constitution Committee, which I chair, that Clause 2 should not be part of the Bill. I am not a lawyer, so I have listened to the last nearly four hours with great interest. I knew that this was a complex area; having listened to all that has been said I think it even more incredible that the Government are actually suggesting that issues of this kind should be decided simply on their say-so and by secondary legislation. I cannot comment on the details and complexities of Lugano or anything else, but I have heard qualified senior lawyers talking about this, and anyone who has heard that would be convinced that there should be proper parliamentary consideration of all these issues before the Government are allowed to take any direct action. It is simply wrong, I think, that these matters will be determined by secondary legislation.

The Constitution Committee was unanimous in its view: we do not divide on party lines anyway, but it was not a difficult discussion, because members of the committee thought it was blindingly obvious that Clause 2 should not be part of the Bill. 

We did, of course, have another thought at the back of our minds. That is the fact that we have been increasingly concerned, over many years, by the way in which the Government have used—or maybe abused—secondary legislation. We have seen an increase in the powers taken through secondary legislation. It is a question of not just the number of SIs but their content. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, referred earlier to some of the consequences that might arise from this situation in the creation of new criminal offences if Clause 2 remains. We have seen new criminal offences created by SIs produced by the Government. I know that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, will speak later; I am sure that he will emphasise this very significantly.

Put simply, the Constitution Committee thinks it wrong that international agreements should be dealt with by the Government through secondary legislation. I certainly hope that either the Government will think again about this or that this clause can be taken out on Report. I share the concerns expressed by my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer, my noble friend Lord Adonis and others about the procedure whereby we cannot vote at this time and express our opinion properly. However, I urge the Government to consider absolutely all that has been said today and realise that it is not good for parliamentary democracy and accountability for Clause 2 to remain part of the Bill.

European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill

Baroness Taylor of Bolton Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Committee stage & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 15th January 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, I declare an interest as a litigator over 30 years of European law issues for whom these paragraphs and the legal uncertainty they unleash bring the prospect of endless work and riches as yet undreamed of. None the less, I put my name to the amendments, which of course will do nothing to obstruct or delay the Brexit that will occur on 31 January.

At Second Reading, I described another clause of the Bill as “Henry VIII on steroids”, but even that description is hardly strong enough for new subsection (5A)(b). That would allow the Minister, by regulations, to decide the extent to which, and the circumstances in which, our courts are to consider themselves bound by the law of the land, whether in the form of retained EU case law or retained domestic case law that relates to it. If Parliament is asked to change retained EU law, we will debate it and no doubt find a way to do it. Taking back control of our laws is one of the principal points of Brexit and, for my part, I hope to play a constructive role in that process. But to stand by and see these law-changing powers given to Ministers is quite another matter.

European law, no less than our own, is contained to a significant extent in the judgments and interpretations of the courts—what in the domestic context we refer to as principles of common law. If Ministers were free to remove the binding force of principles that they did not like, they could selectively neuter the protections given by law to workers, consumers, disadvantaged groups and the environment. Such a power in the Executive to interfere with the law declared by the courts, including the courts of this country, has no precedent that I know of. It would also cause uncertainty with effect from now, because no one can predict which parts of retained EU law will be changed over the year ahead or how the structure of what remains will react when a load-bearing element is removed.

Alarming in a different way is new subsection (5A)(c), on which the noble Lord, Lord Beith, began his remarks. Courts could be licensed under this provision to make their own departures from retained EU case law on conditions that Ministers could specify. As Sir Bob Neill explained in the Commons, that is a recipe for uncertainty, confusion and opportunistic litigation on a grand scale.

The Minister will, I anticipate, encourage us not to worry, because senior judges must be consulted. But consultation means only that. The Government have the whip hand. The complex ramifications will not be exposed by argument as they would be in court and, if deference to the judges’ views could ever have been assumed, it certainly could not be now. I suggest that there would be situations in which the judges will not even feel able to offer an opinion.

Imagine the scene. The Minister summons the judges and informs them of his proposal to instruct them that in accordance with the clear will of the people—or at any rate of the Government—they are no longer to be bound by the settled interpretation of the precautionary principle in environmental cases or the principle of indirect discrimination in employment law. The judges would no doubt come back with such comments as might occur to them on the timing, the procedural implications and so on. But since such instructions would be lawfully issued, if this clause passes into the Bill, and would implement clear government policy, these serving judges could not pass substantive comment without being dragged into the policy sphere, which, contrary to the views of some, they are extremely anxious to avoid.

Secondly, the Minister will point out, quite correctly, that the power in question will sunset when the transition period ends. However, it is the power to make regulations that will sunset, not the application of those regulations after the transition period. So that reassurance is illusory.

Thirdly, perhaps the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, who is as shrewd as he is principled, will tacitly accept the overbreadth of these provisions but hint at their restrained future use. In that case, I would invite him to come back with a version consistent with those restraints. We are reasonable people and if his only concern is a possible bottleneck in the Supreme Court other solutions could be devised and have indeed been suggested to him.

To leave this extraordinary clause unamended would be, I suggest, a dereliction of duty. I hope that amendment will come from the Government. However, when the time comes and in the last resort, as the noble Lord, Lord Butler, said on Monday,

“we should not be intimidated from fulfilling our constitutional role of scrutiny and amendment”.—[Official Report, 13/1/20; col. 490.]

That is particularly so, I would add, on an issue that was not put to vote in the Commons, that has been the subject of strong comment from the Constitution Committee, that in no way jeopardises Brexit but that threatens the independence and good order of the courts.

[Baroness Taylor of Bolton (Lab)]

My Lords, members of the Constitution Committee are very concerned about this suggestion in the legislation. The case was outlined by the noble Lord, Lord Beith, who went into some detail, so I do not wish to repeat all that. I simply want to ask the Minister, first, whether it is the Government’s intention to use this new subsection (5A)(b), and, secondly, if they will not use it, why it is in the Bill. If they intend to use this provision, can the Minister please give us some examples of where that might be?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, this Government are not dogmatic—the noble Lord is quite wrong about that. Let us be clear: there is a starting point. If I can refer the noble Lord back to Section 6(5) of the 2018 Act, he will see that the starting point is already enacted. However, we want to find a way forward that is more effective and appropriate, and that is the purpose of the consultation process that is allowed for in the clause.

[Baroness Taylor of Bolton]

Will the Minister answer the point raised about the policy areas the Government have in mind where they could use these powers?

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Baroness Taylor of Bolton Excerpts

Wednesday 21st March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

With respect, it appears to me that some of the fears being expressed are not about the use of these powers, but about their misuse. As the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, observed, we have to see this provision in context. It is to be applied to the consequences of the Bill becoming law.

The noble Lord, Lord Bassam, asked for further examples. There are many examples in primary legislation of where consequential amendment will be required. I will not elaborate on them at this stage. For example, there are provisions in all the accession Acts that would have to be regarded as necessary to clear up in the context of the statute book. There are provisions in such things as the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006, which would again have to be addressed in this context as a consequence of our removal when the Bill becomes law.

What will be required is a meaningful indication of the type of change that is needed to keep the statute book in reasonable order after our departure from the EU. In my respectful submission, where there may be concern about the misuse of this consequential power we are of course alive to concerns that are expressed. It may be that it turns largely not on the way Clause 17(1) is presently framed, but on the use of a term such as “appropriate”. We will give further consideration to the use of that language and whether that is the way this consequential—I stress “consequential”—power should be employed in this context.

I hope that gives noble Lords some degree of reassurance about the intention here. I suggest that the removal entirely of the consequential power contained in Clause 17 would have a materially adverse effect on the way the Bill can be properly implemented to bring the statute book into proper order following our exit from the EU. I hope at this stage that the noble Lord will see fit to withdraw the amendment.

[Baroness Taylor of Bolton (Lab)]

The Minister has just used the phrase that it is “not our intention” to use these powers. That is one of the difficulties that the Committee has on many of the issues that we have raised. The Government repeatedly say that it is not their intention to abuse these powers, yet they are taking powers which clearly can be abused in the future.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

With respect to the noble Baroness, I do not believe that any responsible Government would contemplate abusing powers given to them by Parliament. Indeed, if they did, they would be brought up very short by a sovereign Parliament.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Baroness Taylor of Bolton Excerpts

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 28th February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I speak as a member of the Constitution Committee to make it clear that the committee would say that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has spoken very lucidly for it in setting out the amendment. We are talking about provisions in Acts of Parliament—the Equality Act is one example—that implement EU obligations and would not be repealed by withdrawal or by the repeal of the European Communities Act. Yet Clause 2 opens up to the process of repeal and modification by statutory instrument provisions in UK statutes and in the legislation of the Scottish and Welsh Parliaments. These are provisions in law that are not nullified or made inoperative by the act of withdrawal; they would stay on the statute book. Of course, the legislation may contain features that do not of necessity arise from the requirements of EU directives or other EU obligations. We talk much about British gold-plating of EU measures. We will probably find in a number of measures which this clause would draw in features which were clearly not within the scope of the requirement placed on us by our membership of the European Union. The committee concluded:

“The effect is to inflate the range of domestic law—including primary legislation—in relation to which the ministerial “correction” powers … can be exercised”.


These are powers the extent and scope of which are extremely worrying to the committee.

As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, the Bingham Centre has produced a helpful analysis of many of the things that the committee was concerned about. In almost all cases, it agrees with the committee’s analysis, but, in some, it does not agree with the committee’s proposed remedies. In this case, it suggests that if we go down the route proposed by Amendment 15, there should be an amendment to Clause 6 to make it clear that provisions in EU case law should be taken into account when interpreting EU-derived law which is already on the statute book. The logic is that it is far better that the law is in only one place rather than in two, but we would not want by that means to take away from the court the opportunity to take into account EU-derived case law prior to our withdrawal from the EU, if it ever happens.

The committee is on to an important point. I hope that we can explore as a result of this short debate ways of dealing with it.

[Baroness Taylor of Bolton (Lab)]

My Lords, while I do not want this section of the debate to be dominated by members of the Constitution Committee, I should congratulate my noble friend Lord Pannick on the way he presented the amendment despite it certainly not being in the interest of the legal profession—if we manage to get legal certainty in the Bill, the lawyers will not have their field day. However, I fear that, unless we achieve legal certainty and the clarity that my noble friend mentioned, we will be in real difficulty. Our committee has put forward suggestions, but we do not think that they are the only ways forward. It is important at this stage that the Government recognise the extent of the problem and the damage that will be done if we do not have some amendment and some concessions from them in this area. It is of course an area linked to the other parts of the Bill, because, unless we make changes here, the powers that the Government will have under Clause 7 will be completely unacceptable because of the breadth of legislation there captured.

I therefore urge the Minister to reflect carefully not only on the suggestions of the Constitution Committee but on those of others outside, because this problem will dog the Bill for ever if we do not make some changes here.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

I support the idea that we should get legal certainty in the Bill, and if that damages the interest of the legal profession, it is damage in the public interest.

However, I venture to suggest that it may be wise to leave this provision pretty much as it is. That is because quite a lot of legislation was passed in the light of obligations imposed by the European Union, but we proposed our own legislation to deal with it. As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, excellently illustrated, that legislation is exemplified by the Equality Act. I read this clause as referring only to the part of the enactment,

“so far as … passed or made, or operating, for a purpose mentioned in section 2(2)(a) or (b) of that Act”.

As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, “enactment” sometimes suggests a whole Act, but this provision restricts it to the part of the enactment that deals with this point.

As the noble Lord, Lord Beith, said, it is quite likely that some of these measures are gold-plated—there used to be quite a lot of suggestions from various quarters that we went in for gold-plating. When I was in a sense responsible for some of these matters, I discovered that the gold-plating was more a result of some antagonism to the Bill in question than it was gold-plating in the sense of going beyond what the European Union required. So far as there is gold-plating of that sort—that is, unnecessary as far as the European Union is concerned—I do not think that this clause would strike it, because it is “so far as” the thing is made in view of the provisions “in section 2(2)(a) or (b)” and so on of the Act. Of course, as has been pointed out, it is perfectly likely that in some of these provisions that were introduced in that way adjustment will be required because we are leaving the European Union.

Some provisions—I have not looked too closely at how many but I imagine there might be quite a few—of these ordinary Acts of Parliament will have a connection with the European Union that may be affected by our leaving it. Therefore it is important that in that situation a power to deal with that matter in a reasonable time would be required, and we will be looking at these later. Therefore, I am inclined to think it may be better to leave this provision as it is. I am very interested to hear what my noble and learned friend the Minister has to say about that.

As for the supremacy principle, I will have something to say about that if I happen to be present when it arises. I said at Second Reading and I say again that I think the Constitution Committee has produced a superb solution to that problem, which enables us to forget for ever the supremacy of European law over our law.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Professor Craig addresses a potential categorisation of EU-derived legislation by reference to its origins within EU law, so there is pre-Lisbon treaty and post-Lisbon treaty analysis based on the articles of the pre-Lisbon provisions and of TFEU post Lisbon in 2009. I shall not elaborate on it at this stage as it does not arise in the context of this group. With respect to the noble Lord, I simply want to reassure him that we understand that there is a debate about how we should categorise EU-derived legislation.

The second point I shall mention at the outset is the reference to the principle of supremacy. That turns on Clause 5(2), which ensures that the principle of supremacy—it currently has effect through the ECA—will continue to apply but only for the purpose of resolving conflicts which arise between EU law which is converted by the Bill into domestic law and pre-exit domestic law.

Again, we have to be clear what the purpose of that is. I acknowledge in passing that the Constitution Committee proposed a different way of addressing Clause 5, which on one view might be considered neat, in so far as it involves applying the principle of supremacy without using the word “supremacy”. We will come on to debate that in due course, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, observed, and I will not take time up with that at this stage.

I turn to Amendment 15. Clause 2 has been drawn broadly deliberately. As has been noted, it will preserve any domestic regulations made under Section 2(2) of, or paragraph 1A of Schedule 2 to, the ECA 1972. But it also includes within its ambit any other domestic primary or secondary legislation which implements, or enables the implementation of, EU obligations and any related domestic legislation. In response to the inquiry from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, I make the point that enactments often contain provisions derived from EU legislation—we have to remember that what we are referring to in Clause 2 is EU-derived domestic legislation. It is those parts of Acts such as the Equality Act or the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act that are EU derived which are to be brought within the ambit of retained EU law. It is necessary to read two elements: EU-derived domestic legislation—those parts of legislation that come from the EU—and retained EU law. They are linked.

[Baroness Taylor of Bolton]

I think I am following what the Minister is saying, but a moment ago he used the phrase “legislation which … enables” implementation. How much of what is “enabling” will be caught in this?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

It is only that part of the legislation which is derived from the EU which is then brought in and forms part of retained EU law. As a hypothetical example, let us suppose that there are 20 clauses in some piece of health and safety at work legislation, of which 10 are derived from EU legislation. That forms part of EU-derived legislation for the purposes of this Bill, and will come into retained EU law. But the other parts are not EU-derived legislation and will not form part of EU retained law.

[Baroness Taylor of Bolton]

I accept that, but the Minister is assuming that legislation is always very neatly compartmentalised in a way which would allow that. My fear is that there will be enabling parts of legislation that could be caught up because some subsection could be EU related.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

Could I just follow on from that by expressing a related concern? We know what the Government’s attitude is to the Charter of Fundamental Rights and we know that the Bill provides that there is no right of action on the basis of general principles of EU law. I am thinking aloud here, but the concern might be that even with only a strict and narrow interpretation of which bits of, say, the Equality Act are EU derived and therefore subject to all the consequences, including Clause 6, we might miss some of the context in which those narrow provisions should be interpreted if we were to remain in the EU and fully under the jurisdiction of the court.