(13 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberI agree that it would be surprising if anyone did not want that peace to occur, but we have to accept that there are forces in that country, and even more in the diaspora, who do not want anyone to deal with the current Sri Lankan Government. My point is this: however much people may regret what the current Government have done or dislike them, unless we deal with that Government and get proper reconciliation, we will not be able to get peace in that island. [Interruption.] The hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) shouts “Foreign Office” from a sedentary position. The Foreign Office, through the Foreign Secretary, agreed that I should make that visit and, indeed, cleared the speech that I gave, as it believed that because of the contacts I had developed over time in Sri Lanka, I was in a good position to try to take the process forward. In respect of achieving peace, what matters is what works, rather than what is a departmentally strictly delineated process.
The Secretary of State has twice failed to respond to a specific question, so may I ask him for a third time? When was he made aware that first the permanent secretary and then the Chief of the Defence Staff were concerned about this relationship, what was the advice given to him, and what he did he do as a result of that advice?
As have I said, I was not aware of any direct approach from them. The first direct approach I can remember was when my current permanent secretary came to me in August and said that she had grave concerns about the use of a business card that had “adviser to the Secretary of State” printed on it. She asked what I was going to do about it, and I was able to reply to her that I had already, in June of that year, decided to stop those cards and demand that they not be used again.
(13 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe specific work on that is currently being done by Bernard Gray but, as I said in the statement, it is now important that we increase the length of tenure of many such posts, otherwise we are wasting talent. If the MOD were a private company, it would be number three in the FTSE. The idea of having the most senior people in the private sector stay for 18 months or two years, and then rotating them round because it is “good for their career experience” would not hold water in the private sector, and it no longer holds water in the MOD.
The Secretary of State started his statement by referring to our being in the premier league of military powers. In the view of the three chiefs of the services, we are currently not a full spectrum power. If these reforms are implemented, will we again be a full spectrum power, and if so, when?
I refute the idea that the United Kingdom is not among the leading defence powers in the world. We have the fourth biggest defence budget, and we have extraordinarily capable armed forces, which are among the most professional and best trained. If that does not put us in the premier league, I do not know what does.
(13 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberLegality has to be a foregone conclusion in this House if we are to take our appropriate place in the international family of civilised nations. As to the Government’s duty in sending our armed forces into combat, I would say that they have two clear duties: one is to ensure that we maximise the chance of success of their mission; the second is ensuring the minimum risk to them in carrying out that mission. Both those duties imply that the armed forces must be properly equipped for any task that any Government ever send them to carry out.
I particularly welcome the Secretary of State’s announcement about three cycles of IVF for the injured when they come back. He will know that that is virtually the first thing that the young men who return to the Queen Elizabeth hospital from Afghanistan will ask about. He also mentioned prosthetics. When it comes to rehabilitating soldiers, we are doing things with them—and doing them better—that are not yet happening in the NHS. What work is the Secretary of State doing to ensure that what we learn from the treatment of our veterans can be translated back to the NHS and the wider population?
The hon. Lady makes two valuable points. As regards the first, on IVF, it is bad enough that we often deny mobility and life chances to individuals, but to deny them the chance of producing another generation is worse, particularly when it is something that we can avoid. We should avoid it, and doing so sends out an important signal about the pastoral care that we are willing to give to our armed forces. Today’s announcement is a key one, which I think will be welcomed across the whole country.
On the hon. Lady’s second point, I think many of us will celebrate the fact that the care we give our armed forces is so much better than others might receive in the NHS that parity is being demanded. That is not a bad position for a country to be in, in terms of the care it gives to service people. The work we are undertaking with the Department of Health will set out to see what lessons the NHS can learn from the treatment of those who have been injured in military action and I believe that that is a very proud moment for the country.
(13 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberUrgent Questions are proposed each morning by backbench MPs, and up to two may be selected each day by the Speaker. Chosen Urgent Questions are announced 30 minutes before Parliament sits each day.
Each Urgent Question requires a Government Minister to give a response on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
That is the tide of history, and nothing I could say or do would change it. However, I reiterate to my hon. and learned Friend that we must go through the proper processes where redundancies are concerned. We must stick to the timetables concerned, because that is part of our duty of care to the men and women who serve in our armed forces. We cannot have arbitrary dates set to suit a political timetable, at the expense of our armed forces. That would be quite wrong.
I understood from yesterday’s statement that 170 RAF trainee pilots would not be retained. In his response to my hon. Friend the Member for Barrow and Furness (John Woodcock), the Secretary of State seemed to imply that they would be redeployed in the RAF. Can he confirm whether we are talking about cuts, with those pilots leaving the RAF, or whether they will be used for something else?
I am grateful to the hon. Lady. The reductions are a consequence of reducing the number of aircraft in the RAF, so there is also a reduction in the number of pilots needed, and therefore a reduction in the number of pilots in training. If alternative employment within the RAF can be found for those individuals, we will attempt to provide it.
(13 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberNo, I am not satisfied, and therefore the Government will constantly be urging our NATO partners to do more. However, it is worth saying that some of the smaller nations contribute disproportionately. In particular, given the difficulties that we face in Helmand, I am sure that the House would like to pay tribute to our Danish and Estonian colleagues, who have done such a wonderful job. In general terms, the message for the rest of NATO is that we all need to act together—and in together and out together.
Has the Secretary of State made any assessment of what he thinks the UK force representation in Afghanistan will be post-2015?
That is necessarily dependent on the security position in Afghanistan, especially as regards the quality—discussed in an earlier question—of the Afghan security forces, but I think it would be reasonable to expect the UK to be in Afghanistan in a training and support role for some time after 2015 to ensure that the legacy we hand over to the Afghan Government is maintained because, in the longer term, that regional stability is important for our safety here in the UK.
Further to the Secretary of State’s earlier statement that there will still be British troops in Afghanistan post-2015, will he confirm whether Afghan national security forces or someone else will be responsible for their security?
It is very clear that the aim is to have the threat degraded and the capability of the Afghan national security forces increased, so that they can take control of their own security. Some assistance with training and support may be required, but it is very clear—President Karzai has repeatedly made it clear—that it is the wish of the sovereign Government of Afghanistan that they take control of their own security by the end of 2014.
(14 years ago)
Commons ChamberI am not sure that I accept the basic premise that it is an either/or situation. We have to deal with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Even if we deal with them effectively, that does not mean that there will not be a terrorist threat from elsewhere. We need to be ever vigilant and to recognise that the problem of dealing with an ideology is that it can occur in any part of the globe. We also need to be aware that it is most likely to be present and to have effect where there are failed states.
I believe that proper joined-up government that is willing to consider how we support failing states and how we get improved governance, resources and development into those countries is one of the best ways of ensuring that the ideology never takes root. It is true in whatever dispute we are talking about that people who have nothing to lose may gamble with it, whereas people who have a stake are far more likely to be circumspect about what happens. That is one of the best ways to deny territory to those with that sort of fanatical ideology.
I agree with the Secretary of State’s assessment of Afghanistan and that there is a united House. However, could he enlighten the House by telling us at what stage the Prime Minister consulted him on the withdrawal date of 2015?
We have so many ongoing discussions, not just inside the Government but, as the hon. Lady knows, with our NATO partners and with our American partners. It is essential that when we set these dates we are also cognisant of what the Afghan Government want. The Afghan Government have for some time—as the previous Government fully understood—had the ambition to manage entirely their own security apparatus by the end of 2014. The approach that has been taken by this Government and more widely in NATO has been to ask how we tie our timetables in with the ambitions of the Afghans. It is perfectly reasonable. As the NATO summit in a couple of weeks’ time will show, it is increasingly the view of NATO that we should transition out of a combat role and allow the Afghan Government to have control by the end of 2014, but that we should maintain the resources required to give them support. For example, whether the Afghans will be able to develop any sort of meaningful air wing according to their timetable of 2014 is something that we must consider.
I have absolutely no problem in agreeing with my hon. Friend about the importance of continuous at-sea deterrence. Let me make two simple points about that. First, having a continuous at-sea deterrent has a diplomatic utility. It means that because it is a background and consistent deterrent, we do not have the problem of choosing when to deploy it at a time of rising tension, which could exacerbate a difficult situation. Secondly, if we do not have continuous at-sea deterrence, we have to decide at what point we are physically going to put the deterrent to sea. That may require our having additional military assets effectively to fight it out to sea if required. Those who think that taking risks with continuous at-sea deterrence because it is a cheap option economically might need to think again in the light of what I have said.
The adaptable posture required by the NSC also means that we will be investing in new technology and capabilities more suited to the likely character of future conflict, such as cyber-security, while reducing our stockholdings and capabilities that have less utility in the post-cold war world, such as heavy armour and non-precision artillery. We will, however, maintain the ability to regenerate capabilities that are not needed now if threats change. Capabilities that we have the option of regenerating include increased amphibious capability as well as heavy armour and artillery in the event that more is required. We have taken less risk against those capabilities that are more difficult to regenerate, such as submarines, to take the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Halesowen and Rowley Regis (James Morris).
Alliances and partnerships remain a fundamental part of our approach. In taking decisions in the SDSR, we have given significant weight to the fact that we and our NATO allies consciously rely on each other for particular capabilities. Sometimes even our biggest allies do that. I think, for example, of the United States and the British mine-hunting capabilities in the Gulf.
Our biggest ally always retains certain sovereign capabilities. What would be the Secretary of State’s thinking and planning on which of our sovereign capabilities we need to maintain as opposed to where we just share?
If the hon. Lady will forgive me, I shall deal later with our thinking about what the United Kingdom needs to be able to do itself and in what circumstances.
We rely on our allies, and we will deepen our multilateral and bilateral defence relationships. This week, we set out our deepened relationship with France. On Wednesday, as I intimated to the House the other day, I will have a meeting with the new British-Scandinavian NATO group. That is very important for a number of reasons. We want a closer bilateral relationship with Norway, which is one of our key strategic partners. We want to create a NATO framework that makes it easier for Sweden and Finland to have a closer relationship, and as a nuclear power we want to give even greater reassurance to the Baltic states about the reality of article 5 of the NATO treaty. We also want to create regional structures to make it easier to engage with Russia, where we can, on regional problem solving. It is a useful lesson for the UK that in a world in which there is a multi-polar power base, we need more different levers to act in the interests of our national security.
The UK has unique national interests, however, and we cannot always expect to depend on our partners when Britain’s direct national interests are threatened. I wish to make it clear that we will maintain an autonomous capability to sustain a considerable and capable military force on an enduring basis, if required, for both intervention and stabilisation operations. That means, at best effort, a one-off intervention force of some 30,000, including maritime and air support, or a force of some 6,500 plus enablers for enduring operations. That is not hugely dissimilar to the level of effort in Afghanistan today.
As delivering effective defence capability in the 21st century becomes more expensive at a time when budgets are under growing pressure, we should exploit economies of scale and increase co-operation where national security allows it and sovereign capability is not jeopardised. That means exploring deeper co-operation with NATO members, as demonstrated with France this week, and with partners further afield in key regions around the world.
I wish to set out the future shape of our armed forces and the process by which we have made our decisions. I will then deal with specific issues, particularly those on which we have taken calculated risks with capability.
The SDSR is a point of departure, not the end of the line. We have set a path to 2020 and beyond, with regular reviews every five years. The first period, from 2010 to 2015, is necessarily a period of rebalancing our strategic direction, in the light of the factors that I outlined earlier. That is required to tackle the unfunded liability in the defence programme, to live within our means as the deficit is addressed and to focus our efforts on Afghanistan. Overall, the resources allocated for the spending review period will allow us to pursue today’s operations and prepare for tomorrow, but that means scaling back the overall size of the armed forces.
To make those judgments, we have contrasted cost savings and capability implications with the risks that we face in the real global security environment and our ability to reconstitute or regenerate capabilities that we might need in future. We have taken the tough decisions that the previous Government ducked. The Prime Minister has set out to Parliament in his statement and in the White Paper the implications for the structure and establishment of the armed forces, and I will not tax the patience of the House or yourself, Madam Deputy Speaker, by repeating each of them here. I will, though, address specific issues later.
There are still difficult decisions to be taken for the coming period as we implement the SDSR, including the basing decisions mentioned by the hon. Member for Moray (Angus Robertson), who is no longer in his place, and the rationalisation of the defence estate. As the hon. Member for Bridgend (Mrs Moon) said, we will also have the issue of allowances to deal with in the coming months. I can assure the House that we will take those decisions as quickly as possible, to minimise uncertainty, but in a way that is sensitive to economic and social pressures and the needs of our people and their families. In addition, three further reviews are being undertaken to bring other areas of defence into line with the new force structure.
(14 years ago)
Commons ChamberUrgent Questions are proposed each morning by backbench MPs, and up to two may be selected each day by the Speaker. Chosen Urgent Questions are announced 30 minutes before Parliament sits each day.
Each Urgent Question requires a Government Minister to give a response on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Do the treaties specify in what language the two sovereign nations will communicate when they work together?
An element of some of the coverage today has been to ask what the language of war will be. In the last few years, we have had commanders of the international security assistance force in Afghanistan from Turkey, Germany, Canada, France and Italy, as well as the UK and the US, and we had no linguistic problem.
(14 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberI think it is good counsel for the BBC and the media generally, and for Members of the House, that we use reasonable language and are balanced in our views when discussing this issue. We have a large number of serving men and women in Afghanistan, and they will listen to what we say and to what the media say. That is also true of those who are our enemies in that part of the world. Clarity and honesty would be two very useful tools. I also think, however, that we need to use information. For that reason, I have asked a group of our national newspaper editors to come to the MOD in the near future for a detailed briefing, simply in order that they can understand the facts on the ground and get them first hand from the military, so that there is no excuse for misreporting the facts in future.
Can the Secretary of State update us on the progress that has been made in recruiting to the Afghan national police force, which is just as important as the army?
Good progress has been made on the number of Afghan national police, but to be frank with the hon. Lady, that is not really my concern. My concern is the quality of the recruits to the Afghan national police, and what we need to do is not to have them recruited and then trained, but trained and then put in place. That is a vital mission for the whole of the international coalition. The issue was widely discussed at the NATO ministerial meeting at a number of different levels, and I think there is growing acceptance that providing policing and law and order, not at a Supreme Court level but in terms of dispute resolution and effective policing at the very lowest level, is one of the ways to deny the political and social space that the Taliban will otherwise occupy.
(14 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberI have given way a number of times and I shall give way again later.
I believe that at the beginning of this debate it is vital and useful to go back to first principles and remind ourselves about the purpose of defence. It bears repeating that the first duty of a Government is to provide security for our citizens. Although many arms of government are directed towards or contribute to that aim, the armed forces are central to the effort. Of course, our armed forces can do many things for the promotion of our national interest and to support Government policy more widely. But we must not lose sight of their primary mission—to maintain the capability to apply military force, when needed, so that political decision makers have the widest possible range of choices when making strategic decisions.
That has two aspects. First, our armed forces protect our citizens and territory by deterring and containing threats, preventing possibilities from becoming actualities. The nuclear deterrent is, of course, fundamental to our ability to deter the most extreme threats to the United Kingdom. As I just said in response to the hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn), in 2007 the Conservative party in opposition supported the decision to renew the Trident system based on the analysis set out in the 2006 White Paper, and we remain committed to continuous at-sea deterrence.
As the coalition agreement has made clear, we are scrutinising the Trident renewal programme to ensure that we get value for money, and my Liberal Democrat colleagues will continue to make the case for alternatives. However, we underestimate the value of deterrence at our peril and we do ourselves a disservice if we merely confine the concept to nuclear weapons. We know from historical experience that a declaration of peaceful intent is not sufficient to dissuade aggressors and that a weakening of national defences can encourage them. All our forces, including conventional forces, have a powerful deterrent effect, which we should seek to maximise. Recently, we have not recognised that as much as we should have. I want the SDSR to change that—to take a fresh look at what we are doing to dissuade aggression and at how we might do it better.
I happen to agree with the Secretary of State’s stance on nuclear weapons and Trident. Will he say a little more about the extent to which he regards Trident to be, as well as a deterrent, part of our obligations as a permanent member of the Security Council—as one of the P5, at the top table?
It is not an obligation, but I certainly think that it adds credibility to our position as a member of P5. As I have said, our position on nuclear weapons is that in a dangerous world, when we are looking to 2050 or beyond, we cannot play fast and loose with Britain’s defences. We do not know what threats will emerge or what will happen in terms of future proliferation, and we are simply not willing to take a gamble.