(7 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, names of Members from our Benches are not attached to these amendments, but we would like to associate ourselves with all four of them. I want to say a few words about safety because it is obviously not in the industry’s interest to operate unsafely; in fact, quite the opposite. It would be a way of hastening its end. So it is not that the industry will set out to operate in a cavalier manner, and that is not what these amendments imply. From my experience of working in industries that have an inherent risk but are not necessarily as risky as the space industry, the greater prominence that safety is given in their operations at every level right up to senior management and in terms of the supervision of organisations, the more likely it is that they will be inherently safe. You can rely on processes and people on the ground to operate safely because of course it is in their interests to do so, but it is always more successful when safety is elevated to the highest possible level. It is with that in mind that we support these amendments.
I thank noble Lords for their comments on Clauses 9 and 10, given their central importance to the Bill. In consultation with the Health and Safety Executive, I wrote to the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, to address the points he raised on the first day in Committee. Following that letter, I would like to take the opportunity to explain further the role of the Health and Safety Executive in regulating space flight activities under the Space Industry Bill.
Clause 9 imposes one of the key requirements of the Bill that a regulator cannot grant a licence for spaceflight activities unless satisfied that the operator has carried out an assessment of the risks to the health and safety of persons taking part in spaceflight activities and that the operator has taken steps to ensure that risks to all other persons is as low as reasonably practicable. Furthermore, Clause 9(4)(b) means that even after all steps have been taken to reduce risk to as low as is reasonably practicable, spaceflight will not be allowed where the risk to public health and safety is unacceptable. The Bill places the onus on the regulator to be satisfied that risks are as low as reasonably practicable and that they are acceptable, but the operator must assess the risks and manage them.
The provisions in the Bill have been developed in full collaboration with the Health and Safety Executive to ensure that they align with existing UK health and safety principles on the management of risks. I should like to recap that under this Bill, the Secretary of State is the default spaceflight regulatory authority. The UK Space Agency will perform regulatory functions on the Secretary of State’s behalf, including regulating the procurement of satellite launches from other countries as well as satellite operations from the UK. The UK Space Agency will also regulate all vertically launched rockets covered under this Bill and all space activities. Finally, the UK Space Agency will license and regulate spaceports capable of vertical launch and range control services for launch to orbit.
It is our intention to use Clause 15 to appoint the Civil Aviation Authority as a spaceflight regulator for suborbital spaceplanes and spaceports capable of horizontal launch. The Government’s approach will enable us to build on the existing experience and expertise of the two organisations. I am confident that these bodies will have the capability to evaluate risk assessments and assess whether the risks have been reduced to as low as is reasonably practicable and whether they are acceptable. In this, the bodies will be assisted by the Health and Safety Executive.
I should clarify that we do not intend to appoint the Health and Safety Executive as a regulator under the Bill. This is because it is not a specialist transport, aviation or space regulator and has no experience or expertise in flight safety, space launches or air navigation. However, it is already a regulator for health and safety at work under current health and safety legislation. Accordingly, it is designated as a qualifying health and safety authority under Clause 20 and may be called upon to provide specified advice or assistance in connection with the regulator’s functions relating to safety.
Independently of the Bill, the Health and Safety at Work, etc Act 1974 and associated legislation will apply to spaceports and spaceflight activities as they would to any other workplace, while the Health and Safety Executive would retain lead responsibility for the regulation of safety on the ground. New major hazard sites such as spaceports would also require planning consent from the appropriate planning authority, and the Health and Safety Executive would act as a statutory consultee to the appropriate planning authorities.
However, the UK Space Agency or Civil Aviation Authority will retain responsibility for licensing the spaceport. This aligns with the approach under the Civil Aviation Act 1982 and the Air Navigation Order 2016. Under these provisions, the Civil Aviation Authority has overall responsibility for aviation safety. The divisions of responsibility between the CAA and the Health and Safety Executive are set out in a memorandum of understanding. We anticipate that the spaceflight regulators and the Health and Safety Executive will similarly set out the division of responsibilities.
I emphasise that although it is our intention that there be two spaceflight regulators, it is vital for accountability and safety that for any particular licence application under the Bill, there should be a single regulator responsible for deciding that application. Noble Lords raised that issue today and in Committee. In making its licensing decision, the UK Space Agency may consult the CAA—and vice versa—but that decision will rest with one body in each case.
Giving the Health and Safety Executive an additional specific role—certifying the adequacy of the safety arrangements relating to persons not taking part in spaceflight activities or for public safety in spaceports—would confuse roles and responsibilities for licensing spaceflight and associated activities. The Health and Safety Executive does not carry out this function of certification under any other legislation and does not wish to do so under this one.
I hope I have reassured noble Lords that our proposed approach is consistent with existing health and safety practice and reflects the view of the Health and Safety Executive. I acknowledge the sad history of space activity, as highlighted by the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe; I assure him that safety is at the heart of the Bill. I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
The nature of this work, certainly in the early stages, could be quite lumpy. In earlier discussions —at Second Reading, I think—the Minister talked about perhaps only 12 launches a year. There could be moments of great intensity of activity followed by no activity and therefore no income. How will the regulator maintain this level of expertise through what could be feast and famine during that process?
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, for her comments on Clause 15 and the role of the CAA. As we know, the aviation sector is facing many challenges at the moment, particularly with the introduction of new technologies such as drones and spaceflight, but I can reassure noble Lords that the CAA is in strong position to deal with those challenges.
As the noble Baroness has told us, the chief executive of the CAA has written to her confirming this and, as he explained in the letter, the CAA already has already established a dedicated space team. That team started in 2012 and since then has grown in size and experience, and has worked closely to develop the Space Industry Bill. The team is building on its aviation expertise in areas such as airports and airspace to develop the capability to regulate spaceports and suborbital activities.
The noble Baroness asked what international conversations the CAA might have had. It has established good working relationships with other countries. The UK Space Agency has been building on its relationship with the United States Federal Aviation Administration, drawing on the United States’ vast experience in overseeing flight operations.
The department provides sufficient resource to ensure sufficient delivery in this area. The moneys will vary depending on the nature of the work at different times— for example, on air space consideration or international comparisons—so I am not able to give a figure today. The noble Baroness asked about funding. The Civil Aviation Authority will eventually be able to recover its costs directly from industry. Until that point, the Department for Transport will continue to provide funding.
We are confident that the CAA will have the necessary resources and the appropriate expertise to regulate the new sector. I hope that the letter and my words give the noble Baroness the necessary reassurance regarding the capacity of the CAA to regulate the activities alongside its existing aviation functions. I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw Amendment 11.
May I ask a bit more about government Amendment 40 in relation to Crown dependencies and overseas territories? As I understand it, this is a fairly standard clause in Acts of Parliament, but perhaps the Minister can confirm whether that is so or it is something of a rarity.
My understanding of the Minister’s concluding comments is that a Crown dependency or overseas territory, if it wished, could seek to have a spaceport on its territory. However, would government Amendment 40 be activated, in the sense of seeking the Order in Council, by the British Government or could it be activated only if so requested by a UK Crown dependency or overseas territory itself, or could it indeed be activated at the request of a company or even another country? What would be the criteria for determining whether or not the provisions of the Act should be extended as provided for in government Amendment 40?
Would the provisions of the Act be so extended under the terms of government Amendment 40 if it was felt that it worsened the prospects of the development and expansion of the UK space industry in this country—even in Prestwick? If the provisions were so extended, could companies from any country in the world establish spaceflight facilities in a UK Crown dependency or overseas territory, or would it be restricted to British companies, at least as the lead company? Finally, could we have an assurance that extending the provisions of the Act to the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man or any British overseas territory would not give any companies, whether private or state-owned, any tax advantages, particularly in the form of lower tax, compared to the tax regime that would apply to a space industry company operating under the Act’s provisions in this country?
The noble Lord has stolen many of my lines. There seem to be a lot of loose ends here. I reiterate his question about how much of the Bill applies to a Crown dependency in the event that it builds a spaceport. Are we looking just at the right to do it, or are all the other provisions of the Bill in place in a Crown dependency situation? The point that the noble Lord made very well is: are we in danger of allowing people to set up low-cost competitors in an industry that we are hoping to run from the United Kingdom mainland?
I will try to answer as many of those questions as I can. Yes, this is a standard clause. It was not included originally because we wanted to conduct a consultation with Crown dependencies and overseas territories, which we completed over the summer. That is now done and we are including it as a government amendment.
On who can enact this, it would be done at the request of the Crown dependency or overseas territory, which would then be subject to all the legislation in the Act. But ultimately the creation of a spaceport is going to be a commercial decision, so the UK Government would not take an active role in deciding where it would be. Currently we are not aware of any Crown dependencies or overseas territories that wish to undertake this activity.
That money is available to people who are currently putting together a case to create a spaceport. As I said, there is currently no interest from overseas territories or Crown dependencies, so that money would not be used by them.
On the tax regime, I am afraid that I do not have the full answer. I will have to get back to the noble Lord.
My Lords, I once again associate myself fully with the comments that have just been made. I am still struggling with the “anything necessary” line. Having defended those words so spiritedly in Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, is now escaping. Are we looking at enforcement at an economic level or at a national security level? I suspect there are already the necessary powers, were this to be a national security issue. There are sufficient powers to act with sufficient speed, with or without judicial oversight, in the event that it was a national security emergency that needed to be dealt with quickly. Therefore, it seems that we are looking at a commercial emergency—such a thing exists—and on that basis it seems to me that the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, are entirely reasonable and we should not invest these draconian powers because we do not need to in dealing with that kind of issue.
I thank noble Lords for raising the question of emergency powers again. Since their interventions in Committee, we have been reflecting on this provision. I will do my best not to make all the same arguments that we made in Committee.
This amendment seeks to require that an enforcement authorisation issued by the Secretary of State is evaluated by a justice of the peace within 48 hours after the 48 hours that the authorisation has been in force. The enforcement authorisation issued under Clause 32 may be issued only under certain circumstances, which do not include a commercial emergency. They are: when there is an urgent case to act to protect national security; to ensure compliance with international obligations; or to protect people’s health and safety. The authorisation must be issued in writing to a named person and specify the action authorised to be taken. The authorisation itself will remain in force for 48 hours only. This reflects the urgent nature of the action considered necessary and requires it to be taken within a short period.
We referred to similar powers of other regulators in Committee, and we have tried to look across other legislation to ensure that we have the right balance here. Some of these powers are not subject to any review once they have been exercised. There is a precedent for this approach in the Consumer Rights Act 2015, which allows officers to enter premises without a warrant where it is suspected that there has been a breach of legislation, where giving notice would defeat the purpose of the entry, and where it is not practicable to give notice or where the entry is for the purpose of surveillance. The reasons for which an authorisation under Clause 32 may be issued are strictly related to emergency situations, and therefore are more restricted than the circumstances in the Consumer Rights Act. I should also clarify that improper use of the power by an appointed person under Clause 32 would be subject to judicial review, so it can be challenged if necessary.
The noble Lord, Lord Fox, brought to noble Lords’ attention the fact that warrants issued under the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 are subject to approval by a judicial commissioner within three working days of the warrant being issued. This is appropriate because these warrants remain in place for five days and relate to the sensitive practices of targeted interception, examination of the contents of communications and international assistance in such matters. This is not comparable to either the power under Clause 32 or the approach proposed by this amendment. Our advice from cross-Whitehall consultations is that there is no known precedent of a justice of the peace conducting an evaluation of an emergency power once it has been exercised.
We are also not clear what purpose evaluation by a justice of the peace would serve, as the order would be spent and the specified action taken by the time of the evaluation. It is also not clear what, if any, follow-up action would be available. I am afraid I cannot address the noble Lord’s concerns directly but we are continuing to reflect and will keep working with colleagues across Whitehall to ensure that we get a proportionate set of enforcement powers in the Bill, so that we can undertake spaceflight activities safely but also with regard to our national security and international obligations. I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
I thank my noble friend for his kind comments. I hope to continue in my role as a transport Minister in an unacrimonious way. I am afraid that is as far as I can go: that is my brief.
During Committee, I was given the chance to talk about the work that the UK Space Agency is doing to improve the current licensing regime. I apologise again if this is a case of Groundhog Day: I need to reiterate that as I am afraid we still do not believe that the noble Lord’s amendment is necessary. We outlined the “traffic light system” that the agency is working on and work that was being undertaken on a policy model for insurance for constellations of satellites following feedback that insuring each satellite for a set level of insurance is prohibitively expensive. We think that the traffic light system and the insurance requirements for small satellites and constellations will do the job and that the industry will welcome them. We are holding a workshop in December this year. Very shortly after that, the UKSA will plan the implementation of the policy framework around that. That work will obviously be relevant to the Bill as, when it comes into force, it will regulate the operation of all the satellites in orbit.
Amendment 18 seeks to make it a requirement that a report is laid before Parliament on any consultations, and to include within that report an indication of the regulations proposed. We still believe that the amendment is not necessary. Laying a report before Parliament would be a duplication. It is our intention, in line with the Government’s consultation principles document, to issue a government response to the formal consultations to take place in relation to this Bill. This will, of course, be accessible to everyone.
We expect that the approach to the insurance and licensing of nano satellites under this Bill will mostly be set out within the guidelines and not within regulations, as is the case under the Outer Space Act. This is to enable the development of the policy in line with changing circumstances. I would like to take a moment to explain how we envisage those regulations and guidance working. In Clause 37, the Bill provides the power to make regulations setting out that insurance may be required to cover certain risks and liabilities. The regulations can also set out what the insurance should cover, what may or may not be excluded from the cover and the amounts of cover required. Licences for spaceflight activities are bespoke in nature. Requiring a fixed amount of insurance for the operation of a satellite in orbit within regulations may remove the flexibility necessary to increase or reduce the insurance required, depending on the risks of each mission. It is therefore envisaged that the regulations may set out the methodology for calculating the amounts of insurance without containing specific figures. The regulations will set out those situations where insurance is required, what type of insurance is required and what should be covered within the policy.
Clause 12 and Schedule 1 allow the regulator to include a condition within each licence that sets out the minimum amount of insurance that is required for that licensed activity. We intend to include such conditions in licences for the operation of small satellites. The published guidance will set out the amount of insurance required in line with the regulations. Such guidance could include the insurance requirements for small satellites under the traffic light regime if the policy intention is to treat those in a certain way.
As I set out during the first day in Committee, the purpose of the guidance is to aid policy implementation by supplementing the legal framework. The main benefit of the guidance is the flexibility to amend quickly and take into account changing events. These are areas where guidance may need to be amended regularly and in a timely manner. In the meantime, the UKSA will continue to engage with industry and interested stakeholders. We are confident that we will publish the regulations in due course. I therefore ask the noble Lord to withdraw Amendment 18.
I thank the noble Baroness for her letter on the subject of traffic lights, which I was pleased to receive. On a point of clarity, does the UK Space Agency, the Health and Safety Executive or some other body classify the risk of the launch? Who decides whether it is red, green or amber?
It will be the regulator of the launch, dependent on whether it is suborbital or orbital, therefore either the CAA or the UKSA. However, they will use the same framework.
We have exhausted this debate to a great degree. I still feel a little nervous that people are being asked to commit to a future industry when they are not sure how their satellites will fit into the Government’s regime and what the cost level of that will be. Therefore, there needs to be more clarity—if not in the Bill then issued in the guidelines—so that operators can be assured that they have an industry that they can afford to support. With that hope, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(7 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is of course important that regulations are made within the scope of the delegated powers in the Bill and that they are subject to appropriate parliamentary scrutiny. We have thought very carefully about the delegated powers and the oversight of such powers in the Bill and, as my noble friend Lord Callanan mentioned, we have also taken on board a number of recommendations made by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. However, I note that some of the amendments we are debating here relate to recommendations by the committee that the Government have not accepted, or indeed have been raised by the Select Committee on the Constitution.
Amendment 44 relates to the broad regulation-making power for carrying a Bill into effect and seeks to remove it. I understand the intention behind the amendment and the concern that it may undercut judicial review in the event that the Secretary of State exceeds his or her delegated authority. I assure noble Lords that the Government do not believe there is any need for concern in this case. The scope in Clause 1(1) provides a limitation on the exercise of powers by the Secretary of State in making regulations. That will ensure that only regulations relating to the activities that are the subject matter of the Bill can be made by Ministers. If the Secretary of State were to exceed his or her delegated authority in making regulations under the clause, that ultra vires exercise of powers would be subject to judicial review.
In Committee last week, some concerns were raised about what “associated activities” were contemplated within the scope. These would cover only matters, such as the regulation of spaceports and the provision of range control services, that have a direct link to spaceflight activities. The purpose of the Bill covering associated activities is to provide for activities to be regulated only where there is no current applicable regulation or oversight, and where it is appropriate and necessary to regulate those activities.
The next set of amendments deal with changing the proposed initially affirmative and subsequently negative procedures to affirmative on all occasions. Noble Lords raised their concerns about this approach during our debate last week. I understand that this procedure could possibly be open to abuse. Noble Lords have argued that the Government may make the initial instruments skeletal and leave the detail to later instruments, thereby denying Parliament the opportunity to thoroughly examine the content of the instruments. I reassure noble Lords that this will not be the case. The Government are well aware that if that were to happen, the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments would be likely to report it as an unexpected use of powers.
The development of the first sets of regulation—including those on safety and security—will be subject to a rigorous stakeholder engagement process over the coming months. This will include a call for evidence that will give everyone, including noble Lords, the opportunity to input into the development of the instruments. The Government will then issue a full and wide-ranging consultation on each of the initial draft statutory instruments prior to their being laid. I assure noble Lords that if there were any material change to the original instruments, there would be further consultation. In light of these safeguards, we believe that the current procedure set out in the Bill provides appropriate and proportionate parliamentary oversight.
Moving on to Amendment 51, it is of course important that interested persons are made aware of proposed legislative changes which may affect them, no matter how minor the change. Although we welcome the spirit of the amendment, the Government believe that creating a statutory obligation to formally consult all listed bodies and persons on any proposed amendment is unnecessary. It is not appropriate to do this for all changes made through regulations—for example where minor, incidental, transitional or saving provisions are required.
However, if the intent behind the noble Lord’s amendment is to ensure that the Secretary of State is able to demonstrate that he is seeking the views of the parties that will be impacted by the changes, we can absolutely assure noble Lords that that will be the case. In line with existing practice under better regulation principles, the Government will continue to engage with regulators and other interested persons as appropriate, including the devolved Administrations, when contemplating making legislation affecting them. This will involve full consultation with a wide range of stakeholders where substantive changes to regulations that affect their interests are proposed.
My noble friend Lord Balfe mentioned trade unions. As I said, we intend to consult widely and publicly, which will of course include relevant trade unions. I hope that I have responded to noble Lords’ concerns. As I said on the previous group of amendments, we are listening to the concern raised from all parts of the House and will take it back and reflect ahead of Report, but I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her answers. Some of them may have been helpful—I will review them, probably with a lawyer sitting on my shoulder to help me—but not completely so, I suggest. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, has described the web of seemingly self-reinforcing executive powers, supported by another Henry VIII Act, weaving their way throughout the Bill. We will need to see what emerges: what the Government think that they have to leave in and what—we hope, having had this debate—they believe it would be more sensible to take out. We need to see that in full.
On the substance of Amendment 51, the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, was that an awful lot of parties have to be in line for this to work. In a sense, this has to be more co-operative than many other ventures that this House debates, and to be obviously co-operative and mandate the process in the Bill would be a positive sign to all the parties that have to say yes before it can be a success. I again ask the Minister to reconsider but, with that in mind, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(7 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Willetts, who is not in his place, for his comments in Monday’s debate about the need for flexibility for licensing constellations and the benefits of small satellites. I hope also to address the concerns of the noble Lord, Lord McNally, from that debate about the length of the licensing process and the insurance cost for smaller satellites—and, indeed, nano satellites.
This amendment gives me the chance to explain the work that the UK Space Agency is already doing to improve the current licensing regime under the Outer Space Act. This work is of course relevant to the Bill as, when it comes into force, it will regulate the operation of a satellite in orbit that is carried out from the UK.
The amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, would make it mandatory that, within 12 months of Royal Assent, the Secretary of State must issue a consultation. This consultation would explore a traffic light system to license the operation of small and nano satellites, with the potential to waive the in-orbit insurance requirement under certain circumstances for some small satellites fast-tracked under that system. Finally, it would also explore how insurance requirements could be aggregated for constellations of satellites.
The UK Space Agency already has this work in hand, and I shall take this opportunity to set out what it is doing in more detail—at some length, I fear. The agency conducted a review to evaluate how the UK’s regulatory approach might be tailored for the in-orbit operation of small satellite systems. The outcome of the review was a series of recommendations, and comments on these recommendations were invited from industry.
Feedback was also sought at the regulatory advisory group, which is a meeting co-chaired by the UK Space Agency with industry, where the small satellite community is represented. This review allowed the agency to develop the traffic light system which is currently being trialled ahead of full implementation in the near future. This system gives potential applicants of standard, small satellite operations an idea of the likely outcome of their licence application in advance of lodging a full application. It is a fairly simple system. A green rating will be given where a mission is likely to get a licence; an amber rating signals that a mission is likely to get a licence with some modifications or clarifications; and a red rating means that the potential applicant is unlikely to receive a licence.
For recurrent applications for very similar missions by the same operator, the questions an applicant will be required to answer will be streamlined. Where an applicant is engaging in a repeat mission, some answers will be reused by UKSA in order to minimise the administrative overhead to operators. We expect this to speed up the licensing process for these types of missions.
At this point I shall say a few words about the way in which constellations are licensed. A constellation can be launched under a single launch licence if all the satellites can go on a single launch vehicle. However, the activity of operating a satellite also needs to be licensed as the operator needs to be licensed to carry out the in-orbit operation of each satellite. This is to ensure that the regulator has effective regulatory oversight of each satellite within the constellation. That allows the regulator to direct the operator to take action in relation to each satellite without affecting any of the other satellites under the control of that operator. For example, if 100 satellites are to be launched over four launches, an operator would need to submit only four applications and will result in a licence being issued for each of those 100 satellites.
In addition to the satellite system, the UK Space Agency is considering whether, for certain green-rated missions, the insurance requirement can be reduced or even removed. This assessment will be dependent on a number of risk factors, including the satellites’ operating altitude and whether they are equipped with propulsion systems that allow them to avoid potential collisions with other space objects. Furthermore, the agency is already evaluating policy options to tailor insurance requirements for satellite fleets or constellations, which we discussed in the debate on Clause 3. The feedback from industry is that obtaining a set level of insurance cover for every satellite in a large constellation is prohibitively expensive. Such a requirement could also quickly exceed the capacity of the space insurance market.
We understand that we need a solution that is available and affordable but still offers government and the taxpayer protection by providing sufficient funds in the event of a claim. UKSA is currently developing a policy model which is likely to require operators of multiple satellites to hold a given level of insurance coverage for the damage caused to third parties through collisions—in other words insurance per event rather than per satellite.
Key stakeholders will be invited to comment on the Government’s proposed new policy model, which has been developed in response to the space sector’s innovative approach towards new business models and the development of smaller and more capable satellites, including the nano satellite mentioned by the noble Lord. These matters will be discussed at a workshop on the traffic light system and the insurance requirements for small satellites, constellations and fleets, which is expected to take place by the end of this financial year.
As work on both the traffic light regime for small satellites and nano satellites and insurance requirements for constellations and fleets is already well in hand and likely to be finalised within 12 months of the Bill receiving Royal Assent, this amendment is not necessary. While we appreciate the content of the amendment, the agency is already engaging with the industry and a mandatory consultation in this area would be a duplication of work. I therefore ask the noble Lord to withdraw Amendment 38.
I thank the noble Baroness for her comprehensive answer, and I will be studying it closely in Hansard as it is hard to take in on the fly. If she could write to me about the basic criteria used to flag green, red and amber, that would also be helpful, to give an idea of the parameters being used to make those judgments. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.